| Olof Petersson A European Agenda for Democratic Reform The Swedish Presidency of the European Union
1. The program for Sweden's presidency leaves no doubt that enlargement is the number one priority. Other major tasks mentioned in the program are employment and environment. The agenda set by the Swedish government is also interesting as to what issues are left out or given lower priority. Toward the very end of the program the government argues in brief and general terms for "an open, modern and effective union". But else one is struck by the absence of an active plea for institutional reform Silence is often an implicit argument for status quo, and there is no doubt the Swedish government is skeptical to the ideas of a constitutional, federal framework for the European Union.
2. If coherence is taken as a criterion for political action the Swedish government could be questioned on several grounds. It is surprising that the top priority given to enlargement is not coupled with a fervent argument in favor of institutional reform. The Nice summit only ended in necessary, but not sufficient reforms. A union with 27 or 30 member states will require different institutional mechanisms than the intergovernmental model preferred by the Swedish government. It also worth noticing the inherent contradiction between intergovernmentalism and transparency. The Swedish government argues in favor for the classical method of secret diplomacy and informal contacts between prime ministers. However, openness and democracy can only be achieved by decision-making mechanisms other than pure intergovernmentalism. More than one observer have noted with surprise that the representative of a small country speaks in favor of the intergovernmental model so praised by large countries and turns against the institutions which originally were designed to give a stronger voice to smaller countries.
3. With the expansion of the European Union in terms of members, scope and strength, there are now strong arguments for a comprehensive constitutional reform aiming at a clear and accountable system. One could argue that treaties and community law already form a de facto constitution. One important task would be to rewrite the existing rules into a single, constitutional document, a basic treaty. One possibility is to constitutionalize the treaties without changing their material contents. However, in the view of the last year’s events, this option is less likely now. Joschka Fischer’s speech opened the discussion for a far-reaching reform of the decision-making structure. One of the important points of his speech was that European federalism does not have to mean the death of the nation-state. Strong and democratically accountable institutions at the supranational level could very well be combined with viable democratic structures in the national arena, as well as at the regional and local levels. Modern democracy has to be based on multi-level governance. The task set in Nice to address the question "how to establish and monitor a more precise delimitation of powers between the European Union and the Member States, reflecting the principle of subsidiarity" is long overdue.
4. The democratic aspects have always played a prominent role in the debate on Europe in Sweden. Despite the polarization on the issue of whether Sweden should be a member of the EU, there is a broad consensus on certain fundamental issues. Transparency, equality and popular support are the values cherished by all political camps. The debate has highlighted the conflict between the egalitarian foundations of Swedish political culture and the more elitist and hierarchical traditions which characterize a number of other European countries. One of the undercurrents in Swedish debate is an anxiety that Sweden will have to renounce the fundamental requirements of democracy, in which case our membership in the EU would result in a loss of democracy. The criticism of the shortcomings of the EU-project in terms of popular legitimacy has had an especially powerful impact in Sweden. There is some discussion in Sweden on the future of Europe, but it would not be very fair to say that it is a lively public debate. Even though the situation may be not that different from other member states, there are some specific reasons why public opinion and political decision-makers in Sweden hesitate to discuss constitutional issues. To understand this silence one has to go back in Swedish history. A comparison between Swedish history and the development of our European neighbors reveals certain characteristics of our country. Several important factors which have determined the fate of European countries are missing or only weakly present in the Swedish case. Sweden never had a strong feudal structure and the periods of absolute monarchy were only brief. Federalism never developed; the regions of Sweden are still relatively weak. Cities were small and insignificant until very late in history; urban and liberal influences were consequently weak and appeared late. Sweden has not experienced revolutions or civil war. For almost two centuries we have been spared the horrors of war and no foreign occupation has left scars in the public mind. Mass democracy was introduced in Sweden without revolutions or other traumatic breaks with the past. Popular government was introduced within the framework of old institutions. What was once praised as the Swedish model of political decision-making was a system of government based on corporatist participation of interest groups, bargaining, pragmatism, and consensus. Although the Swedish model has been weakened, some of these traits continue to leave their mark on Swedish politics. Today the evaluation is not as positive as it was a few decades ago. Corporatism turned out to be a rigid procedure, and a fair-weather product suitable for a period of economic growth and public sector expansion. Bargaining and pragmatism ("everything is negotiable") are in some sense the opposite to accountable and constitutional government. I fear that the Swedish government is now trying to push the old Swedish model onto the new European Union. But the bargaining system of intergovernmental decision-making, the open method of coordination, will not be enough to meet the demands of transparency and legitimacy. The quest for open and accountable government will, in my view, sooner or later force us to develop a constitution, a basic treaty, for Europe. With our traditions of local government, public participation, equal rights, gender equality, freedom of information and unbureaucratic administration, Sweden is in a position to make an important contribution to the European debate.
5. This seminar is part of the process of developing practical methods for how the debate on the future of Europe can be organized. The European agenda for democratic reform will be set this year during the Swedish and Belgian presidencies. The Nice decision called for "a deeper and wider debate about the future of the European Union". There are different ideas about how to promote the public debate on European democracy. Let me conclude by mentioning three proposals.
* An early referendum My colleague Philippe Schmitter at the European University Institute has suggested an initial referendum. The European citizens would be asked the following question. "Should the deputies chosen on … (not the present but the forthcoming) election to the European Parliament form a constituent assembly to draft a democratic constitution for the European Union? Choose one from the three alternatives below: [ ] No, the existing institutions of the EU should only be modified by treaties that have been negotiated and ratified unanimously by its sovereign member states. [ ] Yes, but the constituent assembly should devote its primary effort to limiting the powers of the EU and to ensuring the continued sovereignty of its member states. [ ] Yes, and the constituent assembly should produce a draft designed to make the institutions of the EU capable of acting effectively in the interests of Europe as a whole, even if that means reducing the sovereignty of its member states." Such a referendum would set the agenda and focus the public discussion on the central issues.
* Citizen panels as constitutional conventions Local and national citizen panels have been used as an instrument to test the ideas of deliberative democracy. A rather small, representative group of citizens would be given the opportunity to gather over a weekend, meet with experts and politicians and engage in a discussion to see whether it is possible to reach an agreement. Citizen panels show that political preferences are not fixed. People change their opinions after being confronted with new facts and different arguments. A European citizen panel would be cross-national and also include representatives also from candidate countries. One could also imagine parallel panels that represent different groups, for instance a group of constitutional experts. Another method would be a virtual panel, a transnational constitutional convention meeting in cyberspace. This would be one way of promoting a truly European public sphere.
* No IGC before 2004 My final proposal perhaps sounds negative, but it is in fact very constructive. No IGC before 2004. The failures of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice show that constitutional issues are too important to be left to ministers and ambassadors. IGCs are like black holes: they draw all energy and emit no light. The stage should be left to other actors. The convention that prepared the Charter is one example of an alternative model. Governments should limit themselves to the final decision-making and intervene as late as possible in the constitutional process.
References Schmitter, Philippe C. 2000. "An excursus on
constitutionalism", The Institute of Europas Studies, The Queens University of
Belfast. Teorell, Jan 2001. Kan folkviljan förfinas? Om medborgarpaneler och
samtalsdemokrati.
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