


Citizen Power

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1. The Meaning of Citizenship

From subject to citizen

What the concept of citizenship has meant to political life can only be compared with the significance of the industrial revolution to economic life and the Age of Enlightenment to the life of the mind.

The idea of citizenship marked a revolutionary innovation in the relationship between the individual and society. All societies had previously been based on the principle of inequality. People were born unequal and lived unequally. Rights and obligations were determined by class membership, privileges and kinship. Some were condemned to remain slaves or subjects. Changing one's position in society not only involved practical difficulties, but was often theoretically impossible. The life chances of an individual were constrained by barriers of hopelessness.

In contrast, citizenship is based on the principle that people are of equal value and enjoy equal rights. Every citizen is ensured the same opportunities to share in social change. All individuals are full-fledged members of society.¹

1. The historical progression "from subject to citizen" employed here makes no claim to originality. At least two books written in Swedish bear this title: Anders Björnsson, ed., *Från undersåte till medborgare: Om svenska folkets demokratiska traditioner* (From Subject to Citizen: On the Democratic Traditions of the Swedish People), Ordfront, Stockholm, 1981, and Walter Korpi, *Från undersåte till medborgare: Om fonder och ekonomisk demokrati* (From Subject to Citizen: On Employee Investment Funds and Economic Democracy), Tiden, Stockholm, 1982.

It has frequently taken a long time to move from general ideas to actual realities. The evolution from a society based on privilege to one based on civil equality has often been slow, gradual and replete with conflicts. In a famous essay, British sociologist T.H. Marshall described the meaning of citizenship.² Marshall had a dual purpose. He systemized various aspects of citizenship but also sketched a historical process. The concept of citizenship has three elements, Marshall wrote: civil, political and social.

The civil part consists of those rights that are necessary in order to protect personal freedom. The main ones are protection of life and property, freedom of speech, freedom of thought and religion, the right to make agreements freely plus legal rights. The most important of all principles included in the civil part of citizenship is equality before the law. This means that the way the court system functions is crucial. No one should enjoy special treatment based on origin, social position or sex. Justice wears a blindfold.

The political aspect of citizenship means equal rights to participate in the exercise of political power. No one should be excluded from the opportunity to hold political office. The right to choose representatives should rest with all citizens. The fundamental principle of political citizenship is one man -- one vote. This requires a democratization of political institutions. Step by step, the lower class gained access to the political

2. T.H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class" in *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development*, University of Chicago Press, 1964, pp. 71-74. The text was originally a lecture held in 1949. For an interpretation and further refinement of Marshall's concept, see Sverker Gustafsson, "Medborgarskapets innehåll" ("The Contents of Citizenship"), lecture at the annual meeting of the Royal Society of Arts and Sciences of Uppsala, October 8, 1983.

decision-making process. This historical process included freedom of association, universal suffrage and the secret ballot.³

The social aspect of citizenship means that the individual is assured of a social welfare safety net. All citizens should be entitled to live a civilized life in keeping with the standards prevailing in their society. The individual is entitled to share the cultural heritage of this society. The principle is well-being for everyone. Specialized institutions are established in order to provide citizens with education and social benefits.

It is a historical fact that these various aspects of citizenship did not become a reality at the same time. In fact -- and this is Marshall's main point -- the three elements took shape in a definite chronological order. Although Marshall himself admitted that the three stages overlapped to some extent, in devising his historical timetable he still went so far as to assign each of the three aspects of citizenship its own century. Civil rights were the 18th century's contribution. During the 19th century there was a democratization of political institutions through parliamentarism and universal suffrage. The third stage, the 20th century, is characterized by the huge expansion of the welfare state.⁴

3. See the chapter entitled "The Extension of Citizenship to the Lower Classes" in Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977, pp. 89-126. This chapter was written in collaboration with Norwegian sociologist Stein Rokkan. Rokkan has also dealt with nation-building and the democratization process in a number of other works, for example *Citizens, Elections, Parties*, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1970, and *Stat, nasjon, klasse* (State, Nation, Class), Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1987.

4. Marshall, pp. 81 ff.

As a rough stylization, this timetable captures the main features of historical change. The model nevertheless fits some countries better than others. Both Marshall himself and his commentators have pointed out that his quick historical outline was inspired mainly by Britain.⁵ A country like Germany shows special features that do not fit the timetable. The principle of equality before the law did not make its full breakthrough until well into the 20th century. The German legal system lacked the liberal, democratic features characteristic of Britain. German social welfare reforms were an expression of Bismarck's state socialism rather than of the principle of civil rights. It has been argued that the very fact that German modernization did not follow the same slow, gradual, comparatively harmonious evolution as in Britain is an important explanation for the problems experienced by German society during the 20th century.⁶

The image of three successive stages is suggestive. It is therefore hardly surprising that others present ideas about the evolution of citizenship very similar to Marshall's. A slightly different version can be found in Swedish Social Democratic writings, for instance. Here, history begins not with civil but with political rights. The second stage consists of social democracy, the third of economic democracy. What the two models have in common is that the third stage take place in the present day. To be in a pact with history and simultaneously be able to employ such a magical trinity are effective elements of a political ideology.

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5. Marshall, p. 91. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Introduction" in Marshall, 1964, p. ix.
 6. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland*, 5th edition, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, Munich, 1977, pp. 74 ff.

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The question of whether this three-stage timetable provides a historically correct description of actual developments is not crucial in this context, however. The important point is that defining the various dimensions of the citizenship concept focuses attention on one important common denominator, the principle of equality. Citizenship is synonymous with the position enjoyed by a full-fledged member of a community. Everyone is equal with regard to the rights and duties associated with membership. There is no universal principle that determines exactly what these rights and duties should be, but the idea of citizenship creates an image of an ideal citizenship. This ideal can serve as a yardstick to determine how far the idea of citizenship has been realized in a given society.⁷

The Concept of Citizenship

Like most central terms in the social sciences, "citizenship" also has a somewhat variable meaning. There are three main definitions. For the sake of clarity, it is important to specify the differences between these usages.

Citizenship as a concept of international law

Being a Swedish citizen has an exact meaning in jurisprudence and international law. As in most other European countries, the right to citizenship in Sweden is based on the principle of origin. The citizenship of the parents determines the citizenship of the child. In other countries, such as the United States, the territorial principle applies: a person becomes a citizen of the country where he or she is born.

7. Marshall, p. 92.

The legal role of citizenship is, not least, to provide protection against exile and against the actions of a foreign state while visiting there. In addition, the right to participate in the country's parliamentary elections is considered part of the meaning of citizenship. Citizenship also carries the obligation to perform military service in the country of citizenship.⁸

Because of immigration, Sweden's population has become increasingly multicultural and multilingual. More and more Swedish citizens have non-Swedish ethnic origins. In other words, Swedish citizenship is not the same as Swedishness or Swedish nationality in the ethnic sense.⁹

Citizenship as universal rights

The concept of citizenship referred to in this chapter goes beyond the strictly legal meaning to a broader sociological and historical context. Citizenship can be viewed here as a bundle of rights and obligations. The principle of equal rights is expressed with universal validity. The rights that constitute citizenship are valid for all members of a community governed by law. It is a historical fact that modern citizenship has emerged within the constraints of the nation state. Citizenship is based on membership in a nation. This universalism replaced previous loyalties to limited guilds, groups and corporate bodies.

8. Rösträtt och medborgarskap (Suffrage and Citizenship), SOU 1984:11, p. 117. Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU) is a series of reports by official Swedish commissions of inquiry.

9. Ibid., p. 144.

Obviously there is a definite association between the two first-mentioned types of citizenship: citizenship in the legal sense enables an individual to enjoy those rights that constitute sociological citizenship. But the link between these two types of citizenship is not complete. Foreign citizens domiciled in another country may also enjoy civil, political and social citizenship to a greater or lesser extent. In Sweden today, there are only a few remaining distinctions between the legal positions of domiciled foreign and Swedish citizens.¹⁰ The aim of the government's immigrant and minority policy is to remove such differences.¹¹ One basic principle is that immigrants accepted as residents of Sweden should be guaranteed the same living standard as the native-born population. Most of the freedoms and rights specified in the Swedish Constitution also apply to resident foreigners.¹² The chief exceptions are the statutes on protection against exile and the right to move about freely within the country. In Swedish, there is no real word for this category of foreign citizen domiciled in Sweden and enjoying practically all the rights of citizenship. English has the term "denizen" (in the sense of "one admitted to residence in a foreign country, esp. an alien admitted by favor to all or a part of the rights of citizenship," to quote Webster's Third New International Dictionary, not in the more common, pejorative sense of the word. -Tr.)¹³

10. For a review of such differences, see for example SOU 1984:11, pp. 118 ff and the reports of the Commission on Ethnic Discrimination.

11. Government Bill 1975:26, p. 78.

12. Instrument of Government, Chapter 2, Article 20. See Erik Holmberg and Nils Stjernquist, *Grundlagarna med tillhörande författningar* (The Swedish Constitution and Related Laws), Norstedts, Stockholm, 1980, pp. 138 ff.

"Segmented citizenship"

The concept of citizenship has been one of the most successful ideas in contemporary societies. As West German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf once acidly commented: Once the seed of citizenship has been sown in a society, it will grow like ivy, not to say like a weed, until it covers as many citizens as possible and as large a part of their lives as possible. The idea of citizenship, the general right of participation on equal terms, consumes other, more differentiated social roles.¹⁴

Along with the broadening of the universal concept of citizenship, there has been a strong increase in the role of the public sector as a supplier of norms for limited portions of society. These regulations apply to specific categories or segments of the population and confer special rights and obligations. To distinguish this type of rules from the rights underlying the general concept of citizenship, Gudmund Hernes, a researcher for the Study of Power and Democracy in Norway -- a forerunner of the corresponding Swedish commission of inquiry -- has suggested the concept of segmented citizenship.¹⁵ There are three main motives behind the evolution of segmented citizenship: protecting particular categories of people, protecting the business sector and protecting "clients." Unlike the universalistic concept of citizenship, which encompasses all citizens, segmented citizenship is particularistic, in that it only encompasses a limited category of citizens.¹⁶ Yet it is a

14. Ralf Dahrendorf, "Citizenship and Beyond: The Social Dynamics of an Idea," *Social Research*, 41, 1974, p. 680.

15. Gudmund Hernes, "Samfunnsendring og politiske ressurser: Statsborgerskap och partsborgerskap" (Social Changes and Political Resources: Citizenship and Segmented Citizenship) in NOU 1980:7, p. 25 ff. The abbreviation NOU refers to the reports of Norwegian official commissions of inquiry.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

variation on the general concept of citizenship. Segmented citizenship, to return to Marshall's concept, also has three components. The legal aspect means that it is based on rights and relationships of responsibility fixed by law. The political element of segmented citizenship may be exemplified by the practice of giving representatives of a special interest group seats on commissions of inquiry, boards of government agencies or other public bodies. The social aspect of segmented citizenship is demonstrated by the existence of special rights and benefits for specific categories of citizens.¹⁷

Membership in a category that entitles a person to segmented citizenship may be based on different criteria: profession, age, social situation etc. A very brief sample of kinds of segmented citizenship can be found in the index of a Swedish handbook on social rights and benefits:¹⁸ abortion seekers, adoptive parents, stock market investors, alcoholics, allergy sufferers, employees, legally responsible publishers, employers, the unemployed, heirs, installment-plan buyers, dismissed employees, residents, creditors, those saving money to buy homes, boat operators, family child care providers, those listed in databases, tax return filers, demonstrators, beneficiaries of an estate, survivors, power consumers, pupils, emigrants, energy savers, union members, real estate agents, vacation workers, fish farmers, foster children, individuals exempted from military service, business owners, parents, participants in group excursions, debtors, visiting students, the disabled, pupils entitled to immigrant language instruction, home helpers, tenants, inmates, immigrants, holders of hunting rights, consumers, convalescents, locked-out employees, borrowers, wage earners, drug abusers, patients, retirees, laid-off employees, Swedes living abroad, the mentally retarded, deportees, legal

17. Ibid., p. 29

18. Samhällsguiden (Social Services Guide), 4th edition, Liber/Allmänna Förlaget, Stockholm, 1986. (In the original Swedish, the categories are listed in alphabetical order.-Tr)

guardians, military conscripts, appellants and probation officers.

In older political theory, citizenship was linked to the public sphere. As more and more aspects of people's lives have become the object of institutionalized rights based on the model of the citizenship concept, the strict division between public and private in this respect has become blurred. According to the old approach, for example, it would have been self-contradictory to view the role of the consumer as an aspect of citizenship. Being a consumer is behaving as a buyer in a market. Being a citizen is participating in public, political life. But in today's society, the ability to pay is not the only thing that determines the strength of the consumer. Such public efforts as legislation, municipal services, central government agencies, ombudsmen and courts of law institutionalize people's rights in order to strengthen the position of the consumer.¹⁹

Three Fundamental Principles

The step from general principle to actual implementation has thus followed somewhat different historical paths, resulting in national variations. It is not possible to find one single fixed, sharply delimited definition of exactly what the concept of citizenship includes. Civil rights and obligations vary both over time and space.²⁰

19. A generation ago, the existence of state institutions to protect consumer interests was singled out as something characteristically Swedish. Andrew Shonfield, *Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power*, Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 205 and 390.

20. Morris Janowitz, "Observations on the Sociology of Citizenship: Obligations and Rights," *Social Forces*, 59, 1980, pp. 1-24.

But in spite of everything, the various definitions of the citizenship concept have a common core. To be a citizen is to enjoy equal opportunities to join with others and participate in shaping one's own society.²¹ Citizenship can thus be described as based on three fundamental principles, namely the three proud watchwords that guided the French Revolution: liberty, equality and fraternity.

Liberty

The human ideal behind the concept of citizenship is the autonomous person. In this context, autonomy means self-determination. Autonomy can refer both to individuals and groups of individuals. Its opposite, heteronomy, means that the rules applicable to a person or a group have not been established by that person or group itself, but by some outside authority. Autonomy is thus the same as the opportunity to choose for oneself, to enjoy freedom of choice.²²

Individual freedoms and rights are a crucial element of citizenship. One example of the structure of a fundamental civil

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21. Dennis F. Thompson, *The Democratic Citizen: Social Science and Democratic Theory in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970.
 23. It would take too long here to examine the extensive debate on the concept of liberty. For a discussion of the mutual ties between the concepts of autonomy and liberty, see Robert Young, *Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty*, Croom Helm, London, 1986.

right is freedom of the press. The Freedom of the Press Act, a part of the Swedish Constitution, begins with the following words: "Freedom of the press means the right of every Swedish national, without any hindrance raised beforehand by any authority or other public body, to publish any written matter." The central element here is captured by the words without any hindrance raised beforehand. Censorship, i.e. examination of written matter prior to publication, violates the principle of freedom of the press. The power to publish written matter and determine its contents should rest with the citizen himself and no one else.

The historical emergence of citizenship actually consists of the destruction of a series of barriers. On one point after another, privileges have been abolished and restrictions eliminated. The struggle for citizenship has been synonymous with the abolition of inequities. The historical struggle has occasionally assumed an almost negative character, more a struggle against injustice than a struggle for a positive ideal. When Herbert Tingsten traces the battle for universal suffrage, he presents this as an important fact, but also as a significant problem for democracy: "In public discourse, democratic policy has seemed less an ideology than a critique of ideologies and traditions. This has entailed a weakness, insofar as democracy has been introduced without examination and discussion of its problems."²³

Equality

Citizenship means equality of opportunity. The transformation from subject to citizen means that old inequities are

23. Herbert Tingsten, *Demokratiens problem* (The Problems of Democracy), Aldus/Bonniers, Stockholm, 1960, p. 67.

narrowed. Citizenship presupposes equality. At this general level, such a statement is uncontroversial. But the question is exactly how equality should be defined. In simple political doctrine, it may seem as if the call for equality is an unambiguous, clear concept. This is by no means the case. One scholar has distinguished five different criteria for equality (whether equality concerns individuals or groups, is global or marginal, concerns ends or means, applies to things or persons, is relative or absolute). The number of theoretically possible combinations thus becomes large; it is possible to imagine no fewer than 108 different variations on equality.²⁴

Equality can be regarded as an ideal, a benchmark. Deviations from this goal may be large or small. The degree of equality, to put it somewhat inappropriately, can thus be described by some measure that indicates the distance between this ideal and reality. In this context, it is of minor importance what the exact object of equality is; it may concern access to resources or other conditions important to the realization of citizenship.

The measure of equality is thus a difference, namely the deviation between the ideal of complete equality and the conditions that are actually observed. The conclusions as to whether equality exists or not therefore depend very much on the formulation of the ideal, the definition of what should constitute the concept of equality.

24. Douglas Rae, *Equalities*, Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 133. For a Swedish application of this discussion, see Nils Stjernquist and Håkan Magnusson, *Den kommunala självstyrelsen, jämlikheten och variationerna mellan kommunerna* (Municipal Self-Government, Equality and Variations Between Municipalities), Civildepartementet (Ministry of Public Administration), Ds 1988:36, chapter 3.

In the following pages, three different ideals of equality will provide the basis for a comparison with Swedish reality today. It will thus be possible to distinguish three different variations on inequality: inequality with regard to variation, differentiation and cumulation. Figure 1.1 summarizes how these three types of inequality are defined and measured.

Inequality with regard to variation is a way of describing the distribution of a given attribute, such as the possession of a particular resource. One example is income. The income situation of a group of people can be described in two ways: average or variation. Complete equality of income exists only if everyone earns the same amount. Every individual's income is equal to the group's mean value. In that case there is no dispersion or variation around this mean value. Conversely, great inequality implies that some people have very small incomes while others have very large incomes. The mean may be the same, but in this case the variation around the mean is very large. The degree of variation is thus a measure of inequality. The greater the variation, the greater the deviation from the ideal of complete equality.

There are various statistical yardsticks that express the degree of variation.²⁵ One such yardstick is variance/standard deviation, another is the Gini index/Lorenz curve. These measurement techniques make it possible to provide exact figures in reply to questions of the following kind: Is equality in terms of income increasing or decreasing? Does the variation in incomes

25. For a thorough comparison between such yardsticks, see Frank A. Cowell, *Measuring Inequality*, Philip Allan Publishers, Oxford, 1977.

differ from one country to another? How does concentration in the ownership of land vary between different countries in the Third World?

Inequality with regard to variation implies a comparison between individuals belonging to a particular group or society. This first type of equality thus concerns individual variations.

Inequality with regard to differentiation, however, concerns a comparison between two or more different groups. Given that there is some measure of individual variation, the question is: to what extent can this variation be attributed to membership in a group? Assume that voter turnout is 90 percent. Now, is there a difference between persons with low and high incomes in terms of the percentage who vote? If voter turnout is 85 percent among low income earners and 95 percent among high income earners, some degree of inequality exists. Equality prevails in the event that voter turnout is equally high in both income groups.

A similar comparison between women and men provides a yardstick of equality of status between the sexes. If the percentage of actual voters, Members of Parliament, board members etc. were equally large among men and among women, equality between the sexes would be complete in these respects. The greater the difference between the two groups, the greater the degree of inequality.

Inequality in terms of differentiation concerns the association between membership in a social category and the achievement of true citizenship. But in reality, not all citizens take advantage of their right to choose those who govern. The question is how strongly the inclination to vote is related to different social situational factors. The stronger the association, the greater the inequality. The absence of such associations implies political equality.

When equality is discussed in terms of differentiation, it is always necessary to specify the groups being compared. As in Sweden today, voter turnout may be almost completely equal when it comes to the sexes but unequal in terms of incomes. Greater equality in one respect does not automatically signify greater equality in another.


Differentiation refers to an asymmetric relationship -- how a particular type of difference causes another type of difference. The question at hand is the extent to which differences in one respect, for example voter turnout, can be attributed to differences in another respect, for example incomes.²⁶ If differences in incomes play a large role in the inclination to go out and vote, if there is a strong statistical association between income and voter turnout, this means there is a high degree of political inequality with regard to incomes.²⁷

The principles of the third type of equality, equality with regard to cumulation, have been formulated most clearly by the American philosopher Michael Walzer.²⁸ Walzer distinguishes

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26. For an international examination of the degree of political equality, see Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-on Kim, *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978.
27. The fact that equality with regard to differentiation implies a comparison between two groups should not be taken too literally. As already indicated, the comparison can very easily be extended to more than two groups. Purely in principle, there is no difference if the criterion of comparison consists of a given number of groups (discrete categories) or a continuous scale. In the text, for reasons of clarity the argument focuses on the simplest case, with only two groups.
28. Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983.

between simple equality and complex equality. In a society with full (simple) equality, everything is for sale and all citizens have the same amount of money to buy things with. But such a situation would not last particularly long. Some people would soon control more than others. To restore equality, a centralized and powerful state is required. This state, in turn, would nevertheless end up being controlled by a few powerful people in positions of authority. To restore political equality, new bodies would have to be established and so on. Actually attempting to achieve a society with full, simple equality soon leads to side effects that in themselves threaten equality.

Walzer recommends another strategy, however. Inequalities, perhaps even monopolies, can conceivably be accepted under one important precondition, namely that different goods and utilities are not freely marketable. Although there are many small inequalities, these inequalities are not reproduced from one area to another. Such a society is characterized, in Walzer's term, by complex equality. There is no single norm for fair distribution. Every sphere of society, every area of life, has its own norm of fairness.



Equality Inequality

Variation
Differentiation
Cumulation

Variation among individuals
Difference between groups
Association between areas

Figure 1.1 Three types of equality

To Walzer, this principle of equality is an attempt to reconcile equality with pluralism. A society characterized by complex equality means the opposite of tyranny. No citizen's position in one respect can be threatened as a consequence of his position in some other respect. A person can be elected to a political post and thus have greater political power than another citizen. But as long as an elected official is not also accorded other benefits (such as housing or better medical care) because of his political position, inequality with regard to political power can be reconciled with the call for complex equality.

The principle of complex equality is directed against the concept of dominance, in which some special position or resource (political power, birth, wealth etc.) should entitle a person to benefit in other respects as well. In Walzer's formulation: No social good designated as A should be distributed to citizens who possess some other good B merely because they possess B and without regard to the meaning of A.²⁹

Walzer's theory provides a point of comparison to measure the extent to which complex equality is actually implemented. Inequality in this respect means that differences in one area "spill over" or "infect" another area. Differences cumulate over different spheres: he who has shall receive.

Cumulation is a question of association. A strong association means that there is a close connection between two areas: those who are strong in one respect are generally also strong in another respect and vice versa. The absence of associations means that the two areas are not related to each other; in this case, there is equality in Walzer's sense. Figure 1.1 illustrates the

29. Ibid., p. 20.

strength of this association using two axes (vectors). If the two axes are connected by a right angle, this means that the correlation is zero; the two areas thus lack mutual associations. A small angle indicates a close association.³⁰ In extreme cases the association is complete -- the two axes coincide completely. Cumulation can therefore be expressed in terms of dimensionality. Equality with regard to cumulation is the same as multidimensional citizenship. Two preconditions must be fulfilled: that there are several separate dimensions and that these dimensions are unrelated to each other.

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The statement that "money gives power" presupposes that there is inequality with regard to variation and inequality with regard to differentiation. Financial resources are unevenly distributed, and financial resources determine the possession of power. There are thus two strategies for reducing the dependence of power on money. One is to diminish the variation in financial resources. The other is to diminish the role of money.

Both strategies are more or less open to political initiatives. The distribution of financial resources can be controlled partly by political decisions.³¹ In some respects, the opportunity to convert money into power has been restricted by political measures. A splendid example of the latter is the introduction of universal and equal suffrage (see Figure 1.2).


30. The cosine of the angle expresses the size of the correlation.

31. The association between changes in income or wealth and political factors is the subject of a separate study within the framework of the Study of Power and Democracy in Sweden.

Before 1909, municipal voting rights were related to the possession of financial resources.³² People with incomes below a certain cutoff point were not entitled to vote. The number of votes a person could cast was proportional to his income and real estate holdings.³³ In many municipalities, a single person controlled all the votes. The late Prime Minister Tage Erlander writes about Värmland province during his childhood, early in this century, when power followed money: "A farmer who inherited a farm with 20 cows was immediately considered better suited to handle municipal affairs than he was when he had only one cow. 'The cows were the decisive factor,' said father. I thought this was awfully strange."³⁴ The same reaction to the unfairness of graded voting rights is expressed in Verner von Heidenstam's famous Medborgarsång (Song of the Citizen): "'Tis a shame, 'tis a stain on the national flag, that a citizen's rights are called money."

The partial voting right reform of 1907-1909 somewhat modified this effect. The maximum number of votes per person was set at 40 (the 40-point scale). Not until 1921 did voting rights become completely democratic. The principle of "one man -- one vote" was also introduced in municipal elections. A constitutional reform, implemented only after a long and hard political struggle, thus ended the association between money and political power, at least in this respect.

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32. For a review of the relatively complicated regulations on voting rights, see Gunnar Wallin, *Valrörelser och valresultat: Andrakammarvalen i Sverige 1866-1884* (Election Campaigns and Election Results: Elections to the Second Chamber of the Swedish Parliament, 1866-1884), Ronzo, Stockholm, 1961, pp. 7 ff.
33. In 1869 the maximum number of votes per person was set at 100 in cities, and in 1900 at 5,000 in rural areas.
34. Tage Erlander, *Sjuttioatal* (The Seventies), Stockholm, 1979, p. 93.



Figur 1.2 Den kommunala rösträttens demokratisering

Before 1909	1909-1921	After 1921
Number of votes		
Income		
Lower limit	40-degree scale	One man -- one vote

Figure 1.2 The democratization of municipal voting rights

There may very well be situations where all three types of inequality occur and simultaneously reinforce each other. Suppose one discovers inequality with regard to cumulation. The question is then how the transfer from one sphere to another occurs, and why a person who is strong in one respect is also strong in another. One possible explanation may be that possessing a particular form of resources affects all three areas. One hypothesis that appears likely is that financial resources assume a special position and that money generates power and influence not only in the financial sphere, but also in other contexts.

Fraternity

The concept of citizenship implies liberty and equality, but also fraternity. Being a citizen presupposes a feeling of community with one's fellow citizens, a sense of solidarity with the members of society as a group.³⁵

35. For a recent study of the legitimacy of the welfare state, see Willy Martinussen, *Solidaritetsens grænser: En undersøkelse av oppslutningen om velferdsstatens verdier og virkemidler* (The Limits of Solidarity: A Study of Support for the Values and Methods of the Welfare State), Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1988.

Solidarity can assume two directions: toward other individuals and toward collective institutions. Much of the sociology of the past century has focused on how people's feeling of affinity and sense of community has been affected by the sweeping changes connected with industrialization, modernization, population movements and social regrouping. The list of demands that can be made of citizens in a democratic society often include tolerance, or respect for the opinions of others. Another thing demanded of modern man is empathy, the ability to see yourself in someone else's position.³⁶

The concept of citizenship also includes the assumption that people join forces to shape their collective institutions by democratic means. These institutions should therefore enjoy at least a minimum of legitimacy. Citizens should be able to rely on the impartiality of the judicial system and assume that politics is not corrupted by bribes or irrelevant considerations. Democracy requires a shared superideology, a loyalty to the principles and institutions of democracy.³⁷

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The banner of liberty, equality and fraternity still flutters over the structure of ideal citizenship. But even on this abstract, theoretical level there is disharmony. First, the three fundamental principles are so general that, as already indicated, they can be interpreted in many different ways. Second, the three principles are not clearly reconcilable. When it comes to three such grand objectives, goal conflicts are particularly strong.

36. The need for empathy is emphasized especially by Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society, The Free Press, New York, 1964, pp. 64 ff.*

37. Tingsten, pp. 42 ff.

Liberty and equality are not always reconcilable. One can admittedly regard democracy and majority rule as a combination of these two principles.³⁸ But in many cases, a desire to achieve equality, especially equality with regard to variation, will limit individual liberty.

Liberty and fraternity can occasionally be happily combined in the form of mutual cooperation among free individuals. But the individuality of liberty can also end up being in direct conflict with the collectivism of the community.

Equality and fraternity can be achieved at the same time if everyone loyally shares everything equally. But equality can be pursued to the point where it challenges social solidarity. Is a welfare state like Sweden better suited to achieving equality than to promoting solidarity?³⁹

Citizenship and Power

Some social rights are "automatic" in the sense that they are realized regardless of whether a citizen takes any initiative or not. Child allowances and basic (i.e. social security) pensions are two examples. The mainframe computer at the National Social Insurance Board offices in Sundsvall is an efficiently operating "equality machine." Provided that its database is correct, these social benefits are disbursed to everyone who is entitled to them.

38. Jan-Magnus Jansson, *Frihet och jämlikhet: En studie över den politiska demokratin (Liberty and Equality: A Study of Political Democracy)*, Söderströms, Helsinki, 1952.

39. Helga Maria Hernes, *Welfare State and Woman Power: Essays in State Feminism*, Norwegian University Press, Oslo, 1988, pp. 153 ff.

But in terms of numbers, these automatic rights are very few. In most cases a citizen must take the initiative himself and make an active effort to take advantage of his right. The ability to defend one's interests, to insist on one's rights, has a greater or lesser impact on how these rights are actually used. Differences in competence, ability and resources will thus be decisive.

Dependence on personal initiative varies from right to right. According to what shape a given right assumes, the need for initiatives arises at different points in time. The main idea of democracy is that citizens should be able to exercise influence on the form and content of public services. In the private sector, market demand is the primary means of controlling supply. In consumer law, the opportunity for consumer influence occurs primarily after a service has been provided.⁴⁰ The extent to which legal opportunities are actually utilized is an open question requiring "investigations of a legal-sociological nature."⁴¹

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To repeat a key phrase, being a citizen means having equal opportunities to participate together with others in shaping society. The definition of citizenship thus includes an element of power, of influence. To be a citizen is to enjoy the opportunity to exercise influence.

40. Curt Riberdahl, "Privatisering, entreprenad eller kommunaldrift -- juridiska aspekter," ("Privatization, Contracting-Out or Municipal Operation -- Legal Aspects"), Förvaltningsrättslig tidskrift (Journal of Administrative Law), no. 4-5, 1985, p. 175.

41. Ibid.

More than any other concept in the social sciences, power has been interpreted and defined in greatly differing ways. The literature on the concept of power is large and rapidly growing. The only thing on which there seems to be agreement is that there is no agreement as to what power is.⁴²

But in spite of this, or perhaps because of it, the discussion of power is very valuable. This lengthy debate has led to clarifications and warnings against the excessively naive use of the power concept. Theoretical discussions are thus of great practical utility.

The debate on power has taught us one lesson: we should not take a word like "influence" too literally. Our understanding of power is colored, often unconsciously, by images taken from physics and technology. These mechanical metaphors can be deceptive in many different contexts, not least when it comes to a study of the power of citizens and the way democracy functions.⁴³

There is consequently no single and unambiguous theory of power, no single general way of measuring the degree of power. But the study of power nevertheless has certain common denominators. An important one is the quest for realism, a description of actual power conditions.

42. An introduction to the debate on power is provided in an anthology that was published as the introductory volume of the Study of Power and Democracy in Sweden: Olof Petersson, ed., *Maktbegreppet (The Concept of Power)*, Carlssons, Stockholm, 1987.

43. See also Olof Petersson, *Metaforernas makt (The Power of Metaphors)*, Carlssons, Stockholm, 1987, especially ch. 7-8.

The difference between what is and what seems to be never ceases to fascinate the human senses. So strong is this longing to bridge over the gap between the visible and the invisible, appearance and reality, the superficial and the underlying, that during the era of professionalization, special occupational categories have emerged whose task is to reveal and destroy myths. The scientist, the journalist, the documentary filmmaker, the researcher who studies the structure of power -- all of them want to be counted among the ranks of the truth tellers.

More than one examiner of power has been driven by a longing to make such revelations. John Kenneth Galbraith is one example: "I have wanted to be sure that, the covering flesh having been stripped away, the anatomy of power stands fully revealed."⁴⁴

In the social sciences, the discrepancy between illusion and reality has ended up applying very much to the difference between the written and the living constitution. Every country has its set of fundamental norms, specifying who is entitled to make what decisions and how conflicts should be resolved. In a constitutional state governed by laws, these norms are gathered in a constitution -- usually a written document. The gap between the written constitution and the actual system of government is sometimes wide. The actual system of government can undergo an evolutionary process that does not lead to corresponding changes in the text of the constitution.

Formulating "the real system of government" is a major research task. The Study of Power and Democracy in Sweden may be regarded as one contribution to this work.

44. John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Anatomy of Power*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1983, p. xv.

In a democracy, power over societal change is supposed to rest ultimately with the citizens themselves. The introductory paragraph of the Swedish Constitution formulates the main principle of popular sovereignty: "All public power in Sweden emanates from the people." During the expansionary phase of the welfare state, in one field after another, institutions have been built up and rights have been formulated, all for the purpose of giving citizens an opportunity to live a richer life and to influence their own situation and the changes in their society.

The study presented in this book is an attempt to provide some notion of the distance between such beautiful ideals and the realities of Sweden today.

The Citizenship Survey

This survey was based on interviews with a representative sample of adult Swedes. During a conversation lasting more than one hour, each subject was asked questions about his or her living situation, own activities, assessment of opportunities to exercise influence and perceptions of institutions and organizations in today's society. Their answers provide a portrait of the Swedes as citizens.

The citizenship survey examines their opportunities to exercise influence. Part of the survey focuses on the opportunities for citizens to influence their own situation. Six areas of life were selected, representing different situations in which citizens find themselves: the role of resident, consumer, patient or relative of a patient in the medical care system, parent of preschool children, parent of school children and participant in the labor market. A separate chapter is devoted to the issue of inequality with regard to cumulativity -- i.e. whether inequality is reproduced in several different roles.

Another important part of the study analyzes the opportunities citizens enjoy to influence overall societal changes. It therefore focuses on the relationship between citizens and political institutions. It also examines the role of organizational life.

After thus mapping out the various dimensions of citizenship, the study turns to the task of explaining these individual variations. How much inequality is there with regard to differentiation? The differences between women and men, between the generations and between social classes are examined. The role of collective resources such as membership in organizations and access to informal networking resources supplements the picture it provides of how citizenship is implemented. The study makes it possible to assess the interplay between individual and collective resources.

One of the advantages of the interview method is that the subjects' own assessments can supplement data on objective conditions. One question is how much legitimacy a society's established institutions enjoy among its citizens. A lack of trust in parties and politics can thus be placed in a broader context. Another question concerns what attributes the citizens themselves believe should characterize ideal citizenship. Another aspect of the subjective side of citizenship is the individual's political self-confidence and self-perception as a citizen.

Up to this point, the data presented are based on a sample representing all adults domiciled in Sweden. This material is supplemented with a separate sub-sample of married couples. With the aid of this sample, the division of political labor in families can be analyzed. The question addressed here is whether families are homogeneous or heterogeneous, i.e. whether only one spouse or both spouses are active in public life.

The citizenship survey provides a picture of conditions at one point in time. There is thus little opportunity to determine the extent to which its findings are stable or changing. But in some instances, it was possible to repeat questions that had been asked in earlier studies. A special effort was made to include questions from the survey of Swedish living conditions conducted by the Commission of Inquiry on Low Incomes in 1968; these questions were also repeated in 1974 and 1981. On some points, we are therefore able to study the changes that have occurred during a rather unique 20-year period of modern Swedish history. These were the years when the welfare state underwent its greatest expansion, a Leftist wave challenged established political institutions, a financial crisis forced a reconsideration of economic and political assumptions, a Rightist wave called for privatization and deregulation, and the peace and environmentalist movements brought about a change in attitudes toward society and its development.

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Although in some respects the citizenship survey can be compared with earlier measurements, it mainly includes questions that were not previously asked. There have, admittedly, been earlier studies of relevance to particular aspects of citizenship, for example on the role of resident, on consumer attitudes, on utilization of the medical care system, on the role of parent, on workplace democracy, on voter behavior etc. But to the best of our knowledge, no previous Swedish study has attempted to compare and examine the mutual relationships among such a broad spectrum of citizenship roles.

A number of studies have some similarities with the Survey. Studies by political scientists regarding voter behavior,⁴⁵

45. The most recently published book is Sören Holmberg and Michael Gilljam, *Väljare och val i Sverige* (Elections and Voters in Sweden), Bonniers, Stockholm, 1987.

research on local democracy,⁴⁶ and a number of earlier studies on political participation⁴⁷ can serve as points of comparison when it comes to the political aspects of citizenship. Walter Korpi's studies of the Swedish working class should also receive particular mention here.⁴⁸ The living standard studies and studies of living conditions conducted in Sweden over the past two decades have provided a rich body of background material for a description of the well-being of the population.⁴⁹

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46. See Lars Strömberg and Jörgen Westerståhl, eds., *De nya kommunerna* (The New Municipalities), Liber, Stockholm, 1983; Jörgen Westerståhl and Folke Johansson, *Medborgarna och kommunen: Studier av medborgerlig aktivitet och representativ folkstyrelse* (Citizens and Municipalities: Studies of Civic Activity and Representative Government), DSKn 1981:12.
47. For example Vilgot Oscarsson, *Politiskt deltagande: En jämförande studie av politisk participation i Sverige, USA, Storbritannien och Västtyskland* (Political Participation: A Comparative Study of Sweden, the United States, Britain and West Germany), licenciat dissertation, Department of Government, University of Gothenburg, 1974.
48. For example Walter Korpi, *Arbetarklassen i välfärdskapitalismen: Arbete, fackförening och politik i Sverige* (The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism: Labor, the Unions and Politics in Sweden), Prisma, Stockholm, 1978.
49. The pioneering study in this field is Sten Johansson, *Politiska resurser: Om den vuxna befolkningens deltagande i de politiska beslutsprocesserna* (Political Resources: On the Adult Population's Participation in Political Decision-Making Processes), Low Income Commission, Allmänna Förlaget, Stockholm, 1971. The studies of living standards are analyzed

A number of studies of citizenship and democracy have been carried out in neighboring Nordic countries.⁵⁰ In the early 1970s, Finnish sociologist Erik Allardt conducted a comparative study of well-being, living standards and quality of life in the Nordic countries.⁵¹ As part of a study of living standards in Norway, Gudmund Hernes and Willy Martinussen provided an analysis of democratic and political resources.⁵² Other reports within the framework of the Study of Power and Democracy in Norway are also relevant.⁵³ Norwegian research in this field has been particularly lively; Willy Martinussen's book on the shortcomings

in Robert Erikson and Rune Åberg, eds., *Välfärd i förändring* (Well-Being and Change). Statistics Sweden has so far completed more than 50 reports in its ULF series (studies of living conditions). A summary is provided in Joachim Vogel et al, *Ojämlighet i Sverige: Utveckling och nuläge* (Inequality in Sweden: Developments and Current Situation), *Levnadsförhållanden, rapport 51*, Statistiska Centralbyrån (Living Conditions, Report 51, Statistics Sweden), Stockholm, 1987.

50. For a review of a few such Scandinavian research studies, see Michele Micheletti, "Democracy and Political Power in Denmark, Norway and Sweden: A Review-Essay," *The Western Political Quarterly*, 37, 1984, pp. 324-342.
51. Erik Allardt, *Att ha, att älska, att vara* (Having, Loving, Being), Argos, Lund, 1975.
52. Gudmund Hernes and Willy Martinussen, *Demokrati og politiske ressurser* (Democracy and Political Resources), NOU 1980:7.
53. Johan P. Olsen and Harald Saetren, *Aksjoner og demokrati* (Actions and Democracy), Universitetsforlaget, Bergen, 1980. Cf. also *Maktutredningen: Slutrapport* (Study of Power and Democracy in Norway: Final Report), NOU 1982:3, esp. ch. 4.

of the democratic process has played a major role in public discourse.⁵⁴ A group of political scientists at the University of Århus, Denmark, conducted an extensive study of the people's strategies in Danish politics.⁵⁵ Denmark's own low-income study commission also devoted attention to citizen participation and influence.⁵⁶ In many ways, these Nordic research reports have provided inspiration for our study.⁵⁷

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54. Willy Martinussen, *Fjerndemokratiet: Sosial ulikhet, politiske ressurser og politisk medvirking* (Distant Democracy: Social Inequality, Political Resources and Political Participation), Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, Oslo, 1973. For a critique of Martinussen's work, see William M. Lafferty, *Participation and Democracy in Norway: The 'Distant Democracy' Revisited*, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1981. Cf. Ottar Hellevik, "Politisk deltakelse i Norge -- begrenset og skjev?" ("Political Participation in Norway -- Limited and Skewed?"), *Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning* (Social Science Journal), 24, 1983, pp. 3-30.
55. Erik Damgaard, ed., *Folkets veje i dansk politik* (The People's Strategies in Danish Politics), Schultz, Copenhagen, 1980. Erik Damgaard, ed., *Partigrupper, repræsentation og styring* (Party Groups, Representation and Governance), Schultz, Copenhagen, 1982; Erik Damgaard et al, *Dansk demokrati under forandring* (Danish Democracy in Transition), Schultz, Copenhagen, 1984.
56. Finn Valentin, *Fordelingen av påvirkningsmuligheder* (The Distribution of Opportunities for Influence), Lavindkomstkommissionen, Arbejdsnotat 14, Copenhagen, 1980.
57. Cf. Olof Petersson, *Folkstyrelse och statsmakt i Norden* (Popular Government and the State in the Nordic Countries), *Diskurs*, Uppsala, 1984, Chapter 9.

The citizenship survey was conducted during the fall of 1987.⁵⁸ Responsibility for designing the interview form and processing the results rests with a research team at the Department of Government, University of Uppsala (Olof Petersson, Anders Westholm and Göran Blomberg) and a research team at the Institute of Social Research in Oslo (Helga Maria Hernes and Nils Asbjørnsen). Sampling and field work were conducted by Statistics Sweden (Statistiska Centralbyrån, SCB). The inquiry was financed by a research grant from the Study of Power and Democracy in Sweden. The survey was carried out with the permission of Sweden's Data Inspection Board.

The sample consists of people aged 16-80 who were registered in Sweden for census purposes as of July 1987. Foreign citizens domiciled in Sweden were thus included.⁵⁹ The gross sample consisted of 2,688 people. Of these, 30 had died or emigrated by the time the field work took place. The net sample thus consisted of 2,658 people. The number of interviews that were conducted was 2,071, equivalent to 77.9 percent of the net sample. The 22.1 percent non-participation rate can be regarded as normal for this type of survey nowadays.

The interviews were conducted by specialists from Statistics Sweden in the homes of respondents. Interviewees had received advance information in the form of a letter and an information folder about the survey.

Sources of error in an interview study such as this can be divided into two categories, non-systematic and systematic. Non-systematic errors occur as a chance factor in every random

58. The bulk of the interviews were conducted during the latter half of September and during October. A small number of follow-up interviews were done in November and December.

59. A more detailed account of how the study was conducted will be provided in a Swedish-language Technical Report (to be published later).

sample survey. The accuracy of the reported figures depends on the variance of the replies and the size of the sample. The smaller the variance and the larger the sample, the more certain the statistical estimates will be. For estimates based on the entire sample of just over 2,000 people, the confidence interval amounts to $\pm 1-2$ percent. When breaking the sample down into smaller groups, there is greater uncertainty. The confidence interval for a group consisting of 200 individuals amounts to roughly $\pm 4-7$ percentage points. The data reported in this book should thus be regarded as representing approximate values, not exact figures. Small differences should not be accorded much weight.

A systematic error may arise, for example, if non-participants are unevenly distributed. An examination of the composition of the non-participant group shows that there was some degree of imbalance. For example, the rate of non-participation was somewhat larger among women and among residents of major cities. On the whole, however, the differences were not so large as to influence the results in any decisive way. In specific cases where the non-participation rate may have a greater impact, this will be specially pointed out.

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2. Influencing One's Own Situation

Providing a realistic picture of the realization of citizenship means showing the statistical association between situation and action. This association has a dual significance. On the one hand, a person's situation determines his actions: external living conditions provide opportunities and set limits on what is possible. On the other hand, a person's actions determine his situation: to a greater or lesser extent, one's life can be influenced by personal initiatives.

It is no great exaggeration to say that modern Swedish research on citizens' living conditions has concentrated on the factual situation. In the past two decades, impressive amounts of statistics have been gathered to describe the material content of welfare. Detailed tables thus enable us to trace how various population categories are distributed in terms of education, employment, working environment, housing, communications, leisure, isolation and sense of community, political resources, economic security, safety and health.¹

1. These measurements of welfare consist of two series of studies: studies of living standards (levnadsnivåundersökningar, LNU) carried out in 1968, 1974 and 1981, and the studies of living conditions (undersökningen om levnadsförhållanden, ULF) which began in 1975. For a summary of their findings, see Robert Erikson and Rune Åberg, *Välfärd i förändring (Well-Being and Change)*, Prisma, Stockholm, 1984, and Joachim Vogel et al, *Ojämlighet i Sverige: Utveckling och nuläge (Inequality in Sweden: Developments and Current Situation)*, *Levnadsförhållanden, rapport 51, Statistiska Centralbyrån (Living Conditions, Report 51, Statistics Sweden)*, Stockholm, 1987.

In fact, there has been a deliberate effort to restrict this research to the objective living conditions of citizens. The purpose of these measurements of welfare is to assess how well the public sector's welfare policy has achieved its aims. By supplying decision-makers and citizens themselves with data on welfare trends, there is feedback of information on the impact of political measures. To put it a bit provocatively, the person assessing the citizen's situation is a politician/statistician, and not the citizen himself. This "objectivist" approach is very deliberately chosen: "There were many arguments in favor of letting the individual evaluate his own situation. No one else can reasonably be more familiar with his particular circumstances. In this study, however, a decision was made to ignore the respondent's own assessments as far as possible."²

The above-mentioned restrictions in Swedish studies of living standards can be justified by very good arguments. A more "subjective" method invariably causes the findings to be colored by the respondents' own level of expectations. In practice, an individual's evaluation of his living conditions measures how satisfied he is. Differences between groups would express disparities in their level of expectations as well as actual inequalities. The strong affinity between the researchers and the goals of public-sector welfare policy also justifies focusing on objective indicators. Public policy aims at supplying citizens

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2. Michael Tåhlin, "Handlingsutrymme, anspråksnivå och välfärds­mätningar" ("Room for Action, Level of Expectations and Measurements of Welfare"), in Ingemund Hägg and Lennart Arvedson, eds., *Livschanser och välfärd* (Life Chances and Welfare), SNS Förlag, Stockholm, 1987, p. 70.

with a number of resources: actual preconditions for an active life. How a citizen then uses these resources and how the good life is realized lie outside the domain of this policy. The interest of welfare policy, and thus of welfare measurements, ends with people's material living situation.

This citizenship survey begins where welfare research ends. The general question is: assuming that welfare is distributed in one way or another -- what are the consequences? What difference does it make if one group has larger resources than another? Welfare research focuses on a citizen's situation. This study analyzes the statistical association between situation and action. Action refers specifically to activity aimed at influencing one's own situation.

Now, an individual's situation is not without its ambiguities. The concept of citizenship shows how an individual's life can be regarded as a multidimensional space full of chances. This study examines certain aspects of citizenship. Such a selection will always be more or less arbitrary, and there is no obvious rule to determine which particular aspect of citizenship should be considered more important than another. The six areas chosen here make no claim to be representative of a person's entire situation. But they cover vital aspects of a citizen's life in a modern welfare state. These six citizenship roles are:

Resident. This aspect refers to the role of tenant or homeowner.
Consumer. The citizen behaves here as a buyer; the crucial thing is the ability to assert his (or her) interests in the market.

Patient. This role refers to the citizen's contacts with the public health and medical care system, one of the key elements of the publicly operated welfare system.

Parent of preschool children. The aspect of the parental role discussed here is how child care is organized.

Parent of school children. Here the parental role refers to the situation of having children in the compulsory school system.

Participant in the labor market. This examines the situation of people who work either as employees or as business owners.

These six aspects of a citizen's daily life may seem disparate. They deal with qualities and experiences that are not comparable. There is no universal yardstick by which to rank the value of being well-housed, being able to obtain the goods and services one demands, receiving treatment for an illness, arranging good day care for one's preschool children, providing older children with a stimulating education and achieving job satisfaction.

This notwithstanding, a common denominator does exist. In theory, either directly stated in the legislation or in the general ideology of the mixed-economy welfare state, these citizenship roles are connected with the right to exercise influence. Certain rights and benefits are generally guaranteed regardless of whether the individual takes any initiative or not. But many life situations imply the right to participate and personally influence the outcome to one's own advantage. Here the citizenship role assumes the form of a chance to take initiatives.

A brief recapitulation of the rights connected with these six roles shows how the general principle of co-determination has

been applied concretely in some important areas of society.³

Being a resident. Many of the rights of tenants are written into the law. If someone rents an apartment, he is entitled to a lease. The rent may not be freely determined by the landlord. Rent is set after negotiations; in public housing companies, a tenant is represented by a tenants' association. He is entitled to paint and wallpaper the apartment himself. The landlord is obligated to repair the apartment if there are faults and deficiencies. If the landlord and tenant disagree about the rent or repairs, the tenant can appeal to a rent tribunal. A tenant enjoys far-reaching safeguards against being forced to move, which are referred to as security of tenure.

A member of a cooperative housing association who has paid the purchase price of a co-op apartment is a part-owner of the association, which in turn owns the entire property. The association is responsible for the financial affairs and general management of this property.

Buying goods and services. The right that is of greatest importance to a citizen in the role of consumer is the market economy's fundamental principle of the free encounter between buyer and seller. The primary purpose of consumer-related legislation is to maintain the free play of the market. There are various legal rules intended to combat breaches of contract,

3. For a review of the rights and obligations of Swedish citizens, see Samhällsguiden (Social Services Guide), 4th edition, Liber/Allmänna Förlaget, Stockholm, 1986. The following presentation is essentially based on this handbook.

restrictions on competition etc. The state has also intervened more directly to strengthen the position of the consumer. Most municipal governments have consumer advisory services that people can turn to for advice and help both before and after purchases. A central government agency called the National Board for Consumer Policies is entrusted with aiding consumers and defending their position in the market. The director general of this agency is simultaneously the Consumer Ombudsman (KO). Special regulations govern payments by check, credit cards and installment plans, "open purchases," exchange and repurchase rights, while establishing the consumer's right to cancel any door-to-door sales order within seven days.

The consumer has many opportunities to obtain redress if a product is faulty, if it has been delivered at the wrong time or if the seller has made inaccurate or misleading statements. A consumer can bring a company before the National Board for Consumer Complaints. The buyer, and the seller, can also turn to the appropriate district court to resolve a dispute.

Being a patient or relative of a patient. The Public Health and Medical Care Act established the right of the population to good public health care and medical services. This means, among other things, that the care of an individual patient is to be provided in a spirit of consensus and cooperation between medical personnel and the patient. This includes the right to accept or refuse the treatment offered.

Being the parent of preschool children. Public-sector child care services consist of preschool programs and recreational programs. Preschool usually means municipally operated day care centers, part-time kindergartens and publicly subsidized "family day care" services. Municipal governments have a system of waiting lists. Children in need of special assistance, for example those with disabilities, are entitled to higher priority.

Parents may organize their own day care centers. If the center operates on a cooperative basis, offers special instruction or is otherwise non-profit, it can receive central government grants. But no such grants are payable to preschools run on a for-profit basis.

Having children in school. Children are required to attend school from the year they turn 7 until the year they turn 16. Municipal responsibility for the compulsory school system is exercised by local education committees and education offices and, in municipalities that have them, also by committees covering smaller districts. Parents may ask to speak directly to the principal, director of studies, home-room teacher or class teacher. As a rule, these officials schedule regular telephone or appointment hours.

One essential element of public administrative policy today is a desire to strengthen the influence of the people who use public services. In a bill aimed at encouraging more active popular government at municipal and county levels, Sweden's Social Democratic cabinet writes that "it is important, for example, that pupils, parents and those receiving medical or social welfare services enjoy increased opportunities to participate in and take responsibility for local government programs."⁴

Working. One fundamental concept behind the labor law reforms of the 1970s was to give the employee side greater opportunities to influence working life. This influence refers not only to conditions of employment in the narrow sense, but also organizational and management issues. The Work Environment Act stipulates that working tasks should be organized "in such a way that employees themselves can influence their working situation." The Co-Determination Act (or Act on Employee Influence on Decision-Making) contains rules entitling employees to expanded

4. Government bill 1986/87:91, p. 12.

negotiating rights, the right to information, precedence for their union's interpretation of a contract until the dispute is resolved, and veto rights for unions on certain hiring matters. In companies of a certain size or larger, employees are entitled to full representation on the board of directors. In all essential respects, the same labor legislation now applies to the public sector as to the private sector.

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Our field survey included a number of interview questions aimed at finding out which one or more of the above six citizenship roles each respondent fulfilled. The result was an overview of how common various life situations are among the adult population of Sweden today (Table 2.1). There were broad variations -- being a resident applied to 100 percent⁵ while medical care, gainful employment and consumption of capital goods each affected more than two thirds of the population, and the two parental roles involved 14 and 18 percent of the citizenry, respectively.

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The question now is to what extent these life situations lead to action -- action aimed at influencing the situation at hand in

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5. This finding should not be interpreted as a claim that there are no homeless people in Sweden. This category is so small, however, that in a cross-section of the entire population it accounts for a mere fraction of one percent. Homeless people who nevertheless had a roof over their heads can be found in this study, either among those who sublet apartments or who are classified under "other home." There is also reason to assume that there were a number of homeless people among those who could not be reached for an interview.

one way or another. The association between a person's situation and such action is by no means direct and immediate. There is an important intermediate stage, a kind of precondition for action: dissatisfaction. One might say that dissatisfaction is social energy. The demands generated by dissatisfaction with one's situation are the very fuel of public life. A society without dissatisfaction would be a static society. Unmet demands are the dynamic element of a society.

But the association between one's situation and dissatisfaction is by no means created in a simple, unproblematical way. Dissatisfaction is no mere reflection of one's actual situation; openly expressed demands are not directly proportional to a person's actual life circumstances. Those demands that reach the stage of articulation are shaped as much by a person's level of expectations as by his material situation. Precisely for this reason, welfare researchers have chosen to abstain from asking citizens what they themselves felt about their situation.

Table 2.1 Six citizenship roles

Resident: The breakdown of respondents by form of housing was:

Own home	54
Housing cooperative: HSB or Riksbyggen	8
Housing cooperative: private	4
Rented home: municipal housing company	15
Rented home: private landlord	16
Rented home: sublet arrangement	1
Other home	2
Total percentage	100

Consumer: During the preceding year, 68 percent of all respondents had made at least one major capital goods purchase. The breakdown among particular kinds of goods was as follows:

A major household appliance, such as a washing machine, dishwasher, freezer or microwave oven	28
Home electronic equipment such as a TV set, VCR, stereo or computer equipment	29
A car	27
Furniture	31

During the year some people had not made one but several kinds of capital goods purchases. The breakdown of respondents by how many kinds of goods they had purchased was:

Four kinds of capital goods	3
Three kinds of capital goods	10
Two kinds of capital goods	20
One kind of capital goods	36
No capital goods purchased	32
Total percentage	100

What conclusions should we draw from the fact that the association between people's situation and their actions is not immediate and that the dissatisfaction they articulate is partly shaped by their level of expectations? The answer depends on what phenomena we wish to analyze. If we are interested in measuring the material living standards of the population, the welfare researchers are of course right: the extent of dissatisfaction cannot be assumed to be a fair indicator of actual welfare. But if we instead wish to analyze the prerequisites for action aimed at influencing a person's own situation, then things are different. Although the way a person views his dissatisfaction is subjective and psychological, such feelings are precisely what can be assumed to provide a very important motive for action.

Table 2.1 Six citizenship roles (continued)

Patient, relative of patient: Of all respondents, 76 percent said they had been in contact with the medical care system during the preceding year. The breakdown into specific forms of contact and medical care was as follows (percentage of all respondents):

Had sought or obtained care for a minor illness or ailment	54
Had sought or obtained care for a major illness or ailment	16
Had been an inpatient at a hospital or other medical care facility	16
Had come into contact with the medical care system because a close relative needed care	39

Contacts with the medical care system were distributed as follows with respect to the respondent's own medical care needs and those of a relative:

Because of the medical care needs of both the respondent and a relative	24
Only because of the respondent's medical care needs	37
Only because of a relative's medical care needs	15
Had not been in contact with the medical care system during the preceding year	24
Total percentage	100

Parents of pre-school children: Of all respondents, 14 percent had children aged 0-6 years. The form of child care they used varied as follows (percentage of parents of pre-school children; some of them mentioned more than one form of child care):

Child care in the home, provided by the respondent, husband/wife/companion or relatives	24
Municipal day care center, after-school recreation center or preschool	39
Non-municipal day care center, after-school recreation center or pre-school	2
Municipally funded family day care (in private home)	22
Privately organized family day care	7
Other child care	2

Parents of school children: Of all respondents, 18 percent had children aged 7-15.

Gainfully employed people: Of all respondents, 71 percent were gainfully employed (64 percent employees, 7 percent business owners). Their working situation was as follows:

Full-time job	52
Part-time job	16
Temporarily unemployed (less than 6 months)	1
On leave of absence for studies	0
On parental leave of absence	1
Not working at present for other reasons	1
Total percentage gainfully employed	71
Retired or on a disability pension	19
Unemployed for a long period (more than 6 months)	1
Student	6
Staying home to take care of children	1
Not gainfully employed for other reasons	1
Total percentage not gainfully employed	28

Measuring dissatisfaction is more complicated than counting indicators of material welfare. Dissatisfaction is merely a collective label for a variety of human situations, frustrations, disappointments and aspirations. What is common to all expressions of dissatisfaction is that there is a difference or gap between what is and what ought to be. This sense of lack of fulfillment, of imbalance between what a person has and what he wants, is the core of dissatisfaction.

In the arsenal of social science methods, a repertoire of ways to measure such psychological qualities as feelings of disappointment has been developed over the years. None of these methods can be described as the right one: every measuring technique has built-in limitations and peculiarities. In the citizenship survey being discussed here, we chose a special method that has been tried out in similar studies in many other countries during the past few years. Respondents were asked to rate their level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction in each area. Their replies were recorded along a continuous scale ranging from 0 to 10. The two end points, 0 and 10, represented the extreme alternatives "no dissatisfaction" and "very great dissatisfaction," respectively.

Table 2.2 Dissatisfaction with one's situation

Satisfied- dissatisfied with	Mean level of dissatisfaction, 0-10	% reporting "no dissatisfaction" (0)	% reporting great dissatisfaction (6-10)
Housing	2.1	54	15
Capital goods purchases	1.0	71	7
Medical care	2.6	50	21
Child care	1.5	63	11
School	2.3	45	16
Work	3.4	27	25

Our first impression from the replies to our questions about dissatisfaction is that they are not at all symmetrically distributed (Table 2.2). The bulk of respondents chose low figures, i.e. replies that indicated weak dissatisfaction. Their replies ranged from 0 to 10, as explained above. The mean figures ranged from 1.0 to 3.4. The percentage of respondents who chose to reply by using alternatives between 6 and 10 on the scale was between 7 and 25 percent, depending on the area. The percentage choosing the very lowest alternative, "no dissatisfaction," varied from 27 up to 71 percent.

There are a number of clear differences among the six areas examined. The largest percentage of dissatisfied people was found in the labor market. A relative large number of those who were gainfully employed said they have had reason to be dissatisfied with conditions affecting their work or workplace. The contrast is particularly great if we compare this result with the area that showed the lowest percentage of dissatisfaction, the consumer role. Among those who had made a major capital goods

purchase during the preceding year, only a small minority of 7 percent expressed a high degree of dissatisfaction with their purchase. The other areas ended up falling between these two extremes. Ranking all areas by degree of dissatisfaction, their order was: work, medical care, school, housing, child care and capital goods purchases.

Two of the components of the model have been reported so far: situation and dissatisfaction. The third element is action itself. Here, too, there are a number of alternative methods for achieving systematic and comparable measurements. In this respect, too, the interview method in itself compels the use of relatively conventional ways of formulating questions; on the other hand, the same question technique has the advantage that it can be applied to many different occasions and circumstances. The desire to generalize and to facilitate comparisons may justify phrasing questions in a relatively general way.

In each of the fields at hand, respondents were asked to tell whether, during the preceding year, they had tried to bring about improvements or resist deterioration related to the conditions surrounding child care, their children's schooling, work and the workplace etc. Those who said they had made some attempt to influence conditions were asked what the result had been -- whether their wishes had been essentially satisfied or not. These questions reveal something very central: to what extent citizens have actually tried to exercise influence on their living situation and, in that case, what the outcome was (Table 2.3).

Table 2.3 Attempts to exercise influence


	% who had tried to exercise influence	Among those who had tried: Were their wishes satisfied? Still			Total
		Yes	uncertain	No	
Housing	28	55	20	25	100
Capital goods purchases	13	65	16	19	100
Medical care	18	47	14	39	100
Child care	27	52	11	35	100
School	35	41	27	30	100
Work	60	57	22	21	100

The question was phrased as follows: "During the past year, have you done anything to try to bring about improvements or resist deterioration related to ..." If so: "Were your wishes essentially satisfied?"

The results show that there was a wide range of variations among the different areas. Those who stated that they had made an attempt at influence varied from 13 to 60 percent of all respondents. The lowest percentage was found among consumers; the 13 percent figure refers to those who had made some attempt to correct problems related to any of the major purchases they had made during the preceding year. The 60 percent figure is for the labor market. In other words, more than half of those with gainful employment stated that during the preceding year, they had done something to try to bring about improvements or resist deterioration related to their working conditions or workplace. Ranking the six areas in terms of how many respondents had made their own attempts to exercise influence, the order was: work, school, housing, child care, medical care and capital goods purchases.

The six areas can therefore be ranked according to two criteria: the degree of dissatisfaction and how many attempts people had made to exercise influence. These rankings evidently bear some resemblance to each other. In both cases, the labor market and the consumer role formed the two extremes. The statistical association between them can be demonstrated more exactly in a diagram (Figure 2.1). One axis indicates how many people were dissatisfied, the other shows how many took an initiative.

The result was an almost perfectly linear pattern. The number of initiatives was directly proportional to the degree of dissatisfaction. The only outstanding exception was medical care, where the number of initiatives was fewer than would be expected, given the percentage of respondents expressing dissatisfaction.



Figur 2.1 Missnöje och initiativ i olika medborgarsituationer

Initiatives

Dissatisfaction (percentage in the interval 1-10)

Arbete: Work
 Skola: School
 Barn: Child care
 Boende: Housing
 Sjukvård: Medical care
 Konsument: Consumer

Figure 2.1 Dissatisfaction and initiatives in different citizenship situations

+ + +

The diagram indicates that there was an association between the average figures for all respondents affected by a given life situation. Now, if a special relationship exists at this level of analysis, it is not at all certain that the corresponding relationship exists at the individual level. The social sciences are full of examples of a statistical association existing at one level of analysis without there necessarily being corresponding associations at another level. But the computer material can easily be processed to test the hypothesis that the association between dissatisfaction and initiatives also applies to the individual level. Is it true that dissatisfied people try more often to exercise influence than satisfied ones? Or is it perhaps the other way around -- that dissatisfaction leads to silence and passivity?

Table 2.4 __Dissatisfaction_and_attempts_to_exercise_influence__

% who had tried to_influence_____	Satisfied__	Dissatisfied__	Association(r)
Housing	15	44	0.32
Capital goods purchases	3	37	0.46
Medical care	4	32	0.36
Child care	9	60	0.56
School	12	56	0.46
Work_____	24	74	0.46_____

The hypothesis is fully confirmed. In all six areas studied, there was a clear positive correlation between dissatisfaction

and initiatives. The probability of becoming active and trying to exercise influence was several times larger among those who were dissatisfied than among satisfied people. The statistical relationship varied from 0.32 to 0.56, which is an indication of strong associations.

What were the results of these attempts at influence? Table 2.3 above presents people's replies to the question of whether their wishes had been satisfied or not; it should be observed that the percentages are calculated on the basis of those who had made some attempt at influence. The main impression is that the differences among the six areas were not dramatic, yet they were clear. The proportion of respondents whose wishes had been satisfied varied from 41 to 65 percent. The proportion reporting negative results was between 19 and 39 percent. The consumer role, again, stands out: among the relative few people who had made some attempt to have problems corrected, the great majority stated that their demands had been met.


Satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Trying to exercise influence or not. Being successful or not. Taking these benchmarks in the field of social action, we can distinguish some combinations that are important from a theoretical standpoint. Figure 2.2 illustrates the opportunities for citizens to exercise power.

Four situations are conceivable. A citizen is satisfied and therefore takes no initiative; no news is good news. He takes an initiative that works; this is the successful exercise of power. He takes an initiative but his wish is not fulfilled; this is the bitter experience of powerlessness. He is dissatisfied but remains passive; this is impotent silence.

In other words, a distinction can be made between powerlessness and impotence. Powerlessness presupposes action, but action that does not lead to the intended result. Impotence is silent and is characterized by passive adaptation to the prevailing situation.⁶

The six citizenship situations showed rather divergent profiles in terms of the reality of exercising power (Figure 2.3). The consumer role was characterized primarily by the large proportion of people whose silence was good news; 69 percent of this group were satisfied and had made no attempt to correct problems. The opposite was true of the labor market, which had the smallest proportion of satisfied passive respondents (21 percent). Yet there was a large group of people who fell into the category of "successful exercise of power." In the labor market

6. Cf. the distinction made by the Study of Power and Democracy in Norway between powerlessness, on the one hand, and "lack of power" on the other. See Gudmund Hermes, *Makt og avmakt* (Power and Lack of Power), Universitetsforlaget, Bergen, 1975, pp. 133 ff.



Figur 2.2 Medborgarskapets handlingsvägar

LYCKATS: SUCCESSFUL

MISSLYCKATS: UNSUCCESSFUL

Makutövning: Exercise of power

Maklöshet: Powerlessness

INITIATIVE

NO INITIATIVE

Hälsan tiger still: No news is good news

Tyst vanmakt: Silent impotence

NÖJD: SATISFIED

MISSNÖJD: DISSATISFIED

SITUATION

Figure 2.2 Paths of action for citizens


there is great dissatisfaction, but there are also many people who have taken initiatives to resolve it, and these attempts at influence are frequently successful. It should also be added that in our survey, the labor market had the largest proportion of powerless people; 13 percent of those with gainful employment had been dissatisfied, had taken an initiative, but had failed. Silent impotence was most common, relatively speaking, in the medical care field. When the energy to take an initiative is lacking, the result is dissatisfaction which remains unexpressed.

The diagram also makes it clear that in practice, the successful exercise of power requires three steps. Step one is from a situation to dissatisfaction. It is very unusual for someone who is satisfied to take an initiative.⁷ If dissatisfaction is lacking, social energy is also lacking. The situation may be imperfect, but if the level of expectations is so low that one's living conditions have not been translated into dissatisfaction and demands, the prerequisite for action is also lacking. The first rule of social education is to learn how to make demands. The second step in the exercise of power is action, taking one's own initiatives, participating. The third step is the result, where the relative strengths of one's own forces and opposing ones work to one's advantage.

What has been described here is the process of exercising power. The model is admittedly simplified, but this stylization


7. For the sake of clarity, it should be pointed out that the fact that few satisfied people had taken any initiative can also be interpreted in the light of the retrospective nature of our questions. A person who was dissatisfied and took an initiative that was successful can then consider himself satisfied.

is specifically intended to emphasize some essential conditions that must be fulfilled to be able to speak of the successful exercise of power. By specifying these various steps, it also becomes possible to describe those situations where it is not justified to speak of the exercise of power. Such situations have turned out to be of fairly distinct kinds, This is because silence can be interpreted in two ways. One interpretation of silence is "no news is good news"; a person is satisfied and therefore finds no reason for action. This implies that if the person only wanted to and had a reason, he could very well take an initiative. The second way of interpreting silence is the vicious circle of impotence. A person is dissatisfied, finds his situation unacceptable, yet does not act. There is a barrier, a threshold between dissatisfaction and initiative. Perhaps the person does not dare to act, and perhaps he does not really know how to do so.



Figur 2.3 Handlingsvägar i sex medborgarsituationer

BOSTAD: HOUSING
 INKÖP: PURCHASES
 SJUKVÅRD: MEDICAL CARE
 BARNTILLSYN: CHILD CARE



Figur 2.3 Handlingsvägar i sex medborgarsituationer (forts.)

SKOLA: SCHOOL
ARBETE: WORK

Figure 2.3 Paths of action in six citizenship situations, cont.

Another way of illustrating these processes is to ask citizens directly what they think about their chances of having an impact. This is related to the subjective side of power -- how individuals assess their own ability to achieve influence. In this respect, too, the question has to be qualified. Because the life situation of citizens is so multifaceted and complex, no single and simple overall measure is sufficient. The interview technique must take into account that the same person may very well consider his chance of influence large in one respect, but very small in another.

Our actual method of formulating questions was very similar to the kind of measurement that was used to gauge the degree of dissatisfaction. The replies consisted of numbers between 0 and 10. These points refer to position along a scale. Questions about a person's own assessment of his chances of influence had in common that the end points of the scale bore the labels "no chance" (for a value of 0) and "very good chance" (for a value of 10).

Merely looking at an overview of this long series of questions provides new insights into citizens' chances of asserting their interests in the six areas of society studied here (Table 2.5). This is because the range of these subjective assessments was considerable. The situations that received the highest average figures, i.e. where those who were affected felt they had a good chance of influence, were repairing one's home and obtaining child care to the extent desired (both with a mean value of 7.0). The lowest average figure, 1.6, was recorded for how the parents of school children assessed their chances of influencing the organization and design of instruction programs.

Table 2.5 Assessment of chances to exercise influence

	Mean, 0-10
Housing	
Influencing how one's home will be repaired	7.0
Influencing outdoor amenities in one's residential area	4.1
Influencing housing expenses	3.8
Changing homes if one would like to	6.4
Average for housing	5.3
Capital goods purchase	
Chance to assess the quality of the product purchased	6.9
Chance to choose between different brands or models at the price one was willing to pay	6.3
Chance to decide whether the product purchased was the best at the price one was willing to pay	6.3
Average for capital goods purchase	6.5
Medical care	
Influencing aspects of medical care on which one may conceivably have preferences	3.8
Getting a sufficient amount of medical care	6.2
Choosing the doctor one wants	3.7
Changing to another medical office, outpatient clinic or ward if one would like to	3.6
Average for medical care	
Child care	
Influencing the structure and design of child care	4.5
Influencing the environment in which the children spend their time	3.7
Influencing the way the children relate to each other	3.9
Changing to another form of child care if desired	4.1
Getting the amount of child care desired	7.0
Average for child care	4.8

School

Influencing the structure and design of the instruction program	1.6
Influencing the design of the school environment	2.0
Influencing the way students relate to each other at school	2.9
Moving the child(ren) to another school if desired	2.7
Average for school	2.3

Work

Deciding when one's work will begin and end for the day	4.4
Deciding how one's own daily work will be organized	6.6
Influencing one's working environment	5.3
Influencing decisions about the general direction of one's work	4.6
For employees	
Changing to other working tasks for one's current employer if desired	4.0
Changing to another employer if desired	5.5
Average for work	5.2

In several cases, there were rather significant differences within the same areas. When it came to housing, there was a major gap between people's assessment of their ability to influence repairs (7.0), on the one hand, and their ability to influence housing expenses (3.8) on the other. In the medical care system, there was a relatively positive assessment regarding one's chances of getting a sufficient amount of care. In contrast, patients and their relatives felt it was harder for them to influence the shape of medical care and the choice of doctor and care facility.

The area that respondents rated the highest in terms of their own chances of exercising influence was the role of consumer. Those who had purchased major capital goods in the preceding year generally believed they had enjoyed a good chance of fulfilling the requirements to be informed consumers. The next highest assessments were for housing and work, which both scored averages above 5. Not far behind were child care and medical care. The area that finished dead last in terms of the affected citizens' own assessment of their chances of influence was the school system. Parents generally had a very negative assessment of their chances of influencing the instruction program, the school environment or the choice of their children's school.

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It now turns out that there is a statistical association between the actual exercise of power and the assessment of one's chances of influence. Personal experience of attempts at influence correspond to people's general assessment of their chances of exercising influence. Table 2.6 presents the respondents' average assessment of their chances of influence, both among those who had not taken any initiative and those who had tried to exercise influence.

The most interesting result of all concerns those who had tried to exercise influence but had failed. This is the main group that stands out. Its members had a far more pessimistic assessment of their chances of exercising influence. In contrast, there was a smaller difference between those who had made a successful attempt at influence and those who had taken no initiative at all. This is further evidence that silence does not necessarily mean powerlessness. Among those who abstained from activity was a large group who can be classified under the category "no news is good news." They were admittedly passive but had a relatively high opinion of their chances of influence. It

is of course by no means certain that this general assessment could actually be transformed into successful exercise of power if matters came to a head. But the data nevertheless indicate that potential deferred influence is substantially greater than manifest influence. Aside from those who actually become active, there is a sizable group who could activate themselves if they wished.

Table_2.6__Chances_of_influence:_experience_and_assessment_____

	Had made	Had attempted to influence:			Assoc- iation (r)
	no attempt at influence	Succeeded	Still uncertain	Failed	
Housing	45	46	38	30	0.21
Capital goods purchases	63	70	64	47	0.10
Medical care	31	32	18	9	0.37
Child care	32	46	22	18	0.38
School	3	5	6	0	0.23
Work	26	47	32	25	0.24

The figures indicate the percentage who felt they had a good chance of influencing their situation in each area. A good chance of exercising influence is defined here as 6 or higher on the 10-point scale.

These conclusions mean that our model can be modified once again. A person's own assessment of his ability to exercise influence may be described as one of the expectations

that constitute an important link between situation and action. What we have now been able to prove is that there is a link running backward from the results of exercising power and the psychological preconditions for action. Powerlessness and failed attempts at influence can easily lead to a negative spiral. Setbacks lead to a more pessimistic assessment, which in turn lowers a person's readiness to act. This vicious circle of powerlessness is part of the dynamic of social action.

A citizen's assessment of his chances of influence can be regarded as an overall yardstick of his feeling of being able to control his situation and run his own life.

A citizen's assessment of his chances of exercising influence are tied to his own experiences of attempts to exercise influence and to his material situation. People's perception of their room for action is just as strongly tied to their external living conditions as to various personality factors. Their housing situation can serve as an example. As mentioned earlier, respondents were asked to assess their chances of influencing four different aspects of housing: repairs, amenities outside their home, housing expenses and chances of changing homes. Table 2.7 shows how their replies differed by categories of residents.

Table 2.7 Perceived chance of influencing one's housing situation

	Chance_of_influence			Change	Mean
	Re-pairs	Out-doors	Ex-penses		
Rural area	8.1	6.5	6.1	6.2	6.7
Town	7.5	3.7	4.2	6.2	5.4
City (not town)	6.7	3.7	3.2	6.5	5.0
Major_city	6.0	3.6	2.3	6.4	4.6

Single-family home, farmhouse	8.1	6.4	6.1	6.2	6.7
Tract home	8.2	4.1	4.9	7.0	6.1
Apartment house	5.2	3.3	1.7	5.7	4.0
High-rise development	5.4	3.1	1.5	5.9	4.0
Own home	8.6	4.8	5.5	6.9	6.4
Housing cooperative: HSB or Riksbyggen	8.1	4.8	2.6	6.8	5.6
Housing cooperative: private	8.0	4.8	4.0	6.9	6.0
Rented home: municipal housing company	4.1	3.0	1.1	5.3	3.4
Rented home: private landlord	4.6	2.8	1.6	5.7	3.7
Rented home: sublet arrangement	3.9	1.6	1.0	2.3	2.2
Institution or other	3.8	3.0	2.6	5.1	3.6
Total	7.0	4.1	3.8	6.4	5.3

There was a very broad range between extremes. Renters felt they had very little chance of influencing the cost of their apartments. The mean figures were as low as 1.0 or slightly above this. The best chance of influencing housing was recorded for those who owned their home, where the question concerned their chance of arranging their own repairs. The differences among various forms of housing were fairly small, however, when it came to people's assessment of their chances of changing homes. Here, renters were not far behind homeowners. In spite of this, the highest average figure for the chance to influence housing was for owners of single-family and tract homes. One effect of this statistical association was also that people who lived in rural areas felt they had a better chance of influencing their housing than city dwellers.

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In closing, it should be noted that each of the six citizenship areas had its particular characteristics when it came to opportunities for influence, both in terms of people's experiences with their own initiatives and their assessment of the chances of exercising influence.

Housing was characterized by major differences between homeowners and renters. A relatively large category of people was dissatisfied with their housing situation but had not done anything to try to influence it. Among the six areas studied here, housing had the second largest percentage of people in the category "silent impotence."

The consumer role, which in this case concerned the purchase of capital goods, was different in a number of respects. The special nature of the market were clearly expressed here. The opportunity to assert one's own interests in a purchase situation was primarily determined by economic assets; the number of capital goods purchases was largest among high-income earners. The chance to exercise active influence was employed primarily in cases that involved correcting a problem after the purchase. This chance was utilized by relatively few consumers. Most consumers could be classified under the category "no news is good news."

Medical care showed the largest element of "silent impotence." There was relatively widespread dissatisfaction, which rather rarely found an outlet in independent action. Here the gap between the theoretical possibility of influence and concrete action was particularly wide. Being sick meant partially losing control both over one's body and one's situation.

Child care is a field where dissatisfaction was not especially widespread. Attempts to influence it were not particularly common, either. This area had the next highest percentage of respondents belonging to the category "no news is good news."

School is the area where those respondents who were affected, in this case synonymous with parents of school-aged children, felt they had the least opportunity to exercise influence. Despite the school system's goal of increasing local influence by users of the system, parents felt it was beyond their sphere of influence.

Work assumed an extreme position in two respects. The number of dissatisfied people here was larger than in any other area. But the percentage who had done something to change their situation was also larger than in other areas. Co-determination and institutionalized forms of on-the-job influence were definitely crucial here. There was a large group of people in the labor market who could be characterized as "successful wielders of power." They were dissatisfied people who took an initiative and who had their demands fulfilled.

+ + +

The various citizenship roles can be regarded as arenas of social action. They open up opportunities and sometimes even demand that the individual take initiatives, make contacts or participate in joint activities. This association between a citizenship role and personal participation may be of greater or lesser strength. In some cases, perhaps personal action is not formally required but there may be strong informal pressure to participate in various joint activities together with others in a similar situation.

Among the various citizenship roles that have been examined in this study, four are especially appropriate for personal participation by citizens. They are housing, child care, school and work. Table 2.8 provides an overview of how large a percentage of citizens actually participated in various citizenship activities. All figures refer to the respondents' participation during the year preceding their interview.

The importance of the exact percentage figures should not be exaggerated. As usual in interview-based studies, the distribution of replies was strongly affected by what questions were asked and how they were formulated. But even using a cautious interpretation, the data still clearly indicate that in housing, only a minority of people were involved in joint activities. Among the citizenship roles studied here, the ones featuring the liveliest participation were the two parental roles. Those who had children at a day care center or in school also felt strong pressure to show an interest and be active.

Table 2.8__Citizenship activities_____

	Percentage of those affected
Housing	
Had attended a meeting or otherwise been in touch with a tenants' association, contact committee, housing cooperative, homeowners' association, row house association or other residents' association	18
Had participated in any group activity, other than membership meetings, arranged by such an association	12
Had participated in some activity together with neighbors that was not arranged by a residents' association	19
Parents of preschool children (with child care outside the home)	
Had had a long talk with the person who takes care of the child(ren)	71
Had had a long talk with other parents whose child care is at the same place	39
Had participated in a group activity with other parents whose child care is at the same place	47
Had held an official position or helped arrange a group activity with parents whose child care is at the same place	10

The questions presented here measure only a small portion of the activities that are conceivable in citizenship contexts. But even these various measurements provide sufficient material to answer one question: To what extent did the same people show up in the various activities? The picture was fairly clear. Although there was no total correspondence, the general pattern was still clear. Within each area, there was a highly positive statistical association among different activities. A person who participated in one activity that involved relatively few people was highly likely to be found in a more commonly occurring activity.⁸

The number of chances to participate varies, of course, according to how many citizenship situations there are. A gainfully employed person with children both of preschool and school age could theoretically fill his or her entire free time with citizenship-related activities. If we wish to find a common denominator with which all citizens can be compared, we must take into account the number of roles there are. One simple yardstick is a person's actual participation, expressed as a percentage of the number of chances. In our survey, a person who was neither employed nor had children could be active in a maximum of three activities: those related to housing. For this person, three Yes

8. A scalability analysis was carried out for each of the four groups of indicators. Loevinger's H coefficient indicates how closely the pattern coincided with a perfect cumulative scale model. The coefficient values for housing, child care, school and work were 0.32, 0.58, 0.44 and 0.63 respectively. According to the rule of thumb stated in the literature, an H coefficient of over 0.30 is required to justify speaking of a scalable pattern. In all cases, this threshold was exceeded.

replies to the questions about housing-related activities were equivalent to the maximum, 100 percent. Corresponding percentages were calculated for all respondents. The average for the entire sample turned out to be 26 percent. Of the possible opportunities to participate, people took advantage of one fourth. The portion of the population scoring 0 percent, i.e. who were entirely passive in the respects discussed here, was one third.

Table_2.8__Citizenship_activities_(continued)

	Percentage of those affected
Parent of school children	
Had attended a parents' meeting or a parent-teacher talk	89
Had otherwise been in contact with a teacher or the school administration	65
Had been in contact with the Parent-Teacher Association	25
Had been in contact with other parents to talk about the children's schooling	54
Had served as a class mother/father	28
Gainfully employed person (employee)	
Had been in contact with a safety steward or other elected union representative on an issue related to conditions at the workplace	49
Had been in contact with a foreman or other representative of the employer on an issue related to conditions at the workplace	68
Had been a safety steward or had another position of trust at the workplace	17

The Citizen and the Authorities

The relationship between a citizen and the state is a combination of rights and obligations. A citizen has institutionalized rights to participate and influence the shape of public business in various contexts. But citizenship also implies that public agencies are entitled to make decisions about a citizen's life. The exercise of public authority means that the public sector is empowered to determine what benefits, rights, obligations, disciplinary actions or comparable conditions will apply to an individual.

A citizen's protection against the arbitrary exercise of public authority is regulated in a number of ways. The general principle that the state should be governed by laws is expressed in one of the introductory declarations in the Instrument of Government, which is part of the Swedish Constitution: "Public power shall be exercised under the laws." The rule of law involves a central element of predictability and normalcy. The Instrument of Government also stipulates that courts of law and administrative authorities must treat everyone equally before the law and must observe objectivity and impartiality.

There are a number of different methods for exercising control over the authorities and for ensuring that public agencies do not violate the above fundamental principles of government by law. Among the monitoring methods employed in the Swedish public administration system, the following can be mentioned: the monitoring roles of the Government and Parliament, appeals of decisions, the monitoring role of the courts, complaints to the European Court of Justice, the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Chancellor of Justice, outside auditing procedures, supervision by a higher-ranking agency or by a ministry, self-correction by agencies, layman membership on agency governing boards, consultation with the users of public services, the principle of

publicity (i.e. extensive access to public documents) and the establishment of internal norms.⁹

The most important method by which a citizen can obtain redress against a decision by a public agency in a particular case which the person affected considers improper is to appeal. The right of appeal has a long historical tradition in Sweden and is the most important element of "corrective legal protection." An appeal is a citizen's chance to have a wrongful decision reversed or corrected after the fact. In this case, the chance to influence one's situation consists of being able to state that an error has been committed, to make the public agency aware of this fact and to present one's complaint in such a way that this argument leads to a change by a higher-ranking public body.

The Swedish system for appealing and correcting administrative decisions differs from that of most other Western European countries. In English-speaking countries, with Britain and the United States as typical examples, the normal procedure is to appeal administrative decisions to public courts of law, which may reject decisions made on incorrect grounds. In Continental European states, the legality of decisions is examined in special administrative courts. In Sweden, administrative decisions can practically never be appealed to public courts of law. Appeals are made either to special administrative courts (mainly county administrative courts, administrative courts of appeal and the Supreme Administrative Court) or to the administrative agency with jurisdiction over the one that made the decision. What is

9. For an overview of how public agencies are monitored in Sweden, see, for example, Donald Söderlind and Olof Petersson, *Svensk förvaltningspolitik* (Swedish Public Administrative Policy), 2nd edition, Diskurs, Uppsala, 1988, chapter 6.

different about Sweden (and Finland) is that this appeal not only concerns the legality of decisions, but also their suitability. If an appeal is approved, the agency that heard the appeal may not only cancel the decision, but may also change its content.

Under the Swedish system, one might say that a decision by a public agency is provisional. In the last instance, an individual can "go to the king," i.e. have his case reviewed by the "king," synonymous today with either the Government or the Supreme Administrative Court. The right to present appeals to the king may be regarded as testimony to the fact that Sweden never had a feudal system under which local potentates enjoyed the equivalent of royal jurisdiction.¹⁰

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The system of appeals rests on one important precondition. In order for the procedure to work, a citizen must have the ability to make his complaint known. An incorrect decision is not automatically corrected. It requires an initiative, a statement from the person affected. The most important precondition from a citizen's standpoint is the ability to complain.

The interview survey contained one question which directly addressed this extremely central requirement for the actual implementation of the rule of law. The question was: "Could you personally take it upon yourself to write a letter appealing a decision by a public agency?" Two thirds, 67 percent, replied Yes. One third, 33 percent, replied No. At first, these figures may seem discouraging. Are one third of adult citizens incapable of asserting their rights against public agencies? The question nevertheless overlooks the fact that some citizens may admittedly

10. Nils Herlitz, *Svensk självstyrelse* (Swedish Self-Rule), Geber, Stockholm, 1933, p. 252.

feel uncertain of their own ability to write a formal letter but may still feel they can assert their rights by obtaining help from some other person. For this reason, an additional question was asked of those who had answered No to the first question: "Do you know anyone that you know you could get help from in such a case?" Of the one third who were asked this question, 69 percent now answered Yes, while 31 percent replied No here too. This means that of the entire population, 10 percent neither have the ability themselves nor know someone who can help them to appeal a decision by a public agency. Of course one can say that an overwhelming majority, 90 percent, fulfill the conditions for "administrative competence" in this sense. But it is still a serious fact that one tenth of Sweden's adult population today feel they lack the opportunity to appeal a decision by a public agency.¹¹

The question is how often an individual citizen has occasion to appeal a decision by a public agency. The frequency

11. A question worded almost the same way was asked in the 1984 government survey of Swedish living conditions (SCB ULF). Of respondents aged 16-84, 63.3 percent replied that they could personally write a letter appealing a decision by a public agency. Those who neither could do this themselves nor knew anyone who could help them numbered 7.5 percent of the total. See Politiska resurser (Political Resources), SCB, BE 40 SM 8601, p. 125. The ULF survey further states that an additional 2.7 percent felt they knew where to turn to get help, even if they did not know such a person (for example, an attorney, legal aid office or the like). This means that the percentage of citizens entirely lacking in opportunities to appeal a decision by a public agency fell to 4.3 percent. The time series from the living standard (LNU) studies between 1968 and 1981 are presented in Chapter 10 below.

depends on two circumstances: the number of decisions that affect a citizen and the proportion of faulty decisions. Even if the proportion of faulty decisions remains constant, the simple fact that public-sector operations have grown larger in recent years will mean that the importance of the appeals system has increased. Another factor is that formal requirements concerning letters of appeal have been loosened. The administrative reforms of recent years have emphasized that public agencies are obligated to provide good service. Agencies have been instructed to give their full attention even to appeals that do not fulfill the strict requirements of an earlier period in terms of their wording and structure.

It is difficult to ascertain how often the appeals system is used, for technical reasons related to the measuring process. It would actually be preferable to measure two aspects: the actual occurrence of faulty decisions and citizens' own assessments of how often the authorities have acted wrongly. These two aspects need not always coincide. Actual errors can pass undiscovered if those who are affected by them do not react. But a decision that is correct from the standpoint of administrative law may be regarded by a citizen as unreasonable or unfair. In that case, the appeals process may function at best as a public forum. The public agency is given the opportunity to explain its decision, and a superior agency or an administrative court is given the opportunity to examine the matter again. Although the citizen is by no means always satisfied with this process, it still provides a chance to correct any shortcomings in communications from the agency that made the original decision.

In this context, it has not been possible to conduct a study of the frequency of actual errors. The aspect examined here is the individual citizen's own assessment of the extent to which he is subjected to incorrect treatment by some public agency. To be specific, the question was: "During the past year, have you been incorrectly or unfairly treated by any state, county-council or municipal agency?" A total of 11 percent answered Yes,

Similar questions have been asked in earlier surveys. The replies have varied somewhat, mainly because the questions have had somewhat different emphases. The ULF study in 1984 asked whether "at any time" (i.e. not merely during the preceding year), the respondent had felt incorrectly or unfairly treated by certain specified public agencies, as well as by other "institutions and companies," such as insurance companies, employers, trade unions, repair shops, department stores, specialty shops, door-to-door salesmen and mail-order firms. The question thus covered a substantially broader spectrum, both in terms of time and contents. The percentage of respondents who felt they had been incorrectly or unfairly treated was consequently much higher: 43.6 percent. The institutions most often mentioned were a tax assessment committee (13.1 percent), a hospital or doctor (10.8 percent), a local social insurance office (9.5 percent) and an employer (9.4 percent).¹²

The 1981 study of living standards asked whether each of 17 specified public agencies/institutions had "at any time" treated the respondent incorrectly or unfairly. A total of 37.4 percent mentioned at least one such occasion. Those mentioned most often were a tax assessment committee (16.1 percent), a health insurance office (5.9), an insurance company (5.7) and a hospital or doctor (5.5).¹³ The ULF and LNU surveys consequently show fairly close agreement.

Using partly different methods of measurement, the three studies provide a general survey of citizens' dissatisfaction with public authorities. Those who assumed that the Swedes are an oppressed lot, constantly plagued with hatred and dissatisfaction

12. Politiska resurser (Political Resources), Be 40 SM8601, pp. 116 and 122.

13. Variabler och koder för LNU81 (Variables and Codes for the 1981 Study of Living Standards), Institute of Social Research, Stockholm, 1984, pp. 375-380.

toward overbearing authorities -- will find no support for this hypothesis in the available interview data. No matter how one counts, there is no majority who feel badly treated by public agencies and institutions. The category of citizens who consider themselves badly treated in some way by public agencies, institutions and companies is still, of course, far from negligible. About 4 out of 10 citizens can recall at least one such negative experience. But if, as in the present study, the perspective is limited to the past year and to state, county and municipal governments, dissatisfied citizens total 11 percent.

Now the question is whether these 11 percent tried to gain redress for their problem, and if so, what they did. When asked if they had tried "to gain redress or bring about a change," 86 percent replied Yes, 14 percent No. Expressed as a percentage of the entire population, somewhat more than one percent (14 percent of 11 percent) consequently felt that during the preceding year, they had been incorrectly or unfairly treated by a public agency, but for one reason or another had refrained from seeking redress.

Had been incorrectly treated and had:	Percentage of	
	These who had sought redress	The entire population
Telephoned the public agency	65	6
Wrote to the public agency	45	4
Visited the public agency	40	4
Appealed the decision in writing	37	3
Complained to the Parliamentary Ombudsman	3	0
Contacted politicians or a political party	4	0
Contacted the media or written a letter to the editor	2	0
Contacted an attorney or got other legal help	17	2
Contacted an organization or association	12	1
Responded in other ways	9	1

Those who had tried to gain redress or bring about a change were asked what action or actions they had taken (Table 2.9). The most common reaction when a citizen felt wrongly treated was a telephone contact. Nearly two thirds of those who felt they had been incorrectly or unfairly treated during the preceding year had tried to argue their case by phoning up the public agency. Visits and correspondence were also relatively common. More than one third, 37 percent, stated that they had appealed the decision in writing. All these percentages apply to the group who felt they had been badly treated. Calculated as a percentage of the entire population, such actions involved between 3 and 6 percent of the total. From this statistical average perspective, other safety valves turned out to be numerically less important; only a few respondents stated that they had complained to the Parliamentary Ombudsman, contacted politicians or alerted the media.

3. The Covariation of Citizenship Roles

The number of citizenship roles varies strongly from person to person. Yet only a tiny number of citizens interviewed in our survey were affected by only one of the six situations studied: 3 percent of the population fulfilled the criteria for one single role. These were people who were not gainfully employed, had no children under age 15, had made no major purchases and had not come into contact with the medical care system. Table 3.1 indicates the distribution of respondents by their respective numbers of roles.

Table_3.1__Number_of_applicable_citizenship_roles_____

Number_of_roles_____	Percentage_____
1 (housing only)	3
2	18
3	28
4	32
5	15
6 (all)	3
Total_percentage_____	100_____

Half the population were thus in a situation where four or more of these citizenship roles were applicable. The most extreme group -- those who at the same time were residents, patients/relatives of patients, consumers of capital goods, parents of preschool children, parents of school children and gainfully employed -- were admittedly no more than a small minority. But these citizen-heroes still constituted 3 percent of the population, i.e. a few hundred thousand people in all.

Most citizenship roles are age-related. The parental role and gainful employment are typically found in active age categories. Purchases of capital goods also vary greatly over a person's life cycle. This means that those citizens for whom all six roles are applicable are found overwhelmingly in the 30-40 year old age category.

The statistical associations between citizenship roles and the human life cycle are visible in the covariations of these roles. Certain role combinations are more common than others. Table 3.2 shows how often two roles are combined.

Table_3.2__Overlapping_citizenship_roles:_percentages

	Consumer	Patient	Preschool children	School children
Patient	53			
Parent of preschool child(ren)	11	12		
Parent of school child(ren)	14	14	6	
Gainfully employed	53	54	12	17

Of the entire population (aged 16-80), 14 percent had preschool children. The great majority of these parents were gainfully employed; those who both had preschool children and jobs constituted 12 percent. Those parents who had both preschool and school-age children numbered 6 percent of the population.

Mutual overlapping of citizenship roles can also be expressed in terms of statistical associations. If two roles were totally unrelated to each other, the association would be zero. If one of these roles were always connected to another role, the association would be maximal, or 1.0. Table 3.3 shows the associations that were observed in the citizenship survey.

Table 3.3 Overlapping citizenship roles: statistical associations

	Consumer	Patient	Preschool children	School children
Patient	0.07			
Parent of preschool child(ren)	0.12	0.10		
Parent of school child(ren)	0.13	0.05	0.25	
Gainfully employed	0.21	0.02	0.18	0.24

The figures in the table are product-moment correlations (r). In calculating statistical associations, this yardstick will be used henceforth unless otherwise stated.

The pattern should, above all, be interpreted as an expression of how these roles vary over a person's life cycle. The living situations that most often occur together are the two parental roles and the roles of gainfully employed person and capital goods consumer.

Now, from the standpoint of power, the most pivotal issue is to discover what associations there are in terms of ability to assert one's interests in various contexts. The previous chapter showed that there are clear differences between individuals. Some people are active, take initiatives to assert their interests, are successful in their attempts at influence and have a high opinion of their chances of exercising influence. Others are silent even though they are dissatisfied, remain passive and mistrust their own chances of action. So far, the analysis has been limited to studying each area of life by itself. The question now is whether people who are devoid of power in one particular life situation are also devoid of power in other respects. What is the association between the ability to assert one's interests in different areas of life?

The first interpretation of the computer material concerns activity levels. It is based on the questions that asked whether respondents had made any attempt during the preceding year to bring about improvements or resist deterioration for themselves or their family. The percentage of people who took such an initiative varied from 13 percent (consumer role) to 60 percent (labor market). The statistical association between the various areas of life is a measure of the cumulativeness of citizenship. A strong positive association means that those who are active and take initiatives in one respect are usually the same people who are active in another respect. Negative associations are an expression of complementary relationships: those who are active in one respect are passive in another and vice versa. Weak associations -- correlations around zero -- indicate that in this respect, the areas studied are unrelated to each other.¹

These associations were weakly positive (Table 3.4). On the one hand, this means there was a tendency toward cumulation. Citizens who were active in one area were often also found among those who were active in another. But these associations were not extremely strong in any instance. The highest correlation was found between child care and working life (0.25). This means that those who took an initiative during the year concerning their own preschool children had relatively often also tried to influence conditions at their own workplace.

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1. These correlations are based on the number of people in our interview sample who combined the roles in question. The association values will therefore be calculated on the basis of differing base figures. The base figures varied from 1,564 (combination of housing and patient) to 121 people (parents of preschool as well as school children).

Table 3.4 Statistical associations between initiatives in
different citizenship situations

	Housing	Consumer	Medical care	Child care	School
Consumer	0.11				
Medical care	0.13	0.07			
Child care	0.21	0.05	0.09		
School	0.15	0.13	0.18	0.19	
Work	0.18	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.17

But although these associations were in a positive direction, the fact that the correlations were relatively weak is the most important conclusion of all. This finding does not support the hypothesis that there is a small stratum of "elite citizens" who are responsible for a large proportion of total activity. The distribution of initiatives and activity in this respect is relatively even. If it were true that attempts to exercise influence formed a strongly cumulative pattern, it would be possible to summarize the computer material using a single scale. This was not the case.²

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There is an additional possibility for comparing the six areas. Within each of these various life situations, respondents were asked to assess their chances of influence. In the preceding

2. The hypothesis that the six variables form a cumulative, scalable pattern proved false. Mokken's homogeneity coefficient for the entire scale was $H = 0.23$.

chapter, the areas were compared with respect to total level: whether citizens felt they had good or bad chances of exercising influence. What now remains to examine are the statistical associations at the individual level. The question is whether those citizens who felt they had a good chance to influence their situation in one respect, such as housing, were the same people who assessed their chances of influence as good in another respect, too, such as work. Another advantage of this analysis is that respondents assessed their chances of influence in a number of different respects in the same area. This means it is possible to compare individual associations both within and between the various citizenship roles.

The most appropriate statistical method for testing this issue is some form of dimensional analysis, such as factorial analysis or principal component analysis. Put simply, such dimensional analysis is a way of finding out which qualities/variables "go together." If several qualities have strong mutual associations, but weak associations with other qualities, the latter will form their own separate dimension or "factor." One dimension can be viewed as an expression of the things that unite different qualities. Dimensional analysis is a way of summarizing a structure of associations, a pattern of correlations.

If it turned out that the same people consistently felt they had a good chance of influence, the correlations should be consistently positive. A cumulative pattern would be clear if the associations within each citizenship area were as strong as the associations between areas. In such a case, dimensional analysis would give a single overall dimension as the result. This dimension would be interpreted as meaning that citizens' chances of influence differed in one single respect. Some felt they had a good chance, others a poor chance. The assessment would be the same regardless of what life situation was being referred to.

An entirely different pattern is conceivable, however. Strong associations within areas, but weak or actually negative associations between areas would indicate that people's assessment of their chance of exercising influence is strongly dependent on sectors. A positive assessment of one's chances of exercising influence in housing, for example, could thus very well be combined with a negative assessment of one's chances of influencing conditions at the workplace. The pattern would be complementary here. Dimensional analysis would not result in a single dimension, but a number of mutually independent ones.

The statistical analysis is based on all conceivable correlations between questions as to how a person assesses his chances of exercising influence. Because the interview material contains 26 such questions, the number of comparisons between two replies is 325. For reasons of space, this entire big table of correlations will not be presented here. But the general pattern is summarized in clear fashion by dimensional analysis.

Table_3.5__Dimensional_analysis_of_assessed_chances_of_influence_____

	Dimension_number							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Dimension 1: Work								
When work will begin and end for the day	75	-01	00	00	05	-05	06	08
How daily work will be organized	80	-02	03	05	03	15	09	06
Working environment	72	05	14	12	06	-04	-01	17
Decisions on general direction of work	75	00	10	11	03	12	13	14
Dimension 2: Medical care								
Influencing medical care	-01	71	12	14	08	03	18	-07
Getting sufficient medical care	-04	69	03	04	09	05	22	-09
Choosing the doctor	03	73	03	02	-01	01	-09	04
Changing medical office, outpatient clinic or ward	00	60	-01	00	-08	26	-01	36

Dimension 3: Housing								
How home will be repaired	09	03	80	02	05	-02	11	02
Outdoor amenities in residential area	04	06	72	-02	05	21	-12	-02
Housing expenses	10	05	79	10	06	-02	08	00
Changing homes	04	07	40	10	14	-10	30	35
Dimension 4: School								
Structure and design of instruction program	08	-08	-05	79	01	10	19	06
Design of school environment	13	19	16	75	00	-06	07	-16
How students relate to each other at school	06	16	05	73	-03	30	-05	10
Moving child(ren) to another school	17	41	04	27	09	-10	-19	44
Dimension 5: Capital goods purchase								
Assessing quality of product purchased	06	03	00	04	80	16	02	-01
Choosing between brands or models	06	04	12	02	69	-02	01	07
Deciding whether product purchased was best	04	03	06	-07	84	10	05	06
Dimension 6: Child care -- focus								
Structure and design of child care	-03	00	-01	11	16	62	47	-04
Environment in which children spend time	20	10	04	02	05	76	00	-09
How children relate to each other	-03	09	09	21	14	75	-07	19
Dimension 7: Child care -- amount								
Changing to another form of child care	19	14	02	13	-03	21	70	01
Getting desired amount of child care	09	07	10	03	04	-11	74	07
Dimension 8: Opportunity to choose								
Changing to other working tasks	16	06	02	02	06	-05	10	64
Changing to another employer	16	-08	-01	-09	03	12	-01	66

All loadings have been multiplied by 100.

Given the customary criteria for this type of analysis,³ the number of dimensions will be eight. Table 3.5 shows the "loadings,"

3. The number of factors is determined according to the "Kaiser criterion"; factors with an eigenvalue larger than 1 are included.

which can be interpreted as measures of the statistical relationship between the respective variables and dimensions. The eight dimensions have been labeled on the basis of those variables with the strongest loadings for each respective dimension.

The first dimension was characterized mainly by the four questions that measure the respondent's assessment of his own ability to influence conditions at the workplace. These questions were asked both of employees and business owners. The replies to these four questions had strong mutual associations; the correlations varied between 0.39 and 0.54. Those who felt they had a good chance of influencing decisions on the general direction of work were ordinarily also those who believed they could influence the working environment; those who had little chance of deciding when work would begin and end for the day also believed they have scant influence on how daily work would be organized, etc. These strong associations within one area are perhaps not so surprising. Less expected is the fact that assessments of one's influence at the workplace had such weak associations with a respondent's views about the chance of exercising influence in other contexts. For example, quite a few people felt they had little chance of influencing working conditions, but on the other hand felt they had considerable influence over their own housing situation.

This general pattern of relatively strong associations within each area and weak associations between areas is expressed in the dimensional analysis. These dimensions mainly describe one area each. Work, medical care, housing, school and the consumer role each essentially form their own rather clearly defined dimension. How the parents of preschool children assessed their chances of influence could not, however, be captured by a single factor. Dimensions 6 and 7 indicate that the assessment

of child care occurred mainly on the basis of two criteria. Three questions -- the ones about the structure and design of child care, the environment in which the children spend their time and the way the children relate to each other -- may be regarded as three indicators of a person's ability to influence the quality of child care. But two other questions -- the ones about the possibility of changing to another form of child care and getting sufficient child care -- primarily measure a quantitative aspect of child care: the chance to choose the desired amount of care.

The eighth and last dimension is not entirely discrete. It consists primarily of two questions asked of employees. These questions were about the chances of changing to other working tasks and of changing to another employer. But the dimension also includes some of the answers to three other questions having to do with opportunities to make changes: the opportunity to change housing, change to another medical office or clinic/ward, and move one's children to another school.

The general result of this dimensional analysis is completely clear, however. Respondents' assessments of their own chances to exercise influence within a given area were rather weakly related to their corresponding assessment in another area. Powerlessness in one field was often compensated by influence in another.

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The eighth factor in the above analysis points toward an interesting hypothesis. There still seems to be one special common denominator across the various areas. Can it possibly be true citizens' assessment of their opportunity to change cumulates and shows covariations over so many different areas?

This hypothesis can be tested, because even while designing the questions we took into account that there are two different strategies for influencing conditions in a given area. In a famous book, the American economist Albert Hirschman formulated these two strategies in terms of exit and voice.⁴ If a person is dissatisfied with an organization or a product, for example, one possible response is to give it up, leave it, and switch to another alternative. The other strategy is to make one's voice heard, to complain, to protest. One of these need not, of course, exclude the other, but the division between exit and voice has turned out in many contexts to be a clarifying distinction. These two concepts illustrate that there are two different ways to express one's dissatisfaction.

The citizenship survey contained eight questions in which respondents could directly assess their chances of making a change. The breakdown of replies was presented in the preceding chapter, but it may still be of interest to see how different life situations are grouped according to citizens' assessments of their chances of switching to some other alternative. As earlier, these figures are based on replies by people for whom each life situation is relevant (Table 3.6).

4. Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1970.

Table 3.6 Chances to make a change

	Mean (0-10)
Changing homes	6.4
Choosing between different brands or models at the price one is willing to pay (capital goods purchases)	6.3
Changing to another employer	5.5
Changing to another form of child care	4.1
Changing to other working tasks	4.0
Choosing the doctor one wants	3.7
Changing to another medical office, clinic or ward	3.6
Moving the children to another school	2.7

Once again, the general result from the preceding chapter is confirmed. Among the six areas examined in this survey, the one in which citizens believed they had the least influence was the school system. The replies still referred to the way parents assessed their children's schooling; the alternative choice here was the opportunity to move them to another school if so desired. Medical care also ended up far down the list in this ranking of opportunities to exercise influence. Patients and their relatives believed they had relatively little chance to choose doctors or switch to another medical office, outpatient clinic or ward.

The paired correlations between replies to questions about alternative choices provided a measure of the extent to which a citizen's assessment of his alternative actions in one respect agreed with his corresponding assessment in other area. The very closest association, hardly unsurprisingly, was recorded for two questions that dealt with the same area. A person's opinion

of his chances of switching doctors naturally had a strong correlation with his opinion on his chances of switching medical offices, clinics or wards (0.46). There were a few other correlations of similar weight; changing medical offices, clinics or wards, for example, showed a covariation of 0.30 with changing schools. All this notwithstanding, the general impression is that these statistical associations were relatively low (the average correlation stood at 0.08). Although the above dimensional analysis indicated that questions of alternative choices tend to be related, a separate dimensional analysis of the eight "exit" questions yields no unambiguous results.⁵

Our interpretation has to be the same as the general pattern in assessing one's own chance of exercising influence. Statistical associations within sectors may have been rather strong, but associations between areas were generally weak. A lack of ability to assert one's interests in one context was often compensated by a greater ability in some other context.

But this conclusion must still be hedged with one important reservation. Associations between areas were by no means negative; it is not true that those who felt they had little influence over their working conditions normally felt they had a great influence on, say, their housing. In spite of everything, there was a positive association here -- the important thing here is that this association was not so strong. There are many exceptions to the "vicious circle" principle. It is far from true that impotence in one area always leads to impotence in another.


5. Applying the Kaiser criterion, the number of factors was three. The first was based primarily on questions about doctors, medical offices and schools. The second factor was hardly discrete; the highest loadings were recorded for employers, working tasks and housing; but schools, forms of child care and brands also had relatively high loadings.

One way of illustrating this major finding, as well as summarizing some of the most important data from the citizenship survey, is with the statistical associations presented in Table 3.7. This table is no longer based on individual interview questions, but on the summary indexes presented in Chapter 2. Within each area, we calculate the mean value of replies concerning what chances people felt they had to exercise influence. In principle, every index could vary between 0 and 10; the latter reply would indicate a person who consistently felt he had maximal opportunities to influence his situation within the area in question. The table shows the associations between each of the six areas (Table 3.7). The correlations were positive but comparatively weak.

Just as it is possible to calculate an average in each area, it is naturally also possible to calculate the mean for all six fields. This provides an overall measure of how citizens assessed their chances of influencing their total situation, including all the life situations under study. The actual distribution of this average index is of great interest. If it were true that a large group of citizens consistently had a low opinion of their chances of influencing their situation, the overall index would reflect this by including such a large group with a low average. Correspondingly, in the upper portion of the index one can distinguish a category who consistently felt they possessed a good chance at influence.

Table 3.7 Associations between perceived chances of influencing different citizenship situations

	Housing	Consumer	Medical care	Child care	School
Consumer	0.19				
Medical care	0.16	0.09			
Child care	0.22	0.17	0.21		
School	0.20	0.03	0.28	0.23	
Work	0.22	0.15	0.05	0.22	0.21



Figur 3.1 Bedömning av möjligheter att påverka sin egen situation: frekvensfördelning

Frequency

Chances of influencing one's own situation (mean value)

Figure 3.1 Assessment of chances of influencing one's own situation: frequency distribution

It turns out, however, that these extreme cases were very few in number (Figure 3.1). The bulk of citizens ended up in the middle of the scale. They included people who consistently rated their chances of influence as middle-sized or people who sometimes gave high figures and sometimes low ones. In both cases, the final result was an average near the middle.

Extremely few citizens thus felt they were entirely lacking in chances to exercise influence in the various stages of life. Nor were there many people who felt they had a full opportunity to exercise influence in every situation that arose. Calculated across the entire citizenship spectrum, the picture was neither one of impotence nor of effective influence.


+ + +

So most respondents ended up somewhere in the middle of the scale. As already indicated, this group had a mixed composition. In principle, there was a significant difference between those who, on the one hand, felt they had a modest overall chance of exercising influence and those who, on the other hand, felt they were very strong in one respect but very weak in another.

One of the sustaining concepts of modern sociology is that societies are characterized by an increasingly far-reaching division of labor and specialization. Is there such a trend when it comes to citizenship roles as well? Will a citizen become an expert in his own occupational field, a specialist within a limited portion of public life?

What this concerns is variations at an individual level. Statistically, it is no more complicated to calculate how much each individual's assessments vary from one area to another than to calculate an individual's mean value. Each individual can thus be assigned two values: mean and standard deviation. The first figure represents his average chance of exercising influence; these are the values illustrated in Figure 3.1. The second figure is a yardstick of how much the average figure for each respective sector varies from the individual's total average. If an individual should state the same level of opportunities in different areas to exercise influence, the variation would be minimal; the standard deviation would equal zero. A high standard deviation, on the other hand, would indicate that his assessments of his chances of influence varied sharply from one field to another.

Examples of people with high standard deviations are the one who believes he has a full chance of influencing his housing, but who feels completely powerless in facing the medical care system; one who believes he lacks an opportunity to influence his children's schooling, but who feels in a strong position as a consumer; one who finds himself lacking an opportunity to influence his working conditions but who can arrange his housing the way he wants.



Figur 3.2 Bedömning av möjligheter att påverka: frekvensfördelning för inomindividuella variationer mellan olika medborgarsituationer .

Frequency

Chances of influencing one's own situation (standard deviation)

Figure 3.2 Assessment of chances to exercise influence: frequency distribution of intra-individual variations between different citizenship situations

Figure 3.2 shows how these individual measures of variation were distributed in the entire sample. Most people had fairly low standard deviations. Their assessments of their own chances of influence did not vary dramatically from one area to another. But in addition, there was a minority distinguished by high standard deviations. In other words, a number of citizens had strongly divergent perceptions of their chances of influencing different situations.

4. Influencing the Situation of the Country

What is meant by democracy? In public discourse, there are two major schools, two main perceptions of the meaning of democracy: the concept of direct democracy and the concept of representative democracy. Before specifying the essential differences between them, however, it is important to point out that the advocates of these two doctrines agree on a number of fundamental points. There is consensus between them that the following requirements are necessary, but perhaps not always sufficient, prerequisites for viewing a society as democratic.

1. Those who are affected by a decision must be able to influence it.
2. To the extent that representatives are chosen, those who are affected must be entitled to select who will represent them.
3. Those who are in opposition must have the opportunity to mold opinion. Among other things, this requires freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
4. Citizens must have the right to establish and be members of free organizations to be able to protect their interests.
5. The majority must be entitled to make binding decisions for everyone, but the majority is not entitled to make constitutional changes that weaken the equal rights of the minority. The position of the minority is protected by constitutional freedoms and rights.¹

1. Gundmund Hernes and Willy Martinussen, *Demokrati og politiske ressurser* (Democracy and Political Resources), NOU 1980:7, p. 84; Robert A. Dahl, "Procedural Democracy," in *Democracy, Liberty, and Equality*, Norwegian University Press, Oslo, 1986, pp. 191-225.

The common denominator of these two doctrines of democracy is the concept of popular sovereignty. The wishes of the citizenry are to be translated with the help of some kind of procedure into collective, authoritative decisions. What distinguishes the two approaches to democracy is what exact type of governing method should be employed.

The doctrine of direct democracy maintains that democracy is realized to the extent that all citizens personally take part in political decision-making. The power of the people consists of the right of co-determination and direct participation. The doctrine of representative democracy instead states that the constitutive criterion of democracy is free competition -- the fact that a number of parties are able to compete in free elections.² The power of the people consists of the right to change rulers.

The differences between supporters of direct and indirect democracy are expressed in a number of ways. Their attitudes toward referendums are one example: participatory democrats have a positive view of this opportunity for the citizenry to decide the outcome of political issues directly; the advocates of representative democracy, in contrast, are opponents of the concept of giving referendums more than a marginal role in the political process.

At times, the debate between these two doctrines reveals differing assessments of the political competence of the citizenry. Supporters of representative democracy have often expressed a pessimistic view. They have indicated that by and

2. Cf. Kaare Strím, "Konkurrensdemokratiet" ("Competitive Democracy"), *Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift*, 4, 1988, pp. 227-243.

large, voters lack the knowledge required to make decisions on important political issues. They have therefore been able to view lack of participation as something positive -- apathy means that representative institutions can work in greater harmony and with fewer disruptions. Participatory democrats obviously have another opinion. First, they believe that the ability of citizens to participate personally and make decisions is far greater than their opponents state. Second, they argue that participation itself has a positive effect on political competence: by participating personally, people are schooled in political awareness.³

This division into two theoretical camps is an analytic stylization, a simplification into two extreme poles. In practice, there are nuances and mixtures of both.

Current debate on democracy in Sweden is still being conducted using arguments closely akin to these two main doctrines. It is no exaggeration to state that the current climate of debate favors direct democracy. Such participatory democracy is viewed, openly or implicitly, as the genuine and original form of democracy.

3. For a summary of the two doctrines of democracy, see for example Hernes and Martinussen, 1980, p. 86. Danish research, too, is based on this classification: see Erik Damgaard, ed., *Folkets veje i dansk politik* (The Role of the People in Danish Democracy), Schultz, Copenhagen, 1980, pp. 18 ff. Cf. the classification into "normativists" and "functionalists" in Leif Lewin, *Folket och eliterna* (The People and the Elites), Almqvist & Wiksell, 1970. The participatory democracy perspective is developed in Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory*, Cambridge University Press, 1970, and in Dennis F. Thompson, *John Stuart Mill and Representative Government*, Princeton University Press, 1976.

"Move Decision-Making Closer to the People!" is the characteristic title of a Swedish Government-appointed commission report -- one of a long series of recommendations in recent years aimed at strengthening democracy.⁴

Whether the operative slogan is decentralization, grass-roots democracy or user influence, the same concept underlies the democratic reforms that are being debated. The people who are affected should make their own decisions. According to this concept, the power to make decisions must be transferred to people who have a direct, personal interest in the issue at hand.

This line of reasoning suffers from one crucial weakness. It is based on confusing power with geography. A spatial metaphor has played a trick. It is as if the desire to reduce the "distance" between decisions and results has led to the conclusion that geographic distance, too, must be reduced. Competence and territory flow together.

If this perception of the meaning of democracy is to be regarded as the only valid one, the consistent conclusion must be that all public-sector decisions should be transferred to those who are directly affected. The social ideal that hovers over this perception of democracy is the small, clearly defined community characterized by proximity, personal relationships and genuine openness.

This ideal nevertheless stands in sharp contrast to some of the main features of modern society. As Karl Popper has pointed

4. Decentraliseringsutredningens principbetänkande (Theoretical Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Decentralization); SOU 1978:52.

out, the modern open society has an abstract character. Many relationships between people are impersonal and anonymous. Markets, exchanges and cooperation take place between people who are not acquainted with each other or who lack deep, lasting or emotional ties.⁵

Mental images of these two societal models are the village and the big city. The closed world of the little village encompasses a small group of people who know each other well, who are united by common ties of kinship and customs and who jointly run their own affairs. The big city is characterized by openness, contemporaneity and a countless number of individuals, each one fulfilling his life project. They are united in a complex, constantly changeable network of temporary encounters and anonymous relationships.

These two societal models are theoretical stylizations. No actually existing society today can be described as a pure "village" or "big city." Actual societies include both "concrete" elements in the form of personal relationships and "abstract," anonymous elements. The mixture between these two types of relationships may vary greatly from one society to another.

This classification into two discrete models draws attention to the fact that the general principle of democracy (or popular sovereignty, autonomy, self-determination; these terms are regarded here as synonyms) can be realized in two different ways. Let us call them microdemocracy and macrodemocracy.⁶

5. Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, I, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1966, pp. 174-175.

6. This distinction is made in Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, 1, Chatham House, New Jersey, 1987, p. 11.

Microdemocracy means that a group of people decide their joint affairs through direct personal cooperation. Residents themselves have the power to decide how the playground outside the building will be organized. Employees decide when they will take vacations. The members of the sports club decide how the soccer field will be used. Neither the market, political decisions, rulings by civil servants nor agreements determine the outcome. A group of citizens makes the decisions that affect their own situation.

Macrodemocracy means making decisions about collective concerns via abstract institutions. Democracy in this sense presupposes two things: a state, and popular control of this state. The state, the legal system and the administrative system are an instrument or tool for carrying out joint projects. Popular control is exercised through civil liberties and rights, universal suffrage and free opinion-molding. Macrodemocracy presupposes political parties. These parties formulate general ideological programs: coherent sets of opinions about society as a whole.

The main doctrine of popular sovereignty has been formulated in classic fashion in the opening passage of the Instrument of Government, a part of the Swedish Constitution: "All public power in Sweden emanates from the people." But as a description of how democracy actually works, this proud slogan is deceptive. The formulation suggests that power is a substance, a thing that originally rests with the people and that somehow springs forth or emanates from the people. It is more realistic to assume that public power rests with political decision-makers. Even in a democracy, power is unevenly distributed. Measured in actual influence on decisions, a member of the Government has incomparably greater power than a citizen in general. What distinguishes democracy is that citizens are able to demand that

their rulers take responsibility for their decisions. The importance of general elections is based on the assumption that in their role as voters, citizens are offered two or more alternatives: the policies of the Government or those of the opposition.

The distinction between micro- and macrodemocracy is, of course, a simplification. The way decisions are made about a country's common concerns is not always clearly attributable to one category or the other. There are intermediate forms and borderline cases. Municipal self-government combines elements of both microdemocracy and macrodemocracy; otherwise, developments at the municipal level from the 1950s onward were characterized by a process in which macrodemocratic features displaced an older type of government that was closer to the microdemocratic model.

The distinction between microdemocracy and macrodemocracy serves the purpose of highlighting the theoretical dissimilarities between different methods of government aimed at putting self-determination by the citizenry into practice.

There is an intricate relationship between microdemocracy and macrodemocracy. It is not possible to present these two models as each other's opposite poles, as two mutually exclusive categories. It is thus not necessary to take a stand in favor of one and against the other. What can be criticized, however, are attempts to present one model as an alternative to the other or to bridge over the differences between them.

If microdemocracy is attacked because it lacks the special features of macrodemocracy, this critique is misdirected. The collective decisions of groups of citizens on common concerns can be realized without employing the entire arsenal of representative democracy. Differences of opinion concerning the distribution of practice times at the local sports center can be resolved without citing major ideologies.

A similar and equally misguided attack on macrodemocracy argues that it lacks the qualities of microdemocracy. Conflicts between political parties, the creation of compromises, the establishment of standards, bureaucracy (in the sense of administration governed by rules) and legal sanctions are just as alien to microdemocracy as they are indispensable elements of macrodemocracy. The dream of the victory of microdemocracy over macrodemocracy is synonymous with the dream of democracy without politics.

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One crucial point in the debate on democracy is its approach to citizen participation in politics. One school has considered it vital to broaden participation in various ways, while the other school has not seen high levels of participation as equally vital, and has even regarded it as a threat to the smooth functioning of representative democracy.

There is, of course, a close association between democracy, in the sense of self-determination by the citizenry, and participation. The problem is that participation cannot be regarded as the decisive criterion of the realization of true democracy. In that case, democracy would require maximum participation, a citizenry constantly attending meetings. The criterion that distinguishes democracy should instead be formulated in terms of rights. Democracy has been realized to the extent that citizens have genuine opportunities to influence those decisions that affect them, elect their representatives, mold opinion and form free organizations.

As Michael Walzer has pointed out, "democracy requires equal rights, not equal power."⁷ Here, rights mean guaranteed

7. *Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p. 309.

opportunities to exercise a minimum of power (suffrage) and to exercise a greater measure of power (freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the right to present demands).⁸ It is not legitimate for the winner, the majority, to use its unequal power to deprive the loser, the minority, of its freedoms and rights. The winner admittedly has the right to say that, having won the confidence of a majority, it is thereby entitled to govern the minority as well. But it would be synonymous with tyranny to say that it therefore has the right to govern forever. Political rights are permanent guarantees, Walzer continues; they are the basis for an endless process, a never-ending exchange of opinions. In democracy, every situation is temporary. No citizen can claim to have persuaded his friends once and for all. New citizens appear, and every citizen is entitled to voice his views anew. It is therefore not correct to characterize the ideal model of democracy as a situation where political power is evenly distributed at any given time. The demand for equal distribution applies, however, to the opportunity to achieve political power. "Every citizen is a potential participant, a potential politician."⁹

A study of how democracy operates in practice requires that attention be focused on three aspects: what citizens get, what citizens know and what citizens actually do. What citizens get is a statement of their formal democratic rights. These rights are a necessary, but insufficient, criterion to be able to speak of an actual functioning democracy. Formal rights must also be accompanied by resources and knowledge, by the ability to take advantage of these rights. Functioning democracy nevertheless also requires something beyond general knowledge: activity.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., pp. 309-310.

In a way, the relationship between participation and democracy is paradoxical. On the one hand, not everyone needs to participate. But on the other hand, some must participate. Politics can never be reduced to an automatically operating machine (although many utopias have hoped for this), but instead consists of the creative actions of people. Political man, homo politicus, is an inevitable element of every society. Political activity is not a necessary prerequisite for every individual, but at the same time is a necessary prerequisite for society as a whole.

Although the extent of participation should not be regarded as the decisive criterion of democracy, information that shows who participates is naturally still very interesting if one wishes to characterize how the democratic process actually works in a society. How similar or dissimilar to other citizens is "political man"?

Nor is political participation something given, once and for all. The scale of participation may vary greatly over time, both for the society as a whole and for individuals. In periods of calm, politics may be the concern of a relatively small number of people; in times of crisis and instability a larger proportion of the citizenry may be drawn into political action. For an individual, times of heated involvement may alternate with periods of withdrawal from public affairs. There are whole theories of such cyclical swings between public and private life.¹⁰

Even if no democratic doctrine can require people to feel obligated to be constantly active in politics, it can be convincingly argued that the citizen of a democracy must possess some preparedness to intervene in politics. "Although no

10. Albert O. Hirschman, *Shifting Involvements: Private Interests and Public Action*, Princeton University Press, 1982.

democratic system can be based on constant political activity by all citizens, the prerequisite is still that the citizens are potentially capable of representing their own interests as needed, and in any event that a minority is also prepared to assume a more lasting and intensive political involvement," according to German political scientist Fritz Scharpf.¹¹

A survey of political participation on any given date is therefore a study of which citizens have found reason to move from preparedness to practical activity at that particular time.

The participation that is actually observed can easily be misinterpreted, both in the direction of underestimation and overestimation. Focusing on active citizens ignores those citizens who are prepared to act but have not found a motive to become involved, for one reason or another. This fact is one part of the problem of interpreting silence. Silence and passivity may be as much an expression of satisfaction and self-confidence as of impotence and frustration. Measuring the number of active people may therefore underestimate the potential political ability of citizens.

On the other hand, observing political participation may lead to overestimation. Activity does not necessarily imply influence. Attempts to exercise influence may fail; a high level of participation may be an indication of a people's desperate actions to assert their interests.

The interpretation of the meaning of political activity therefore depends on citizens' own assessments and feeling of being able to exert influence, their view of the legitimacy of the

11. Fritz W. Scharpf, *Demokratietheorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung*, Scriptor, Kronberg, 1975, pp. 71-72.

political system. These issues will be addressed later in this book. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a survey of political participation in Sweden today.¹²

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The voters have no power between elections. This statement is not some more or less sensational research finding from political science, but a pure platitude, a truism. As a social creature, a citizen has many different roles. One of these is as a voter. On election day, a citizen has the right to choose representatives in political bodies. His power as a voter consists only of the act of voting. Between elections, a citizen can exercise influence in a number of different ways, but in roles other than that of voter.

On election day, the voter is sovereign. Voter turnout is a measure of how many citizens take advantage of this right. Under Sweden's current election system, introduced in the early 1970s, voter turnout for parliamentary elections has been around 90 percent or slightly less (Table 4.1).

A turnout of 85-90 percent is a high figure but is internationally not unique. At the last two elections, in 1985 and 1988, voter turnout admittedly declined, but the category of Swedes who never vote is extremely small nowadays. Studies indicate that there is relatively significant turnover among non-voters. About half of those who do not vote in a particular election usually vote in the next one. This means, on the other hand, that the percentage of those eligible who always go and vote is lower than 90 percent. Those who vote in three consecutive elections number a bit over 80 percent.¹³

12. Political participation in Sweden will be discussed in greater detail in Göran Blomberg's doctoral dissertation.

13. Olof Petersson, *Väljarna och valet 1976* (The Voters and the Election, 1976), *Valundersökningar, rapport 2* (Election Studies, Report 2), SCB/Liber, 1977, p. 156.

The fact that the overwhelming majority of eligible voters actually exercise their suffrage nowadays means that one of the most fundamental requirements of representative democracy has been fulfilled. But the next question is what a person's choice of political party actually means. One of the most controversial issues in international election research concerns the degree of rationality in the act of voting. Do the voters fulfill the necessary requirements related to information, consistency and good sense for the outcome of the election to be interpreted as an enlightened expression of citizen opinion, as a mandate based on objective reasons and presented to their ruling representatives? Looking at Sweden today, the research findings seem fairly clear. When election researcher Sören Holmberg summarizes his surveys of the voters, a bright picture of the functioning of representative democracy emerges:¹⁴

- o Most voters have firm opinions on current political issues.
- o There is a clear association between their views and choice of party. This association, a measure of the extent to which voting behavior is based on political opinions, also tends to become stronger over the years.
- o A majority of the voters have correct perceptions of what positions the parties take on issues raised in the election campaign.
- o Changes of party are clearly associated with voters' positions on the issues.

Holmberg rounds off by saying: "The conclusion of our analysis of the existence of political views among Swedish voters and the voting based on these views is thus surprisingly positive. On the basis of our results, one cannot argue that Swedish democracy works poorly at the voter level."¹⁵ The prevailing view among

14. Sören Holmberg, *Väljare i förändring (Voters in Transition)*, Liber, Stockholm, 1984, pp. 232 ff.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 235.

political scientists on the relationship between the ideals of representative democracy and reality is thus a bright one: the high voter turnout and the rationality of the act of voting mean that the election results can be interpreted as a genuine expression of public opinion.

Table_4.1__Voter_turnout_in_parliamentary_elections,_1970-1988__

Election_year_____	Voter turnout in_percent_____
1970	88.3
1973	90.8
1976	91.8
1979	90.7
1982	91.4
1985	89.9
1988	86.0

This description of the relationship between ideals and reality can be supplemented with data on municipal democracy. The series of mergers that reduced the number of Swedish municipal governments from 2,500 in 1950 to fewer than 300 today was accompanied by a strongly voiced concern that municipal democracy might shift away from the democratic ideal. As early as the 1950s, the debate on the proposed municipal mergers declared that the relationship between democracy and efficiency posed a dilemma. The cutback in the number of municipal governments was guided primarily by demands for efficiency. The small, old-style municipalities would not have large enough population and tax bases to be able to sustain the planned expansion in the

social welfare system. The school system, old age care and other social services required larger units. Municipalities faced heavy pressure to expand their business sectors, housing stock, meeting facilities, libraries, sports grounds and sewage treatment plants. But how would democracy function in the new super-municipalities? In its 1961 proposal on merging small municipalities into larger blocs, the Social Democratic Government explicitly discussed the conflict between efficiency and democracy. It is not always possible to combine efficiency and democracy; the Government spoke of a "matter of tradeoffs."¹⁶ One could of course hope that democracy would not have to be weakened, but there was no guarantee. In the situation then prevailing, the demand for efficiency was accorded greater weight than the risk of weakened democracy. The series of municipal mergers was implemented.

A quarter of a century later, after extensive studies, political scientists conducting research on municipal government arrived at a conclusion which -- to quote one research director -- was "unexpectedly positive": "Granted that municipal democracy had undergone far-reaching changes, it had nevertheless quickly found its new form and, on the whole, appeared to be working well."¹⁷ Municipal democracy has become more similar to the representative democracy that exists at the national level. The media follow municipal issues more intensively. Municipal politicians are highly representative of voters' views. The citizenry is knowledgeable, interested and active.¹⁸

16. Government bill 1961:80, p. 47.

17. Jörgen Westerståhl, *Staten, kommunerna och den statliga styrningen* (The State, Local Governments and State Control), Stat-kommunberedningen, civildepartementet (Ministry of Public Administration), 1987, p. 25.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

Studies of municipal democracy thus merely confirm the conclusion reached by the election studies. Representative democracy works relatively well today, according to political science researchers.

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Yet only a small fraction of citizens are active in political parties on a day-to-day basis. The figures cited in the following section are based on the interviews conducted during the citizenship survey in late 1987. As usual, these numbers should be regarded as approximations -- as estimates based on a random sample. The wording of the questions has not always been chosen by us. To facilitate comparisons with questions asked in older studies, their wording has been kept unchanged. The opportunity to compare responses in order to examine any changes over time will be utilized in Chapter 10. Table 4.2 presents breakdowns of the responses to some of the survey's questions about political activity.

Those who stated that they were members of a political party or political body numbered 15 percent of all respondents. Those who are or have been "politicians" in the sense that they hold or once held an elected post in the municipality, county council or Parliament totaled 6 percent. Those who held such an elected post at the time of the interview numbered 2 percent. One tenth had attended a political meeting or gathering during the preceding year. Political participation in this sense thus involved only a small minority of the population.

If the meaning of political participation is expanded to include other forms of activity besides pure party politics, the percentage of respondents who are active becomes higher. Around 30 percent of all respondents had participated in a demonstration, 40 percent had spoken before a club meeting, 20 percent had written something for a newspaper or magazine. But these forms of participation still involved less than half the population.

Table 4.2 Political participation

Are you a member of a political party or other political organization?

Yes	15
No	85
Total percentage	100

To those who are members: Do you hold, or have you held, any position of trust in a political club or organization? (Been a board member or the like)

	Of members	Of all respondents
Hold position of trust	15	2
Have held position of trust	22	3
No	63	
Total percentage	100	

Have you attended any political meeting or gathering during the past year?

Yes	10
No	90
Total percentage	100

Do you hold, or have you held, any political position in the municipal or county government or in Parliament?

Yes	6
No	94
Total percentage	100

To those who hold or have held such positions: When did you hold such a position most recently?

	Of those with political positions	Of all respondents
Hold political position now	26	2
Earlier during the 1980s	31	2
During the 1970s	29	2
During the 1960s or earlier	14	1
Total percentage	100	

Did you vote in the municipal council election in 1985, or was there any reason why you couldn't or didn't wish to vote?

Yes, voted	90
No, did not vote but was eligible to do so	10
Total percentage	100
Percentage of sample not eligible to vote	9

Have you ever participated in a public demonstration?

Yes	30
No	70
Total percentage	100

Have you ever spoken before a meeting of a club or organization?

Yes, gave a speech	26
Yes, took part in discussion	14
No, never	60
Total percentage	100

Have you ever written an article or letter to the editor of a newspaper or magazine?

Yes, an article	11
Yes, a letter to the editor	9
No, never	80
Total percentage	100

The citizenship survey also contained a somewhat unusual instrument for measuring how large a proportion of the population had become involved during a one-year period in efforts to exercise influence on society. It asked whether, during the preceding year, the respondent had done anything to try to achieve improvements or resist deterioration on some issue that did not just involve himself and his family. After this, the survey listed a large number -- 16 -- of possible ways of exercising influence. For each of the actions the respondent said he had taken, he was asked a follow-up question: What issue or issues was the action related to? In this way, we have as complete a picture as possible of citizens' own attempts to influence society.

It is worth emphasizing that the question specified that the reply should deal with matters that did not merely involve the respondent and his family; figures on such efforts at exercising influence are already found in the data presented in Chapter 2. Here the main emphasis is not on attempts to influence one's own situation, but attempts to change something in society at large.

One important aspect of how the question was phrased was that the respondents were presented with 16 different possible methods of exercising influence. The disadvantage, obviously, is that there may be methods that do not fit any of these categories; the survey will then underestimate the participation level. The alternative would be to ask a completely open question as to what the person did. Experience with this measuring technique shows, however, that the researcher encounters a bigger problem here: in an interview situation, it is not always easy for the respondent to remember all the things he has done during a year. In fact, the open question technique leads to underestimation of the participation level. By explicitly asking whether the respondent has done this or that, we obtain more reliable data. The replies are presented in Table 4.3. It should be pointed out that the question refers to the 12-month period before the interview.

The most common activities reported by the respondents were making financial contributions or doing fundraising, followed by signing a petition. After that came contacting a central or local government official, contacting a club or organization and participating in boycotts.

Turning to the issues these activities dealt with, the most common were those related to conditions in other countries. It is by no means true that the problems that people become involved with are those that are closest in the geographic sense. International issues occupied first place among 15 different subject areas.

The way the interview question was structured, it was possible to gain a detailed picture of the various combinations of forms of activities and subject areas. The most frequent combination was giving financial contributions for some international purpose (21 percent of the population). The number of theoretical combinations is large, however: 240 (16 X 15). Given so many categories, most of them will -- of necessity -- show rather low frequencies.

In their own way, the results in Table 4.3 resemble the measurements of political participation reported earlier. In no case did the frequency exceed 50 percent. This might indicate that involvement in public affairs is sustained by a small, intensely active minority, while the great majority is excluded. But the table contains an important bit of information that contradicts such an interpretation. The proportion of respondents who had done at least one thing on the list was 69 percent. During a one year period, more than two thirds of the population took at least one initiative to influence society in some way.

Table_4.3__Attempts_to_influence_society_in_the_preceding_year____
Percentage

Activity	Percentage
Contributed or collected funds	39
Signed a petition	36
Contacted a central or local government official	20
Contacted a club or organization	18
Boycotted certain products, for instance	15
Wore or distributed campaign buttons	10
Contacted or appeared in the media	9
Worked in another organization	9
Contacted a politician	8
Contacted a lawyer or judicial body	7
Took part in a demonstration (other than May Day)	5
Worked in a political party	3
Worked in a political action group	2
Took part in a strike	2
Other activity	2
Took part in an illegal protest action	0
Did at least one of the above	69
The issues these activities were related to	
Conditions in other countries	29
Medical care	18
Sports, leisure, facilities for youth	16
Work and labor market	14
Local environment, traffic planning	13
Housing	13
Nuclear power, environment and nature	12
Schooling and education	11
Peace and defense	8
Child care	7

Immigrants and immigration	6
Consumer issues	5
Freedoms and rights in Sweden	4
Equal status for men and women	1
Another issue	17

Wording of the question: "There are different ways of trying to achieve improvements or resist deterioration in society. During the past year, have you done any of the following? I am referring to things you did for a purpose involving not just yourself or your family." Each of the various activities were read out. For each activity the respondent had participated in, he was asked: "What issue or issues did the matter involve?" A reply card with 15 different issues/subject areas was presented.

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This observation leads to the question of how the various activities are related to each other. This is the same theoretical issue that was raised earlier: Is participation cumulative or complementary? Is a small minority strongly active, or is a majority involved in less heated fashion? Here, too, a statistical dimensional analysis may cast a revealing light on our data.

The method is the same one we employed earlier. The survey contains a total of 22 measurements of political participation; a breakdown of the replies was presented earlier in this chapter. The (total of 231) correlation pairs between these variables are calculated. This pattern of correlations forms the input data in a dimensional analysis. The purpose is to reduce the data to a smaller number of dimensions. Using the customary criteria, the analysis ends up with a total of five dimensions. The results are presented in Table 4.4.

The pattern is interesting in a number of respects. Political participation cannot be summarized simply by using a single scale. Several activity models, all different from each other, emerge.¹⁹ The common denominator in the group of questions that form the first dimension is that they measure citizens' various contacts. They involve contacts with government officials, politicians, organizations, media and judicial bodies. What this dimension primarily measures is the degree of initiative, the ability to make one's voice heard. This is a matter of communicative competence. People who often telephone, write and ask for the floor at meetings received high ratings in this dimension.

The second dimension measures party activities. Those issues that have high loadings in this dimension are ones concerning party membership, party work, participation in political meetings and positions of trust. Assiduous party workers received high marks here.

Dimension number three deals with various forms of political manifestations. They need not always be related to verbalized expressions of opinion. It deals especially with people who have been involved in boycotts, signed petitions, given financial contributions and worn a campaign badge.

The fourth dimension consists mainly of three activities: strikes, illegal protests and other demonstrations besides organized labor's traditional May Day procession. These types of participation have in common that they are a more militant variety of protest.

19. The pattern has great similarities with corresponding studies in other countries. Cf. Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-On Kim, *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison*, Cambridge University Press, 1978.

As a fifth and final dimension, voting is classified as an activity of a special character. Participating in an election does not fit clearly under any of the other four dimensions. It should also be added that there is a technical reason why voter turnout in general has a low correlation with the other yardsticks of participation. The voting variable is very skewed; the material consists of 90 percent voters and only 10 percent non-voters. Because most other ways of measuring activity are skewed in the other direction, due to these restrictions a correlation measurement will only show a weak association. But the fact that participation in elections forms a separate dimension is nothing unreasonable or unusual; surveys in other countries also indicate that voting should be regarded as a separate aspect of political action.²⁰

It must also be added that the sequence of dimensions should not be accorded any great importance. Their sequence and the relative "weight" of the dimensions are determined in practice by how many questions are classified under each respective dimension. It is therefore crucial which questions have been included at all in the analysis. If the survey had contained more questions about protest behavior, for example, this dimension would probably have crystalized at an earlier stage. The results of the dimensional analysis should therefore not be regarded as the only true picture of the pattern of political participation in Sweden. The analysis shows the dimensional structure given the questions that were asked. With a somewhat different set of measurements of participation, the pattern would also have looked a little different. Parallel analyses of similar data from other surveys nevertheless indicate that the general pattern remains relatively stable, regardless of minor changes in the sample of indicators of political participation.

20. Verba and Nie, 1978, Chapter 3.

Table 4.4 The dimensions of political participation

	Dimension_number				
	1	2	3	4	5
Dimension 1: Contacts					
Contacted a central or local government official	68	09	01	00	00
Contacted or appeared in the media	63	09	09	07	01
Spoke before a meeting of a club or organization	58	16	17	-04	06
Contacted a club or organization	58	08	17	06	-14
Wrote an article or letter to the editor	54	18	21	-01	06
Contacted a politician	49	41	04	04	-17
Worked in another organization	47	11	20	-09	-05
Contacted a lawyer or judicial body	46	-08	-04	15	12
Dimension 2: Party activity					
Member of a political party or other political organization	02	74	05	-03	09
Worked in a political party	16	73	05	04	-12
Attending a political meeting or gathering	12	71	13	14	-01
Holder of elected public position	25	59	-02	-10	09
Dimension 3: Manifestations					
Boycotted certain products, for instance	08	01	61	05	-13
Signed a petition	13	-03	58	03	05
Contributed or collected funds	28	-04	56	-18	03
Wore or distributed campaign buttons	13	17	56	12	-03
Participated in a public demonstration	04	29	45	28	16
Worked in a political action group	02	14	35	07	-55
Dimension 4: Protests					
Took part in a strike	08	-05	04	68	06
Took part in an illegal protest action	03	00	-04	68	-15
Took part in a demonstration, other than May Day	-01	17	38	51	07
Dimension 5: Voting					
Turned out for 1985 election	03	13	17	01	74

All loadings have been multiplied by 100.

+ + +

This account of citizens' involvement in politics has so far been limited to manifest participation -- various forms of activity. Although political participation per se is of great interest, other aspects of citizens' political involvement are not expressed in practical actions. A person may have a lively interest in political issues, actively follow public events, become deeply knowledgeable and take an independent position without contacting politicians or public agencies, working for any party organization, manifesting his opinion or engaging in any dramatic protest activity. A discussion of citizens' political involvement would be highly incomplete if it only included external actions.

The citizenship survey contains some attempts to clarify the "silent" side of political involvement as well. The two measurements mainly used here are no novelties in political sociology. Both of them have been included for many years among the fundamental analytical instruments used in regularly recurring studies of the electorate, for instance.

The first question concerns a person's own assessment of his interest in politics. The wording of the question, which is identical to the one used in studies of the Swedish electorate, is very direct: "In general, how interested in politics are you? Which of the replies on this card applies best to you?" Four alternatives were presented; the breakdown of the replies can be seen in Table 4.5:

Table_4.5__Interest_in_politics

	Percentage
Very interested	12
Rather interested	40
Not especially interested	36
Not at all interested	12
Total_percentage	100

The question may appear much too simple, but experience shows that the replies classify people clearly by their degree of political involvement. In various experiments using more sophisticated methods of measurement to characterize political involvement, it still turns out that replies to the simple question about a person's self-perceived political interest measure the same thing.

The pattern of replies is similar to a statistically normal distribution curve. Three fourths of respondents chose one of the two middle alternatives. Only slightly more than one tenth considered themselves very interested in politics; an equally large percentage chose the opposite alternative, not at all interested in politics. Approximately one out of two adult Swedes is either very or rather interested in politics. One out of two is not especially or not at all interested.

Another aspect of the citizenry's psychological orientation toward politics is based on the key role of political parties in the representative process. The concept of party identification refers to a voter's feeling of support for a political party. Party identification is a psychological concept that may, but need not, be combined with formal membership in the party.²¹

In the citizenship survey, 59 percent of respondents stated that they regarded themselves as supporters of a specific party. Of these, most (60 percent) felt they were among the strongly

21. The concept of party identification assumes a central role in international election research. See, for instance, Angus Campbell, Philip E Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter*, Wiley, New York, 1960; Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe and Dennis Farlie, *Party Identification and Beyond: Representation of Voting and Party Competition*, Wiley, London, 1976.

convinced supporters of their party. Of the 41 percent of all respondents who did not spontaneously say they were party supporters, a majority (59 percent) still replied that there was a party they felt "closer" to than the other parties. The overall breakdown of the replies to questions about party identification is shown in Table 4.6.22

Not surprisingly, there is a statistical association between these two aspects of political involvement. People with a strong party identification are also more interested in politics, and vice versa. More remarkable is the fact that this association is not particularly strong. There are many exceptions from the rule, both those who are interested in politics without feeling any ties to a specific party and those who feel a fundamental party loyalty without regarding themselves as very strongly interested in politics. So even if the two measurements can be regarded as two aspects of the general concept of "political involvement," it is also fully justified to make a clear distinction between them. An interest in politics may, but need not at all, mean backing a specific party.²³

Public Opinion, Organization and Democracy

Democracy presupposes a constant interplay between voters and those they elect. No extensive evidence is required to state that

22. The introductory question coincides entirely with the wording in the election studies. Otherwise there are some differences. The replies are therefore not consistently comparable in all respects.

23. Cf. Olof Petersson, *Väljarna och valet 1976*, Valundersökningar, rapport 2, SCB/Liber, Stockholm, 1977, pp. 271 ff.

in a modern society, the media occupy a dominant role in keeping citizens' knowledge of the political process up to date. The media can sometimes trigger direct shifts in people's views. Even more frequently, the media influence opinion-molding by deciding which issues will receive attention at the moment and which ones will not be made the object of public discussion. Journalists become the gatekeepers of politics. If something does not appear on Rapport, Sweden's leading prime-time television news program, it has not happened. Woe to the interest group which finds that its issues have been classified as tedious and no longer newsworthy.

Table_4.6__Party_identification_____

	Percentage
Strong supporter	36
Supporter, but not strong	24
Not a supporter, but close to one party	23
Not close to any party	17
Total_percentage_____	100

But the importance of the media lies at an even more fundamental level. Modern media, especially television and the evening tabloid press, have their very own logic, a logic which also leaves its mark on the entire public discourse. Gudmund Hernes has summarized this media logic under such labels as "the

medialized society" and "media dramaturgy."²⁴ Modern society is no longer characterized by a shortage of information, but by a surplus. The media must use special methods to attract attention. Such methods are exaggeration, simplification, polarization, intensification, concretization and personification.

This "medialization" also applies to politics. To a growing extent, modern politics is characterized by a concentration on what is "news": brief stories, a focus on the abnormal, shorter time perspectives, spectacular events and concentration on personalities. Politics today is not a novel, but a rock video. These trends are also noticeable in studies of the sociology of elections. As in other Western countries, the Swedish electorate is characterized by greater mobility and weaker party identification than before. Older, stable loyalties are dissolving; the new politics is characterized by maneuvering, sudden inflammatory issues and demands for quick, simple solutions. Obviously such a development can lead to problems for a party system based on the concept that voting means expressing confidence in an entire political program, a party's main ideological thrust.²⁵

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24. Gudmund Hernes, "Det medievridde samfunn" ("The Medialized Society"), in *Forhandlingsøkonomi og blandingsadministrasjon* (The Bargaining Economy and Mixed Administration), Universitetsforlaget, Bergen, 1978, pp. 181-195; "Media: struktur, vridning, drama" ("The Media: Structure, Bias, Drama"), *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift*, 1984:1, pp. 44-45. The analogy between theater and politics is a common one. See, for example, Olof Petersson, *Metaforernas makt* (The Power of Metaphors), Carlssons, Stockholm, 1987, Chapter 9 and the literature cited there. Cf. also Richard M. Merelman, "The Dramaturgy of Politics," *Sociological Quarterly*, 10, 1969, pp. 216-241.
25. Cf. Jörgen Westerståhl, "Om representation" ("On Representation"), in *Makten från folket* (Power from the People), folkstyrelsekommittén, Liber, Stockholm, 1985, p. 30.

The trend outlined here can be described as a self-reinforcing process. The logic of the media, especially television, leads politics to become more short-term. This, in turn, leads to increased mobility in the electorate, which makes parties adapt their behavior, which leads to even greater accentuation of media dramaturgy, and so on.

The fact that the media have grown into such strong opinion-molders need not, of course, lead to the conclusion that they must be tamed and weakened. Any restriction on free opinion-molding is contrary to the ideals of democracy. What is of particular interest in this context is to discuss the relative importance of the media compared with other, alternative opinion-molding institutions. Aside from focusing attention on the relative strength of modern media, it is worth pondering the relative inability of organizations and parties to mold opinion via their own channels. Is the medialization of society a sign of crisis for grassroots "popular movements" and the organized society?

In sociological theory, a distinction is sometimes made between mass and group. According to Torgny Segerstedt, for example, the mass is receptive to suggestion and is characterized by expressions of emotion. It wishes to be anonymous and avoid responsibility, and it is selfish and unpredictable. The group is typified by permanence, division of labor, awareness of itself and the existence of other groups plus habits which determine the mutual relationships of its members and their relationships to the group as a whole. What characterizes a group is cooperation and organization.²⁶ To Segerstedt, there is an obvious association with the nature of political organizations: "Mass man belongs in a totalitarian society, group man in a democracy."²⁷

26. Torgny T. Segerstedt, *Demokratins problem i socialpsykologisk belysning* (The Problems of Democracy in the Light of Social Psychology), Natur och Kultur, Stockholm, 1939, pp. 37-38.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 162.

Some of contemporary cultural criticism is aimed precisely at the features associated with group man. The apology for individualization, flexibilization and narcissism sometimes becomes a direct polemic against organized democracy, universalism and ideology. One voice from the French debate proclaims, "The modern ideal of subordination of the individual under rational collective rules has been pulverized."²⁸

These postmodernist fanfares have a strange sound compared with Segerstedt's formulation of the essence of democracy, recorded at a time when making the distinction between democracy and dictatorship was an acute reality: "One must seek to create a feeling of responsibility and duty, one must seek to create the insight that a citizen is responsible for society as it is and as it will be. One must seek to create something of the sense of belonging that we argued characterized primary groups. In this sense of belonging, the individual found security, but he also found a desire to work and a greater ability to perform. Man is bound by his group. The group's image of reality and scale of values conquer the individual. But on the other hand, the individual person creates and maintains the laws and habits that prevail in the group. When a person feels and understands this, he feels secure and free. This form of security and freedom is the goal of democracy."²⁹

28. "Rupture avec la phase inaugurale des soci,t,s modernes, d,mocratiques-disciplinaires, universalistes-rigoristes, id,ologiques-coercitives tel est le sens du procšs de personnalisation... L'id,al moderne de subordination de l'individuel aux ršgles rationnelles collectives a ,t, pulv,ris,." Gilles Lipovetsky, L'šre du vide. Essais sur l'individualisme contemporain, Gallimard, Paris, 1983, p. 8, 10.

29. Segerstedt, 1939, p. 177.

In words typical of his age, Segerstedt formulates the concept that democracy combines individual autonomy and institutional autonomy. The postmodernist challenge again raises the fundamental political-philosophical problem of the relationship between freedom and order.

The great importance of organizations in the democratic process has also been emphasized by other authors. When Alexis de Tocqueville traveled around the United States in the mid-19th century and observed how it differed from old Europe, he was struck not least by the vitality of its organizational life: "Americans of all ages, all walks of life, all ways of thinking are constantly forming associations with each other." Democracy and organizations seemed mutually connected. "Thus the most democratic land on earth in the current age is likewise the country where people have furthest perfected the art of working jointly to achieve the goal of their common wishes."³⁰

Accounts of the problems of modern democracy, too, emphasize the central importance of organizations. The American political scientist Robert Dahl has devoted a book to the advantages and the disadvantages that are related to the existence of independent organizations in a society. These large organizations are what Dahl refers to as the "dilemma of pluralist democracy."³¹

30. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*,

31. Robert A. Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982, pp. 32 ff. See Chapter 8 below.

+ + +

The modern organizational system in Sweden has a history more than a century old. The formation of voluntary associations occurred in three major waves. The organizations that emerged from the first stage were an expression of a cultural protest. The revivalist movement and the "free" churches opposed the rigid doctrines of the state Lutheran church. The struggle of the temperance movement against alcohol abuse was also an important source of schooling in grassroots activity and collective organization. In the second wave, economic interests formed the basis for establishing organizations. The creation of economically based associations was at its most intensive around the turn of the century. Farmers joined forces to protect their interests. The rapidly growing industrial worker class laid the foundations of the organized trade union movement. The third big wave of new organizations dates from the interwar period. It consisted mainly of recreational and educational organizations. Sports emerged as one of the major popular movements.

Today, the popular movements and organizational life are accorded great weight in public administrative policy. People's involvement in these organizations "is a fundamental element of Swedish democracy." Citizens should be given "greater participation and greater freedom of choice through greater responsibility for popular movements, voluntary associations and cooperatives."³² The Social Democratic Government's bill on the revitalization of the public sector emphasizes the importance of such associations: "In reform work aimed at increasing people's participation in the continued building of society -- not least at the local level -- active voluntary organizations are essential."³³

32. The Government's instructions to the Commission of Inquiry on Popular Movements, dir. 1986:17.

33. Government bill 1984/85:202, p. 54.

In 1987, when the Commission on Popular Movements described today's grassroots organizations in Sweden, the picture was predominantly bright. Its final report began with an exclamation: "Never before have so many people belonged to different voluntary associations! Never before have we joined forces with others as we do now, to collectively solve common problems or satisfy common needs."³⁴ According to the commission's calculations, in Sweden there are 145,000 local associations affiliated with nationwide organizations, and altogether they have more than 31 million members. Associations are formed for every imaginable purpose, the commission writes. "They include ideological movements with broad programs for societal development, interest or identity organizations that people join because they belong to a certain category, associations for hobby activities or just plain socializing." These associations, the commission believes, are of "enormous importance in creating a social network in their area of activity."³⁵ The general trend is considered positive: interest organizations have grown both in membership figures and activities. What worried the Commission most was the crisis affecting the classical popular movements. "Ideological movements" seemed to have problems with "stagnating or even declining numbers of members and low activity."³⁶

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Aside from the important observation that the classical ideologically based popular movements are having difficulties, the generally accepted perception is still that Sweden has a very extensive and lively system of voluntary associations. Sweden is renowned for its high degree of organization. The Swedes, it is sometimes said, are a people constantly attending meetings.

34. Ju mer vi är tillsammans (The More We Are Together), SOU 1987:33, p. 9.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., p. 10.

Is this a true picture? The citizenship survey put a great deal of effort into mapping Swedish voluntary associations in detail. The interviewers went through a long catalog of organizations. This imposing list was classified into 30 types of organizations, ranging from sports clubs to immigrant organizations and temperance lodges to professional organizations. For each of these types, respondents were asked if they were members and, if so, whether they held any position of trust in an organization and whether they had been active in it during the preceding year. Table 4.7 shows how large a proportion of the population were members of each type of organization.

Table 4.7 Membership, activity and positions in voluntary associations

(OBS vissa org.namn är oöversatta eller provisoriska; uppdaterad tabell_baserad_på_efterforskningar_i_Stockholm_sänds_under_9/89)___

	Member (% of everyone) ___	Active (% of members) ___	Position (% of members)
Sports club All types of sports, including supporters' clubs, sports officials' associations	36	58	22
Outdoor activities club Swedish Society for the Promotion of Outdoor Life, Swedish Touring Club, Fjällklubben, Field Biologists, scouts, conservation clubs etc.	11	40	11
Environmentalist organization Miljöförbundet, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, Miljövarnet, Miljöcentrum, Folkkampanjen mot Kärnkraft, Swedish Society for Protection of Nature, Swedish Forestry Association, Žlvräddarna, etc.	8	13	1

Cultural, musical, dance or theater club	17	56	22
Music club, dance club, theater group, choir, orchestra, rock band, folk dance association, art club, literature club, handicraft association, Kontaktnätet, film group, local radio association etc.			
Other hobby club	13	62	23
Sewing association, stamp club, chess club, bridge club, model-building club, ham radio club, computer club, collectors' club, Unga Forskare etc.			
Automobile organization and the like	12	32	12
Union of Temperance Drivers, Swedish Automobile Association, Royal Automobile Club, boat club, yacht club, flying club, RV club etc.			
Residents' club	28	28	15
National Association of Tenants' Savings and Building Societies, tenants' association, homeowners' association, tract home association, row house association, real estate owners' association, housing cooperative etc.			
Parents' club	10	42	18
Parent-Teachers' Association, parents' association, Adoption Center etc.			
Club for disabled people or for medical patients	4	34	14
Handicap association, club affiliated with National Association for Disabled Persons or HCK, etc.			
Immigrant organization	2	58	25
Including national cultural associations and sports clubs			

Women's organization	2	46	13
Housewives' association, Fredrika Bremer Association, business and professional women's clubs, Kvinnojour, etc.			
Retired people's organization	7	41	16
Swedish Pensioners' National Organization, RPG, Statspensionärernas Riksförbund, Sveriges Folkpensionärers Riksförbund etc.			
Investment club	6	29	13
Swedish Association for Share Promotion, other investment clubs			
Group or club within the Church of Sweden	4	69	39
Evangelical National Missionary Society, Ansgarsförbundet, Bibeltrogna Vänner, Kyrkans Ungdom, Svenska kyrkans lekmanaförbund etc.			
Other Protestant denomination	5	83	57
Salvation Army, Methodist Church, Pentacostal Church, Baptist Church, Swedish Missionary Society, Livets Ord etc.			
Other religious denomination	2	54	15
Orthodox congregation, Islamic congregation, Muslim congregation, Jewish congregation. other denomination			
Humanitarian aid organization	9	33	17
Red Cross, Save the Children, Individuell Människohjälp, Lutherhjälpen etc.			
Temperance organization	3	36	26
Good Templars-National Templars, Verdandi, Association for Aid to Drug Abusers, Women's Christian Temperance Union, Svenska Frisksportförbundet, Blåbandsföreningen, other anti-drug association			

Voluntary defense organization	5	50	31
Home Guard, Women's Auxiliary Defense Service, Women's Motor Transport Corps, Auxiliary Naval Corps, rifle club, National Defense Society, Central Federation for Voluntary Military Training, SCF etc.			
Peace organization	2	33	14
Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society, Christian Peace Movement, Women for Peace etc.			
Local political action group	2	53	22
Interest or action group for local issue			
Group for international issue	3	43	17
Amnesty, the Nordic Society, UN association, solidarity organization			
Lodge or similar society	3	70	38
Rotary, Lions, Masons, Odd Fellows, Zonta, other lodge			
Consumer co-op	36	7	2
Konsum, Solidar, other consumer cooperative society			
Other cooperative organization	11	29	15
Parents' co-op, school co-op, housing and recreational co-op, senior citizens' co-op, purchasing association, work co-op, neighborhood co-op, road association, water/electricity/heat association, residents' council			
Trade union	60	23	14
Union affiliated with Swedish Trade Union Confederation, Central Organization of Salaried Employees, Central Organization of Professional Associations, syndicalists, other union			


Farmers' organization	4	25	15
Local organization or producer co-op affiliated with Federation of Swedish Farmers; other farmers' association			
Business or employers' organization	3	19	12
National organization affiliated with Swedish Employers' Confederation, Commercial Employers' Association, Swedish Federation of Crafts and Small and Medium Sized Industries, Swedish Retail Federation, Federation of Swedish Industries, other business organization			
Other professional organization	5	32	14
Swedish Bar Association, Swedish Inventors' Association, Swedish Society of Engineers, other professional group			
Other club or association	8	45	15
Political party or political organization	15	*	15

* The figure for activity in a political party is not comparable with others. For figures on participation in political meetings, see Table 4.2.

The four big types of voluntary organizations, in terms of membership, are trade unions, the sports movement, the consumer co-ops and residents' clubs (such as the Swedish Tenants' Association, the National Association of Tenants' Savings and Building Societies, housing cooperative, homeowners' association or row house association).

Membership itself is, naturally, of fundamental importance. It enables a person affiliated with an association to monitor its operations, entitles him to exercise influence on how it is run and opens the opportunity to partake of services and benefits connected with membership. Although membership is a fundamental prerequisite for vigorous organizations, it captures only one aspect of the relationship between citizens and organizations. Membership itself is a necessary but not sufficient condition for vigorous organizations. If an association is to be something more than an empty paper construction, active involvement is required from at least a number of its members. This active membership is a central ingredient of the "popular movement" concept.

What kind of statistical relationship is there between membership and active involvement? The following discourse is based on some extremely elementary definitions, in fact only the simple observation that the size of a percentage figure depends on what we divide by -- the denominator in the fraction. The proportion of active people in an organization can be expressed either as a percentage of its membership or as a percentage of the entire population. The latter figure will obviously depend on how large a proportion of the population belongs to that organization at all. Figure 4.1 defines the concepts.



Figur 4.1 En förenings medlemskategorier

Befolkningen: Population

Medlemmar: Members


Aktiva medlemmar: Active members

Figure 4.1 Categories of members in a voluntary organization

The size of the organization, in member strength, can be expressed as the number of members divided by the size of the population. Let us call this membership. The number of active members divided by the membership figure is a yardstick of member involvement. This proportion can be labeled the activity level. The number of active members divided by the size of the population is a yardstick of how large a portion of the community as a whole participates in the work of the organization. This ratio can be labeled degree of mobilization.

It follows from these simple definitions that the degree of mobilization equals membership multiplied by activity level. The same degree of mobilization can thus arise as a result of completely different combinations of membership and activity level. If 10 percent of the population is active in a particular organization, this may mean it is a small organization with strong member involvement. In the most extreme case, all members are active and member support is the same as the degree of mobilization. But it may also be a matter of a large organization with many passive members, for example 50 percent of the population, of whom 20 percent are active.

These simple relationships between degree of mobilization, membership and activity level can be illustrated graphically. The curves in Figure 4.2 connect points with identical degrees of mobilization. In the upper left-hand corner are intensive associations; they are small and have many active members. In the lower right-hand corner are extensive organizations; they are large and have few active members.



Figur 4.2 Föreningslivets mobiliseringskurvor

Activity level

Size of membership


Figure 4.2 Mobilization curves for voluntary organizations

The diagram illustrates the dynamics of organization building. A new association with a few enthusiasts has low figures for both membership and degree of mobilization, but high ones for activity level. Increased mobilization can be achieved by recruiting more members. But unless one involves them in active work at the same time, the activity level declines and the level of mobilization remains the same as before.

What kind of similarity is there between Konsum (Sweden's main organizer of local consumer co-ops) and a lodge or fraternal society? Answer: both have the same degree of mobilization. As a proportion of the entire population, 2 percent are active members of a consumer co-op. Those who are active members of lodges also number 2 percent of the population. But the figures for membership and activity level naturally differ sharply. Konsum counts 36 percent of the population as members, of which 7 percent are active. The lodges have only 3 percent of the population as members, but no fewer than 70 percent are active.

Table 4.8 indicates that the sports movement has the highest degree of mobilization. With 36 percent of the population as members, of which 58 percent are active, 21 percent of the population is active in a sports club. The union movement comes in second with 14 percent active; note that this is a percentage of the whole population; as a percentage of all employees, the figure is higher. But most types of voluntary organizations have a low degree of mobilization. Not many can claim that they activate more than a few percent of the population (Figure 4.3).

This does not, of course, prevent them from sometimes having very strong member involvement. The Protestant churches outside the Lutheran state church ("free churches") are such an example. Of their members, 83 percent state that they are active. But because no more than 5 percent of the population are members, the degree of mobilization is no higher than 4 percent. The free churches are an excellent example of a very intensive but not particularly extensive organization.



Figur 4.3 Medlemsanslutning och aktivitetsnivå för några förenings-typer

Activity level/Membership

Frikyrka: free churches

Orden: lodge

Hobby: hobby

Idrott: sports

Aktionsgrupp: political action group

Facket: trade union

Miljögrupp: environmentalist group

Konsum: consumer cooperative

Figure 4.3 Membership and activity level of selected types of voluntary organizations

Sometimes people in Sweden speak of "the new popular movements." In the international literature, "the new social movements" have become an established concept. This term refers to new types of organizations that are aimed against established power groups and often make use of non-parliamentary and unconventional channels for opinion-molding. In recent years, these new groups have been of major significance. They have awakened public debate on previously neglected issues. They have succeeded in influencing public opinion and thereby political decisions on a number of important issues. It is not possible to draw a completely sharp distinction between these new movements and older types of organizations, but the main ones are the peace movement, the environmentalist movement, the women's movement and local political action groups.

One issue that is not entirely uninteresting in this context is how large a base these base organizations actually have. All three of our yardsticks are of interest here. How many people are members? How active are these members? How large a percentage of the population do the new popular movements mobilize?

The 30 types of organizations studied have been ranked according to their degree of mobilization (Table 4.8). Last place is occupied by peace organizations. Only 2 percent of the population are members, of which 33 percent are active -- consequently between 0.6 and 0.7 percent of the population have been mobilized by the peace movement. Next to last place is occupied by the women's movement; just under 1 percent of the population are active here. Third from the bottom are the local political action groups; here too, the degree of mobilization is around 1 percent. As for environmentalist organizations, a somewhat larger percentage of the population admittedly hold formal membership (8 percent). But members of environmentalist organizations have a very low activity level (13 percent). Aside

from Konsum, there is no type of organization that has such a large percentage of passive members as the environmental movement. Greenpeace is an extreme example of this type of organization -- a few highly professional activists and many paid-up members. "The new popular movements" have great influence but few active members.

Table 4.8 Voluntary organizations: membership, activity and mobilization

	Member- ship	Activity level	Degree of mobil- ization
Sports club	36	58	21
Trade union	60	23	14
Cultural club	17	56	10
Residents' club	28	27	8
Hobby club	13	62	8
Automobile club and the like	12	32	4
Outdoor activities club	11	40	4
Parents' club	10	42	4
Protestant "free church" congregation	5	83	4
Cooperative (except consumer co-op)	11	29	3
Humanitarian aid organization	9	33	3
Retired people's organization	7	41	3
Voluntary defense organization	5	50	3
Group within Church of Sweden	4	69	3
Consumer co-op	36	7	2
Investment club	6	29	2
Professional organization (except union)	5	32	2
Lodge or similar society	3	70	2
Environmentalist organization	8	13	1
Club for disabled people	4	34	1
Farmers' organization	4	25	1
Group for international issue	3	43	1
Temperance organization	3	36	1
Business or employers' organization	3	19	1
Immigrant organization	2	58	1
Other religious denomination	2	54	1
Local political action group	2	53	1
Women's organization	2	46	1
Peace organization	2	33	1

This account has focused on membership from the perspective of the organizations. The various types of clubs and associations can thus be characterized in terms of the number and involvement of their members. Let us examine the same question from a slightly different angle: the people who participate in these organizations. How is membership distributed in the population? Is involvement spread among many citizens, or is it concentrated to a small number of meeting-freaks?

The Commission of Inquiry on Popular Movements reported that voluntary organizations in Sweden are based on "a membership of 31 million." Divided by the size of the population, this would imply an average of 4-5 memberships per inhabitant, depending on how early in their childhood young citizens can be expected to start attending meetings. In our interview survey, respondents reported an average of 3.2 memberships. Translated to the entire adult population, this would mean aggregate membership of just over 20 million. The discrepancy between the two figures has a number of plausible explanations. First, the citizenship survey did not include children and young people under 16. All little leaguers, school-age environmentalists and members of scouting organizations below this cut-off age thus remained uncounted. A second explanation is that the data cited here do not include political parties; this aspect was covered earlier in the section on political participation.³⁷ Third, technically our figure does not refer to membership in an organization but in a type of organization. To make the interview fairly manageable, we only asked if a person was a member of a "sports club," for example, not a specified club. Those who were members of two related

37. For the sake of comparison, the information about political parties in the overview of members and activists in organizations was repeated (Table 4.7). The parties are not, however, included in the following analysis.

organizations were thus counted only once. A person who sang in a choir and also played amateur theatricals and belonged to an art appreciation club was credited with one membership: in a cultural club.³⁸ Fourth, there may of course be some underreporting. Particularly if a person was only formally a member of an organization, he may have overlooked mentioning the fact that he was a member. If so, this source of error was of greater significance among passive members. The activity level in organizations would thereby more likely be overestimated than underestimated.

Compared with other figures, our mean of 3.2 memberships per person therefore seems fairly reasonable. As an estimate of the degree of organization in the adult population, we probably ended up at about the right approximate level. Moreover, the availability of interview data makes it possible to go considerably further than this general estimate. Individual variation around this average figure is of pivotal importance. Table 4.9 shows how the number of memberships in voluntary organizations was distributed.

People who did not belong to any voluntary organizations numbered 6 percent of respondents. This means that 94 percent of people in Sweden belonged to at least one such organization. If those who were not members of any organization were thus not very numerous, not many people had an extremely large number of

38. On the other hand, there is some double counting. An organization that does not really fit into the various categories may be recorded twice. The Finnish Association's soccer club may end up both among immigrant organizations and sports clubs. An examination showed, however, that the frequency of such double counting was virtually negligible.

memberships. For example, 8 percent belonged to seven or more types of organizations. The record-holder in our survey had 18 different memberships; merely keeping track of all these membership cards and postal giro payment receipts must be regarded as an admirable performance. But the great bulk of citizens were members of a few organizations; 70 percent belonged to between one and four types of organizations.

Number of memberships	Percentage of respondents
0 memberships	6
1	16
2	20
3	20
4	14
5	11
6	6
7	4
8	2
9	1
10 or more memberships	1
Total_percentage_____	100_____

Member of both_____	Percentage of respondents
Trade union and Konsum (consumer co-op)	25
Trade union and sports club	25
Trade union and residents' club	20
Konsum and residents' club	13
Konsum_and_sports_club_____	12_____

Nearly three fourths of the population belonged to two or more organizations. The occurrence and distribution of such overlapping memberships can be interpreted in a number of different ways. One bit of information that can be extracted from these data is how similar to each other various organizations are. If one assumes that two closely related organizations are also characterized by the fact that they have many members in common, the frequency of overlapping membership can be taken as a yardstick of the proximity and distance among organizations.

The prevalence of overlapping membership is also an important argument in the intellectual tradition known as pluralism. A free society, the pluralists argue, presupposes the existence of many independent organizations. The ideal is not a society without conflicts and without power. On the contrary, they emphasize that there are numerous special interests that each organize themselves and fight for their goals. Free competition among various interest groups prevents the emergence of a single unified power elite. In the world of voluntary organizations, pluralism is a sort of equivalent of the concept of the free market in the economic sphere. But, the pluralists continue, there is a danger in letting special interests organize. Society threatens to be torn apart if it is divided into two opposing battle camps. The stability of the system can only be maintained if organizations partly overlap each other. The ideal is a jumble of criss-crossing lines of conflict. In that case, coalition patterns will constantly change and the system will remain in dynamic balance. At the level of the citizen, the crucial criterion will be the extent to which there are overlapping memberships.³⁹

39. This theory was criticized even several decades ago for lacking factual background. The country most frequently depicted as the prime example of pluralism, the United

A review of all the pairs of organizations shows, quite naturally, that the most commonly occurring membership combinations involve large mass organizations. The five most frequent combinations can be seen in Table 4.10.

If we speak of overlapping organizational memberships in Sweden, these are the primary ones involved. The dominance of the three biggest types of mass organizations is clear. In fact, the trade unions, the sports movement and the Konsum local consumer cooperatives account, if not for half, then in any event for 41 percent of all memberships in voluntary associations in Sweden. Take away these three giants in today's Swedish organizational landscape and the average number of memberships falls from 3.2 to 1.9. The importance of the three types of mass organizations is also clear from the fact that if we exclude these three types of membership, no fewer than 23 percent of respondents are not members of any voluntary association; in that case, 71 percent have only two memberships or fewer.

States, turned out to lack many of the most important characteristics specified in the theory. See Sidney Verba, "Organizational Membership and Democratic Consensus," *The Journal of Politics*, 27, 1965, pp. 467-497. A study based on Swedish data has claimed that the existence of numerous party-affiliated organizations in Sweden is a falsification of the hypothesis of pluralism. Victor A. Pestoff, *Voluntary Associations and Nordic Party Systems. A Study of Overlapping Memberships and Cross-Pressures in Finland, Norway and Sweden*, Stockholm Studies in Politics, 10, Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm, 1977. Pestoff's study has been criticized for shortcomings in its empirical analysis, however. See the review by Axel Hadenius in *Statsvenskaplig tidskrift*, 81, 1978, pp. 129-135.

This size factor is naturally important if we wish to make a realistic assessment of overlapping memberships. But there is one difficulty if we wish to use overlapping memberships as a measure of the proximity or distance between two organizations. We need a relative measure that takes into account the different sizes of organizations. Correlations between pairs of organizations have therefore been calculated. A high positive figure indicates that they have relatively many members in common. A negative figure means that those who belong to one organization do not usually belong to the other.

The general result of this elaborate correlation analysis was, to be honest, hardly earth-shaking. The strongest negative correlation (-0.19) was between trade unions and retired people's organizations; because the analysis covers the entire population, this result was merely the outcome of the age factor. Although a person may continue as a passive member of a trade union after retirement, frequency of membership is naturally highest among gainfully employed people. Not unexpectedly, there were also negative correlations between trade unions and employer organizations, as well as between retired people's organizations and sports clubs. The strongest positive correlation existed between peace organizations and groups for international issues (0.28). Four types of organizations, in fact, were linked by mutually positive associations: cultural organizations, environmentalist organizations, peace organizations and groups for international issues.⁴⁰ They were united by a relatively large number of overlapping memberships. There were also common ties among business and employers' organizations, investment clubs and lodges (with paired correlations of up to 0.15). The analysis

40. A factor analysis of the correlation matrix also indicates that these four are linked. They form the first factor after a varimax rotation.

also revealed common ties between the trade unions and Konsum (0.16) and between retired and disabled people's organizations (0.15). But otherwise, the correlations were weak. Except for the vague groupings mentioned here, there were no sharply outlined conglomerates of organizations.⁴¹

But even this negative finding may conceivably be of interest. It tells us that something is missing. At the citizen level, there are no isolated islands of interest groupings. This fact may naturally be taken as a sign that Sweden demonstrates pluralistic features. But on the other hand, our data provide an opportunity to make a more realistic assessment of the pluralistic theory. The more bombastic declarations about pluralism underscore its importance to the stability of the whole democratic system. In itself, it is not an irrelevant fact that quite a few people were members of both Konsum and a sports club, that there were members of automobile clubs who also belonged to parents' clubs, and that there was some overlap between the members of environmentalist organizations and cultural clubs. The question is only whether this was what the theoreticians of pluralism primarily had in mind. The theory is of greater relevance in societies plagued by bitter conflicts related to classes, castes, languages, religion and ethnic minorities.⁴²

41. When the Kaiser criterion was applied, the factor analysis resulted in no fewer than 11 factors, several of which were difficult to interpret. Concentration on that portion of the population who had three or more memberships yielded an even more contradictory result.

42. Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies. A Theory of Democratic Instability*, Merrill, Columbus, Ohio, 1972.

So Swedish citizens were members of slightly more than three types of voluntary associations on average. No fewer than 94 percent were members of at least one organization. But the circle of people who sustained the organizational system with their active labor was considerably smaller. The proportion of citizens who had some kind of position of trust in some kind of voluntary association amounted to 35 percent. Using this method of counting, the remaining 65 percent were not part of the active management of such organizations (Table 4.11).

Number of positions	Percentage
0 positions	65
1	24
2	7
3	2
4 or more positions	2
Total percentage	100

The proportion of people with two or more positions was 11 percent. If the lower limit for "organizational pros" is three positions, such people numbered only 4 percent of the population. People who were actively involved in many different organizations were no more numerous than this.

A person can, of course, be active in voluntary associations without being elected to any position of trust. The measure of activity presented earlier was based on the question whether during the preceding year, a person had been active in the

association that he said he belonged to. On average, the Swedes were active in slightly more than one association. But here, too, there were individual variations. Those not active in any association comprised 42 percent of respondents. Those who were active in more than two types of associations numbered 14 percent.

If we then summarize the general picture with the help of our data on membership, positions of trust and activity, we find that the proportion of all respondents who were entirely passive members of voluntary associations totaled 35 percent (Table 4.12). Adding the 6 percent who held no memberships, the result was that 41 percent of all respondents stood outside active organizational life. Those who were active or held positions of trust in two or more organizations numbered almost one third, or 30 percent of all respondents.

Table 4.12 Membership, positions of trust and activity in
voluntary organizations

	Percentage
Not a member of any organization	6
A member, but not active and with no position of trust	35
Active or holding a position in one organization	29
Active or holding a position in two organizations	15
Active or holding a position in three or more organizations	15
Total percentage	100

It is obviously impossible to capture the essence of such a percentage breakdown in a simple formula. On the one hand, only a small minority lacked any affiliation with voluntary organizations. But the image of mass organizations seething with activity was not true, either. The statistics on membership and activity levels were pushed upward by the fact that many people were members of trade unions and Konsum consumer cooperatives and that a fair number were active in sports. But beyond this, a large number of people only came into sporadic contact with voluntary associations. The genuine enthusiasts were few.

+ + +

The sustaining concept behind all these organizations is the idea of voluntary membership. Of their own free will, a group of citizens agree to form an association to protect and promote a shared interest. The principle of autonomy is therefore fundamental to a free system of organizations. This concept also includes the assumption that not only the establishment of an association but also the direction of its day-to-day affairs should be controlled by the members themselves. Internal membership-based democracy therefore becomes crucial in assessing how voluntary associations actually function as an expression of citizens' control over their own society.

There is a wide gap between ideals and reality when it comes to large modern organizations. Even early in this century, some observers noticed that large mass parties were not always governed in a way that coincided with democratic ideals. Robert Michels and Moisei Ostrogorski were two writers who attracted great attention in their heyday for their portrayals of how the new political parties -- the pillars of parliamentary democracy -- were internally controlled in a way that could not be characterized as anything but an oligarchy.⁴³ Control by the few seemed to be a law of nature.

43. Robert Michels, *Organisationer och demokrati: En sociologisk studie av de oligarkiska tendenserna i vår tids demokrati* (Organizations and Democracy: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchic Tendencies in Contemporary Democracy), Ratio, Stockholm, 1983 (the German original was published in 1911). Moisei Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*, Transaction Books, London, 1982 (first published in French in 1903).

Disappointment is always one measure of the difference between expectations and realities. In retrospect, one can read Michels and Ostrogorski as good accounts of the internal life of major political parties in Europe at that time. But their conclusions say at least as much about their perceived ideals as about their observations of fact. When unglamorous everyday realities were contrasted with ideal primal democracy, the result could not be anything but depressing. The large mass organizations of this century are controlled in a way that is far from the ideals of microdemocracy. Political parties and trade unions have been centralized and are controlled by a small number of elected representatives with the help of strongly specialized organizational staffs. The form of representative government that characterizes large voluntary organizations today is far closer to the macrodemocratic model than to the microdemocratic one.

Describing how today's interest organizations are controlled, and assessing how well membership democracy works, is a complicated task which places heavy demands on both source material and research methods. The easiest path seems to be following a specific issue and thereby assessing initiative, influence, opinion-molding, member support and decision-making.⁴⁴

It was outside the scope of our citizenship survey to examine in detail the internal decision-making process in organizations. In one respect, however, we did examine the issue of the members' influence on their associations. Just as the respondents were

44. For such a study of the internal functioning of TCO, see Michele Micheletti, *Organizing Interest and Organized Protest. Difficulties of Member Representation for the Swedish Central Organization of Salaried Employees (TCO)*, *Stockholm Studies in Politics*, 29, Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm, 1985.

allowed to assess their chances of influence in other contexts, they were asked two questions that directly concerned the trade union at their own workplace. Their replies said nothing, obviously, about how Sweden's local union branches actually operate. They provided only one piece of information, but one that was not entirely irrelevant: how the members themselves felt about their unions. The first question concerned membership influence; respondents were asked to assess how much chance they had of influencing the actions of their union local on various issues. The second question dealt with the union's chances of exercising influence: how large were its chances of influencing conditions at the respondent's own workplace.

If an organization is to give its members active leverage, two prerequisites must be fulfilled: these members must be able to influence the organization, and the organization must be able to influence its surroundings. If only the first prerequisite exists, it is a democratic but powerless organization. If only the second exists, it is a powerful but elite-controlled organization. An organization is not always fortunate enough that these two elements are in harmony with each other. On the contrary, internal decision-making mechanisms may be structured in a way that increases the individual member's control over the organization while reducing the organization's ability to act. In the most extreme case, every member has a veto -- the right to prevent the organization from acting. Voting rules can be classified along a scale signifying a gradual reduction in the ability of members to prevent collective action and a gradual increase in the ability of the organization to act on behalf of the group. Majority rule may be regarded as a balance between these two extremes.⁴⁵

45. Gudmund Hernes and Willy Martinussen, *Demokrati og politiske ressurser* (Democracy and Political Resources), NOU 1980:7, pp. 59-60.

The replies to the two interview questions indicated that in general, employees had fairly modest perceptions of the union's power and of their own power over the union. Their average assessment, along a scale from 0 (no chance) to 10 (very good chance), was 3.3 for the respondent's own chance of influencing the local trade union branch and 4.6 for the union's chance of influencing workplace conditions. The union's chance of exercising influence was thus regarded as somewhat greater than the respondent's own chance of influencing the union.

These two aspects of union influence have a clear mutual relationship. People who had little faith in their chances of influencing the union ordinarily also had a low opinion of the union's chance of exercising influence (the correlation was 0.47). But some people also had divergent assessments on these two issues. As Table 4.13 indicates, there was a significant group (26 percent) who felt that the union had a good chance of exercising influence while they themselves had little effect on the union.

Table_4.13__Chance_of_influence_via_the_trade_union_____

Chance of influencing the union	Union's chance of exercising influence	Percentage of all employees
Good	Good	29
Good	Not good	8
Not good	Good	26
Not good	Not good	37
Total percentage		100

"Good" is defined here as 5-10 on the scale of replies, "not good" as 0-4.

The replies can also be compared with the data on membership and activity presented earlier in this chapter. Table 4.14 indicates one statistical relationship that was both clear and predictable: The minority of employees who do not belong to the union also felt they had little chance of influencing how the local branch of the union would act. The active union members felt they had a relatively good chance of influencing the union. The respondents' rated the union's influence in corresponding fashion, although their assessments were not quite so divergent in this respect.

Table 4.14 Assessment of chance of influence via the trade union among different member categories

	Chance of influencing the union	Union's chance of exercising influence
Active member	5.2	5.4
Passive member	3.0	4.6
Non-member	1.8	3.7
All employees	3.3	4.6

Organizations are important not only because they can be instruments for promoting the interests of their members on concrete issues, but also because of their ideological role. By its mere existence, an organization is a manifestation of an interest -- a desire to structure society in one way or the other. This is mainly true of ideologically based popular movements, those organizations whose more or less explicit aim is

to change society. Organized movements thereby also function as opinion-molders. They form a kind of "orienteering markers" or direction indicators in society. To the citizenry in general, and not necessarily just for their own members, organizations become symbols of ideas and ambitions.

Earlier, when we discussed political participation, we said it would be incomplete to describe citizens' political involvement exclusively by measuring external, manifest activities. Observable participation leaves out those kinds of involvement that assume psychological forms such as a strong interest in politics and a sense of affiliation with a party. The same is true of other voluntary organizations. Citizen involvement in large social movements cannot be measured only in the form of memberships and activities.

The relationship between citizens and the organizations in their society can be expressed in terms of solidarity. Such a feeling of belonging or sense of being part of a larger community together with other people is precisely what early sociologists regarded as the identifying feature that separates group man from mass man.

The question is now this: What degree of affinity does a modern person feel toward movements that, in many cases, have now existed in Sweden for more than a century? The technique chosen in this interview study was to ask respondents to state how much affinity they felt toward a number of different movements and member organizations. Their replies were classified on a scale from 0 (no affinity at all) to 10 (very strong affinity). Table 4.15 shows how they replied.

Table 4.15 Affinity with movements and member organizations

Type of organization	Mean (0-10)
The peace movement	5.8
The environmentalist movement	5.6
The sports movement	5.2
International aid and solidarity movements	4.9
The labor movement	3.8
The women's movement	3.7
The adult education movement	3.6
The Church of Sweden (a Lutheran state church)	3.3
The cooperative movement	3.3
The temperance movement	2.6
The "free churches" (mainly Protestant)	1.3

It is striking how much this list differs from the survey's membership and mobilization statistics. The type of organization noted for the lowest degree of mobilization -- the peace movement -- was the one that enjoyed the strongest sense of affinity in the population. In a modern organization, it is not necessary to have numerous and active members. The peace movement and the environmentalist movement demonstrate that the use of opinion-molding makes it possible to gain both political influence and strong support from the population.

Of the movements listed here, those that had the weakest support among the population were the free churches and the temperance movement, the roots of Sweden's modern popular movements. During the 19th century, these two movements were the first to undertake large-scale recruitment of unorganized people into common associations.

The respondents' attitudes toward the various movements show a very interesting kind of covariation. Certain movements have a lot in common, as indicated by the fact that solidarity with one goes together with solidarity with the other. Three large groups of organizations can be distinguished in this way.⁴⁶ The dimensional analysis is summarized in Table 4.16.

These three groups parallel the historical emergence of interest organizations in Sweden. As mentioned earlier, in looking at the origins of such organizations, it is possible to distinguish three major waves. The first occurred roughly during the 19th century, the second around the turn of the century and the third during the interwar period. Even today, these "growth rings" are visible among Swedish popular movements.

Table 4.16 __Affinity_with_movements:_three_dimensions

	Dimension_number		
	1	2	3
Dimension 1: Third wave organizations			
The environmentalist movement	87	11	10
The peace movement	86	18	12
International aid and solidarity movements	75	25	21
The women's movement	73	30	17
The sports movement	47	19	-05
Dimension 2: Second wave organizations			
The cooperative movement	18	85	14
The labor movement	29	79	08
The adult education movement	45	60	24
Dimension 3: First wave organizations			
The free churches	02	-01	82
The Church of Sweden	09	11	75
The temperance movement	24	34	69

All loadings have been multiplied by 100.

46. The correlation matrix has been used as the basis for an analysis of principal components. This shows that the eigenvalue of the first three dimensions are 4.68, 1.48 and 0.99 respectively. The third dimension was included in the subsequent varimax rotation.

5. Dimensions of Citizenship

Having discussed a long series of interview questions in the preceding chapters, it may be time for a summary recapitulation. What the various questions have in common is that they are measures of citizen involvement. With the help of these indicators, it is possible to sketch a general picture of the variations of citizenship. This survey also forms the prelude to a continued analysis of micro- and macrodemocracy. In subsequent chapters, citizen involvement will be related to background explanations of various kinds, including both individual and group factors. Inequalities related to differentiation will occupy a central position.

To facilitate continued discussion, the various indicators have been assigned a common measuring unit. Replies will henceforth be expressed using indexes ranging from 0 to 100. The replies to some interview questions were stated along a scale running from 0 to 10; these figures have been restated by multiplying them by ten. In corresponding fashion, other reply alternatives have been numerically transformed. In no instance does this change affect the results; its only purpose is to achieve greater uniformity in this presentation.

Our discussion in this book began with an account of six different areas of citizenship. The problem was to measure to what extent the people affected were dissatisfied with their situation, and to what extent they had taken any initiatives to try to achieve improvements or resist deterioration. These attempts at influence are the first measures of citizen involvement. The figures given below are mean values. They express how large a percentage of the citizens affected had taken an initiative during the year before the interview, aimed at influencing their situation.

1. Took initiative as resident	28
2. Took initiative as consumer	13
3. Took initiative as patient	18
4. Took initiative as parent of preschool child(ren)	27
5. Took initiative as parent of school child(ren)	35
6. Took initiative as employee	60
7. Took initiative: summary index	27

The seventh indicator is an average of the six indices for each area. The average is based on those areas that apply to each respective individual. The above result should be interpreted as meaning that during a one-year period, citizens took an initiative aimed at exercising influence in about one out of four possible cases. But as already stated in Chapter 2, there are large variations around this mean figure. Taking an initiative to gain redress or to bring about a change is much more common in the labor market than in the role of consumer or patient, for example.

In four of the six citizenship areas, we also asked questions about whether the respondent had participated in any type of group activities. The following indicators simply express the average percentage who had participated in such activities in each respective area during the one-year period.

8. Activities as a resident	16
Attended meeting of residents' association	
Participated in another activity arranged by such an association	
Participated in an activity together with neighbors	

9. Activities as parent of preschool child(ren)	42
Had long talk with person who takes care of child	
Had long talk with parents whose child care is at same place	
Participated in activity together with parents whose child care is at same place	
Held official position or arranged activity among parents whose child care is at same place	
10. Activities as parent of school child(ren)	53
Attended parents' meeting or parent-teacher talk	
Otherwise been in contact with teacher/school administration	
Been in contact with Parent-Teacher Association	
Been in contact with other parents to talk about children's schooling	
Served as class mother/father	
11. Activities as employee	45
Been in contact with trade union concerning conditions at workplace	
Been in contact with employer concerning conditions at workplace	
Been safety steward or had another position of trust at workplace	
12. Citizen activities: summary index	26

Hardly surprisingly, there was a clear statistical relationship between initiatives and citizen activity. By and large, those people who had done something to try to influence their situation were the same people who were seen and heard at parents' meetings, at the row house association and at the workplace. The correlation between activity and initiatives turned out to be the strongest in the school and work fields (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 Statistical association between activity and initiatives

	Association (r)
School	0.40
Work	0.37
Housing	0.22
Child_care	0.16

For every relevant citizenship role, we asked a number of questions that enabled respondents to assess their chance of influencing their own situation. Their replies were classified along a scale ranging from "no chance" (0) to "very good chance" (10). In the following, the replies are restated as figures ranging from 0 to 100. The average assessments in each area can be seen below.

13. Chance of exercising influence as a resident	53
14. Chance of exercising influence as a consumer	65
15. Chance of exercising influence as a patient	44
16. Chance of exercising influence as a parent of preschool child(ren)	48
17. Chance of exercising influence as a parent of school child(ren)	23
18. Chance of exercising influence as a gainfully employed person	52
19. Chance of exercising influence: summary index	51

A citizen's relationship with the legal system was measured in several ways. One central aspect concerned a person's own ability to write a letter and appeal the decision of a public agency. The replies are restated on a scale where a person who believes he has this ability receives 100 points. A person who cannot appeal a decision himself but knows someone who could help him is awarded 50 points, and a person who can neither do so himself nor knows someone who can help him gets 0 points. The results can thus be expressed using a mean that may theoretically range from 0 (no person can do it himself or get help) to 100 (everyone can do it himself). This variable is a yardstick of the administrative competence of citizens.

20. Administrative competence

79

The figures presented so far are related to power over one's immediate situation; in one way or another, they all have to do with microdemocracy. After this comes a discussion of macrodemocracy -- citizen involvement in various ways of influencing politics and society as a whole. One series of indicators of political participation turned out to have a relatively complex structure of statistical associations. It is hardly justified to speak of "political participation" in general. In fact, five different dimensions are required to describe fairly the nature and extent of political participation. The following indicators measure a percentage of a maximum theoretically possible figure. The index values can thus range from 0 to 100.

21. Political participation: contacts

16

Contacted a central or local government official
 Contacted or appeared in the media

Spoke before a meeting of a club or organization	
Contacted a club or organization	
Wrote an article or letter to the editor	
Contacted a politician	
Worked in another organization	
22. Political participation: party activities	6
Member of a party or political organization	
Worked in a political party	
Attended a political meeting or gathering	
Held a political position in a municipal or county government or in Parliament	
23. Political participation: manifestations	22
Boycotted certain products	
Signed a petition	
Contributed or collected funds	
Wore or distributed campaign buttons	
Participated in a public demonstration	
Worked in a political action group	
24. Political participation: protests	3
Took part in a strike	
Took part in an illegal protest action	
Took part in a demonstration (other than May Day)	
25. Political participation: voting	90
Voted in the 1985 municipal council election	

The averages related to political participation thus varied sharply. High election turnout pulled up the mean value of the voting factor. In contrast, only a small percentage of respondents had participated either in party activities or militant protests.

Political involvement which does not necessarily take the form of active participation was measured using two questions: the respondent's estimate of his own interest in politics and

strength of party identification. Although there was a positive statistical association between these two aspects of political involvement, there were nevertheless both theoretical and empirical reasons to distinguish between them in the analysis. They will therefore be treated as two separate indicators.¹

26. Interest in politics	51
27. Party identification	60

The extensive material on voluntary organizations and associations gathered by the citizenship survey can be summarized in a number of different ways. One aspect is how many types of associations a person belongs to; this measure is expressed here as a percentage of the maximum number (30). A second aspect is more active involvement in associations; here we measured how large a percentage of all types of organizations in which the respondent held a position of trust and/or was active. A third index combined these two aspects; here it will serve as a summary measure of participation in voluntary associations.²

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1. The index values have been defined as follows. Interest in politics: Very interested = 100, rather interested = 67, not especially interested = 33, not at all interested = 0. Party identification: strong supporter = 100, supporter but not strong = 67, not a supporter but closer to one party = 33, not close to any party = 0.
 2. More precisely, this yardstick was designed in such a way that a position and/or activity in a type of association was assigned 2 points, membership without a position or activity 1 point, and non-membership 0 points. After that, the sum has converted into an index ranging from 0 to 100.

28. Organizations: membership	11
29. Organizations: positions and activity	4
30. Organizations: total participation in voluntary associations	7

Employees were asked separate questions about their own trade union. One question concerned the respondent's chance of influencing local union actions; another question concerned the union's chance of influencing conditions at the workplace. Together they form an index that describes the individual's assessment of his chance of influencing working conditions via the trade union channel.³

31. Trade union influence	39
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Finally we asked a series of questions about the respondent's degree of solidarity with major organized movements in Sweden. The pattern was not one-dimensional here, either. The various movements turned out to form three large groups, each representing one wave in the history of the establishment of Swedish interest organizations.

3. The index value consists of the mean of the two replies. One alternative would be to create an index consisting of the product of the two replies. Such a multiplicative model could be justified on the basis of a model where the two questions are regarded as two links in a chain.

32. Affinity with third wave organizations	51
The environmentalist movement, the peace movement, international aid and solidarity movements, the women's movement, the sports movement	
33. Affinity with second wave organizations	36
The cooperative movement, the labor movement, the adult education movement	
34. Affinity with first wave organizations	24
The free churches, the Church of Sweden, the temperance movement	
35. Affinity with movements: summary index	39

Although all indicators can be given a common unit of measurement in this way, this does not mean that they are all directly comparable. The distribution of replies, and consequently the mean values given, are still highly dependent on what questions are asked and how these are formulated. In this context, the level of the mean values is actually of minor interest. The variations and reply patterns are of central importance.

This does not, however, prevent us from making a general observation regarding the mean values. There were, in fact, examples where a large number of citizens participated actively in some citizenship role. This applied mainly to voting: a voter turnout of 85-90 percent meant that only a small minority had abstained from taking advantage of their right to choose elected representatives. Relatively high activity levels were also found in the labor market. Of all employees, 60 percent had taken an initiative to influence their working conditions. Participation in the role of parent of preschool and school children was also relatively high. But there were also many examples of participation opportunities that were only used by a minority. Activities related to housing were not particularly widespread. Relatively few people took an initiative to exercise influence in

their role as consumers or as patients. Participation in political party work and in militant protests was tiny. The activity level in voluntary associations and organizations was smaller than people have generally assumed.

But as a yardstick of general citizen involvement, this image of relative passivity is not fair. The fact that many people chose not to get actively involved did not mean that they were timid and felt deprived of all influence. On the contrary, in many areas there was a strong feeling of being able to exercise influence if this should become necessary. Few people felt they lacked instruments to assert their interests in a conflict with public agencies. They often assessed chances of exercising influence in a favorable way -- although there were exceptions; when it came to the school system, many parents felt they lacked the opportunity to exercise influence. Interest in politics can hardly be described as generally low. Although party identification had generally tended to decline in recent years, the political parties still enjoyed relatively strong support among the population. Psychological affinity with organized movements was greater than active participation. Relatively many citizens were passive, but few considered themselves powerless.

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But more interesting than these simple averages were patterns of association. We have already devoted Chapter 3 to an analysis of how various ways of influencing one's own immediate situation were mutually related. This examination can now also be extended to those aspects of citizenship that have to do with politics and organizations. The results may provide important information for assessing how microdemocracy is related to macrodemocracy.

It should be made clear from the beginning that the various measurements of involvement in politics and organizations were

strongly correlated in many cases. Although it is justified to distinguish various kinds of political participation, there is a common denominator: the degree of political involvement. One of the clearest and most direct yardsticks of involvement was each respondent's own estimate of his political interest. This yardstick had a positive association with all five aspects of political participation (Table 5.2).

The fact that two types of political participation -- protests and voting -- showed a relatively weaker association with political interest should not be accorded too great an importance. These particular measurements have a very skewed distribution of replies, in one case because so few people are active and in the other because so many participate. In purely statistical terms, it would be difficult for such unevenly distributed variables to show any strong correlations.

Political participation	Association (r) with	
	Interest in politics	Participation in organizations
Contacts	0.34	0.53
Party activities	0.30	0.30
Manifestations	0.30	0.36
Protests	0.11	0.12
Voting	0.19	0.16

Participation in voluntary organizations, expressed as the number of memberships as well as the number of positions of trust and activities, is a yardstick of the support enjoyed by these organizations at citizen level. The statistical association between involvement in such organizations and political participation means that there are links between voluntary organizations and politics (Table 5.2).

These statistical associations must be viewed as consistently strong. All types of political participation turned out to be very clearly correlated with participation in voluntary organizations. This finding was of particular interest against the backdrop of current discussion about voluntary organizations and democracy. It is customary to describe the democratic process in terms of two channels: parliamentary and corporative. The parliamentary channel is based on territorial representation, political parties, elections and parliamentary government. The corporative channel is based on the ability of organized special interests to exercise influence on the political decision-making process. Even several decades ago, it was pointed out that the corporative channel had assumed greater actual importance than the parliamentary one. As Stein Rokkan put it in a phrase that has become a classic, "votes count but resources decide."⁴

No matter how significant Rokkan's statement may be, there is nevertheless a risk connected with the very metaphor of two channels. This image is partly misleading. It may give the

4. "Votes count in the choice of governing personnel but other resources decide the actual policies pursued by the authorities." Stein Rokkan, "Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism," in Robert A. Dahl, ed., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, Yale University Press, 1966, p. 106.

impression that there are two mutually exclusive pathways to political influence. But it is not a matter of alternative methods.⁵ The data from our interview survey indicates that at the citizen level, these two channels are very much intertwined. The people who play a strong part in the corporative channel are, to a great extent, the same people who have a strong voice in the parliamentary channel. Nor is this statement limited to the type of political participation that focuses narrowly on the activities of political parties. The statistical association between participation in voluntary organizations and involvement in politics is a general one. Even a form of participation such as militant protests shows a covariation with organizational activity. Unconventional ways of voicing political protests are not an alternative in the sense that they provide a voice to people who are political and organizational outsiders.

+ + +

It is now time to raise a question that is pivotal to this study: whether there is any association between microdemocracy and macrodemocracy. The question is: In what way is involvement in one's own immediate environment related to political involvement?

The point of departure for the discussion in Chapter 2 was that there is a mutual association between situation and action. The way in which a life situation is turned into action aimed at changing this particular situation can be divided into three elements: dissatisfaction, initiatives and results. Dissatisfaction is the motive force in the process of change. Initiative is the act required to exercise influence. The result is the outcome of this attempt at influence.

5. In all fairness, it should be mentioned that Rokkan himself was aware of this; he refers, for instance, to "overlap of personnel" and "criss-crossing of role relationships," *Ibid.*, p. 113.

It now turns out that there was a general statistical association between all three of these elements, on the one hand, and political involvement and organizational activity, on the other (Table 5.3).

In this table, dissatisfaction, initiatives and results refer to summary indexes for all the areas that were relevant to each respective person. The associations were positive in all six cases. This means that the percentage of people with a strong interest in politics and high participation in voluntary organizations was largest among the dissatisfied, among those who had taken an initiative and among those who had succeeded.

Table 5.3 Dissatisfaction, initiatives and results: statistical association with interest in politics and participation in voluntary organizations

	Association (r) with	
	Interest in politics	Participation in organizations
Dissatisfaction	0.11	0.10
Initiatives	0.20	0.26
Results	0.06	0.09

The correlations were not consistently strong, however. The clearest link was between initiatives, on the one hand, and political interest and organizational participation on the other. The inclination to become actively involved was visible both in the more private sphere and in the more public one.

Although these statistical associations were not as pronounced when it came to dissatisfaction, the general tendency was still significant. Dissatisfaction and involvement tended to go together; those who were passive and uninvolved were comparatively satisfied.

There was thus a complete pattern. Those who were politically strong were also strong in more private contexts. Every step reinforced this process. Those who were involved were more dissatisfied and made more demands. They took more frequent initiatives and tried to influence their situation. Their efforts more often led to successful results.

This is the general pattern. But as soon as this has been stated, it is time to qualify our conclusions. First, as already noted, the statistical associations in the first and third stages were not especially strong; they were more in the nature of general tendencies, with various exceptions. Second, this conclusion was based on an average -- a general overview of all the different life situations discussed in the survey. It turns out, however, that there were major differences between areas (Table 5.4).

When it comes to citizens' involvement, certain areas were more closely connected to the political sphere than others. The strongest association between attempts at influence and interest in politics was found in the labor market. In contrast, the consumer and patient roles were only weakly related to political involvement, by this measure. Based on participation in voluntary organizations instead of political interest, the ranking between areas was the same; the only difference was that here, school ended up at the same high level as the labor market.

The ranking among areas was little affected by the choice of indicator. Replacing the question about initiatives with the question about the respondent's own assessment of his chance of exercising influence, the main result was the same (Table 5.5).

Table 5.4 Initiatives in different citizenship situations:
 statistical association with interest in politics and
 participation_in_voluntary_organizations

Had taken initiative to exercise_influence	Association (r) with	
	Interest in politics	Participation in organizations
1. Work	0.22	0.25
2. School	0.16	0.25
3. Housing	0.16	0.17
4. Child care	0.15	0.14
5. Medical care	0.10	0.12
6. Consumer	0.07	0.07
Summary_index_for_initiatives	0.20	0.26

Table 5.5 Assessment of chance of influencing one's own
 situation: statistical association with interest in politics and
 participation_in_voluntary_organizations

Chance_of_exercising_influence	Association (r) with	
	Interest in politics	Participation in organizations
1. Work	0.19	0.19
2. School	0.10	0.19
3. Housing	0.07	0.19
4. Child care	0.03	0.08
5. Medical care	0.04	0.09
6. Consumer	0.06	0.11
Summary_index_for_chance_of_influence	0.15	0.19

The statistical association between the respondents' political involvement and assessment of their chance of exercising influence was the most pronounced in the labor market area. People active in voluntary organizations also tended to have greater self-confidence than others in terms of their chance of exercising influence: this was especially true in the labor market, school and housing.

These differences between various areas were of great theoretical interest. There was a clear link between micro- and macrodemocracy. Particularly with regard to the labor market, the two spheres overlapped. But there were also areas where this was not the case. This means that there were people who were actively engaged in politics and public life but who found their own chances of influence limited. Likewise, there were examples of citizens who were not active in politics or organizations but who felt that they had influence and control over their own life situation.

6. Sex, Generation and Social Position

The concept of citizenship means that every person possesses a number of rights. One essential element is the right to shape one's own living conditions. The principle of self-determination can be realized with the aid of various techniques. But the fundamental concept is that the individual should be able to control and govern his own society.

How these rights are actually utilized is another thing; every society to date has shown that the degree of influence varies greatly from person to person. Such differences in power may have different sources. Much of the discussion related to the power structure of societies revolves around three questions: what is the importance of sex, generation and class, respectively. There is a striking difference between men and women when it comes to power. Power is associated with men. Generation and power are connected as well. The young have always challenged the establishment run by their elders. The ties between class and power also appear to be an eternal historical reality. The social classes that originate from the system of economic production do not differ only in terms of material conditions. Everywhere, the rich and the well-to-do appear to have enjoyed superior power and influence.

Women and Men

"The right to vote has not given women political power on the same footing as men. One can therefore say that women's distance from and powerlessness in the political system has remained a fundamental weakness of our democracies."

These are the opening words of a major overview of the position of women in Nordic politics.¹ Despite many years of struggle for women's liberation and years of policies designed to establish equal status between men and women, there is still a strong association between power and sex. The further up in the hierarchy of power one goes, the fewer women there are.

The concept of citizenship presupposes equal rights for all. But the realization of full citizenship has been skewed. The autonomous citizen has, above all, been characterized by male attributes. Historically speaking, citizenship came to be associated with the capacity to bear arms, own property and govern oneself. Citizenship is based on a combination of rights and obligations. Universal conscription became one of the strongest arguments for universal suffrage. This principle was expressed by the slogan "One man -- one weapon -- one vote." As political scientist Carole Pateman has argued, there is a built-in distortion here. The ideal citizen is a man. Of course, women also had a fundamental obligation: to secure the continued existence of the state by bringing children into the world. The big difference, however, was that the duty of women toward the state was not accompanied by corresponding civil rights.²

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1. Beatrice Halsaa, Helga Maria Hernes and Sirkka Sinkkonen in *Det uferdige demokratiet. Kvinnor i nordisk politikk* (Unfinished Democracy. Women in Nordic Politics), Nordic Council of Ministers, Oslo, 1983, p. 1.
 2. Carole Pateman, "The Patriarchal Welfare State" in Amy Gutman, ed., *Democracy and the Welfare State*, Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 238. Cf. also Maud Eduards et al, *Kön, makt, medborgarskap: Kvinnan i politiskt tänkande från Platon till Engels* (Sex, Power, Citizenship: Women in Political Thought from Plato to Engels), Liber, Stockholm, 1983.

Women have been caught in a dilemma. On the one hand is the demand that full citizenship should also be extended to women. The ideal, both in theory and practice, is a sex-neutral citizenship. On the other hand is the argument that women possess special skills, talents, needs and interests. Women's unpaid work as mothers and in providing other forms of personal care should also be a part of citizenship. The risk is that neither of these two demands will be fulfilled. Women will remain second-class citizens at the same time as specifically female dimensions are defined as falling outside the scope of citizenship.³

Political involvement seems to be an overwhelmingly male concern. A major international study of political participation found that there was a link between sex and political activity everywhere. In all countries studied, men were politically more active than women.⁴

This finding recurs with deafening monotony. Researchers have taken the difference between the sexes in politics for granted and have instead concentrated on the question of why. What is the reason why women are politically more passive than men?

The difference is only partially explained by differences in resources. Nor can lower participation by women be explained by women being generally indifferent to politics. Women in general were, admittedly, found to have a somewhat weaker psychological sense of commitment to politics, but this difference paled when it was also taken into account that on average, women had

3. Pateman, pp. 252-253.

4. Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-on Kim, *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1978, p. 238.

received less formal education and belonged to fewer organizations. Among gainfully employed people with a high educational level, the difference between the sexes in terms of psychological involvement in politics was minimal. Among women, however, having an interest in politics did not always lead to political activity. These findings strongly indicated that lower participation by women could not be explained by general apathy. Instead there were structural obstacles -- external circumstances -- that hampered the political role of women.⁵

A number of studies thus document the existence of differences between men and women in political participation. But some of this research has been criticized. The surveys have been structured rather conventionally. Participation in politics has been defined as synonymous with political activity in the narrow sense. The Norwegian women's researcher Beatrice Halsaa has sharply attacked this scholarly tradition.⁶ The conventional concept of politics, Halsaa believes, is sexist. It excludes the domestic sphere and those aspects of public life that primarily involve women. Participation research has almost exclusively concentrated on politics in the sense of political parties and public agencies. There is an unspoken link between the concepts of politics-men-power-public sector. Such a narrow concept of politics, Halsaa writes, may have a depoliticizing effect. Politics in the sense of power politics, a society where power is perceived as a masculine attribute and virtue, excludes women from "natural" political activity. Politics as something reserved for the public sector, in a society that makes a sharp distinction between public and private, while each

5. Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978, pp. 266-267.

6. Beatrice Halsaa Albrektsen, *Kvinner og politisk deltakelse* (Women and Political Participation), Pax, Oslo, 1977.

sex dominates its own respective sector -- turns politics into something distant and non-essential to women. Politics in the sense of party politics and the public sector makes women invisible because there are so few women there. Women are rendered invisible. Women's issues are not politics. Women's problems are privatized and made invisible. The political consciousness of women is weakened.⁷

Researchers are unanimous on one point. Women are politically more passive than men. Is this picture correct in Sweden today? Both yes and no. Men are undoubtedly more active in certain respects. But there are also areas where the situation is the exact opposite. There are, in fact, forms of citizen involvement where women are more active than men.

Table 6.1 shows the fields where there are significant differences between the sexes.⁸ Among the fields where men enjoy an advantage are worklife, party politics in the narrow sense, political contacts and the ability to assert themselves against public agencies.

7. Ibid., pp. 27 ff.

8. Citizenship roles have been ranked here by how large the differences between the sexes are. As a measure of the association between sex and citizenship involvement, the correlation r has been used. An alternative measure would be the standardized regression coefficient b , which is synonymous with the difference in percent in cases of simple linear regression with dichotomous variables. Another approach would be to calculate how large the agreement is between the distributions among men and women, respectively. The correlation coefficient, which is a symmetrical measure, may be regarded as a combination of these two alternatives.

The greater level of involvement by women compared with men is especially clear in the role of parent, both in the case of preschool and school children. Men are more passive when it comes to maintaining a dialogue with those responsible for child care and with other parents at the day care center, participating in activities together with other parents and holding elected positions related to preschool child care. Men also show lower participation when it comes to school children: attending parents' meetings or parent-teacher conferences, maintaining contacts with teachers or school administrators, maintaining contacts with the PTA and talking with other parents about schooling. More mothers than fathers participate in their children's class activities.

But this stronger involvement by women is not limited only to the pure parental role or the role of the patient or relative of a patient in the medical care system. In some respects, political participation is also one of the more "feminine" forms of participation. It turns out that the classification into several dimensions is of great help here. A comprehensive measure of political participation in general is too crude an instrument. The forms of representation that are typical of women would disappear in an overall index. Political activity can assume many different expressions.

As demonstrated in Chapter 4, political participation can be divided into five different dimensions. Two of these are characterized by greater activity among men, two by greater activity among women. One, voting, is sex-neutral. There are no longer any statistically significant differences between men and women when it comes to voter turnout. Other sources indicate that women even have a slightly higher turnout; in the mid-1970s,

Table 6.1 Sex and citizenship

	Women	Men	r
Men show higher values than women			
Chances of exercising influence on the job	46	56	-0.21
Chances of exercising influence: total index	48	53	-0.16
Political participation: contacts	13	20	-0.16
Administrative expertise	73	84	-0.15
Interest in politics	47	55	-0.15
Activities as employee	40	49	-0.14
Influence on unions	37	42	-0.10
Participation in voluntary organizations	7	8	-0.08
Political participation: party activity	5	7	-0.07
Women show higher values than men			
Activities as parent of preschool children	51	33	0.30
Activities as parent of school children	61	45	0.29
Political participation: manifestations	24	20	0.10
Affinity with organized movements	41	38	0.09
Took initiatives as patient/relative of patient	21	15	0.08
Political participation: protests	3	2	0.04

women caught up with men's level of voting activity.⁹

The two aspects of political participation that show a higher degree of activity by men are contacts and party activity. It is more common for men to try to exercise influence by contacting state and local civil servants, politicians and organizational officials or by stating their views in the media or addressing a meeting. It is also more common for men to be members of a political party, to attend political meetings and hold public office. Men thus have an advantage when it comes to the more traditional channels of political influence.

The two dimensions in which women are more active than men are manifestations and protests. More women than men have become involved in boycott actions, petitions, fundraising, demonstrations and political action groups. Campaign and party buttons are worn more often by women than men. Admittedly only a tiny minority have become involved in the more militant protests. In statistical terms, the associations are therefore weak and not always significant. But the general tendency is consistent. Women are more daring than men when it comes to strikes, illegal protest activities and demonstrations other than May Day parades.

9. See Allmänna valen 1985 (The 1985 General Elections), Sveriges officiella statistik, statistiska centralbyrån (Official Swedish Statistics, Statistics Sweden), 1987, table 3.1 and corresponding studies of previous elections. In the cities, women moved past men even earlier. In Gothenburg, the percentage of women who voted exceeded that of men as early as 1960. See Sven-Ulrik Palme, "Vid valurna och i riksdagen under femtio år" ("Fifty Years at the Ballot Box and in Parliament") in Kvinnors röst och rätt (Women's Votes and Rights), Allmänna Förlaget, Stockholm, 1969, p. 46.

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In theoretical discussions of the concept of power, one distinction focuses on the actual way in which people exercise power. This observation was made as part of a critique aimed at the way in which established social scientists study power. An influential study of power on the local level in an American city examined how political decisions were made on a number of central issues. Its critics maintained that this method of inquiry focused exclusively on those issues that had become politicized and ended up on the political agenda. But, these critics believed, power has another face. Silence and non-decisions can also be expressions of power. Powerful interests can prevent threatening issues from being raised for political discussion at all. But some problems may not even get far enough to run into the barrier of this problem-formulating privilege. The third dimension of power is related to controlling consciousness. The power over myths, ideologies and information thus becomes the focus of attention.¹⁰

If one wanted to formulate a general thesis on the changed prerequisites for the exercise of power in today's society, it would be in these terms. The third dimension of power becomes more important than the first. Traditional methods of exercising power and control -- whether by issuing orders, commands or detailed instructions -- are becoming less and less effective. Instead, it is necessary to influence people's perceptions, ideologies and ways of thinking.

10. For an analytical summary of this rich debate, which is associated with names like Robert Dahl, Nelson Polsby, Peter Bachrach, Morton Baratz and Stephen Lukes, see, for example, John Gaventa, "Makt och deltagande" ("Power and Participation") in Olof Petersson, ed., *Maktbegreppet* (The Concept of Power), Carlsson, Stockholm, 1986, pp. 27 ff.

It may be possible to identify profound philosophical associations here between sex and power. The first dimension of power has to do with male techniques of domination. The third dimension of power expresses a more feminine approach to fellow human beings and society.

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Men are somewhat more active in voluntary organizations than women are. The difference is statistically certain both in terms of membership and active participation. But the difference is still small. On average, women belong to 3.1 different types of associations, men in 3.4. Actually, men and women differ far more when it comes to what organizations they belong to than in the total number of membership cards they carry. Table 6.2 shows how membership in associations is distributed among women and men, respectively.

Differences between the sexes in organizational membership are another confirmation that women and men find expression for their social involvement within somewhat different areas of public life. Organizations with a preponderance of men among their members are mainly connected with sports, motoring, civil defense and professional life. Organizations dominated by women are connected with charity work, religion, peace and the family. But there is a relatively large category of organizations with an approximate balance between the sexes. One example is the trade union movement.

As indicated, there is a small preponderance of men among members and active participants in voluntary associations. But in another respect, women are actually more deeply committed to such organizations than men. On the whole, women have a stronger feeling of affinity with Sweden's large movements. But here, too, there are major interesting variations. As mentioned earlier,

Table 6.2 Sex and membership in associations

	Women	Men	r
Men more often members than women			
Automobile organization	5	20	-0.23
Sports organization	28	43	-0.15
Voluntary defense organization	2	8	-0.14
Cooperative, other than consumer cooperative	7	15	-0.13
Lodge or similar society	2	5	-0.10
Other professional organization	3	7	-0.10
Employers' or business organization	2	5	-0.09
Farmers' organization	3	5	-0.06
Investment organization	5	8	-0.05
Women more often members than men			
Women's organization	4	0	0.14
Humanitarian aid organization	13	6	0.11
Consumer cooperative	41	31	0.10
Protestant denomination other than the Church of Sweden	6	3	0.08
Group within the Church of Sweden	5	3	0.06
Peace organization	3	1	0.06
Retired people's organization	9	6	0.06
Other religious denomination	3	1	0.05
Parents' club	11	8	0.05
No significant differences between men and women			
Outdoor activities organization			
Environmentalist organization			
Cultural club			
Hobby club			
Residents' organization			
Club for disabled people			
Immigrant club			
Temperance organization			
Local political action group			
Group for international issue			
Trade union			

three major categories of organizations can be distinguished. The first wave of organizations go back to the Protestant revivalist movement and the temperance movement. The second wave is connected with the emergence of the labor movement and such economically related organizations as the consumer cooperatives. The third wave includes the sports movement, the peace movement, the environmentalist movement, the women's movement and the international solidarity movements.

There is one single movement for which men feel a stronger affinity than women do. That is the sports movement. Some movements are sex-neutral, in the sense that they enjoy equally great sympathies among both men and women: the labor movement, the cooperative movement, the adult education movement and the environmentalist movement. Otherwise women have a more strongly developed feeling of affinity with major movements. This is true of the Church of Sweden, the peace movement, the international solidarity movements, the temperance movement, the independent Protestant churches, and not surprisingly, the women's movement.

Organizations belonging to the second wave enjoy the same degree of trust among men as women, whereas women feel a stronger affinity with organizations belonging to the first and third wave than men do.

+ + +

Women's researchers are right. Given a conventional and narrow view of political participation, one gets an impression of passivity among women. If this perspective is broadened to include the entire spectrum of citizen power, the picture changes. Women are active and involved, too, but in areas other than the traditional ones.

Figure 6.1 provides an overview of the association between the sexes and citizenship roles. At the bottom of the figure are those forms of involvement that have to do with small-scale democracy. At the top are those activities that aim at influencing the whole society. At the left are those activities where women predominate, at the right those where men predominate.

In earlier research, the spotlight has only projected a narrow beam of light over the upper right-hand corner of this figure. The right-hand part of the picture is concerned with party politics, public agencies and worklife.

Three citizenship roles are, for the most part, sex-neutral. When it comes to voting, there are no major differences between men and women in terms of activity levels; nowadays women even have a slight edge. Men are admittedly somewhat more confident in their ability to exercise influence in their roles as residents and as consumers. But both men and women participate to an equal extent when it comes to residents' associations and activities that involve working with their neighbors. Nor are there any differences between men and women when it comes to the number of initiatives they take in their roles as residents and consumers.


To the left are the womens' spheres. Manifestations and protests are linked to a general involvement in public life. Child care and schools are related to the parental role. The stronger involvement evinced by women is not limited to the private sphere. A number of aspects of the parental role are connected with public actions. As a consequence of the expansion of the Swedish public sector, personal care is one area of life now handled by the authorities. What was previously a family issue is now the object of political decisions and is a collective concern. Women's stronger involvement in child-related matters has thereby resulted in their becoming active and gaining power and influence outside the walls of the home.

Generation

A number of citizenship roles have a strong association with age. Institutionalized opportunities to influence one's living conditions are often related to such life events as forming a household, bringing children into the world and having children in school. Given the selection made in the citizenship survey, the number of such situations may vary from one (housing only) up to six. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the average number of roles reported by interviewees is between three and four. Figure 6.2 shows how the number of such roles varies by age categories.

The intensity of everyday life, as reflected in the number of citizenship roles played, rises during a person's youth, culminates between age 30 and 40, then falls with advancing age.

Citizen power is defined here as a successful attempt to change a situation that one is dissatisfied with. An important link in this chain is a person's ability to take an initiative to change his or her own situation. One overall yardstick of this ability is how many initiatives a person has taken as a percentage of all situations that have arisen. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the average for the entire population is 27 percent. It now turns out that this proportion also varies in a characteristic way between age groups. The inclination to take an initiative reaches its peak between ages 30 and 40 but is far lower among the youngest and oldest age groups. Otherwise, it turns out that the same is true of dissatisfaction; middle-aged people express greater dissatisfaction with their situation than both younger and older groups.




Figur 6.2 Ålder och antal medborgarsituationer

Number of
citizenship
roles

Ålder: Age

Figure 6.2 Age and number of citizenship situations



Figur 6.3 Procentandel initiativ efter kön och ålder

Initiatives
 (total index)
 Kvinnor: Women
 Män: Men
 Ålder: Age


Figure 6.3 Initiatives as a percentage of citizenship roles, by sex and age

Figure 6.3 also shows that the age pattern related to the number of initiatives is mainly the same among men as among women. One small, interesting difference can be noted, however. The age curve is somewhat more accentuated among men. Young women are somewhat more involved than men. Likewise, older women are somewhat more inclined to take initiatives than older men. But in the more active age categories, men are somewhat ahead of women.

Here it is worth noting that the yardstick that measures one's inclination to take initiatives is a percentage representing the number of initiatives divided by the number of citizenship roles that a person assumes. The number of initiatives is even more strongly associated with the more active age categories, because more situations arise there (Table 6.3).

If the total number of initiatives is regarded as an expression of the collective demands of citizens during one year, it is clear that this citizen opinion does not represent all age groups equally. The young and the elderly speak here with a weaker voice.

People's general assessment of their own ability to influence their situation also follows a bridge-shaped curve across the generations (Figure 6.4). The peak is located in a somewhat higher age category, however. As pointed out earlier, men feel that they have greater chances to exercise influence than women do. The two age curves run nearly parallel. In all age categories, women perceive their chances of exercising influence as being lower than that of men. The group that regards itself as most powerless is the one consisting of very young women.




Figur 6.4 Bedömning av möjlighet att påverka efter kön och ålder

Ability to
exercise
influence
(total index)
Män: Men
Kvinnor: Women
Ålder: Age

Figure 6.4 Assessment of one's ability to exercise influence, by sex and age

Table 6.3 Age and number of initiatives

Age	Number_of_initiatives
16-20	0.4
21-30	1.0
31-40	1.3
41-50	1.0
51-60	0.6
61-70	0.3
71-80	0.2



Figur 6.5 Administrativ kompetens efter kön och ålder

Admini-
strative
competence
Män: Men
Kvinnor: Women
Ålder: Age


Figure 6.5 Administrative competence, by sex and age

The age curve for administrative competence is similar (Figure 6.5). People aged around 40 are those who make the most positive assessments of their ability to appeal a decision and assert themselves against public agencies. But here it is not the young, but on the contrary the elderly who have the lowest values. Those who have the hardest time asserting their rights before the authorities are older women.

+ + +

How do the various generations differ when it comes to political participation? According to one common perception, today's young people are politically passive. It is often stated that the youth of today flee politics.

As it turns out, however, the picture is relatively complicated. There is no simple truth about the relationships between age and political participation. Once again, it proves useful to be able to distinguish between different types of participation. Figure 6.6 presents four different dimensions of political participation. The curves show participation levels among both women and men.



Figur 6.6 Politiskt deltagande efter kön och ålder

The first aspect of political participation -- contacts -- varies with age in a familiar way. This type of involvement is highest among people aged 30-50. In all age groups, men are more active than women. The male edge is particularly noticeable among middle-aged and older age categories.

The second dimension of political participation -- party activities -- is also characterized by a higher level of activity among men than among women, except in the youngest age category. The highest level of involvement when it comes to party membership, party work, participation in meetings and holding positions of trust occurs among men over 50.

An entirely different picture emerges when it comes to the third dimension of political participation -- manifestations. Here women score consistently higher than men, except in the very oldest category. Young women are by far the most active when it comes to participating in boycott actions, signing petitions, making financial contributions and wearing campaign buttons.

In this context, the fourth dimension of participation -- protests -- refers to strikes, illegal protests and demonstrations other than May Day ones. One category of people distinguishes itself particularly in this area: women aged 16-20.¹¹ Otherwise there are only minor differences; only a small

11. The number of interviewees aged 16-20 is small, of course. But the big gap between men and women in this age category is probably no statistical accident, because this finding is largely confirmed by a special study of young people based on a far larger sample. See Anders Westholm, Arne Lindquist and Richard G. Niemi, "Education and the Making of the Informed Citizen: Political Literacy and the Outside World" in Orit Ichilov, ed., *Political Socialization for Democracy*, Teachers College Press, New York, forthcoming.

minority became involved in protest activities. But the most politically militant category of the population is young women.

The degree of association between age and level of political participation thus depends on what is being referred to. Contacts -- phoning, writing or taking other types of direct initiatives aimed at exerting pressure -- are most common among people of middle age. Young people and the elderly are more passive in this respect. Young people are also relatively inactive in traditional party politics. But the type of political participation related to opinion-molding and protests is most common among young people.

The image of an apolitical and uninvolved younger generation is therefore incorrect. Young people perhaps claim to be uninterested in conventional party politics. But if the definition of politics is expanded to include an understanding and involvement in the future shaping of society, young people are just as involved as older generations.¹²

Our general conclusion about young people and politics will therefore be the same as for women and politics. If we limit our field of vision to politics in the narrow sense -- party activities and contacts with public agencies -- both young people and women appear relatively passive. But if our perspective is also broadened to include other aspects of civic activity, the impression is completely different.

12. The political socialization of young people in Sweden during the 1980s is the topic of a project called Youth in Politics. Its findings will be presented in doctoral dissertations by Anders Westholm, Arne Lindquist and Göran Blomberg.

+ + +

Several measures of civic involvement are related to psychological qualities. Both a person's identification with a political party and feeling of affinity with Sweden's organized movements have to do with attitudes and personal orientation. These measures of identification and affinity show marked variations between different age groups.

Identification with a political party is stronger among older groups than among younger ones (Figure 6.7). This association is not uniquely Swedish, but is also found in other political systems. The phenomenon is usually interpreted as an effect of aging. With rising age, greater political experience and increasing familiarity with the political alternatives, a person also gains a more strongly developed feeling of closeness to a particular party.¹³ This aging effect is, however, not an expression of any mechanical adherence to law. Political events can both raise and lower the level of identification with a political party.¹⁴ The association between party identification and age has also been interpreted as a generational phenomenon.¹⁵ Since the late 1960s, party identification among Swedish voters has tended to become weaker.¹⁶


Women show somewhat weaker party identification than men. The difference appears in all age categories. But one cannot, on this basis, draw the conclusion that women's psychological involvement

13. Philip E. Converse, "Of Time and Political Stability," *Comparative Political Studies*, 2, 1969.

14. Philip E. Converse, *The Dynamics of Party Support. Cohort Analyzing Party Identification*, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1976.


15. Sören Holmberg and Mikael Gilljam, *Väljare och val i Sverige (Voters and Elections in Sweden)*, Bonniers, Stockholm, 1987, pp. 241 ff.

16. Olof Petersson, *Väljarna och valet 1976, Valundersökningar, rapport 2 (Voters and the 1976 Election, Election Studies, report 2)*, SCB/Liber, 1977, p. 269; Holmberg and Gilljam, 1987, pp. 241 ff.



Figur 6.7 Partiidentifikation efter kön och ålder

in public issues is lower in general. On the contrary, the association between such involvement and sex looks completely different if one moves from political parties to other organized movements in Sweden. Figure 6.8 shows how people's feeling of affinity with various movements and organizations varies by generations. This is a composite index that measures their affinity with the first, second and third wave of special-interest organizations. With a single exception, women score higher than men in all age categories.



Figur 6.8 Samhörighet med organiserade rörelser efter kön och ålder

Affinity
with
movements
Män: Men
Kvinnor: Women
Ålder: Age

Figure 6.8 Affinity with organized movements by sex and age

Here, too, there is a connection between age and sense of identification. Younger people have a weaker identification with organized movements than older age categories do. This association with age is particularly strong when it comes to the first wave of organizations, those concerned with temperance and religion. Second-wave organizations, too, enjoy much stronger support among older age groups. The same is actually true of most


third-wave organizations. The environmentalist movement, the peace movement and the international aid and solidarity movements enjoy at least equally strong sympathy among older age categories as among the young. The sports movement is the only one where young people actually score the same high point levels as older age groups.

Class

In every comprehensive account of Western European political sociology, Sweden is distinguished by its comparatively simple conflict structure. The political landscape of many countries is criss-crossed by a jumble of conflict lines. Struggles between different language groups, ethnic minorities, religious denominations and regional special interests have generated conflicts that have had a permanent impact on political conditions in these countries. In linguistically and culturally homogeneous Sweden, such factors have been of negligible importance in modern times. Instead, the Swedish political system has been dominated by one single type of conflict: the socioeconomic one. Large socioeconomic interest groups have assumed a dominant role in Swedish politics.

The analytical diagram that Stein Rokkan once drew to capture the fundamental structure of Norwegian politics can be applied to Sweden with at least equal justification. Socioeconomic conflicts are even more dominant in Sweden than in Norway, where such factors as language and culture have occasionally played a major role. Rokkan's model is very simple. The conflicts that determine politics can be derived from a triangular class diagram (Figure 6.9).¹⁷

17. This model is presented in Stein Rokkan, "Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism" in Robert Dahl, ed., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966, p. 93. Cf. also Henry Valen and Stein Rokkan, "Norway: Conflict Structure and Mass Politics in a European Perspective" in Richard Rose, ed., *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook*, Free Press, New York, 1974, pp. 332 ff.



Figur 6.9 Socioekonomiska skiljelinjer i svenskt 1900-tal

Labor

Business

Farm

Figure 6.9 Socioeconomic cleavages in 20th century Sweden

The vertical axis in the diagram reflects the conflict between countryside and city, between primary and secondary economic sectors. The horizontal line between labor and business represents the fundamental class conflict of industrial society.

The three poles in the diagram manifest themselves through strong organizations: farm labor unions and producer cooperatives, the trade union movement and the employer organizations. The major coalitions initiated during the 1930s, which had a decisive influence on Swedish public life, were agreements between labor and agriculture (starting with the crisis agreement of 1932) and between labor and capital (the spirit of Saltsjöbaden).

The structure of the party system can likewise be derived directly from the triangular field of socioeconomic forces. The three poles are represented by the Agrarians (now Center Party), the Social Democrats and the Conservatives (now Moderates). Although the Left-Right dimension is the dominant one in Swedish party politics, the other -- vertical -- dimension can occasionally manifest itself in "unusual" party constellations, as demonstrated by the nuclear power issue of the 1970s.

If one had to choose a single model to sum up the social roots of Swedish 20th century politics, it would be precisely this one. But how relevant is this three-class diagram as the 20th century

moves toward its end? To interpret the structure of the Swedish party system, this model remains indispensable. The fundamental left-right scale, with the occasional emergence of another dimension where the Center Party represents one extreme pole, forms the basic pattern of Swedish party politics. This pattern would be incomprehensible if we ignored the socioeconomic lines of conflict that prevailed when the political party system was created early in this century. But a party system can be more resistant to change than a social structure. Stein Rokkan has observed that a party system develops by jumps rather than by degrees. The party system usually "crystallizes" at a breakpoint, then "freezes" and keeps its basic structure over a long period of years. The party system continues to show this fundamental sluggishness. The fact that the three-class diagram is clearly recognizable even when examining today's party conflicts can therefore not be taken immediately as an indication that the model is also the best description of today's social structure.

The most direct way of measuring the relevance of the three-class model is simply to calculate how large a proportion of the population it covers. If a model is perceived as a description of a country's main classes, it is undeniably of some interest to know how large a percentage of the gainfully employed population does not fit into the categories of the model.

The model describes the conflicts in a society that includes primary and secondary economic sectors. The simplest measure of the relevance of the model is therefore how large a percentage of the gainfully employed population works in agriculture and industry. For more than a century, Sweden's agricultural population has fallen continuously. The percentage of the labor force employed in industry peaked during the first half of the 1960s and has declined since then. The combined result is therefore unambiguous: industry and agriculture are gradually declining in importance as sources of livelihood.

During the period 1960-1985 the proportion of the labor force employed in agriculture shrank from 15.7 percent to 4.8 percent. Industry's share of all gainfully employed persons fell from 40.3 percent to 29.9 percent.¹⁸ This means that the proportion of the labor force working in industry and agriculture fell from 56 percent in 1960 to less than 35 percent in 1985. Today only one third of the gainfully employed population works in the economic sectors that form the fundamental socioeconomic conflict model of Swedish political history.

Now, a picture based on statistics about economic sectors is not the same thing as a class analysis in the strict sense. Each respective sector includes occupations belonging to completely different classes. Due to the nature of the statistical source material, it is considerably harder to obtain a comparable overview of the changes in the sizes of social classes. Attempts have nevertheless been made, by processing census data, to sketch the changes in the class society. In such an analysis, Göran Therborn has described Swedish class structure since 1930.¹⁹ One of Therborn's findings is that the size of the working class has remained essentially unchanged. This conclusion has been challenged, however; other analyses indicate that the working class is shrinking.²⁰ These divergent conclusions are largely due

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18. Statistisk årsbok (Statistical Yearbook), Statistics Sweden, Stockholm, 1987, p. 178.
 19. Göran Therborn, *Den svenska klasstrukturen 1930-1980* (Swedish Class Structure, 1930-1980), Zenit, Lund, 1981.
 20. Robert Erikson, "Den sociala strukturen och dess förändring" ("Social Structure and Its Change") in Robert Erikson and Rune Åberg, eds., *Välfärd i förändring. Levnadsvillkor i Sverige 1968-1981* (Well-Being in Transition. Living Conditions in Sweden, 1968-1981), Prisma, Stockholm, 1984, pp. 42 ff.

to different definitions. Therborn includes a large portion of the service sector in the working class, for example occupations belonging to the wholesale/retail sector and the medical care system. The increase in these groups offsets the declining number of industrial workers. But Therborn's material can be regrouped, so to speak. Four categories are relevant to the three-class model: "farm workers," "other productive workers: industry, construction, transportation etc.," "farmers" and "other business owners." The sum of these four categories as a proportion of the total gainfully employed population declined from 63 percent in 1930 to 39 percent in 1975. This method of calculation also leads to the conclusion that the relevance of the three-class model is diminishing.

As a social description, the three-class diagram fits better into early 20th century Swedish society, with its labor-intensive factories and farms, than into today's society of industrial robots, computers, desk jobs and publicly operated medical and social welfare institutions. A pertinent solution would be to modify the diagram, change or add one or more classes and identify some new categories that better cover today's realities.

But the problem is more fundamental than that. The intellectual operation of class analysis has itself become problematic. The fundamental conceptual model can be said to consist of three stages: (1) an individual (2) is placed (3) in a class. All three stages can be questioned. The significance of a class is no longer self-evident. The question is what is meant by placing or referring someone to a certain class. Nor is it self-evident what is being placed in a class; the model presupposes an unambiguous individual. These three problems will be discussed here in turn.

The Multiple Meanings of Class Structure

Marxist-inspired class analysis is best suited to a polarized society. To the extent that there is an exploiting upper class and an exploited lower class, there is a correspondence between the description of a concrete society and the materialistic perception of history. The history of all societies to date is a history of class struggle, according to the opening passage of the Communist Manifesto of 1848. As has frequently been pointed out, however, there is no clearly formulated class theory in Marx's own writings. In his analyses of contemporary political events in Europe, he employed considerably more sophisticated categories than this bipolar diagram. Without distorting fundamental Marxist concepts excessively, it is possible to add one or more "middle classes," for example the petty bourgeoisie or yeoman farmers.

But what remains a fundamental precondition is that classes be regarded as a classification. Logically speaking, a class is a category. A classification is made up of categories that are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. An individual can be placed in only one class. A class structure is like a chest of drawers. Occupations end up in the same drawer depending on their class-related position. The idea is that occupations are characterized by a single attribute.

A large proportion of Marxist-inspired class analyses have ended up focusing on problems of where to draw the lines. The only types of individuals who cause no problems are the big businessman who owns factories and the proletariat that sells its labor to this businessman. But the problems become correspondingly harder when we look at newer types of occupations. Attempts to squeeze the categories of modern society into a class diagram are becoming more and more frustrating. It is clear that the basic class diagram, perhaps modified by a few

categories for artisans and farmers, was best suited to the proletarianized industrial areas of Europe around the turn of the 20th century. Later attempts to apply class theory contain the hidden accusation that Marx did not foresee and take into account the existence of computer programmers, windsurfing instructors and nurses' aides.

The difficulty connected with Marxist applications of class theory is that they assume that in conceptual terms, class equals classification. Spatial analogies undoubtedly determined this concept. The whole discussion about where to draw the lines between categories presupposes spatial metaphors. The logical-statistical expression of this concept is that class structure is determined with the aid of a discrete, taxonomic classification requiring mutually exclusive categories.

When attempting to use a Marxist-influenced class concept as an instrument of empirical analysis, it has become increasingly obvious that the model causes great difficulties. In many cases it is not possible to place a particular occupation in a definite class by using a single criterion. This lesson has led to various modifications in the simple class diagram. American sociologist Erik Olin Wright has introduced the concept of "contradictory class locations." A research team has conducted an empirical study of Swedish class structure on the basis of this class concept.²¹

Wright and his associates distinguish among three types of power and control in worklife: 1) ownership of capital, 2) the

21. Göran Ahrne, Hedvid Ekerwald and Håkan Leiulfstrud, *Klassamhällets förändring (Changing Social Classes)*, Arkiv, Lund, 1985.

right of decision-making about using the means of production and 3) the right of decision-making and control over the labor of others.²² There are occupations that fulfill some, but not all, of the criteria; these are the ones with contradictory class locations. One large category consists of "semi-autonomous wage labor": "Because they are wage laborers, they belong to the working class, but because they control their own work themselves to a substantial degree, they belong to the petty bourgeoisie."²³

The author of this passage became self-critical. The concept of contradictory class locations is now criticized by Olin Wright himself in four respects.²⁴ First, the concept of "contradictory" is inappropriate; it would have been better to speak of "dual or heterogenous." Second, the right of decision-making and control over the labor of others is dubious as a criterion for distinguishing the petty bourgeoisie. Third, the model is inadequate as a way of describing the class structure of "post-capitalist" societies. Fourth, the three class criteria should not have been based on dominance, i.e. power and control, but instead on the concept of exploitation.²⁵

There is no reason to take sides here as to whether the earlier or the later Olin Wright is correct. Both variations on the class concept are somewhat sterile. But the fundamental concept is good enough. To be able to describe the class structure of modern society, a single criterion is not

22. Ibid., p. 23.

23. Ibid., p. 24.

24. Erik Olin Wright, *Classes*, Verso, London, 1985.

25. Ibid., pp. 51 ff. Olin Wright's new model is based on the theory of exploitation developed by John Roemer, a representative of American "rational choice Marxism."

sufficient. An empirical determination of class structure must take into account the fact that an occupation can be classified in several ways at the same time. The class concept is multidimensional.

What is missing from Olin Wright and other contemporary Marxist social scientists, paradoxically enough, is a historical link. The various class typologies are sterile precisely because they do not take into account the historical peculiarities of the society that is the object of analysis.

Trying to capture the class structure of a society by using a classification system can be regarded as a special interpretation of historical materialism. It is probably yet another spatial metaphor that has played a trick. The basic model of historical materialism states that societies move through a number of stages (protocommunist, feudalism, capitalism, socialism/communism). One can, of course, always discuss the number and character of the various stages, but what is essential here is that the stages be perceived as sections of one road; in the course of history, societies "pass through" one era or another and "move" into the next one. A society viewed at a given point in time is characterized by the era then prevailing. Thus the main conflict during industrial capitalism is between labor and capital; any "remnants" of precapitalistic production systems are regarded with a mixture of irritation and superiority, as something "condemned" to wither away and disappear. This mechanistic interpretation of the theory of stages is what gives class-analytical classifications such remarkably static features.

Now, it is quite possible to retain the concept that society has gone through a number of periods, each characterized by its own particular means of production. It does not, however, follow from this that the previous phases have been passed forever and been thrown on the garbage heap of history. If any metaphor is

appropriate, it should instead be the language of geology; the social structure of society can be regarded as a number of sediments -- socioeconomic relationships that have been laid down on top of each other and still coexist. The class location of an individual must therefore be determined not only in relation to one of society's class-dividing lines, but all of them.

A multidimensional class analysis of this kind can therefore be summarized as follows. "Class" refers to a person's relationship with a society's means of production. Every society has its own way of organizing its productive system. To borrow the words of Pontus Fahlbeck, "the sustaining principle of the class system" is "in the first instance, property and acquisition, followed by various kinds of labor such as working with the head and with the hands."²⁶ The different ways of organizing the productive system can each be traced to a particular historical era. These historically unique means of production form the dimensions of the class society. In principle, every individual can be represented as a point in a multidimensional coordinate system. The degree of clarity in the definition of a class is an empirical question. Class homogeneity appears as tightly clustered collections of points. A more diffused, unclear pattern of points is a sign of fragmented class structure; in that case, there are many individuals with ambiguous class positions.

This way of characterizing a class society is a refinement of the relationship between the individual and the means of production. The method does not, however, presume to capture all the elements of Marxist class theory. One essential problem for Marx concerned the subjective, political side of classes. In order for classes to behave as active subjects on the stage of history, they must possess a collective awareness of their situation and their fate. Only then does a class assume an

26. Pontus Fahlbeck, *Stånd och klasser (Estates and Classes)*, Lund, 1892, pp. 43-44.

identity. It is, of course, entirely possible aside from the multidimensional class model also to try to characterize the existence of a collective consciousness and determine to what extent the aggregates formed by a common position in relation to the means of production are also accompanied by a perception of shared interests among individuals in these groups.

The Multiple Meanings of Class Membership

The complication that has been discussed so far has concerned the actual appearance of class structure. It has to be simultaneously possible for each occupation to be defined in more than one way. The next problem arises when an individual is to be placed in the class structure on the basis of his or her occupation. In many cases this is relatively unproblematic. But there are still several instances where an individual's class membership is more or less ambiguous.

Some examples: A person works half-time on his farm and half-time in a factory. Another person divides his time between heading a research institute and raising sheep. A ladies' hair stylist forms a sole proprietorship and rents a chair in the firm where she was previously employed. An employee owns stock in his company and is "90 percent worker and 10 percent capitalist." In the past few years, blue-collar and white-collar workers at about 200 Swedish companies have subscribed for convertible bonds worth SEK 13 billion (over \$2 billion).²⁷ LO-tidningen, the weekly newspaper of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, asks in one headline, "What role will the unions play if workers become capitalists?"²⁸

27. Barbro Sköldebrand, Anställd och ägare -- konvertibler (Employee and Owner -- Convertible Bonds), Arbetslivscentrum (Swedish Center for Working Life), Stockholm, 1988, pp. 34ff.
 28. LO-tidningen, 46, 1986.

It is no longer self-evident whether a person should be classified as a business owner, a blue-collar worker, a white-collar employee, an employee etc.

The problem of unequivocally assigning a person to one, and only one, class is further exacerbated if a time dimension is introduced. Social mobility, both between and within generations, means that a person may carry experiences from completely different social environments, either from his childhood or as the result of his own changes of occupation.

To be able to represent this type of individual correctly in an empirical study requires not just one but many determinations. This is no problem in itself. The difficulty arises when making the actual class determination. It becomes difficult to maintain the assumption that an individual belongs to one, and only one, category.

The Multidimensional Individual

Suppose that the first two types of problems did not exist. The categories included in the class structure are unequivocal and an individual can be assigned to one and only one class. But what, then, is the significance of this placement? The idea is to arrive at a fair measure of the individual's social situation. Given his or her relationship to the means of production, the individual is assumed to behave as a member of a class, as part of a socioeconomic structure. One imagines miners in the British coalfields, living for generations in the same dilapidated, sooty brick houses. Or the landowner strolling about his country estate with inherited self-assurance.

One of the major social changes of the modern age is the disappearance of the housewife. The percentage of women of

working age who neither hold nor have held paid jobs outside the home is extremely small in Sweden today. In less than two decades, this far-reaching change has had consequences for both the labor market and the family.

For purposes of describing social class structure, the implications of the altered status of women has hardly been taken into full account. A large proportion of statistics is still structured in the same way as when the husband was normally the family's sole breadwinner. A household is assigned to a specific class on the basis of the occupation of the person with the highest income in the family. In most cases, the result is that the woman's occupation is not counted.

To obtain a fair picture of a family's class membership, the occupation of all gainfully employed members of the household must be taken into account. In many cases, of course, both spouses work in similar occupations. If so, the class membership of the family can still be determined in straightforward fashion. But in those cases where gainfully employed family members are assigned to different classes, the determination of the family's class becomes ambiguous. The wife of a metal worker holds a white-collar job at the local Social Insurance Office. A woman belonging to the Union of Commercial Employees, who works in the perfume department of a department store, is married to a white-collar employee at a computer firm. The wife of a farmer works as a nurse at the community hospital in the nearest city. The wife of the neighboring farmer works half-time at the bank.

The question is: How common are these cases? How often are there families with ambiguous class identities? A later analysis of data from Statistics Sweden's 1983 income study, initiated by the Central Organization of Salaried Employees (TCO), indicates

that households with mixed class identities are very common. "Homogeneous" households are defined as those where both gainfully employed spouses belong to the same socioeconomic group. "Heterogeneous" households are those where the two spouses belong to different groups. A calculation of the relative numbers of such types of households naturally depends very much on how these socioeconomic groups are defined: the more exactly they are defined, the fewer homogeneous households there will be. It turns out that even with a rough division into three categories (senior white-collar employees, other white-collar employees and blue-collar workers), homogeneous households numbered no more than 57 percent of the total. In 43 percent of households, the two spouses belonged to different social classes.²⁹ A sociological analysis of Swedish class structure arrives at similar results: the percentage of "cross class families" is nearly half of all families. Membership in such a mixed family turns out, moreover, to be of significance to people's views about power, politics and class.³⁰

The association between family and class membership will be discussed later in a separate section (Chapter 9).

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29. Karsten Lundequist and Jan-Erik Nyberg, *Tjänsteman och andra. En studie i fördelningspolitik (White-Collar Employees and Others. A Study in Redistribution Policy)*, TCO, May 1987, p. 24. Analysis of Table 3. The sample includes households in which both partners are gainfully employed wage-earners.
30. Håkan Leiulfsrud and Alison Woodward, "Women at Class Crossroads: Repudiating Conventional Theories of Family Class," *Sociology*, 21, 1987, p. 399; Håkan Leiulfsrud and Alison Woodward, *Cross-Class Encounters of a Close Kind: Class Awareness and Politics in Swedish Families*, manuscript, 1987, p. tab. 1, p. 24. See also a corresponding Norwegian study, Tom Colbjørnsen, Gunn E. Birkeland, Gudmund Hernes and Knud Knudsen, *Klassesamfundet på hell (Class Society in Decline)*, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1987, pp. 88 ff.

Fragmentation

A class analysis is a method for describing the social structure of a society. The difficulties connected with determining the class structure of contemporary Sweden say something important about this society. The image of a society as a clear hierarchy with sharply delimited strata, as a system of isolated categories, is very graphic but misleading.

The image of a fragmented class structure is not unique to Sweden. Some years ago, a book on British class structure was published, bearing the significant title *The Fragmentary Class Structure*. Its main argument was that traditional class distinctions are dissolving and being replaced by a more fragmented class structure. Its authors polemicized against a number of popular theories. Ongoing trends did not signify that the working class was becoming more bourgeois, or that the proletariat was being transformed in a revolutionary direction, or that a new working class was emerging. Instead, the meaning of these changes is that homogeneous classes are dissolving.³¹

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The task of the Study of Power and Democracy in Sweden, according to the Government's instructions, includes examining how "access to economic resources" determines citizens' "chances ... of defending their rights." This is one way of formulating the classical problem of the relationship between social class and power.

31. K. Roberts, F.G. Cook, S.C. Clark & Elisabeth Semeonoff, *The Fragmentary Class Structure*, Heinemann, London, 1977.

Using the method chosen here -- an interview-based field survey -- our strategy is to characterize individuals (and later also families) according to their class position. We will then use this class determination to explain variations in citizen involvement. It will thereby become possible to state whether the actual realization of the meaning of citizenship is systematically related to class membership.

Toward the end of the chapter, we will also present other yardsticks of the social position of individuals. They involve two concepts closely related to class membership: educational level and income. We will devote a separate section to the difference between center and periphery. We will also focus special attention on one group of people who may be assumed to have particular difficulties asserting their interests in society: immigrants.

+ + +

Now, the fact that class structure is increasingly complex and many-faceted does not mean that large social categories have disappeared. Even today, people's occupation and relationship to the means of production have a decisive impact on social habits and collective action. We will eventually add more details to this picture, but a conventional starting point in discussing the statistical relationship between social position and citizenship is to group people into three major social classes. These three categories are blue collar workers, white collar employees and business owners. Gainfully employed people are classified according to their current occupation. Those who are temporarily unemployed, on parental leave or otherwise away from work are classified according to their most recent occupation. Retired people are classified according to the occupation they were engaged in when they left gainful employment. Those who

cannot be classified as members of any occupation, mainly students and housewives who have never been gainfully employed, amounted to 7 percent of our survey respondents; these people are thus not included in the following analysis. Respondents were asked in detail about their occupation, their working tasks and what kind of production and operations occurred at their workplace. On the basis of their replies, these occupational data were subsequently converted to numerical codes.³² The blue collar worker category essentially includes the occupations organized by the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO). Occupations organized by the Central Organization of Salaried Employees (TCO) and the Central Organization of Professional Associations (SACO/SR) have been classified as white collar jobs. The business owner category mainly consists of small business proprietors; it also includes farmers. A breakdown of our sample indicates that nowadays, white collar employees make up nearly half the population -- 47 percent to be more exact. Blue collar workers represent 44 percent of the population, business owners 9 percent.

Table 6.4 provides an overview of the statistical relationship between social class and citizen involvement. Within each of the three major occupational categories, it shows the mean value of the various dimensions of citizenship.

32. Actually, three separate coding systems were utilized: one for the older categorization into social classes (to make comparisons with earlier studies possible), one for the occupational classifications used as a basis for Swedish political scientists' studies of voter behavior, and one that reflects Statistics Sweden's current classification into socioeconomic groups. The occupational coding principles we have used are explained in a Swedish-language technical report on the citizenship survey, to be published later.

In only a few cases did equality prevail -- in the sense that citizen involvement was the same in all three social classes. One thing that was common to most aspects of the actual realization of citizenship was that blue collar workers scored lower figures. The measurement that summarizes respondents' assessments of their chances of influencing their own situation indicates that business owners had the strongest feeling of control. White collar employees admittedly lagged behind business owners, but they had a consistently more positive assessment of their own chances of influence than did blue collar workers. The various measurements of activity and initiatives also demonstrate clearly that white collar employees were more heavily involved in citizen roles than blue collar workers. The same thing was true of the five different dimensions of political participation. Nor did voluntary organizations counterbalance this trend; here too, blue collar workers had the lowest level of involvement.

Citizenship activities and the ability to assert one's interests in society varied from one social class to another. Measured in this way, blue collar workers wielded less power than white collar employees and business owners. There was a statistical association between social position and the actual realization of citizenship. Dividing lines between the social classes reflected inequities between citizens. In this respect, Sweden remains a class society.

This is the general, comprehensive view. But a closer examination of our computer material indicates that the various aspects of citizenship were related to class membership in somewhat divergent ways. Some aspects of citizenship were strongly class-bound, while others were only weakly related to class membership. Table 6.5 shows the association between class and the various dimensions of citizenship. Here the occupational

categories were reduced to two: white collar employees and business owners were combined into a single category for the sake of statistical analysis.

Table 6:4 Class membership and citizenship

	Blue collar workers	White collar employees	Busi- ness owners
Initiatives as residents	25	35	20
Initiatives as consumers	11	16	6
Initiatives as patients	15	22	20
Initiatives as parents of preschool children	21	33	29
Initiatives as parents of school children	25	42	31
Initiatives as employees	49	70	--
Initiatives: summary	23	35	18
Chance of influence in the role of:			
Resident	49	58	62
Consumer	63	66	65
Patient	42	47	41
Parent of preschool child(ren)	43	51	52
Parent of school child(ren)	19	25	23
Gainfully employed person	40	56	80
Chance of influence: summary	47	54	60
Activities as resident			
Activities as parent of preschool child(ren)	12	22	16
Activities as parent of school child(ren)	35	49	36
Activities as employee	47	57	44
	39	50	--

Administrative competence	70	88	80
Political participation:			
Contacts	10	24	18
Party activities	7	8	11
Manifestations	19	26	18
Protests	2	3	1
Voting	86	93	93
Interest in politics	46	57	52
Party identification	58	60	63
Membership in voluntary organizations	9	13	11
Perception of trade union influence	36	42	--
Affinity with organized movements	37	42	41

Table 6.5 Class membership and various citizenship situations

	Association (r) with class
Assessment of chance of influence in role of:	
Gainfully employed person	0.39
Resident	0.18
Parent of preschool child(ren)	0.17
Parent of school child(ren)	0.17
Patient	0.09
Consumer	0.06
Took initiative to exercise influence in role of:	
Gainfully employed person (employee)	0.22
Parent of school child(ren)	0.15
Parent of preschool child(ren)	0.12
Patient	0.10
Resident	0.08
Consumer	0.06

The correlations all have plus signs. This means that blue collar workers consistently had lower figures than white collar employees and business owners. But the size of the coefficients varied considerably. We can distinguish three groups of dimensions of citizenship, based on the strength of their statistical association with class membership.

Working life occupied a category of its own. There were very strong differences between blue collar workers, on the one hand, and business owners and white collar employees, on the other, in terms of how they assessed their chances of influencing working conditions (working time, job organization, working environment and the general direction of work). White collar employees were also more active in terms of taking initiatives to bring about improvements or resist deterioration related to their working conditions and the workplace. (This question was not asked of business owners, only of employees.)

Occupying a middle category was the parental role; in this context it mattered little whether the respondent was the parent of preschool or school-aged children. The association with class membership was of middling strength. Here, too, there was a clear relationship between class membership, on the one hand, and the respondents' perceptions of their ability to exercise influence, on the other. But this association was not quite as strong as in the labor market.

The two citizenship areas with the weakest relationship to class membership were capital goods purchases and medical care. There was very little difference between the ability of the working class and the middle class to assert their interests as consumers or as medical patients.

In corresponding fashion, we can compare the covariations between different aspects of political participation and class membership. This raises crucial questions about how the political system works: To what extent do politically active people constitute a social elite? Is there a stratification into social classes that expresses itself in political terms? Do politically articulate people speak with an upper class accent? Table 6.6 provides some answers to these questions.

Table 6.6 Class membership and political participation

Political participation	Association (r) with class
Contacts	0.29
Manifestations	0.14
Voting	0.12
Party activities	0.05
Protests	0.03

It is impossible to give an unequivocal answer. Some forms of political participation are more strongly associated with social dividing lines than others. The type of political participation that involves the greatest measure of individual, personal initiatives -- contacts -- was the one where the middle class, and especially white collar employees, had their greatest advantage over blue collar workers. Opinion-molding manifestations and voting also showed clear differences between social classes. On the other hand, there were two dimensions of political participation that showed only insignificant statistical relationships with social class: party activities and protests. As for protests, it is of course worth pointing out that the low overall frequency of participation necessarily resulted in low correlations.

But this association was not merely an artificial statistical product; militant actions occurred extremely rarely among business owners. It is also significant that political party activities were just as common among blue collar workers as among business owners; only white collar employees had a modest advantage here.

+ + +

The main conclusion is that in a number of respects, there were substantial differences between the major social classes. This obviously does not exclude the simultaneous existence of considerable variations within each class. As indicated earlier, the image of a number of sharply delimited and homogeneous classes is hardly realistic today. The question is: What significance do such intra-class differences have for the various components of citizenship?

As already mentioned, one of the difficulties of conventional class analysis is that some people have more than one occupation. Two jobs, an extra part-time job or a sideline mean that the same person may be classified under more than one occupational category. Our interview survey contained questions about such outside jobs. Although double class membership is of great theoretical interest, its practical importance should not be exaggerated. This is because as it turned out, no more than 10 percent of our survey respondents had another job in addition to their main employment. Of these, roughly half had sidelines that fell within the same class category as their main occupation. For example, white collar employees with sidelines generally worked in the service sector. It is true that some blue collar workers were small business owners on the side; this group did not, however, add up to more than two percent of the field survey sample.

Another way in which a person may have gained experience from different social environments is by means of social mobility. The survey included questions about the occupation of the respondents' parents, enabling us to gain some idea of intergenerational social mobility. Just the simple percentage breakdown provides a quick summary of social regrouping in Sweden during the 20th century. In the parental generation, 25 percent were farmers or business owners; among the respondents themselves, this category totaled 9 percent. The proportion of blue collar workers declined from 47 to 44 percent. At the same time, the proportion of white collar employees rose from 28 to 47 percent. Those respondents with occupations in the same category as that of their parents numbered 47 percent of the total. Fewer than half of them thus belonged to families that were stable in class terms. A majority belonged to a different social class than their parents. This means that a large proportion of today's population had different social experiences in their childhood environment than in their current occupation.

Double occupational membership includes a small percentage of citizens, social mobility a much larger percentage. The question is: What role do these varying class experiences play when it comes to their activity and involvement as citizens? Statistical analyses have essentially yielded negative results. A person's own occupation is the decisive factor. His experiences from sideline work or from his childhood appear to be of completely subordinate importance here. Even this negative finding -- this absence of a statistical association -- is of interest. In other contexts, social mobility has turned out to be of great significance, for example to a person's choice of political party: Blue collar workers from farm homes more frequently vote nonsocialist than workers who grew up in working class homes. White collar employees with working class parents vote Social Democratic more often than do white collar employees with a middle class background. But this pattern is not repeated when it comes to participation and citizen influence. Here a person's own current situation appears to be completely decisive.

+ + +

The simple class division we have utilized so far is actually a combination of two criteria: whether a person is an employee or business owner, and (among employees) whether he is white collar or blue collar. So even this simplest of occupational groupings is based on more than one criterion of classification. This fact illustrates what was pointed out earlier: a class concept should be regarded as multidimensional, rather than as a simple classification. We will now attempt here to define some of these dimensions. Our task is to characterize each individual occupation on the basis of a number of criteria. It is not self-evident what the dimensions of the class concept should be. The choice of criteria depends on the question asked in the survey and the questions asked of the computer material. Two main issues are applicable to the citizenship survey.

The first has to do with power. Our underlying hypothesis is as follows. Different citizens have different degrees of power. One explanation for this variation in power can be found in the labor market. Class membership is defined as a person's position in the production system. Different classes have access to different socioeconomic resources. Access to resources is important to the power of citizens. According to this hypothesis, there should consequently be a general statistical association between class and power. In this respect, the definition of the class concept should focus on what type of power, what power base is appropriate. The power base of an occupation can be determined in three different respects. These form the first three dimensions of the class concept.

The first aspect has to do with the relationship between work and capital. This dimension is simply a refinement of the employment relationship. For the sake of simplicity this

dimension, like the following ones, will be broken down into three categories. In principle, we can imagine these categories as an approximation of a continuous scale. The power base involved here is power as an employer: the fact of having employees. Business owners with employees are placed at one extreme pole. Employees are grouped at the other extreme. Business owners without employees are gathered in an intermediate category.

The second type of power resource is a person's position in a hierarchy. Despite such modern ideals as flattened organizational structures and self-managing work teams, the labor market is usually still characterized by stratification into superior and subordinate groups. Some people manage, others obey. In this respect, the group known as "employees" is very mixed. A manager is counted as an employee, just like the office "go'fer" at the bottom of the hierarchy. Three categories are appropriate: those who give orders, those located in a middle position who both give and take orders, and those who mainly receive orders.

The third class dimension involves knowledge as a power base. Some occupations enjoy their special position because they form a profession: an occupation characterized by special training, qualifications and identity. At the opposite extreme are occupations without any particular requirements. Occupations such as crafts and manual jobs requiring specialized skills are placed in a middle category.

These three dimensions rank individuals on the basis of three different types of power resources. But other aspects of occupational membership may also be crucial to the role of citizen. We will single out three such factors, which can be summarized under the heading of sectoral cultures. Our hypothesis here is that different segments of society have come to be characterized by special cultures, styles, attitudes or ways of

interpreting and understanding society. To the extent such a perception of society embodies stated or unstated norms about a citizen's relationship to his society, it is a reasonable hypothesis that there is a statistical relationship between occupational membership and the realization of citizenship. The concept of sectoral culture will be defined more precisely in three different respects.

The first type of sectoral culture is related to membership in an economic sector. During the past century, Sweden has undergone a uniquely dramatic transformation from an agrarian to a postindustrial society, with most gainfully employed people now working in various kinds of service occupations. The three intervals in this dimension consist of the primary (agricultural), secondary (industrial and tertiary (service) sectors, respectively.

A second conceivable source of divergent sectoral cultures is related to public vs. private ownership. For several decades after World War II, Sweden's public sector underwent extremely rapid expansion. In many municipal districts, the municipal government itself is the largest single employer today. It would be peculiar if a modern categorization into classes and occupations did not take this social revolution into account. Private and public sector employees, respectively, are placed in two extreme categories. People who work for organizations located in the borderland between the public and private sectors, such as public enterprises and state-owned companies, are classified in a middle category.

The third form of sectoral culture is related to the difference between women and men in working life. The Swedish labor market is strongly segregated by sex. Many jobs are typical women's occupations, while other occupations are strongly male-dominated. Occupations can therefore be classified by their gender. Please note that this category has nothing to do with whether a particular person is a man or woman, but whether this person works in a male- or female-dominated occupation. As earlier, it is not the individual but the occupation that forms the basis for this class analysis.

Table 6.7 Six dimensions of the class concept

	Percentage
A. POWER BASE	
1. Capital	
Business owner with employees	1
Business owner without employees	9
Employee	90
2. Hierarchy	
Management position: gives orders	19
Middle position: gives orders and takes orders	19
Subordinate: takes orders	62
3. Knowledge	
Profession	16
Skilled craft	43
Unskilled job	41
B. SECTORAL CULTURE	

4. Economic sector	
Agriculture (primary)	5
Industry (secondary)	30
Service (tertiary)	65
5. Ownership	
Private sector	57
Quasi-public organization	8
Public sector	35
6. Gender	
Male-dominated occupation	39
Sexually mixed occupation	22
Female-dominated occupation	39

In all cases but one (dimension 5), the figures refer to current and former occupation. The figures on ownership apply only to respondents who were gainfully employed.

Table 6.8 Dimensions of the class concept: mutual associations

	Capital	Hierarchy	Knowledge	Economic sector	Ownership
Hierarchy	0.58				
Knowledge	0.18	0.68			
Economic sector	0.27	-0.08	-0.16		
Ownership	0.26	0.02	-0.03	0.37	
Gender	0.21	0.15	0.22	0.55	0.43

The six dimensions of the class concept are summarized in Table 6.7. Of course there are mutual associations between several of these dimensions; Table 6.8 shows the correlations.

For natural reasons, the first three dimensions are mutually linked. They all express a form of ranking related to power base. There is a certain mutual dependence inherent in the very structure of these three measurements; by definition, a business owner cannot be placed at the bottom of the hierarchy dimension. But in a number of cases, the statistical relationships are relatively weak. The fact that negative correlations appear in a few cases is of little significance; this is due only to the arbitrary decision to assign higher figures in the economic sector and ownership dimensions to the primary sector and private ownership, respectively.³³

The role of class membership in the various dimensions of citizenship can now be studied in greater detail. What exactly is it about a given occupation that influences people's level of involvement and assessment of their chances of influence in various contexts? The six class dimensions may be regarded as independent variables. In a statistical analysis, in this case

33. The existence of high mutual associations is something of a problem in a statistical analysis where the six dimensions are simultaneously viewed as explanatory, independent variables in a statistical regression analysis. This phenomenon, known as multicollinearity, has the effect of weakening the reliability of estimates of relative effects. The following analysis disregards small differences in this respect, however. Only larger, statistically significant effects are stated.

analysis, in this case multiple regression analysis, we can measure the relative importance of each dimension. Regression analysis results in a measurement of the effect of each of the six dimensions once we have adjusted for the effect of the other five. In addition, the analysis results in a figure which expresses the total explanatory power of the six class dimensions. This sum, the proportion of explained variance, serves as a yardstick of the extent to which each dimension of citizenship is rooted in class and occupational differences.

Table 6.9 provides an overall presentation of the results. Each line summarizes the result of one regression analysis. A plus or minus sign denotes the existence of a significant effect. The absence of a significant effect is denoted by a period.³⁴ The column at the far right show the percent of explained variance.

The first impression gleaned from Table 6.9 is that it is indeed worth the trouble to work with the more complex six-dimensional class concept. Each of these dimensions has an independent explanatory value on at least one occasion. The picture is considerably more complex than was the case with the conventional classification of respondents into blue collar workers, white collar employees and business owners.

Those who took an initiative to exercise influence, with the aim of bringing about improvements or resisting deterioration in their life situation, were most often people in high positions and with knowledge-intensive occupations. On the other hand, one form of power base -- capital -- had the opposite effect here: employees actually took more such initiatives than did business owners.

34. The threshold for significant effects has been set at a certainty level of 0.95.

The relative inactivity of business owners in this respect was not, however, accompanied by any perception that their influence was weak. On the contrary, business owners rated their chances of influencing their own situation higher than did employees. But there was another dimension that had a positive effect on people's assessment of their chances of influence: the possession of "knowledge capital."

As before, even this more finely calibrated measure of class membership shows that a person's chance of exercising influence in the labor market is strongly tied to occupational role. All six class dimensions play a part here. Occupational qualities that have a correlation with power in working life are the following: business owner, high position, possession of knowledge capital, service sector, private business sector and male-dominated occupation. Examples of occupations that fit this profile are physicians in private practice, engineers and consultants.

Knowledge capital turns out to be the class dimension that has the greatest relative effect on administrative competence: the ability to assert one's interests before public agencies.

Table 6.9 Dimensions of the class concept and how they relate to citizenship

Class dimension:	Capital	Hierarchy	Knowledge	EC_sector	Ownership	Gender	
Plus value =	Business owner	Manages	Profession	Agricult.	Private	Male occ.	
Minus value =	Employee	Obeys	Unskilled	Service	Public	Female occ.	R2
Initiatives as:							
Resident	-	2
Consumer	2
Patient	2
Parent of preschool child(ren)	2
Parent of school child(ren)	4
Employee	*	+	+	.	.	.	5
Initiatives: total	-	+	+	.	.	.	7
Chance of influence as:							
Resident	+	.	+	.	.	.	4
Consumer	.	.	+	.	.	.	1
Patient	.	.	.	+	-	.	2
Parent of preschool child(ren)	-	.	5
Parent of school child(ren)	2
Gainfully employed person	+	+	+	-	+	+	32
Chance of influence: total	+	.	+	.	.	.	12
Administrative competence	.	.	+	.	.	.	9
Political participation:							
Contacts	-	+	+	.	-	.	16
Party activities	.	.	.	+	.	.	2
Manifestations	.	+	+	.	-	-	8
Protests	.	+	.	.	-	.	2
Voting	.	+	.	.	-	.	2
Interest in politics	-	+	+	.	-	+	8
Party identification	1
Member of voluntary organization	-	+	+	.	-	.	15
Number of effects	8	9	11	3	9	3	

The table is based on a series of regression analyses. The absence of significant effects is denoted by a period. The analysis includes only gainfully employed people.

* Not applicable.

The five different aspects of political participation have somewhat different social patterns of association. Contacts and personal appeals are less closely associated with capital, but all the more closely related to hierarchy and knowledge. Employment in the public sector also occupies an independent role here. Thus, the people who most often contact high-level public officials are other high-level public officials.

Political party activities have a completely different social base. One particular group stands out: farmers. Farmers are far more active in political parties than any other occupational group. On the other hand, the data do not support the hypothesis that public sector employees have taken over the political parties.

One trait shared by other forms of political involvement is that they are most common among people holding high positions and working in the public sector. These two qualities also have a positive correlation with an interest in politics. In this case, "knowledge capital" also has an effect. In contrast, the power base known as "capital" has no such effect here: business owners are less interested in politics than employees are. A similar pattern of association also applies to membership in voluntary organizations. The likelihood that a person will belong to many organizations rises if he has a high position, has knowledge capital and works in the public sector.

An even closer examination of the computer material indicates that in some respects, there are sizable variations within the service sector. If we bring together high-level white collar employees in the spheres of medical care, education and culture, we find a group with very high figures for initiatives, administrative competence, contacts, manifestations, protests, voting and membership in voluntary organizations. These teachers, doctors, librarians etc. are the most active and most politically involved of all citizens. Their own assessment of their chance of influence does not diverge very much from the average, however.

The bottom of Table 6.9 presents a rudimentary measurement summarizing the relative importance of the six class dimensions; we have simply added up the number of cases where there were significant effects. Two of the dimensions turn out to be of minor importance: economic sector and gender. This does not imply that these two factors have no association with the realization of citizenship. We are speaking here of relative effects -- the importance of each respective factor, given the effect of all the others.

The four dimensions of occupational membership which have the greatest relative effect are capital, hierarchy, knowledge and ownership. It should then be observed that the first and last of these sometimes yield the opposite effects. Sometimes being a business owner has a positive correlation with citizenship: in this case with regard to a person's own assessment of his ability to exercise influence. Sometimes being an employee has an effect; these cases involve initiatives and activities. In one case, private ownership has an effect -- on a person's assessment of his chance of influencing working conditions. Otherwise, employment in the public sector has a positive impact. This effect applies to most varieties of political participation, as well as to the activities of voluntary organizations.

The two occupational factors that most often have a positive effect are a person's position in terms of hierarchy and knowledge.

Educational Level

The ability to assert one's rights presupposes a greater or lesser measure of knowledge. A person must know that there is a chance to exercise influence, whom he should turn to, what is required, how to present his case and what strategies to use. It is a plausible hypothesis that this ability is closely associated with educational level. Even if formal schooling is not the only royal road to influence and positions of power, education is still one of the most important resources for enabling people to assert their interests.

This is one of the best documented statistical relationships in international political sociology. Political participation is directly associated with the level of socioeconomic resources, especially education. Lower-educated people are passive, upper-educated people are active.³⁵

Sweden is no exception. Most yardsticks of citizen involvement have a clear association with educational level (see Table 6.10). Making contacts and taking initiatives, belonging to organizations, being able to assert one's interests against public agencies and several other aspects of participation occur much more frequently among the well-educated than among those with little schooling.

But differences in educational level do not always have such a strong impact. In Table 6.10 the various indicators of citizen involvement have been ranked by the strength of their statistical association with educational level. Precisely those activities that require a large measure of personal initiative end up at the top. In contrast, some aspects of citizenship show no difference at all between people with very little education or a lot of it. Psychological affinity with organized movements, party identification, party activities and the feeling of being able to

35. Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978, chapter 4.

exercise influence through a trade union are often at least equally strongly developed among people with little schooling as among the highly educated.³⁶

Table 6.10 Educational level and citizenship

	Educational_level			Association (r)
	Low	Medium	High	
Political participation: contacts	9	16	27	0.32
Membership in voluntary organizations	8	11	14	0.32
Administrative competence	66	82	92	0.31
Initiatives aimed at influence: average	19	29	37	0.24
Political participation: manifestations	17	23	28	0.21
Activities as parent of preschooler(s)	31	40	48	0.19
Activities as residents	10	17	23	0.19
Interest in politics	45	50	60	0.19
Activities as parent of school child(ren)	46	51	58	0.17
Activities as employee	36	47	48	0.14
Chance of influence: average	49	52	53	0.09
Political participation: voting	89	89	94	0.06
Political participation: party activities	6	8	9	0.06
Political participation: protests	2	2	4	0.05
Trade union influence*	37	40	40	0.05
Party identification*	61	61	57	-0.05
Affinity_with_movements*	40	40	38	-0.05

* No statistically significant association with educational level

36. The low statistical association between educational level and protest activities is partly due to the fact that the protest variable is so unevenly distributed; the correlation is therefore low by necessity.

Respondents' assessments of their chances of influencing their own situation had a statistically significant association with educational level: more education brings greater self-confidence in this respect. The level of education had an even stronger association with the number of initiatives people take to influence their own situation. These findings are based on average indexes for all situations in question. But there are clear differences between the various areas (Table 6.11).

Table 6.11 Educational level and various citizenship situations

Situation	Association (r) between educational level and		
	Dissatisfaction	Initiatives	Results
Resident	0.12	0.14	0.01
Consumer	0.07	0.09	-0.16
Patient	0.09	0.12	-0.04
Parent of preschool child(ren)	0.12	0.19	0.09
Parent of school child(ren)	0.22	0.16	0.08
Gainfully employed person	0.11	0.16	0.03
Average	0.18	0.24	-0.01

Dissatisfaction with one's situation was ordinarily stronger among the highly educated. This finding once again underscores the fact that dissatisfaction is not only an expression of actual life circumstances but also -- and sometimes quite strongly -- of a person's level of expectations, his ability to make demands and state his views.

The strongest association of all between educational level and dissatisfaction was found in school-related areas. Highly educated parents were especially annoyed by the conditions at their children's school. In contrast, in the roles of patient and consumer there were only minor differences between people with varying educational levels.

Highly educated people were more likely to take initiatives to influence their own situation than people with little education. On the other hand, the outcome of these attempts at influence was not at all as strongly associated with the length of a person's education. In one situation -- the consumer role -- the statistical association actually works in the opposite direction. Among those who had tried to gain redress for problems related to a major purchase, well-educated people felt they had been less successful than did those with little education.

The association between educational level and a person's assessment of his own chances of influence showed clear variations from one situation to another (Table 6.12). The strongest association was found in the labor market. Highly educated people felt they had a much larger chance of influencing their working conditions. For the two parental roles -- preschool child care and schooling -- the respondents' assessments of their chances of influence were clearly related to their educational level. But for the other three roles, the relationship was far weaker; for the roles of patient and consumer, it was completely insignificant. Educational level was of extremely minor importance here.

Table 6.12 Educational level and assessment of one's chance to exercise influence

Assessment of chance to exercise influence_in_the_role_of_____	Association (r) with_education_
Gainfully employed person	0.18
Parent of preschool child(ren)	0.11
Parent of school chil(ren)	0.11
Resident	0.06
Consumer	0.04
Patient_____	0.03_____

If we now combine these findings with the statements made in the immediately preceding chapters, the following picture emerges. There is a close statistical association between the labor market and political life: those who felt they had a good chance of influencing their work situation were usually people who were also more politically involved than average. Inversely, powerlessness at work is related to political passivity. But now we have also seen how educational level is associated with both influence at work and political involvement. The question is whether the relationship between the labor market and politics is only an apparent one -- a function of differences in educational level. Table 6.13 provides the answer.

Table 6.13 Associations between politics and the labor market, taking and not taking educational level into account

Type_of_association	Association between perceived chance of influencing one's working conditions and	
	Interest in politics	Participation in voluntary organizations
Correlation	0.19	0.19
Partial correlation after taking educational level into account	0.17	0.14

Partial correlation is a yardstick of how the association is affected when educational level is taken into account. This yardstick can be regarded as a weighted average of the statistical associations within educational categories. If the relationship originally noted had been entirely a function of

the educational factor, the partial correlation would have been zero. This is by no means the case. The association admittedly becomes somewhat smaller, dropping from 0.19 to 0.17, when educational level is taken into account. But the main result is unchanged. There is a clear connection between workplace democracy and political democracy. As the table indicates, essentially the same is true of people's assessment of their influence in the labor market, on the one hand, and activity in voluntary organizations, on the other. Those who had a strong position in voluntary organizations were also those who had a strong position in the labor market, a fact which is only explained to a small extent by educational differences.

Income

Given the fact that both occupation and education have turned out to have a clear statistical association with many of the dimensions of citizenship, it is hardly surprising that differences of income also have a clear impact. High income earners are more active, and their assessments of their own chances of influence are more positive than those of low income earners. Table 6.14 shows the correlaton between income and some key citizenship variables.³⁷

Although the correlations are consistently positive (higher income is associated with activity and the perception of influence), the associations vary in strength. Some aspects of citizenship are more strongly tied to income differences than others. Of the six citizenship roles, housing has a particularly high association with income; decisive here is that owners of single-family homes have a better chance of influence. Influence at the workplace also has a strong association with income level.

37. Income is defined here as the tax-assessed disposable income of the respondent's family. Income figures are taken from public records of the 1986 tax assessment.

Of the various dimensions of political participation, contacts and personal initiatives are most strongly affected by income differences. There is also a clear association with voting; the percentage of citizens who did not take advantage of their voting right was clearly larger among low income earners than among citizens with higher incomes.

Table 6.14 Income level and citizenship

	Association (r)
Initiatives aimed at exercising influence: average	0.13
Perceived chance of influence in the role of:	
Resident	0.30
Gainfully employed person	0.16
Consumer	0.07
Patient	0.06
Parent of preschool child(ren)	0.06
Parent of school child(ren)	0.00
Administrative competence	0.16
Political participation:	
Contacts	0.24
Voting	0.14
Party activity	0.08
Manifestations	0.04
Protests	0.01
Interest in politics	0.12
Party identification	0.12
Membership_in_voluntary_organizations	0.34

City and country

One dividing line that has typified societies over the centuries runs between center and periphery. The conflict between cities and rural areas is characteristic of every urbanized country. The tension between center and periphery may be of varying intensity. Sometimes cities can exert a nearly total control over rural areas and their populations. The centralization of power then also gains a geographic and territorial meaning. In that case, the influence of citizens will largely be determined by their place of residence. City gentlemen dominate the subjugated rural population.

In Sweden, tension between city and country has not reached the same exaggerated and dramatic proportions as in many other countries. Historical circumstances play a part here. Our vast, forested country was difficult to govern from the capital. Popular rule and local consent played a larger part than in many other countries. The urbanization of Sweden was late and weak. Industrialization did not give rise to proletarianized urban slums, but instead assumed the shape of small company towns. This helped reduce the tension between city and country.

But the rapid social transformation of the past century in Sweden has still favored the cities. Despite attempts at decentralization and regional development policies, power is mainly found in cities -- especially the capital. That is where one finds the top leadership of the public sector, major corporations, influential special-interest organizations and major media companies. Other formal and informal institutions cluster around these centers of power. Higher education, research and culture reinforce this accumulation of power resources. In this network of power, the threads are most closely entwined in the blocks surrounding Lower Norrmalm, the main business district of downtown Stockholm.

The question is to what extent this difference between the center and periphery also exists at the level of the citizen. Is the urban population responsible for civic activity? To what extent does the rural population feel it is without influence? Table 6.15 provides an overview of how citizen involvement varies between different places of residence. It breaks these down into four categories: purely rural areas, towns, cities (but not major cities) and big cities (Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö).

Table 6.15 City, country and citizenship

	Rural areas	Towns	Cities	Big cities
Higher figures in cities than in the countryside				
Initiatives aimed at exercising influence	22	25	29	31
Activities as resident	11	15	18	20
Activities as parent of preschool child(ren)	35	38	43	56
Interest in politics	48	49	52	55
Political participation: manifestations	19	21	23	25
Political participation: protests	2	2	3	4
Administrative competence	75	77	80	81
Higher figures in the countryside than in cities				
Chance to influence one's housing	67	54	50	46
Chance to influence child care	53	47	51	34
Political participation: party activity	12	7	6	6
Party identification	64	60	59	55
Affinity_with_movements	43	38	39	38

There is considerable evidence that the rural population not only has a more peripheral situation in a geographic sense, but also in a political sense. A number of yardsticks of citizen involvement show a systematic association with place of residence. The more urbanized the environment, the more initiatives people take in an effort to influence their situation. We can also add that dissatisfaction with one's situation is generally stronger in cities than in the countryside. In the cities, there is also a stronger interest in politics; a wider range of political activities of an opinion-molding nature are open to the public, and people have greater faith in their ability to assert their interests against the authorities. Active, involved and verbally adept citizens are found in cities more often than in the countryside.

But this is not the entire picture. The fact that a citizen in a rural area is more passive in this respect does not mean that he or she also feels generally excluded from social developments. Quite the contrary, in a number of instances rural people have a greater faith in their ability to run their lives than people in big cities. One such area -- housing -- was mentioned in Chapter 2. Although citizens in urban environments participate more frequently in activities together with their neighbors, the inhabitants of rural areas have the most positive assessment of their ability to influence housing conditions. The same thing is true of child care. Here, too, cities differ from rural areas. Urban families with children participate in more group activities. But the parents of preschool children in rural areas make the most favorable assessment of their own chance of influencing child care.

The difference between city and country is not limited to people's immediate environment and private situation. Certain aspects of macrodemocracy, of political participation, also turn out to be more favorable in rural areas. The party system enjoys

somewhat stronger support in rural areas than in cities. A larger proportion of the population in rural areas is active in party organizations; party identification is stronger. Affinity with organized movements is just as strong in rural areas as in cities.

The role of the center-periphery dimension in the actual realization of citizenship is thus more complicated than we might initially have expected. The periphery is not generally weaker than the center. Urbanized citizens admittedly score higher on a number of measurements that have to do with external activities and opinion-molding. But in a number of respects, the rural population has a stronger level of commitment and greater civic self-confidence than city dwellers.

Immigrants

As we pointed out at the beginning of this book, being a citizen means two different things. Citizenship in the legal sense is tied to nationality; rules on naturalization and acquisition of citizenship determine who is and who is not a citizen. But the concept of citizenship can also be used in a social sense. Many rights and obligations apply not only to Swedish citizens but to anyone domiciled in Sweden. A foreigner with a residence and labor permit enjoys essentially the same social rights and benefits as a Swedish citizen. Only a small number of rights and duties are actually reserved for Swedish citizens, although these may be quite important. For example, this applies to the right to vote and run for office in elections to Parliament, to hold high-level state civil service positions and to perform military conscript service. But in most everyday situations, social citizenship is the same regardless of a person's legal citizenship.

It is a different matter that a person's chances of taking advantage of his rights are in fact statistically related to his legal citizenship. It is easier for those who are born and raised in a country to know what formal and informal rules apply and what strategies to use in order to assert their rights. A person who has recently arrived in a foreign and unfamiliar social setting finds it much harder to assert his interests. It is therefore a highly reasonable hypothesis that immigrants are generally in a weaker position than natives; the question is, instead, how much and in what respects.

For a number of reasons, it is not very appropriate to use legal citizenship as a criterion for defining immigrants. There are, of course, many people who have immigrated to Sweden and who are not Swedish citizens. But there is also a sizable category of people who acquired citizenship after living for some years in Sweden, yet who still regard themselves as socially and culturally belonging to an ethnic minority. Because the biggest wave of immigration is now a couple of decades behind us, there are also numerous people who were born in Sweden but who have one parent (or both) who once immigrated here. There is thus no unequivocal definition of who an "immigrant" is.

The citizenship survey asked three questions dealing with immigration: whether the respondent himself, his father or mother had immigrated. Of all respondents, more than 8 percent had immigrated themselves. Those who were born in Sweden but had a least one immigrant parent numbered nearly 5 percent of respondents. Counting in this way, a total of 13 percent of the population aged 16-80 has some form of immigrant background. Due to the nature of the survey method, this group is not large enough to allow any detailed separate analyses. Our statistical examination must be limited to a general overview of the entire immigrant group, although we know that there are major differences between various immigrant groups and nationalities. Table 6.16 shows the difference between immigrants and other Swedes.

Although the differences were not dramatic, in a number of key areas there were significant gaps between immigrants and other respondents. The immigrants' assessments of their chances of influencing their own life situation were generally lower than those of other Swedes. Politically speaking, immigrants were also outsiders to a somewhat greater extent than other respondents. They had a weaker interest in politics, they did not feel the same level of party affiliation and they had a weaker affinity with organized movements in Sweden.

Looking a bit closer at the two categories of people with immigrant backgrounds -- those who had immigrated themselves and those who had been born in Sweden but had a parent who had immigrated, a number of similarities brought them together. The feeling of affinity with organizations and parties was equally weak in both groups. But in some cases, people who had just immigrated themselves were the ones with particularly low scores. This applied especially to the feeling of being able to influence their own situation and the ability to assert their interests in dealing with public agencies. As for those who had an immigrant mother or father but had been born in Sweden themselves, in some cases the situation was different. They were by no means a silent, powerless group of citizens. In terms of administrative competence and externally directed political activities aimed at opinion-molding, they actually surpassed Swedes who had no immigrant backgrounds.

Table 6.16 Immigrant background and citizenship

	Respondent immigrated	Parent(s) immigrated	No immigrant background
Chance of influence in the role of:			
Resident	44	51	55
Consumer	63	63	65
Patient	39	44	45
Parent of preschool child(ren)	32	55	50
Parent of school child(ren)	18	21	24
Gainfully employed person	44	49	53
Chance of influence: average	43	50	52
Administrative competence	73	83	79
Political participation:			
Contacts	14	14	17
Party activity	5	6	6
Manifestations	18	25	22
Protests	2	3	3
Interest in politics	42	47	52
Party identification	51	50	61
Participation in voluntary organizations	6	8	7
Affinity_with_movements	33	33	40

Citizenship and Social Position: Summary

The general conclusion of this chapter probably requires no repetition by now: in many cases, the ability to assert one's interests in various citizenship situations varies greatly between different groups of citizens. The economic and social inequities of society are clearly reflected by differences in their level of activity and involvement.

But as soon as this general finding has been stated, it has to be emphasized that the picture is relatively complicated. The rule stating that there is a relationship between social position and the realization of citizenship has many exceptions and nuances. Table 6.17 provides an overview of a number of social determining factors and their relative effects on the different dimensions of citizenship. The table is a summary of a series of regression analyses; for each dimension of citizenship, it estimates the partial effect of seven social indicators. For the sake of readability, it shows only the significant effects; plus and minus signs indicate the direction of the association. The column at the far right -- percentage of explained variance -- is a yardstick of how strong an overall effect the seven social background factors have on each dimension of citizenship. A high figure is a signal that differences in people's level of involvement and activity are largely rooted in socioeconomic disparities. The seven indicators selected here are those that turned out earlier to have been of importance to at least some of the aspects of citizenship.

The simple fact that the number of plus and minus signs (i.e. statistically significant effects) is largely the same means that all seven social determining factors are independently important. To take one example, we were able to demonstrate earlier in this chapter that differences in educational level disappear in some cases when we also take into account other social differences, mainly occupation and income. But in many cases educational level has its own effect, even after such multivariable examinations.

Occupation and income have an unequivocal impact in the sense that where they have significant effects, they are positive in direction. In other words, in none of the dimensions of citizenship studied here did blue collar workers and low income earners enjoy a stronger position than middle class or high income respondents; the opposite situation was all the more common. Educational level had the same impact, though with one exception: affinity with Sweden's organized movements was stronger among people with little education than among the highly educated. It should also be pointed out that the age factor plays a part here. Because identification with organized movements was stronger among older people, there was also a negative statistical association with educational level.³⁸

One additional factor whose effect is consistently in the same direction is immigration. In no case did immigrants have a stronger position than other Swedes, but in various cases immigrants reported lower participation figures than other people. The effect of the immigration factor thus remained, even after taking into account differences of occupation, income and educational level.

38. The reason why the age variable was not also included in the regression analysis is that in most cases, age has non-linear effects; activity and involvement are often lower among both the youngest and oldest respondents. Given its assumptions about linear effects, regression analysis is therefore unsuitable as an analytical instrument in this context. On the other hand, an analysis that includes the age factor is justified for the identification variable, because it essentially concerns linear, constantly rising effects. Such a regression analysis very correctly shows that age has a separate, very strong effect while the educational factor no longer has any significant effect here.

Where ownership of the workplace is of any significance, in the overwhelming number of cases public sector employees are characterized by higher activity. All else being equal, local and central government employees have a greater interest in politics, a higher political participation level and more memberships in voluntary organizations. But there is one exception, and an important one. On average, those who have gainful employment in the private sector have a stronger feeling that they can influence their living conditions, especially in working life.

There are, of course, differences between men and women when it comes to various dimensions of citizenship. But as indicated earlier, the direction of the association is not unequivocal. Men dominate certain areas, especially party politics and contacts with public agencies. But there are other aspects of citizenship in which women are in a stronger position. Two of those appearing in Table 6.17 are related to personal care issues, one is a form of political participation (opinion-molding manifestations) and the last is affinity with organized movements.

Nor do the differences between city and country point in any single direction. In some cases big cities have higher figures, in other cases rural areas do.

The right-hand column provides a measurement that summarizes the total effect of the seven social situation factors on each dimension of citizenship. In a number of cases, the figures are fairly low. There are, of course, a few significant effects, but the rule that social circumstances determine the practice of citizenship has many exceptions here. But in other cases, the figures are higher. Here the realization of citizenship is strongly associated with one's position in the social and economic structure. The strongest association of all is with influence at the workplace. Differences of power in working life are the ones most strongly linked to social differences. Influence on housing is also socially segregated to a relatively great extent.

Table 6.17 Social position and citizenship

Positional concepts:	Occupation	Level of education	Income	Ownership	Location	Immi-gration	Sex	
Plus value =	White col., busn. owner	High	High	Private	City	No	Male	
Minus value =	Blue collar	Low	Low	Public	Country	Yes	Female	R2
Initiatives as:								
Resident	.	+	.	-	+	.	.	4
Consumer	.	.	.	-	.	.	.	2
Patient	.	+	-	2
Parent of preschool child(ren)	.	+	4
Parent of school child(ren)	5
Employee	+	.	+	.	.	.	+	7
Initiatives: total								
Chance of influence as:								
Resident	+	.	+	.	-	.	.	18
Consumer	+	2
Patient	+	.	.	-	.	.	.	3
Parent of preschool child(ren)	-	8
Parent of school child(ren)	+	4
Gainfully employed person	+	.	+	+	.	+	+	25
Chance of influence: total	+	.	+	+	-	+	+	14
Administrative competence	+	+	+	.	+	.	+	13
Political participation:								
Contacts	+	+	+	-	.	+	+	19
Party activities	.	.	+	.	-	.	+	3
Manifestations	.	+	.	-	+	+	-	8
Protests	.	.	.	-	+	.	.	3
Voting	+	.	+	.	.	+	.	5
Interest in politics	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	12
Party identification	.	.	+	.	-	+	.	4
Member, voluntary organization	+	+	+	-	.	+	+	20
Trade union influence	+	.	+	-	.	+	+	4
Affinity with movements	+	-	+	-	-	+	-	6
Number of positive figures	14	9	13	2	6	10	10	
Number of negative figures	0	1	0	11	5	0	4	

The table is based on a series of regression analyses. The absence of significant effects is denoted by a period. The analysis includes only gainfully employed people.

Political participation in the form of personal initiatives and appeals also exhibits sharp distinctions between social classes. The ability to assert one's interests before public agencies and people's perceived interest in politics also largely follow social dividing lines.

A person's position in organizational life, in terms of his number of memberships in voluntary organizations, is also socially skewed. The level of involvement in such organizations is highest among well-educated people, high income earners, white collar employees in the public sector and men.

Public Involvement, Action and Influence

The social differences noted here may help throw light on one of the most pivotal problem areas of political sociology. What are the conditions governing political participation? What relationship is there between participation and influence?

At the beginning of this book, we presented a model based on a simple concept: that there is a mutual association between situation and action. This model was then used as the basis of a discussion of how different citizenship situations look and what relationships there are between situation, dissatisfaction, initiatives and results. The model was intended, above all, to systematize the discussion of minidemocracy: a citizen's chances of changing his living conditions via his own initiatives.

In a subsequent chapter, we broadened this analysis by also focusing attention on "macrodemocracy": those actions which aim at changing all of society or part of society -- and not merely a person's own private situation -- in one respect or another.

There is now a common denominator between the logic of minidemocracy and that of macrodemocracy. Both of them presuppose that, in one way or another, there is a relationship between three different components: involvement, action and influence (see Figure 6.10).



Figur 6.10 Hypotetiskt samband mellan engagemang, handling och inflytande

Involvement

Action

Influence

Figure 6.10 Hypothetical association between involvement, action and influence

Involvement refers here to psychological qualities. Participation -- or action -- presupposes some form of ideological motive force. It requires conviction, dissatisfaction, devotion, indignation, interest -- in other words some kind of internal energy, if action is to come about. The actions referred to here are those whose purpose is to exercise some kind of influence. The object of an action may be one's own life situation or some condition affecting a larger group of people. We are referring to a targeted social action, whose purpose is to affect others. It is therefore a question of power and influence. In order for the model to be valid as a form of social logic, there has to be some kind of association between purpose and results, between action and influence.



This general model can naturally be defined more exactly in different ways. In this context, the model can be operationalized with the help of three dimensions of citizenship used in our survey. Involvement is measured here by using the respondent's perceived interest in politics. This is a psychological quality, an example of what the English-language literature in this field

usually characterizes as "political involvement." There are a number of different conceivable indicators of action. Here we choose one of the dimensions of political participation: contacts. This dimension is based on a number of questions about personal initiatives aimed at trying to influence social issues. As earlier in this study, influence refers to subjective influence. For practical reasons, it was unfeasible in such a large-scale interview survey to carry out measurements of the actual exercise of power. What we have is the respondents' own assessments of their chances of influence. Here we use the summary index, which is based on all the interview questions that were relevant to each respondent's particular situation.

A calculation of the statistical associations between the model's three variables shows that there are indeed significant positive correlations. People who made numerous contacts were ordinarily also very interested in politics. Those who felt they had a good chance of influencing their living conditions were generally also those who participated actively. These general tendencies seem highly plausible. But perhaps the most interesting finding is that these associations were by no means perfect. There were obviously exceptions to the rule. The correlation between interest and participation was admittedly 0.34, but the correlation between participation and subjective influence was lower, 0.18.

A correlative measurement such as this indicates how well the data agree with the hypothesis of a completely linear association. The correlation reaches its maximum level of 1.0 only in those cases where all observations are gathered along a line: each value for the independent variable corresponds to one and only one value for the dependent variable. A low correlation figure means that the observations are scattered around this regression line and include great variations. What, then, is the meaning of such a lack of correspondence between interest and participation, between participation and influence? Figure 6.11 can illustrate.


In the upper one of these two diagrams, the diagonal line divides the surface into two fields, with the following meaning. An individual located above and to the left of this line (which has what is usually called a positive residual) has a higher participation level than we have reason to expect, given the level of his involvement. Correspondingly, people below and to the right of the line have a lower participation level than expected (negative residuals). The latter group is especially interesting. Who are these people, whose involvement is not fully expressed in the form of action? Are there barriers, some type of obstacles, to their active participation?




Figur 6.11 Samband mellan engagemang och handling samt mellan handling och inflytande

Action/Involvement
 Involved, active
 Negative residual
 Involved, passive
 Barrier to participation?
 Uninvolved, passive
 Influence/Action
 Active, influential
 Silent influence
 Ritual participation
 Passive, powerless

Figure 6.11 Statistical association between involvement and action, as well as between action and influence



Figur 6.12 Samband mellan intresse för politik och politiskt deltagande : kontakter



Figur 6.13 Samband mellan politiskt deltagande: kontakter och bedömning av eget inflytande

Political participation (contacts)
 High-level white collar employees, reproduction
 High-level white collar employees, public sector
 Private sector managers
 The highly educated
 White-collar employees
 Men
 Recipients of social assistance
 Farmers
 Rural areas
 The disabled
 Women
 Blue collar workers
 Those with little education
 Interest in politics

Figure 6.12 Statistical association between interest in politics and political participation: contacts

Chance of influence
 Farmers
 Private sector managers
 Business owners
 High-level white collar employees in the public sector
 Rural areas
 White-collar employees
 Men
 The highly educated
 High-level white collar employees, reproduction
 Those with little education
 Women
 Blue-collar workers
 Recipients of social assistance
 Immigrants
 Political participation (contacts)

Figure 6.13 Statistical association between political participation: contacts and assessment of one's own influence

The lower diagram makes the same type of distinction between participation and influence. Here a positive residual means that someone who is relatively passive believes that he has a relatively large influence. Negative residuals signify those citizens who feel relatively powerless, despite their active participation.

Various social categories can now be placed in each respective diagram (Figures 6.12 and 6.13). The result is a kind of social map of the practice of citizenship.

Figure 6.12 indicates that the great majority of social categories are located along the diagonal line. Interest and participation ordinarily go together. At the lower left-hand corner are groups with low interest and low participation: people with little education, blue collar workers and women. At the upper right-hand corner are those who are strongly interested and active: the highly educated and people in management positions.

But there are two groups that diverge from the pattern. Recipients of social assistance³⁹ reported a higher level of participation than there was reason to expect, taking into account their average interest in politics. Their involvement level was clearly below average, but their participation level was slightly above the average for the entire population. Other studies admittedly indicate that recipients of social assistance are politically somewhat more passive than the population in general,⁴⁰ but in any event, when it comes to various types of contacts and appeals, they showed no lower activity than normal.

Another type of deviation from the general pattern is illustrated by the disabled.⁴¹ This group is characterized by

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39. Recipients of social assistance are defined as people who have someone in their family who has received such payments. This group makes up 4 percent of all respondents.
40. Socialbidragstagarna (Recipients of Social Assistance), *Levnadsförhållanden, rapport 52 (Living Conditions, Report 52)*, Statistiska Centralbyrån (Statistics Sweden), 1987, pp. 133 ff.
41. The disabled are defined here as people who have received public allowances for disabilities. This group accounted for 1 percent of all respondents.

negative residuals. The disabled had an above-average interest and involvement in politics, but their participation was below the mean level. External, physical obstacles apparently blocked their participation. The psychological motive force was present, but this energy was prevented from being transformed into action.

Figure 6.13 shows the position of various social groups in the diagram of participation and influence. The categories in the lower left-hand corner -- low participation and low influence -- are familiar: blue-collar workers, people with little education, women and immigrants. But otherwise there are significant differences compared with the picture just presented. Those who believed they had the greatest influence were not those who were most active. The largest positive residuals belonged to managers in the private business sector, farmers, business owners in general and the rural population. The elite corps of political participation -- high-level white collar employees in the public sector, especially those in medical care, education and cultural affairs -- came out far lower in terms of their chances of influencing their situation. Publicly employed people with university degrees or the equivalent frequently participate in voluntary organizations and attend meetings, but this activity is far from always accompanied by power over their own situation. Business owners are not always so politically verbal, but they believe that they have great influence over their situation. It is a matter of more silent power. The motto "be present, but not visible" applies most strikingly to farmers and executives.

7. On the Importance of Groups

Organization


There is a statistical relationship between social position and political participation. Those who are better off are more active than low income earners and people with little education. This association between economic and social resources, on the one hand, and political activity, on the other, is one of the best-documented of all research findings in political sociology.

But what surprised researchers for a long time was that this association did not have the same strength everywhere. In some countries there are very few exceptions from the rule; the statistical correlation is very strong. Yet in other countries, it seems as if this general tendency is not fully operative. Here the difference between the political participation level of various social classes is less than elsewhere. Political equality is sometimes greater, sometimes less. Why is it that social resources do not have the same political impact in all societies?


The solution to the problem came when researchers broadened their perspective. Traditional studies had paid attention only to individual determining factors. There are innumerable measurements documenting the fact that political activity is linked with educational level, occupation, income and other financial resources. But what must be borne in mind is that institutional factors also play a part. Access to collective resources may strengthen, but also may weaken, the importance of individual resources.

The study that has done more than any other to emphasize the importance of institutional factors is a major international comparative research project on variations in political participation. This Cross-National Participation Project, led by American political scientists Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, was based on field surveys in seven countries: the United States, India, Japan, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Nigeria and Austria.¹ The model on which this research project is based can be illustrated with the help of three diagrams. (Figures 7.1-7.3).²

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1. Its main findings are presented in two books: Sidney Verba & Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*, Harper & Row, New York, 1972; Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie & Jae-on Kim, *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1978.
 2. Adapted from Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978, pp. 6 ff.



Figur 7.1 Hypotetiskt samband mellan resurser och deltagande: endast individuella faktorer



Figur 7.2 Hypotetiskt samband mellan resurser och deltagande: kollektiva faktorer ökar skillnaderna

Political participation
(activity rate)

Individual (motivation and) resources

Figure_7.1 Hypothetical association between resources and participation: individual factors only

Political participation

Group factors

Individual resources


Figure 7.2 Hypothetical associations between resources and participation: collective factors increase the differences.

Political participation

Group factors

Individual resources

Figure 7.3 Hypothetical association between resources and participation: collective factors reduce the differences



The first figure shows a theoretical case where only individual factors play a part. The diagonal line represents the direct association that exists between individual resources and political participation: the richer the resources, the more active a person is. The angle of the line is a measure of the power with which individual differences influence participation. A steep angle is equivalent to a strong effect. A flatter line means that differences in individual resources only influence the level of participation to a modest extent. In the extreme case, the line is parallel with the horizontal axis, meaning that political participation is the same regardless of the level of people's socioeconomic resources. In that case, full political equality prevails with respect to individual resources.

Institutional factors may be specified in different ways. For example, it is entirely possible to influence political equality by means of legislation. The "one man - one vote" rule places an upper limit on voting as political participation. Compulsory voting may coercively "lift" the lower part of the population; this establishes a lower limit on political participation. But the type of institutional factors we will mainly examine here are part of the organizational system.

Organizational resources, like other institutional factors, may either increase or decrease the angle of the line. Figure 7.2 illustrates what happens when collective resources strengthen individual differences. In this case, those who are strong as individuals also have the greatest collective assets. In Verba and Nie's studies, the United States serves as the typical example. The political and social structure of the U.S. is individualistic. People with high social status are clearly overrepresented among the politically active. Group-based processes tend to amplify the differences between haves and have-nots. The lower class lacks strong organizations.

Why is the significance of class in American politics large and small at the same time? the authors ask. "The answer may be that it is just the absence of an explicit class basis of politics in an institutional or an ideological sense that explains the close relationship in the behavioral sense. If there were more class-based ideologies, more class-based organizations, more explicit class-based appeal by political parties, the participation disparity between upper- and lower-status citizens would wvery likely be less.... The absence of institutions and ideas associated with social status makes, paradoxically, such status a more potent force in American politics."³

Figure 7.3 shows what happens when collective factors have the opposite effect. Those groups which are inferior in terms of individual resources can instead obtain collective resources through organizations and clubs. Such group-based resources have both a material and a psychological side. They offer channels and opportunities to participate which would not otherwise be available. But they can also raise consciousness and mobilize groups that would otherwise be doomed to political silence and apathy. Organization is a powerful lever. In cases where the lower class is better organized than the upper class, the significance of individual differences in resources may be minimized and perhaps even be eliminated.

No Nordic country was included in the international survey we have summarized here. But there is one study that has tested Verba and Nie's questions on Swedish data. As part of a 1968 political science study of voter behavior, Vilgot Oscarsson compared political participation in Sweden with that of three

3. Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 340.

other countries.⁴ Oscarsson finds that Sweden diverges in important respects from the image of the United States that Verba and Nie present. The statistical relationship between social position and political participation is very weak in Sweden. People with little schooling and those who are highly educated have largely equal levels of participation. In addition, the organizational factor favors the lower social classes. First, they are well-organized. Second, this collective resource promotes political participation. In Sweden, "those people who are members or active in organizations and who have little education participate in political activities to a greater extent than members/active people who have more formal education."⁵ These Swedish findings are thus exactly the opposite of the American ones. The author summarizes: "We believe that the weak association that exists in our country between social status and political participation can probably be attributed largely to the fact that the Social Democratic Party and the Center Party, via the blue collar trade unions and farmers' organizations, can mobilize workers and farmers in political activity."⁶

The picture of the research situation presented here can probably be regarded as generally accepted. One of the authors of

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4. Vilgot Oscarsson, *Politiskt deltagande: En jämförande studie av politisk participation i Sverige, USA, Storbritannien och Västtyskland* (Political Participation: A Comparative Study of Sweden, the United States, Great Britain and West Germany), licenciat degree dissertation, Survey of Political Representation, Department of Government, University of Gothenburg, 1974. For a summary, see Vilgot Oscarsson, "Politiskt deltagande" ("Political Participation"), *Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift*, 79, 1976, pp. 185-208.
 5. Oscarsson, 1976, p. 197.
 6. *Ibid.*, pp. 202-203.

this book has also helped spread these research findings in various contexts. In a review of Verba, Nie and Kim's international survey in a professional journal, he stated: "Sweden was not included in the survey summarized here. Yet we know, among other things from a study by Vilgot Oscarsson, that Sweden is closer to the pattern prevailing in Japan and Austria than that prevailing in the United States, India and Yugoslavia. Popular movements, not least blue collar workers' and farmers' organizations, have promoted political participation. They have partly offset the handicap to political activity created by low status."⁷ In a report written for a broader audience, he characterized the political science research situation thusly: "Sweden is ... interesting as an example of how grassroots 'popular movements,' an extensive system of organizations and popularly supported political parties can elevate groups into political consciousness and political involvement -- groups that would otherwise have been condemned largely to political silence. Along with the other Nordic countries, Sweden is proof that large-scale organizations can compensate for political imbalance....In a historical perspective, it is primarily the farmers' and workers' parties and organizations that have drawn into politics groups of people who are passive in many other countries."⁸

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7. Olof Petersson, review of Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978, in *Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift*, 83, 1980, p. 88.
 8. Olof Petersson, *Democracy -- Idea and Reality*, Study of Power and Democracy, English Series, Report No. 7, December 1987, p. 18. This is a revised version of an address to the National Board of Education's R&D conference on Adult Education and Democracy, April 9, 1987. The original Swedish text is available as STM rapport R87:35, in which the editorial board made a helpful contribution by furnishing the above-quoted paragraph with the sub-heading "Popular movements give a voice to the silent."

After these resoundingly authoritative statements, it actually appears unnecessary to carry out additional studies. But the question of the relationship between individual resources, organizational resources and political participation is so important that it deserves to be examined anew. The reason is that the generally accepted image of Sweden needs to be revised.

The following discussion will be divided into four steps:

1. Definitions. What is meant by political participation? Do the various studies refer to the same thing?

2. The relationship between social position and political participation. The prevailing image of Sweden is that political equality is at a high level; there is little difference in political participation between higher and lower social classes. How well does this perception agree with the findings presented in the preceding chapters?

3. The relationship between social position and organizational resources. The expression "popular organizations" evokes the image of Sweden as a country of flourishing grassroots organizations, where blue collar workers and farmers, not least, find a channel for their participation in public life. In what respect does organizational activity diverge from one social class to another?

4. The interplay between individual resources and organizational resources. The introduction to this chapter presented some basic models of how institutional resources can affect the relationship between individual resources and political participation. How does the pattern look in Sweden?

Definitions

The international research project presented by Verba, Nie and Kim utilized a long series of indicators of political participation. They could be grouped into four dimensions: voting, campaign participation, communal (i.e. local) activities plus particularized contacts with a social referent (i.e. dealing with political issues) and, finally, particularized contacts with a particular referent (i.e. on personal issues).⁹ Oscarsson's study is based on six indicators: voting, membership in a political party, activity in a political party, discussion activity, attendance at campaign rallies and membership in an organization "that could do something about a bill in Parliament." These six yardsticks are regarded as forming a single dimension.¹⁰ The international project thus works with four dimensions of political participation, Oscarsson's Swedish study with one, and our citizenship survey with five.

Although a number of indicators are shared by all the studies in question, there are also a number of differences. The operationalizations are not identical, a fact which obviously makes direct comparisons difficult. Oscarsson's survey is the only one that gathers all yardsticks into a single dimension. The computer material that was available to him did not contain a sufficiently large number of yardsticks of participation to enable him to carry out a full-fledged dimensional analysis. This means that his combined scale encompasses yardsticks from several of the citizenship survey's different dimensions of participation, mainly party activity and voting. But the most remarkable thing about Oscarsson's scale of participation is that it contains a question about organizational membership.¹¹ Because

9. Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978, Appendix B.

10. Oscarsson, 1976, pp. 189 ff.

11. To some extent, membership in a political party is one indication of membership in a voluntary organization, because many blue collar trade unions in Sweden are collectively affiliated with the Social Democratic Party.

one key point of the survey concerns any relationships between organizational membership and political participation, it is extremely unfortunate that the yardstick of political participation itself contains a component of organizational membership.

Relationships Between Social Position and Political Participation

To what extent does political participation differ from one social class to another? Table 7.1 summarizes the two Swedish studies discussed here.

The two studies agree and disagree with each other at the same time. The citizenship survey shows that the statistical association between social position and political participation is weak in certain respects, but not all. A reasonable interpretation is that Oscarsson's findings are entirely plausible as long as one bears in mind that they only apply to certain types of political participation. On this point, the two studies state the same thing. This fact, in itself, is naturally important in principle. In Sweden, the type of political participation that is related to the core of representative democracy -- voting and party activities -- is only weakly associated with social position. People who are active in political parties do not comprise a social elite.

But the subject of social position and political activity is not thereby exhausted. There are also other forms of political action. Two dimensions -- contacts and manifestations -- exemplify a type of political involvement that demands greater individual initiative of a verbal or written kind. These two dimensions have a clear association with such individual factors

as class membership and educational level. In this respect Sweden thus fits nicely into the common international pattern, where those who are socially weak are also politically silent.

The question of whether this is any association between social position and political participation thus has no unequivocal answer. It all depends on which aspect of the many forms of political activity one is referring to. The picture provided by the earlier study is consequently only partially correct.

Table 7.1 Social position and political participation

	Association (r) with	
	Occupation	Education
Political participation in 1968 (according to Vilgot Oscarsson)	0.04	-0.05
Political participation in 1987 (according to the citizenship survey):		
Contacts	0.29	0.32
Manifestations	0.14	0.21
Voting	0.12	0.06
Party activity	0.05	0.06
Protests	0.03	0.05

Occupation has been divided here into two groups: working class and white collar employees/business owners. Educational level consists of three categories: low, middle and high.

It also deserves mention that there is another conceivable reason behind the differences in the two surveys: Nearly 20 years had elapsed between these two measurements. The pattern of associations could easily have had time to change over these years. But the question of which changes have actually occurred is so large that we will devote a full chapter to it later. We are therefore postponing this topic for the time being.

Relationships Between Social Position and Organizational Resources

Another argument as to why Sweden should differ from a country like the United States is that its system of organizations has a much more solid social underpinning. According to conventional wisdom, members of lower social classes in Sweden -- unlike those in many other countries -- are just as well-organized as more affluent citizens.¹²

The data that form the evidence to support this view, however, focus on only one part of the organizational system: the trade union movement. It is an indisputable and important fact that a high percentage of eligible employees belong to trade unions in Sweden. According to the available statistics, this percentage is the highest in the world.¹³ The percentage who belong to unions is largely the same among both blue collar and white collar employees.¹⁴

But it would be overly hasty to conclude from this that organizational resources in general are evenly distributed

12. See, for example, Oscarsson, 1976, p. 197.

13. Anders Kjellberg, "Sverige har fackligt världsrekord" ("Sweden Holds World Trade Union Record"), LO-tidningen (weekly newspaper of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation), 20, 1988, pp. 8-9.

14. In Oscarsson's study, membership in voluntary organizations refers only to trade unions: Oscarsson, 1974, p. 76, note 1. It should be pointed out that the analyses include all respondents, thus even those not gainfully employed. To a considerable extent, variations in organizational membership will therefore measure variations in labor force participation levels, which in turn vary with age and (in 1968) also with sex.

among social classes. This is because the relationship between class membership and organizational membership differs greatly from one type of organization to another. Table 7.2 provides an overview of the association between occupation and organizational membership. The organizations have been ranked here according to the strength and direction of this association. The higher up on the list, the greater are the differences in favor of the middle class. A minus sign in front of the correlation figure indicates that this type of voluntary organization has a larger proportion of members among blue collar workers than among white collar employees and business owners.

Many organizations have an equally large proportion of members among blue collar workers as among white collar employees and business owners. For the dozen or so organizations at the bottom, the differences are so slight that they are not even statistically significant. The most important of these organizations in numerical terms are the trade union movement and consumer cooperatives. Membership in a union and in a Konsum association are equally common in both social classes.

But there is also a long list of organizations with lopsided recruitment from different classes. Cultural clubs and organizations specializing in outdoor activities have the highest statistical association between occupational group and membership. The working class is strongly underrepresented among their members. But parents' clubs, residents' clubs and sports clubs also recruit a larger proportion of their members from the middle class than from the working class.

Table_7.2__Class_membership_and_voluntary_organizations_____

Type_of_organization_____	Blue collar workers	White collar, bsn. owners	Assoc- iation
Cultural	10	23	0.18
Outdoor activities	5	16	0.17
Humanitarian aid	5	13	0.14
Investment	3	10	0.14
Lodge or similar	1	5	0.14
Parents	6	14	0.13
Residents	23	34	0.12
Environmentalist	5	11	0.10
Sports	31	39	0.09
Retired people (% of retired people)	34	42	0.07
Peace	1	3	0.06
Disabled people	3	5	0.05
Local political action	1	2	0.05
Group for international issue	2	3	0.04
Other Protestant denomination	4	5	0.04
Hobby	12	15	0.04
Automobile or similar	11	14	0.04
Temperance	3	4	0.03
Group within Church of Sweden	3	4	0.02
Trade union (% of paid employees)	80	81	0.02
Consumer co-op	36	38	0.02
Voluntary defense	5	5	0.00
Other religious denomination	2	2	0.00
Immigrant	2	1	-0.01
Women	2	2	-0.02
Strongly organized: member of more than three types of organizations	26	51	
Weakly organized: member of no organization or of only one type of organization	28	14	
Average_number_of_types_of_organizations_2.6_____		3.8_____	

It is a remarkable fact that no type of organization has an inverted statistical association. Not one of the types of organizations surveyed has a significantly higher proportion of blue collar workers among its members than white collar employees and business owners.


This means that total organizational resources are clearly larger among higher social classes than among lower ones. The percentage who either belong to no voluntary organizations or who are only members of a single organization is twice as large in the working class as in the middle class. Conversely, the proportion of "highly organized" people, defined here as those with more than three memberships, is about half the middle class but only one fourth of the working class.

The thesis that Sweden is a country of egalitarian popular movements has limited validity. A number of organizational types which in fact are important -- among them the trade union movement -- do fit this profile. But as a description of the social base of the entire organizational system, this image is incorrect. Organizational membership is an important form of collective socioeconomic resource. Access to this resource is clearly greater among higher social classes than among lower ones.

Interplay Between Individual and Organizational Resources

What combined effect, then, do individual resources and organizational resources have on political participation? The model introduced earlier may be used in order to construct some hypothetical cases (Figure 7.4).¹⁵

15. This presentation is based on Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978, pp. 84 ff.



Figur 7.4 Hypoteser om samspelet mellan individuella och kollektiva faktorer

A. Weak institutional system

Effect:
 Ind. +
 Org. .
 I x O .

B. Additive system

Effect:
 Ind. +
 Org. +
 I x O .

C. Dominant system

Effects:
 Individual .
 Organization +
 Ind. x Org. .

Organized

Unorganized

Political participation

Individual resources

D. Restrictive system

Effect:
 Ind. +
 Org. +
 I x O +

E. Mobilizing system

Effect:
 Ind. +
 Org. +
 I x O -

Figure 7.4 Hypotheses on the interplay between individual and group-based factors

The horizontal axis of the diagram signifies individual resources, defined here as educational level. The vertical axis measures the level of political participation. In each diagram there are two lines. One is for the strongly organized, the other for the weakly organized. This is a way of illustrating the statistical relationship between individual resources and political activity for two subgroups: the organized and the unorganized. It thereby becomes possible to tell the degree to which political activity depends on individual resources and organizational resources.

The first example (Diagram A) shows a case where political participation is influenced only by individual socioeconomic resources but not by organizational resources. The two curves overlap; the organizational factor has no effect. The unorganized (or in Verba, Nie and Kim's terminology, "unaffiliated") have the same level of participation as the organized (or "affiliated"), given a particular level of education.

In Diagram B, participation is influenced both by individual and collective resources. The organized have the same head start over the unorganized within all educational categories. The effect of education is the same among the organized as among the unorganized. The two effects are added to each other. The organizational system has an independent role, but not so strong that it nullifies the influence of individual differences. Among people who are organized, those who are better off are also the most active; the same thing applies among the unorganized.

In the third example (C) only the organizational factor has an effect. Here, organizational membership is both a necessary and sufficient precondition for activity. All those who are organized have a high activity level, regardless of individual resources. Those who stand outside of voluntary organizations are all passive. Nor does the individual factor play any part among the unorganized; the highly educated are just as passive as those with little education.

Common to all three of these types of cases is that the two lines are parallel. The effect of individual differences is the same, regardless of what percentage of people belong to organizations. The two remaining examples are different in this respect. The association between individual socioeconomic resources and political activity is different from one of these groups to the other.

Example D is a "restrictive" institutional system, where membership is a necessary but insufficient prerequisite for political activity. In Diagram E, a "mobilizing" system, membership is a sufficient but unnecessary condition.

In the restrictive system, all those who lack organizational resources are "excluded." Only those who have access to an organization can turn their individual resources into political action. In this case, the organizational system primarily has the effect of excluding highly educated people who do not belong to an organization. The gap between the two curves, a measure of the significance of the organizational factor, is widest among the well-educated.

The situation in case E is the reverse. In a mobilizing system, all members of organizations are active, regardless of their socioeconomic resource level. The organizational factor is of greatest significance here for those with little education. The organization is a lever that lifts people with weak resources to a level far above the level of participation that would be expected in a system without organizations.

These graphic diagrams are only one way of illustrating these five types of cases. Another method for specifying mutual relationships is a mathematical function. The following labels are introduced: P stands for the level of political participation, I for individual resources and O for organizational resources. The following is thus true:

$$P = aI + bO + cIO$$

The three coefficients a, b and c specify the size of the relative effects. Participation is a function of three quantities: individual resources, organizational resources and the interplay between these. If participation were a simple sum of individual resources and organizational resources, the two first terms would have sufficed. Interplay c -- statistical interaction -- signals that the two lines are not parallel. The model contains both additive and multiplicative effects.


Diagram A contains only the individual effect; both b and c equal zero here. In case B there is both an individual and an organizational effect, in C only an organizational effect. In these three cases the lines are parallel: there are only additive effects, and interplay in consequently zero.

In Diagram D the interplay effect is positive, in E negative. In the first case, participation is extra high for those who have large individual resources and large organizational resources at the same time. In the second case, this group has a lower participation than would have been true if the organizational factor had not been present.

The hypothesis that can be derived from earlier research is that Sweden exemplifies case E. The idea is that the organizational factor is of greatest importance to lower social

classes. The silent are given a voice; participation by members of organizations who have little education should thus be at the same level as that of members who are highly educated. Among people who do not belong to organizations, however, individual factors have a strong impact. The organizational system is assumed to have a leveling function.

Our findings after testing this hypothesis for each of the five dimensions of political participation are presented in Figure 7.5. Individual resources are measured in terms of educational level. The organizational factor is expressed by the number of memberships in organizations; here the material has been grouped into three categories.



Figur 7.5 Politiskt deltagande som en funktion av utbildning och organisation (forts.)

Contacts			Many organizations	
			Few organizations	
Effects:				
Education	+			
Organization	+			
Ed. x Org.	+			
		Low	Medium	High
			Education	
Party activities			Many organizations	
			Few organizations	
Effects:				
Education	.			
Organization	+			
Ed. x Org.	.			
		Low	Medium	High
Manifestations			Many organizations	
			Few organizations	
Effects:				
Education	+			
Organization	+			
Ed. x Org.	.			
		Low	Medium	High
			Education	
Protests			Many organizations	
			Few organizations	
Effects:				
Education	-			
Organization	.			
Ed. + Org.	+			
		Low	Medium	High
			Education	
Voting			Many organizations	
			Few organizations	
Effects:				
Education	.			
Organization	+			
Ed. + Org.	.			
		Low	Medium	High
			Education	

Figure 7.5 Political participation as a function of educational level and membership in organizations (continued)

The result is not entirely unequivocal; individual and group-based resources differ in importance depending on the type of political participation. For political contacts, both educational level and membership in organizations have a statistically significant impact. In addition, a certain interplay effect (positive) can be proven. The lines are not entirely parallel; the gap between the organized and unorganized is somewhat wider among the highly educated than among those with little schooling. The organizational factor amplifies, rather than weakening, the effects of differences in educational level. There is a very large difference between highly educated people who belong to organizations and people with little education who remain unorganized.

The second dimension of political participation -- party activities -- generates another pattern. The effect of educational level is weak and irregular; in this case, individual resources have no significant effect. On the other hand, the three curves are located at completely different levels; organizational resources clearly tip the scale. The diagram illustrates what was pointed out earlier: the "parliamentary" and "corporative" channels are strongly intertwined. Those who are active in voluntary organizations and those who are active in party politics are largely the same people.

The third dimension of participation -- manifestations -- generates a structure of statistical associations reminiscent of the first case. Both educational level and membership in organizations have an effect. The difference here is that no interplay occurs; the lines are mainly parallel.

The protest dimension forms a somewhat bewildering pattern. This type of activity involves only a few people. The differences between various subgroups are sometimes dictated mainly by chance. The most significant finding is that there is a positive interplay. The effect of the organizational factor is greatest among the well-educated.

The fifth and final dimension of participation, voting, is interesting. When we check for membership in organizations, as here, the effect of educational level disappears; the lines are virtually parallel with the horizontal axis. The pattern is thereby the same as for party activities: a significant organizational effect, no individual effect and no interplay. As the preceding chapter indicated, well-educated people have somewhat higher voter turnout than others. Here it is clear that this is essentially because well-educated people belong to more organizations than those with little education. Voter turnout among people with little education and many organizational memberships is just as high as among well-educated people who belong to many organizations.

In other words, it turns out to be hard to draw any general conclusions about the significance of individual factors and organizational factors to political participation. Once again our findings must be qualified with regard to the type of participation.

But there is one similarity among the five diagrams. In no case is there any negative interplay. In this respect, the hypothesis as to the special nature of Sweden must consequently be rejected. It is not possible to prove any instance where organizational resources favor, or "lift," people with little schooling more than they favor the highly educated.¹⁶

16. There is, of course, always a suspicion that these results are due to the choice of indicators. In the literature, there is no consensus as to how the organizational factor should be operationalized. The analysis presented here is based on what is perhaps the most natural method of measurement -- simply the number of memberships in organizations. Various alternative indicators have also been tried, however; for reasons of space the results are not presented here. One

The conventional picture therefore needs to be modified. Sweden is no exception from the general rule. The middle class has greater organizational resources than the working class. The organizational factor does not compensate for a lack of social resources. These findings do not, on the other hand, exclude the possibility that in some respects, Sweden may still conceivably constitute a divergent case. For example, the positive statistical association between individual and group-based resources may very well turn out to be weaker than in many other countries.

Informal networks

The organized system of voluntary associations is one important type of collective resource, but is far from being the only one. Aside from institutionalized clubs, labeled by sociologists as "secondary groups," there are also primary groups: informal ties at the close personal level. A person who has frequent and intimate contacts with his immediate and extended family and with

variation on organizational membership also takes into account people's positions and activities in organizations. A second variation studies only the effect of trade union membership (this analysis only includes paid employees). A further variation operationalizes the degree of collective resources using party identification. In no case was any negative interplay effect evident. The findings reported here are thus not likely to depend on the choice of indicator.

his friends has a resource at his disposal which may very well be highly important in addition to the individual resources that are directly tied to himself and the collective resources represented by membership in larger, more anonymous groups.

There is no unified opinion about the importance of informal networks in modern society. According to one commonly occurring interpretation of history, the importance of primary groups was far greater in precapitalist societies. In the era of the subsistence economy, when production took place in people's own homes and farms, personal ties with close relatives played a much larger part in daily life than today. The market economy implies that economic life forms a separate part of society. Economic transactions are no longer determined by social connections or bonds of kinship. Individuals increasingly act as rational, calculating creatures isolated from each other. Anonymous and atomized social relationships characterize modern society. The emergence of the welfare state means that even many reproductive tasks in fields like personal care and child-rearing have been taken over by impersonal institutions. Primary groups are being deprived of more and more functions. Ties with the immediate and extended family are becoming weaker.

But this outline of history has not gone unchallenged. Anonymous economic transactions are more at home in the theoretical world of economic models than in daily reality. Networks and personal bonds are just as important today as during earlier epochs.¹⁷ A few decades ago, sociology was criticized for

17. For a critique of the idea that traditionalism and modernity are supposed to be mutually exclusive, see Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977, p. 407.

having constructed an "oversocialized" human being -- a person burdened by group pressures and totally predetermined by the prevailing norms of society. Today the danger is the opposite. A renewed wave of support for the market economy, which has also washed over the field of social theory, has created the image of an "undersocialized" human being. Only purely economic calculations based on utility guide people's actions.¹⁸

It is much too simple to imagine that society is regulated by only two control systems -- the market and the public sector. There is at least one more important arena for coordination and distribution: social networks. It is worth studying not only the relationship between the public sector and the market, but also the relationship between the public sector and social networks and between the market and social networks.¹⁹

Furthermore, it has been argued that in recent years the role of social networks in redistributive policy has increased rather than decreased. The ownership of houses or other dwellings in the desirable neighborhoods of big cities has become a strategically important property asset in the hands of one's heirs. The efforts of government social welfare policy to raise the living standards of the population have resulted in the transfer of financial resources to the social network. The significance of the network with respect to redistribution is increasing, not in spite of the welfare state but because of it. "At the end point

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18. Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," *American Journal of Sociology*, 91, 1985, pp. 481-510.
 19. Einar éverbye, "Det sosiale nettverkets ikende betydning som fordelningsarena" ("The Increasing Importance of Social Networks as an Arena of Distribution"), *Sociologisk Forskning*, 23, 1986:1, p. 83-92.

of the welfare state, we glimpse the private state," according to one Norwegian researcher. The extended family has undergone a partial renaissance as an arena of distribution.²⁰

What we will primarily examine here is to what extent access to social network resources helps strengthen or weaken political equality -- how the role of citizen is affected by chances to obtain assistance from friends and relatives.

It is by no means self-evident exactly what a social network is supposed to mean. In this context, the individual's relationships with his primary group occupies the spotlight. This type of personal connections can assume many forms. Our citizenship survey asked a number of different questions whose common purpose was to measure to what extent the individual has a chance to obtain various kinds of help and support. Table 7.4 presents these questions and shows the frequency of different responses.

Nearly all respondents were in at least occasional contact with relatives and friends. Between one third and half often had such contacts. A comparison with the 1968, 1974 and 1981 living standard surveys, which asked similar questions, indicates that people's contacts with relatives and friends are becoming more and more frequent. The proportion of people who often visited relatives rose during the period 1968-1981 from 28 to 40 percent. During the same period, the proportion who often visited friends and acquaintances rose from 30 to 49 percent.²¹ The proportion of socially isolated citizens is declining.

20. *éverbye*, 1986, pp. 86-87.

21. Christina Axelsson, "Familj och social förankring" ("Family and Social Roots"), in Robert Erikson & Rune Åberg, eds., *Välfärd i förändring* (Welfare in Transition), Prisma, Stockholm, 1984, p. 276.

One third of employees met their co-workers socially during their free time. More than eight out of ten had at least one acquaintance or person they were close to that they could talk to about confidential matters. This is about the same percentage who said that they knew someone who could provide construction or handyman help. Access to special expertise is not really equally widespread, yet one third of respondents knew someone in their social network with legal expertise.

The various measurements of the social network are mutually associated. Those who can obtain help with one matter are often the same people who also have access to other forms of help. But this overlapping is far from complete. To take a single example, how close a person is to his relatives has no statistical association with his access to legal expertise. Certain items are connected by strong associations, while others are not related to each other at all. This pattern of data forms a systematic structure which is revealed by dimensional analysis. Four components can be distinguished (Table 7.4).

Table_7.3__Social_networks

	Percentages	
	Yes, but rarely	Yes, often
Do you and your neighbors usually borrow things from each other, such as food, tools, cookware etc.?	40	21
	Yes, sometimes	Yes, often
Do you usually:		
Go out to visit relatives	54	40
Have relatives over for a visit	60	33
Go out to visit friends and acquaintances	48	49
Have friends and acquaintances over for a visit	50	47

	Yes
Do you often meet your co-workers socially during your free time? (asked of employees)	33

As you know, sometimes people need help with various matters. Do you have any personal acquaintance or person you are close to from whom you could easily get help with the following matters: Yes

Construction or handyman help?	79
Getting products on better terms than in ordinary stores?	37
Arranging a large party?	58
Talking about confidential matters?	84
Medical expertise?	49
Financial expertise?	60
Legal expertise?	34
Computer expertise?	42


Access to one kind of expertise normally goes together with access to other kinds of expertise. In corresponding fashion, there are ties between different aspects of personal contacts with neighbors or other people who can provide help in various everyday situations. Furthermore, people's friendships and their bonds with relatives form two separate dimensions.

Table 7.4 Dimensions of the social network

	Dimension_number			
	1	2	3	4
Dimension 1: Contacts with experts				
Legal expertise	77	00	03	-01
Financial expertise	68	28	04	04
Computer expertise	67	11	09	-01
Medical expertise	60	16	09	08
Dimension 2: Primary social contacts				
Construction or handyman help	06	71	-06	04
Arranging a large party	12	65	14	04
Talking about confidential matters	10	61	07	08
Getting products on favorable terms	29	47	12	-10
Borrowing things from neighbors	09	39	20	07
Dimension 3: Friends				
Having friends over for a visit	08	14	87	21
Going out to visit friends	08	17	87	18
Meeting co-workers socially	06	05	46	-08
Dimension 4: Relatives				
Having relatives over for a visit	02	06	07	92
Going out to visit relatives	04	08	10	90

All loadings have been multiplied by 100.

Obviously nothing prevents us from temporarily disregarding these variations within networks and instead examining the density of the total network. The question is how many people have low figures in all four dimensions, which is a yardstick of social isolation. One simple index consists of the total number of network contacts, expressed as a percentage of the number of possible contacts. The index figures can thus range from 0 to 100. Figure 7.6 shows the range of index figures in the population.



Figur 7.6 Fördelning av nätverksresurser


Frequency

Network contacts (total index)

Figure 7.6 Distribution of social network resources

The mean was 57. This implies that the average citizen has access to more than half the social contacts mentioned in the survey. There are obviously variations around this mean; both extremes, 0 and 100, were represented by some of the people in our sample. But the general impression is still that the variations are relatively modest. Most citizens have access to social network resources that are fairly close to the mean. Inequality in this respect could have been far greater. The percentage of citizens who are socially isolated is small. If the limit for a thin social network is set at an index figure of 25, then no more than 6 percent fall below this line.

Access to social network resources varies from one population group to another. The type of contacts that has the strongest statistical association with social position is the one related to expertise and specialized knowledge. Highly educated people and high-level white collar employees have the largest number of such contacts. The density of social networks also differs in various respects between the generations. Primary social contacts and acquaintanceships with specialized experts are less common among the elderly. Social contacts with friends are also age-related. On the whole, this means that access to network resources is largest in younger age categories. According to the overall index figure for access to personal contacts, the peak already occurs in the 20-30 age category (Figure 7.7).



Figur 7.7 Nätverksresurser inom åldersgrupper

Network
contacts
(total index)

Age

Figure 7.7 Social network resources by age categories

There are certain other differences between population groups as well. Contacts with relatives are more common in the countryside than in the city. Women have more contacts with relatives than men.

But otherwise, the differences are small. There are no dramatic differences between social classes. People with little education and blue collar workers naturally do not have the same access to expert contacts as highly educated white collar employees. But when it comes to the chances of getting help with various personal matters, the distribution is more even. In this respect, class differences are small.

What statistical association is there between the private and public spheres, between informal networks and citizenship roles? Do personal contacts matter at all to citizen involvement and to people's chances of exercising influence? Table 7.5 provides an overview of the associations between network resources and citizenship roles.

The general picture is completely clear. There is a positive general association between the strength of the informal network, on the one hand, and citizen involvement and influence on the other. In the table, there are two exceptions; party identification and affinity with organized movements have no statistical association with network resources. As it turns out, however, this absence of correlation is only apparent. The age factor plays a trick here. Identification and affinity are higher in older generations; social network resources are inversely associated with age. A check for generational differences also shows that there is a positive tendency in each age group. Network resources are thus also related to people's party identification and affinity with organized movements.

The findings presented here are based on a comprehensive index of all network resources. A detailed analysis reveals that the expert dimension is the aspect of the informal network that has the strongest statistical association with citizen activities. But primary social contacts are not far behind. Meeting friends and relatives, respectively, has clearly weaker associations with citizen activities, but here too the general tendency is positive. The importance of the network is far from being limited to highly educated people's contacts with experts. Nor can generational differences explain the strong associations. The main finding remains valid, even after taking age into account.


The importance of the informal network is additional evidence that not only individual resources, but also group-based factors influence the realization of citizenship. The question now is exactly how these individual and collective conditions work together. The theoretical literature on the importance of social networks presents one hypothesis which is a direct parallel to the above-discussed hypothesis about the impact of the organizational factor on political participation.

This hypothesis is as follows.²² It is easier to mobilize individual resources than social network resources. Variations in individual resources should therefore have a greater effect than differences in network resources. Even more important, however, is that there is an interplay between individual resources and network resources. People who are both weak themselves and have a thin social network have a much harder time asserting their interests than one would expect merely on the basis of the sum of missing individual resources and missing network resources. Being weak in both respects has a multiplicative, not an additive effect.²³ There should thus be an interplay, a statistical interaction, between individual and collective factors. Figure 7.8 illustrates this hypothesis. The simultaneous absence of the two types of resources is assumed to be particularly inhibiting.

The hypothesis is not confirmed, however. Network resources certainly have a definite separate effect on political participation, for example. But this effect is additive, not multiplicative. The expected interplay pattern does not materialize. Figure 7.9 provides an illustrative example of the pattern that actually appears in the data. As earlier, individual resources are measured in terms of educational level. The collective factor indicates aggregate social network resources. The choice of indicators is not crucial here; an alternative analysis using primary social contacts as a yardstick of networks yields the same results. Political participation refers here to contacts.

22. See, for example, Robert E. Hanneman, *Computer-Assisted Theory Building. Modeling Dynamic Social Systems*, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, Calif., 1988, pp. 273 ff.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 273.



Figur 7.8 Hypotetiskt samspel mellan individuella resurser och nätverksresurser

Involvement,
influence

Network resources

Strong
Weak

Weak


Strong

Individual resources

Figure 7.8 Hypothetical interplay between individual resources and social network resources

Both individual resources and social network resources are of importance. The highest political activity is demonstrated by highly educated people with strong social networks. People with little education and weak networks are politically silent. To this extent, the hypothesis is correct. But the effects are additive; the lines are practically parallel. Nor when other aspects of participation and involvement are examined do we see the type of interplay effects that the theoretical hypothesis would give us reason to expect.

There is another way of proving that the network factor has an independent role. As shown in the preceding chapters, the various dimensions of citizenship have stronger or weaker statistical associations with individual social position. Exactly which social background factors explain variations in participation and influence was determined by using multiple regression analysis. One way of studying the extent to which network resources have a separate effect is to repeat the earlier regression analyses, while also including the network factor. If it should turn out that the extent of social contacts was only a reflection of differences in educational level and other social dividing lines, the network factor would not provide any significant contribution to the analysis. But this is not the case. A series of regression analyses (not presented here for reasons of space) indicates that in most cases, access to informal social networks is of great separate importance.



Figur 7.9 Politiskt deltagande som en funktion av utbildning och nätverksresurser

Contacts

Strong network

Weak network

Low

Medium

High

Education

Figure_7.9 Political participation as a function of education and social network resources

The fact that the influence of the social network is of an additive and not a multiplicative nature means that network resources provide an extra plus to people with both small and large individual resources. On the one hand, it means that those who have strong individual socioeconomic resources have a chance to strengthen their position further. But on the other hand, there are no insurmountable thresholds for people with weak resources. People who lack both individual resources and social network resources are not definitively handicapped; those with such a double weakness in resources do not lag extremely far behind the rest of the population.

Leisure-time cultures

Power and influence are determined by the socioeconomic resources that are available to a person. Access to resources, both individual and group-based, must therefore be the focus of any discussion of the ability of different categories of citizens to assert their own interests in their society. But there is a danger connected to an overly one-sided perspective on the relationship between resources and power. The core of the resource concept has to do with material assets. But an individual's position in society is not determined merely by such factors as occupation, educational level, income, membership in organizations and frequency of social contacts.

Modern sociology has focused attention on the fact that non-material circumstances may also contribute to the structure of society. In European social research, Pierre Bourdieu of France has been particularly prominent because of his series of theoretical works and empirical studies seeking to describe the role of culture in social life.²⁴ The concept of culture is

24. An introduction to Bourdieu's sociology is provided in Donald Broady, ed., *Kultur och utbildning (Culture and Education)*, National Board of Universities and Colleges, FOU 1985:4.

used here in a broader sense than "highbrow culture." Culture has to do with taste -- a way of orienting oneself in society. Culture brings people together, but also separates them from other groups. Culture is relational, separational and distinguishing.²⁵ The possession of "cultural capital" can serve as an important power base.

A closely related concept in contemporary sociology is lifestyle. It is possible to single out various personality types, not only in an individual psychological respect, but also in social terms. Different people have different fundamental values -- varied ways of relating to society. Various kinds of values are connected with various kinds of societies. In Sweden, sociologist Hans Zetterberg has played a leading role in developing theories and instruments for measuring such lifestyles. One proposed classification distinguishes three different types of people. Subsistence people, who are governed by values related to earning their livelihood, are connected with an agrarian society. Outer-directed people are related to industrial society. Inner-directed people are the human type associated with the affluent welfare state.²⁶

The aspect of the cultural concept that we will examine here concerns people's leisure-time interests. These are activities related neither to gainful employment nor to the obligations and involvements of public life. Different people like to do different things in their free time. The question is whether these leisure pursuits say anything more -- whether they have any broader social, or even political, importance. It is possible to

25. Ibid., p.18.

26. Hans L. Zetterberg et al, *Det osynliga kontraktet. En studie i 80-talets arbetsliv* (The Invisible Contract. A Study of Worklife in the 1980s), Swedish Institute of Public Opinion Research, Stockholm, 1983, pp. 37 ff.

view different leisure activities as expressions of a kind of membership, not in any formal organization or institution, but in a more indefinite kind of group, a cultural community. In that case, it should be possible to distinguish various separate cultures or cultural "spheres" in society.

It is extremely difficult to measure taste and cultural expressions while fulfilling demands for systematic reliability and exactitude. Obviously, culture can assume forms that are extremely subtle and hard to record. It is therefore no coincidence that studies of cultural sociology have often ended up using anthropological and ethnological methods. Trying to capture different trends related to taste and lifestyle in a mass survey, using questions structured in advance, necessarily requires simplifications and limitations. The measurements we will be presenting here make no claim to exhausting the subject or even capturing the most crucial cultural differences. But even a number of simple questions on people's leisure-time habits can throw some light on the problems raised here. The series of interview questions employed here have, moreover, been included in earlier surveys: the studies of living standards initiated by the Commission of Inquiry on Low Incomes.²⁷ The questions and a breakdown of the replies can be seen in Table 7.6.

Of the various leisure activities included in this series of questions, the great majority are applicable to at least half the population. Only a few activities -- bingo, hunting and musical instruments -- attract fewer than one third of the population.

27. See Michael Tåhlin, "Fritid och rekreation" ("Leisure and Recreation"), in Robert Erikson & Rune Åberg, eds., *Välfärd i förändring* (Welfare in Transition), Prisma, Stockholm, 1984, pp. 321 ff.

Table 7.6 Leisure activities, 1968-1987

	Sometimes (%)				Often (%)			
	68	74	81	87	68	74	81	87
Reading books	72	77	78	84	31	37	44	48
Taking excursions by car	71	72	68	78	28	24	17	24
Going to restuarants	36	49	55	77	3	5	6	12
Hobby activities	59	62	62	72	35	39	41	44
Gardening	49	56	62	72	25	33	36	43
Reading popular weekly magazines	73	74	69	72	32	34	29	29
Walking around on the streets and in shops	40	49	52	72	9	12	12	22
Going to the theater, concerts, museums, exhibitions	40	45	49	69	6	6	6	12
Going to a movie	42	41	45	62	6	5	6	11
Going dancing	32	42	45	59	8	9	9	15
Fishing	36	39	40	50	10	12	11	12
Sports	26	30	34	49	13	15	20	29
Study circles and courses	19	27	32	42	7	12	12	14
Playing a musical instrument	14	15	16	21	5	6	7	9
Hunting	7	7	8	10	3	3	3	4
Bingo	--	8	5	7	--	1	1	1

The figures for 1968-1981 are taken from three living standards surveys; see also Chapter 10. For the sake of comparison, this table only includes people aged 16-76. The question about bingo was not included in the 1968 survey.

The patterns of change that could be observed in the early 1980s have continued.²⁸ The general activity level of citizens is rising. None of the leisure activities surveyed has significantly fewer practitioners today than twenty years ago. On the other hand, there are many examples of activities that attract far more people today than a few decades ago.

28. Tåhlin, pp. 323-324.

There is a clear increase in book reading, as well as in restaurant visits, gardening, strolling on the streets and around shops, cultural life, study circles and sports.

But in this context, the patterns of association are just as interesting as the actual reply figures. Certain leisure-time interests go together, in the sense that it is largely the same people who are active in them. The various forms of leisure activities can be reduced to a smaller number of dimensions. The following grouping is based on Michael Tåhlin's analysis of the 1968-1981 data and on a dimensional analysis of the 1987 data.²⁹

The first dimension has as its common denominator an active, urban range of entertainment, or "night life." Movies, eating out at restaurants and going dancing fit together in this way. Younger people are the most active group in this respect, of course.

The second dimension is sports. There are obviously many people who are both active in playing sports and enjoy an active range of entertainment. It is of some interest, however, to distinguish sports analytically as a separate dimension. Sports are Sweden's largest popular movement. The question is: In what way do sports activities go together with other forms of citizen involvement?

The third dimension consists of hunting and fishing. The world of gunshots and reels is primarily one of men and rural areas.

Dimension number four deals with culture. High scores in this dimension went to people who answered that they often go to the

29. Tåhlin, pp. 326 ff. A principal component analysis of the 16 leisure variables in 1987 resulted in five dimensions. For a corresponding analysis of the 1968 living standards survey, see Robert Allen Karasek, "Patterns of Leisure," manuscript, Institute of Social Research, University of Stockholm, 1975.

theater, concerts, museums and exhibitions, read books, play a musical instrument and participate in study circles and courses. The most important background factor is educational level. Highly educated people and white collar employees are still more active in cultural contexts than blue collar workers; women are somewhat more active than men.

The fifth dimension is characterized by gardening, excursions by car and hobby activities such as knitting, sewing, carpentry, painting and collecting stamps. This home life dimension is more common among older people and in rural areas.

A sixth dimension, finally, deals with the amusements provided by mass culture. Two examples of this form of activity are bingo and reading popular weekly magazines. Those who are active in this respect include, not least, women with little education.

These social determinations should obviously be regarded as general tendencies and generalizations, based on averages. In no case is there a complete statistical association between social position and leisure-time culture. There are numerous exceptions from the general tendencies.

Now, the interesting thing is to determine in what respects there is an association between leisure-time culture and citizenship. Leisure involvements reflect how people have chosen to realize their own lives. This has led to the formation of a number of separate cultures, spheres or arenas of social membership. The dimensions of citizenship are an expression of institutionalized opportunities to influence one's own life situation and the future of society. How does leisure-time culture relate to citizenship? Table 7.7 shows the strongest statistical associations.

Those aspects of citizenship that have to do with personal initiatives, political communication and political participation have a consistently strong association with cultural life and educational activities. The politically most active stratum overlaps to a considerable degree with book readers and theater-goers. Political life is largely sustained by the educated middle class.

Those who enjoy urban night life ("entertainment") and who are active in sports -- mainly young people -- are not a political passive or apathetic group at all. They have high administrative competence and they actively try to influence their conditions. They express their political involvement primarily in the form of manifestations, protests and direct appeals. On the other hand, they lack a deep feeling of solidarity with Sweden's established parties and organized movements.

The homebodies -- those who devote their leisure to the garden, the car and their hobby -- are not among those who are most active at meetings and collecting petitions. But they are by no means uninvolved. They are interested in politics, belong to voluntary organizations, feel a strong affinity with organized movements and are eager to take advantage of their voting rights. There is a statistically significant association between gardening and voter turnout. Homebodies do not feel powerless. On the contrary, their assessment of their chances of influencing their situation is above average. What pulls up the mean figure is their positive assessment of their chances of influencing their housing situation.

For the same reasons, outdoor people also make a favorable assessment of their chances of influence. Hunters and anglers are relatively active in voluntary organizations and feel a strong affinity with their political party.

Table 7.7 Leisure cultures and citizenship

	Association_ (r)
Had taken initiative to exercise influence	
Cultural life	0.22
Entertainment	0.15
Assessment of chance to exercise influence	
Home life	0.15
Cultural life	0.10
Hunting and fishing	0.07
Administrative competence	
Cultural life	0.26
Sports	0.18
Entertainment	0.17
Amusement	-0.13
Political participation: contacts	
Cultural life	0.34
Sports	0.18
Entertainment	0.14
Amusement	-0.10
Political participation: party activities	
Cultural life	0.14
Political participation: manifestations	
Cultural life	0.38
Entertainment	0.16
Sports	0.16
Political participation: protests	
Entertainment	0.11
Cultural life	0.11
Political participation: voting	
Cultural life	0.08
Home life	0.08
Interest in politics	
Cultural life	0.26
Sports	0.10
Amusement	-0.09

Party identification	
Home life	0.08
Entertainment	-0.09
Membership in voluntary organizations	
Cultural life	0.34
Home life	0.18
Sports	0.18
Hunting and fishing	0.08
Entertainment	0.08
Amusement	-0.09
Affinity with organized movements	
Home life	0.22
Cultural life	0.17
Entertainment	-0.15

It is very natural for most of these statistical associations to be positive; involvement in leisure activities goes together with involvement in citizenship-related activities. But there are also examples of negative correlations. This applies particularly to the amusement dimension, the one exemplified primarily by popular weekly magazines and bingo. Those who are most active in this dimension are below average in terms of administrative competence, interest in politics, political participation and involvement in voluntary organizations. They feel more powerless than do citizens in general. The type of mass culture in question here goes together with political apathy and impotence.

Political Parties

It would be incomplete to present the group-based factors that are of importance to the realization of citizenship without

mentioning political parties. In a representative democracy, parties assume a key role. Parties present alternative political choices. In reality, party organizations nominate the people who will occupy positions of political trust. The task of political parties is to read public opinion and influence it at the same time. After local elections came under the influence of the political parties following the postwar consolidation of Sweden's municipal districts, the parties have had important tasks to fulfill at central, regional and local government levels.

It is not our intention to examine the sociology of political parties in detail. The social foundations of the parties and their role in election campaigns have already been examined in a series of modern voter surveys.³⁰ Here the party system will be viewed from a somewhat different perspective -- as a possible source of cultural differences that are of importance to the realization of citizenship. The population can be divided up into a number of groups, based on their political party sympathies. The question is: To what extent do the various party groups form distinct cultures, and to what extent are there different types of lifestyles among the supporters of various parties?

The data on political parties refers not to the respondent's choice of party, but to his party sympathy. In connection with the questions about party identification -- the ones asking to what extent the respondent considered himself a supporter of any particular party -- we also asked which party he considered best. People who did not say they were closer to any of the parties

30. For the latest of these political science surveys of the electorate, see Sören Holmberg & Mikael Gilljam, *Väljare och val i Sverige* (Voters and Elections in Sweden), Bonniers, Stockholm, 1987.


were asked whether there was nevertheless any party they thought was "less bad" than the others. In all, 77 percent of respondents expressed a party sympathy. The remaining 23 percent did not wish to answer the question, said they had no firm opinion or stated that they did not sympathize with any party. The following analyses are therefore based on just over three fourths of the survey sample.

One way of examining to what extent there are separate subcultures among party supporters is to study the statistical association between leisure-time culture and party sympathy. Figure 7.10 sketches the party profiles of each of the six dimensions of leisure-time pursuits. Positive figures (to the right in the diagram) indicate above-average activities in the dimension in question. Negative figures signify below-average levels of activity.

Supporters of the Left Party Communists (vpk) are mainly characterized by high figures in the cultural, entertainment and sports dimensions. The social and cultural activities characteristic of urban life are strongly represented here. Home life activities, in contrast, are less often represented among vpk supporters.

Social Democratic sympathizers (s) are consistently characterized by only minor deviations from the mean for the entire population. This is, of course, partly an effect of size; for natural reasons, a large party cannot have such extreme deviations as a small one. There are, nevertheless, certain special features. The two parties that make up Sweden's "socialist bloc" -- vpk and s -- have completely different cultural profiles. A positive figure for vpk is accompanied, without exception, by a negative figure for the Social Democrats, and vice versa. The Social Democrats have lower figures for the entertainment and cultural life dimensions, higher ones for home life. Outdoor life and amusement also occur proportionally more often among Social Democratic supporters.

These data provide no basis for drawing the conclusion that Sweden has a single, unified working class culture. Looking at people's leisure activities, at least three spheres exist: home life including gardening and cars, outdoor life including hunting and fishing, and the world of bingo and popular weekly magazines.



Figur 7.10 Partisympati och fritidskultur

Entertainment
 Sports
 Hunting and fishing
 Culture
 Home life
 Entertainment

Figure 7.10 Party sympathy and leisure culture

vpk = Left Party Communists (formerly Communists),
 s = Social Democrats, c = Center (formerly
 Agrarians), fp = Liberals, m = Moderates (formerly
 Conservatives), kds = Christian Democrats, mp = Ecology Party
 ("Greens").

The rural roots of many Center Party voters (c) are visible from the high figures for the outdoor activities dimension and the accompanying low numbers for urban night life.

In some respects, the Liberals (fp) have more in common with vpk than with the Social Democrats; this is true of sports, entertainment and cultural life, as well as their low figures for outdoor life.

The big city orientation of the Moderates (m) is clear from their positive figures in the entertainment dimension. But Moderate Party supporters do not have extreme figures in any of the six cultural dimensions. There are no major deviations, either upward or downward. In this respect, the Moderates are indeed moderate.

Supporters of the Christian Democratic Party (kds), in contrast, have a number of distinguishing features. Kds supporters are culturally very active. Kds also has some strong negative figures. Those wishing to meet kds supporters should apparently avoid restaurants, hunting chalets and bingo parlors.

The leisure activities of the Greens (mp) most closely resemble those of vpk supporters and Liberals (fp).

As we have already hinted several times, these cultural peculiarities are a reflection of the fact that the voter bases of the political parties have different social compositions. Differences related to education, occupation, age and geography make themselves felt. But adjusting for such factors as educational level and occupation does not result in the complete elimination of these distinctive features. Although differences can be partly attributed to factors connected with population structure, our original observation remains as an important sociological fact. The distinctions between the parties not only have a political and social aspect, but are also related to cultural differences.

These general impressions of similarities and dissimilarities between the parties in cultural terms can be formulated more exactly. The interview contained a total of twenty questions about leisure interests. On the basis of their sympathizers' average replies, each party can be assigned a numerical value for each of these twenty questions. These replies can then be used as the basis for comparisons between pairs of parties. A high statistical association means that the replies show agreement; the two parties are thus similar to each other. Comparable yardsticks of proximity can be calculated for each combination of two parties. The result will be a description of "proximity" and "distance" in the party system.³¹

31. Technically speaking, this calculation is carried out in four stages: 1. The replies to the twenty leisure-related questions are standardized (the difference from the mean figure is calculated and divided by the standard deviation) to create comparable measures (mean = 1 and standard deviation = 0). 2. The standard point value on each of the twenty questions is calculated for each party. This forms a new data matrix with the twenty questions as analytic units and the seven parties as variables. 3. A correlation matrix consisting of product-moment correlations is calculated; the matrix shows the correlations between pairs of parties. 4. A principal component analysis is conducted to determine the number of dimensions (Kaiser's criterion) and to calculate each party's index value for each respective dimension. Another method for determining dimensions has also been tried: cluster analysis. The results are essentially the same. The technique of using a matrix of measurements of similarities and dissimilarities between parties to draw conclusions about proximity, distance and dimensionality in the party system was used for the first time in Sweden by Bo Särilvik: "Partibyten som mått på avstånd och dimensioner i partisystemet" ("Changes of Party as Yardsticks of Distance and Dimensions in the Party System"), *Sociologisk forskning*, 1968:1, pp. 35-80.

Measurements of the degree of similarity between parties can theoretically vary between 1 (completely equal) and -1 (completely different). According to this calculation, the parties that are most similar to each other in terms of the leisure-time interests of their supporters are the Left Party Communists and the Greens, with a figure of 0.74. The greatest dissimilarity is found between sympathizers of the Social Democratic and Moderate parties (-0.87). The Social Democrats and Liberals are also very different in this respect (-0.76).

To this extent, our findings agree relatively well with generally accepted perceptions of the mutual distances between Swedish political parties. But there are also findings that hardly agree with conventional assumptions about a uniform left-right political spectrum. In that case, the two nonsocialist parties in the middle of the spectrum, the Center and Liberal parties, should have a relatively high positive correlation, but in fact their statistical association is negative (-0.67). The two parties in the socialist bloc, the Social Democrats and Left Party Communists, are also characterized by a large distance between them (-0.67). Table 7.8 provides a summary of the largest and smallest distances between parties.

One dimension does not suffice to represent these mutual distances graphically. A dimensional analysis that takes into account all comparisons between pairs of parties results in a diagram with two axes (Figure 7.11).

Four parties are relatively similar to each other (again, only with regard to the interest profiles of their supporters): the Liberals, Moderates, Left Party Communists and Greens. What brings these parties together, not least, is cultural activities and book reading by people with high educational levels.

Table 7.8 Distances between parties based on leisure interests of their supporters

Party	Closest to	Furthest from
Left Party Communists	Greens	Social Democrats
Social Democrats	Center Party	Moderate Party
Center Party	Social Democrats	Liberal Party
Liberal Party	Left Party Communists	Social Democrats
Moderate Party	Liberal Party	Social Democrats
Christian Democrats	Liberal Party	Social Democrats
Greens	Left Party Communists	Social Democrats

The Social Democrats and Center also turn out to have a relatively large area of shared interests. Gardening, car excursions and mass cultural amusements form a common denominator of these two parties.

The Christian Democratic Party has sufficiently many distinctive features that none of the other parties actually ends up particularly close to it. In this cultural diagram, kds assumes a relatively isolated position.


Parliamentary coalition patterns and clashes of opinion are determined by ideological proximity and common views on political issues. If the parties were instead grouped together on the basis of the cultural style and interest profiles of their supporters, the party constellations would look far different from those of today.

+ + +

As we have seen, the dimensions of citizenship have a statistical association with leisure-time cultures. Leisure-time cultures, in turn, are related to the party system. We can thus expect that there is a connection between party and citizenship. This also turns out to be the case (Figure 7.12).

Taking an initiative to try to influence one's own situation is most common in relative terms among the supporters of the Left Party Communists. Center Party supporters are below average in this respect.

But as we showed earlier, initiatives aimed at exercising influence are far from having a complete association with a person's assessment of his ability to influence others. This is also clear from a comparison between the first two diagrams. Supporters of the Left Party Communists are the group of voters that make the most negative assessment of their own chances of influence.




Figur 7.11 En tvådimensionell bild av partisystemet baserad på anhängarnas fritidskultur

Figure 7.11 A two-dimensional picture of the party system, based on the leisure-time culture of party supporters

Influence, measured by the respondents' own assessments, turns out to have a characteristic association with the left-right spectrum. Supporters of the Moderates feel they have the greatest power, followed by the middle parties (Center and Liberals), which in turn come out ahead of the Social Democrats, whose voters in turn have a more positive assessment of their own power than supporters of the Left Party Communists.

But Left Party Communist sympathizers by no means feel powerless in all respects. In terms of administrative competence -- the ability to assert their interests before public agencies -- vpk supporters have largely the same figures as the Liberals, Moderates and Greens; these are consequently parties with a large proportion of highly educated supporters.



Figur 7.12 Partisympati och medborgarskap

Initiatives
 Chance of influence
 Administrative competence
 Contacts
 Party activities
 Manifestations
 Protests
 Voting
 Interest in politics
 Party identification
 Membership in voluntary organizations
 Affinity with movements

Figure 7.12 Party sympathy and citizenship

When it comes to the five aspects of political participation, there is one common denominator: in all cases, vpk has above-average figures, in some cases (contacts, manifestations and protests) clearly above-average. Supporters of the Social Democratic Party are relatively often involved in party activities, manifestations and voting. The Center has about the same participation profile, because its supporters are active in party work and have a high voter turnout. Liberals, on the other hand, are less active in party-related work. But Liberal Party supporters are more involved in various forms of opinion-molding activities. The Moderates provide a partial contrast here. Their way of working only more rarely includes the type of participation described here under the label "manifestations."

Among the respondents who indicated a party sympathy, interest in politics is above average. (Those who are not included in this analysis, the people without party sympathies, are the ones with the negative figures, that is, a below-average interest in politics.) Once again, the Left Party Communists stand out as a special case; political interest among vpk sympathizers far exceeds the averages for the other parties. Party identification shows a different pattern, however. As many voter surveys have demonstrated, the Social Democrats and Center Party have the strongest party identification.

The political involvement of the Greens shows interesting variations. In some cases they have very high figures, for example in terms of manifestations and protests. But faced with those types of involvement that are typical of party politics (party activities, voting and party identification), supporters of the Greens are passive. In noting this, it is perhaps appropriate to point out that the survey was conducted before the Greens won their first parliamentary seats in the 1988 election.

There are also partial differences between political parties in terms of their involvement in voluntary organizations. Again, the Left Party Communists are the most active, followed by the Liberals and Greens. The lowest number of memberships in Sweden's grassroots organizations per person is found among Social Democrats.

Behind this average number of memberships, however, sizable variations are concealed. Party supporters differ in a number of respects in terms of which organizations they belong to (Table 7.9). At the citizen level, there is a statistical association between the party system and the organizational system.

Table 7.9 Party sympathy and membership in voluntary organizations

Type_of_organization	Party						
	vpk	s	c	fp	m	kds	mp
Sports club	35	35	26	46	44	6	39
Outdoor activities club	12	8	12	17	15	0	18
Environmental organization	19	4	9	10	9	0	31
Cultural club	23	14	17	24	19	6	28
Hobby club	4	13	16	17	15	12	17
Automobile organization etc.	7	11	9	14	22	12	10
Residents' club	46	31	17	37	26	24	20
Parents' club	14	9	9	14	11	18	12
Club for disabled people or medical patients	5	4	4	4	4	0	7
Immigrant organization	7	2	1	0	0	0	1
Women's organization	4	3	4	0	1	0	3
Retired people's organization (% of retired people)	--	47	33	43	30	--	--
Investment club	4	4	5	10	14	0	1
Group within Church of Sweden	2	3	10	2	2	18	4

Other Protestant denomination	0	3	8	7	3	82	7
Other religious denomination	0	1	4	2	1	0	1
Humanitarian aid organization	7	7	20	11	12	12	13
Temperance organization	5	4	4	3	1	18	2
Voluntary defense organization	2	5	6	5	7	0	3
Peace organization	12	3	1	2	0	0	3
Local political action group	0	1	4	1	2	0	6
Group for international issue	11	3	1	3	1	0	4
Lodge or similar society	0	1	0	7	10	0	2
Consumer co-op	51	44	36	28	22	53	33
Other cooperative organization	18	11	18	12	12	12	13
Trade union (% of employees)	95	90	84	72	67	--	72
Farmers' organization	0	1	26	4	6	0	3
Business or employers' organization	4	1	5	4	8	0	6
Other professional organization	5	2	6	11	11	0	4
-- Too few respondents							

The percentage of members of residents' clubs is proportionately largest among members of the Left Party Communists. Membership in immigrant organizations, peace organizations and organizations for international issues is also relatively most common among vpk supporters.

The type of organization where Center Party supporters represent the largest proportion of members is farmers' organizations. The Center also has a high percentage of members in women's organizations (for example, in housewives' associations) and in humanitarian aid organizations such as the Red Cross.

There is one type of organization in particular where Social Democratic sympathizers represent a higher percentage of members than all other parties: retired people's organizations.³²

The types of organizations where Moderate Party supporters are distinguished by a high level of membership are automobile organizations, investment clubs, voluntary defense organizations and lodges.

The Moderates and Liberals are also characterized by a relatively large proportion of members in professional organizations for the "liberal professions." The Moderates and Liberals are also the two parties with the largest proportion of members in sports clubs.

The Christian Democrats are characterized mainly by their large proportion of members in Protestant denominations outside the Church of Sweden. Kds supporters also have a comparatively high level of membership in parents' associations and temperance organizations.

32. On this point, the analysis only includes retired people. (This makes the base figure for the smaller parties too small to be used for a statistical count.) One might ask how well this finding agrees with what was stated earlier in this chapter: the percentage of retired people who belong to retirees' organizations is higher in the middle class than in the working class (based on occupation during a person's period of gainful employment). Now it turns out that the percentage of members in pensioners' organizations is largest among supporters of the Social Democrats. These two findings are reconcilable, however, because a more detailed analysis reveals that the percentage of members is higher among Social Democrats in the middle class than among Social Democrats in the working class. The class factor has an impact even within the party.

The membership profile of the Greens is characterized mainly by environmentalist organizations and local political action groups.

The level of trade union membership (among employees) varies clearly between political parties. It is strongest at the left end of the political spectrum, weakest at the right end. More detailed analysis reveals that the level of union membership is highest among socialist (i.e. Social Democratic or Left Party Communist) white collar employees -- 92 percent -- and lowest among nonsocialist blue collar workers (67 percent).³³ There is also a statistical association between organizational membership and party sympathy when it comes to consumer co-ops.

Membership in trade unions and consumer co-ops such as Konsum is higher among vpk supporters than among Social Democrats. There is only one type of organization -- retired people's organizations -- where the Social Democrats have the highest percentage of members.

But the feeling of affinity with Sweden's organized movements is nevertheless relatively large among Social Democratic supporters. Among the five parties represented in Parliament at the time of the survey (vpk, s, c, fp and m), there is a statistical association here with the left-right spectrum. Affinity with Sweden's voluntary organizations is highest at the left end, lowest among the Moderates.

This pattern thus forms a mirror image of the association that was noted when it came to people's assessment of their own chance to exercise influence. The group that feels it has little influence is also the one most favorably disposed toward the country's organized movements. Conversely, those who have great influence, according to their own perception, are fairly cool toward organized groups.

33. As in the table, these figures are based on employees.

8. Legitimacy and Self-Perception

An ideal democratic society rests on the consent of its citizens. The exercise of power occurs under public scrutiny and according to legal and controlled mechanisms. Citizens are protected by fundamental freedoms and rights. The rulers remain in power as long as they have the confidence of the ruled. A majority may become a minority and vice versa. Changes of power are a normal phenomenon.

On the other hand, the majority principle does not require that all citizens concur with all decisions at every point in time. In practice, a unanimity requirement means that a single person can oppose the will of everyone else; the majority principle may be regarded as a way of reconciling demands for freedom and equality.¹ Democracy does not presuppose that everyone is satisfied. Dissatisfaction and demands for change are the dynamic element of society.

There must, however, be a way to change society. To the extent that citizens feel their wishes have no chance of being turned into collective decisions, one important prerequisite for viewing a society as democratic is missing. An organization is democratic to the extent that it is autonomous; its members live under rules that are set by themselves, not by any other outside body.

One central question, consequently, is how citizens perceive their society, especially its political institutions. Do they believe there is a gap between the ideals of democracy and the realities of the prevailing society? How do Swedes today view the relationship between the institutions of their society and citizens in general (themselves in particular)?

1. Jan-Magnus Jansson, *Frihet och jämlikhet. En studie över den politiska demokratin (Freedom and Equality. A Study of Political Democracy)*, Söderströms, Helsinki, 1952.

These questions all revolve around the concept of legitimacy. They concern the nature of consent. On what premises are a society's institutions and leaders accepted? Is their exercise of power considered fair? Do the rulers enjoy the confidence of the ruled? Legitimacy has to do with subjective factors and with how citizens perceive their society. It is closely tied to the way a person views the relationship between citizen and society, what he thinks about the nature of citizenship and about his own role as a citizen in society.

Civic virtues

What distinguishes a good citizen? This book has been full of open or implicit references to a kind of ideal citizen. From the body of doctrines surrounding democratic theory, one can deduce a long list of traits considered appropriate to a democratic personality type. Commonly mentioned among the qualities of this democratic type of citizen are tolerance, knowledge, openness, activity and social spirit.

Democratic theory is thus one conceivable source of the elements required to draw a portrait of a democratic person. Another source is the citizens themselves. The citizenship survey included a number of questions aimed at finding out what traits should be regarded as important in order to be a good citizen. A number of such traits were listed, and respondents were asked to state how important they considered each of them. Their answers could range from 0 ("not at all important") to 10 ("very important"). The wording of the questions and the average responses can be seen in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1 Citizens' perceptions of what distinguishes a good citizen

	Average (1-10)
Forming one's own opinion independently of others	9.1
Voting in public elections	8.7
Staying informed of what is happening in society	8.5
Always obeying laws and regulations	8.2
Never trying to evade taxes	8.1
Showing solidarity with people who are worse off than oneself	8.1
Being ready to break a law when one's conscience demands	5.8
Being active in organizations	5.2

The trait that receives the highest rating is forming one's own opinion independently of others. The great majority also consider voting and staying informed very important civic virtues. The two traits that end up last, with a relative large proportion of respondents not according them very great importance, are being active in organizations and being ready to break a law when one's conscience demands.

Most of the traits of citizenship listed thus received generally favorable ratings. But the consensus was by no means total. There were dissenting votes even on the trait that respondents considered the most important. There is some degree of individual variation when it comes to assessing civic virtues. Moreover, these variations form a clear pattern. A dimensional analysis reveals that respondents' answers can be represented not by one, but two different dimensions (Table 8.2).

Table 8.2 The dimensions of civic virtues

	Dimension	
	1	2
Dimension 1: Obeying rules		
Always obeying laws and regulations	83	19
Never trying to evade taxes	78	25
Being ready to break a law when one's conscience demands	-59	37
Dimension 2: Creating rules		
Staying informed of what is happening in society	03	72
Forming one's own opinion independently of others	-10	57
Being active in organizations	17	54
Voting in public elections	22	54
Showing solidarity with people who are worse off than oneself	37	42

All loadings have been multiplied by 100.

The first dimension concerns those aspects of citizenship that deal with obeying rules. Those who score high in this dimension are people who consider it important to obey laws and not to try to evade taxes, and who disagree with those who feel that a citizen should be able to follow his conscience to the extent that he may violate the law. It is worth pointing out that civil disobedience -- allowing one's conscience to justify even a

violation of the law -- has a negative statistical association with the first dimension. The reply patterns should be interpreted as meaning that civil disobedience is not regarded here as a positive value in itself. The common denominator of the first dimension is obedience to the law. The highest priority among the respondents whose opinion is reflected here is obeying the existing rules, even at the price of going against one's own conscience.

The second dimension is mainly characterized by such traits as staying informed, forming one's own opinion, being active in organizations and voting. The common denominator of these aspects of citizen is that they are related to creating rules, personally participating and being active, in order to influence society.

These two dimensions bear a remarkable resemblance to the two components that are singled out in the literature on the principles of democratic citizenship. Democracy, viewed as autonomy, entails a form of self-commitment. Democracy does not entail the absence of rules and compulsion. On the contrary, a state and a legal system are necessary but insufficient prerequisites for democracy. What characterizes democracy is that these rules are set by the citizens themselves. Citizenship in a democracy thus combines two different elements: participation to create rules and willingness to obey these rules.² In their

2. Cf. Hans Kelsen, *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, Julius Springer, Berlin, 1925, pp. 325-6. One West German legal scholar has put it in the following way: "In a democratic state the right to react stands against the legal obligation to obey, or viewed from the other side, voting rights and liberties stand against the obligation to be bound by these rights." Wilhelm Henke, "Demokratie als Rechtsbegriff," *Der Staat*, 25, 1986, p. 159.

famous study of the attitudes of citizens in various countries, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba state that the climate of opinion most favorable to democracy is shaped by several different components, including both "participant" and "subject": "The democratic citizen is called upon to pursue contradictory goals: he must be active, yet passive; involved, yet not too involved; influential, yet deferential."³

The relationship between democratic principles and the need to obey rules is complex and controversial. The debate is not made easier by the fact that the language is ambiguous. Someone who calls attention to rules is considered a "formalist." According to the dictionary, "formal" means something "that fulfills certain requirements as to external form which are not necessarily objectively important."

Common usage thereby mixes two things together. On the one hand, formal means obeying rules (formal as opposed to material). On the other hand, formal signifies being meaningless (formal as opposed to real).

The fact that "formalist" sounds derogatory implies that the whole concept of legal principles is considered something suspect and concerned with external, ceremonial and unessential matters. It is as if breaking rules were morally superior to obeying them. The rule-breaker is a hero.

So is breaking rules never justifiable? There are two interesting situations. One is related to the law of emergencies: how to act in extreme and exceptional situations that could not have been foreseen by legislators. The other is related to civil

3. Gabriel A. Almond & Sidney Veerba, *The Civic Culture*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1963, pp. 343-4.

disobedience. In certain situations, a citizen may be entitled to refuse to obey laws. The limits of this right of opposition were the topic of lively debate, for example, during the American civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s and the West German peace movement of the 1970s and 1980s.⁴ There is general consensus that civil disobedience is a moral and political safety valve, a way for a minority to protect itself against a majority's suppression of human liberties and rights. Civil disobedience requires taking a personal, moral position and is an appeal to social conscience.

In a democratic society, the law of emergencies and civil disobedience are methods reserved for exceptional situations. The right of civil opposition does not imply that breaking a law is justified merely because one disapproves of it or finds it inconvenient. No one is Mahatma Gandhi just because he drives 140 kilometers an hour when he thinks the police are not watching him.

One fundamental feature of a society based on laws is that there is a distinction between legislation and law enforcement. In this respect, there is a separation of powers. Legislation has its own procedures and institutions: opinion-molding, political conflict, parties, elections and parliament. Law enforcement is pursued under other premises: legal rights, objectivity, impartiality and judicial professionalism. Those who disapprove of a legal rule may work toward changing it, but are obliged to obey it as long as it is in effect.

4. For a collection of essays from the Norwegian debate, see Bernt Hagtvet, ed. *Den vanskelige ulydigheten* (The Problem of Civil Disobedience), Pax, Oslo, 1981.

These two aspects of government by laws are also reflected in how the citizens themselves view the meaning of citizenship. The two dimensions can be illustrated with the aid of a diagram (Figure 8.1).


The combination of traits singled out by the theoreticians of democracy are found in the upper right-hand portion of the field. The term chosen here is "solidarity." This label encompasses the perception that it is essential both to create and to obey rules.

The far upper left-hand corner of the figure represents the combination of views that places a high value on obeying rules, but accords less importance to participation. The label "loyalty" signifies this passive adaptability.

The lower right-hand portion illustrates the opposite combination of traits: here the emphasis is on creating but not obeying rules. The term "activism" signifies the active element: being able to influence, without having to accept the status quo.

The fourth combination has low scores on both aspects of citizenship. Here it is essential neither to participate in creating rules nor follow them. It therefore represents a kind of anticollectivism and skepticism toward both aspects of mutual, collective action which are traditionally considered important in the debate on democratic ideology.

The four combinations distinguished in this way are extreme types: the outer poles in a chart of principles. In reality, these perceptions are only rarely found in such pure form. But differences of degree and individual variations nevertheless occur. With the aid of the responses to the interview



Figur 8.1 Demokratins medborgardygder: att skapa regler och att följa regler





Figure 8.1 The civic virtues of democracy: creating rules and obeying rules.

questions presented earlier, each person can be assigned a score based on his position on each of the two dimensions.⁵ Different sub-groups can then be characterized on the basis of the average scores of the individuals belonging to them. Figure 8.2 illustrates the positions of various population categories on the two-dimensional map.

None of the categories examined is located at the far upper left-hand corner. The "loyalty" combination -- following rules but not personally taking part in their creation -- is relatively unusual. The group that comes the closest is people with little education. The main category found at the top of the chart -- people who assign a high value to following existing laws and rules -- is older people. Somewhat further down, with positive scores on both dimensions, are women, along with supporters of the Center Party, Social Democrats and Christian Democrats. These are the groups that end up being closest to the upper right-hand corner, the "solidarity" combination that emphasizes both creating and obeying rules.

5. These consist of standardized factor points, based on the principal component analysis presented above.



Figur 8.2 Medborgardygder: några befolkningsgruppers uppfattningar




Figure 8.2 Civic virtues: perceptions among certain population groups

The lower right-hand corner -- the "activism" combination -- is represented primarily by supporters of the Left Party Communists; Liberal Party sympathizers also end up in this portion of the diagram. The emphasis is on being active and involved, rather than on obeying the existing rules.

The fourth combination -- low scores on both dimensions -- characterizes young people and supporters of the Moderate Party and Greens. Their attitude can be described as a form of anti-collectivism. The Moderates are the party whose sympathizers score lowest on questions related to solidarity with people who are worse off than oneself, never trying to evade taxes and being active in organizations. The three parties that score lowest on the question about always obeying laws and regulations are the Greens, Left Party Communists and Moderates. Sympathizers of the Greens also accord less emphasis than others on the importance of voting in general elections.

The expression "dimensions of citizenship" has now been used in two different senses in this book. In earlier chapters, it referred to various types of citizen involvement: initiatives aimed at exercising influence, assessments of one's chance of influence, public and political activities, feelings of affinity etc. This chapter has used the expression in the sense of "aspects of an ideal citizen." As it now turns out, there is a statistical association between citizenship in the former sense and this chapter's assessment of what constitutes a good citizen. Table 8.3 shows the most important associations.

Table 8.3 Citizenship and perception of civic virtues

	Association (r) with	
	Dimension 1 Obeying rules	Dimension 2 Creating rules
Initiatives aimed at exercising influence	-0.16	0.09
Administrative competence	-0.19	0.15
Political participation: contacts	-0.15	0.23
Political participation: manifestations	-0.16	0.19
Interest in politics	-0,08	0.32
Membership in organizations	-0,07	0.21
Political participation: voting	0.07	0.26
Party identification	0.08	0.24
Affinity_with_movements	0.12	0.31

These associations have one consistent feature. The second dimension -- perceiving participation and involvement as a general civic virtue -- is strongly related to whether the respondent himself is active in various contexts. This mutually causal correlation is difficult to study, and in this context it is not the essential point either. Regardless of whether a respondent's opinion of civic virtues is a cause or an effect of his own involvement, it suffices here to state that there is a mutual association between his basis of evaluation and his own actions.

In contrast, the first dimension -- obeying rules -- shows no clear association. There is a negative correlation with aspects of citizen involvement that are expressed in actions that require a larger measure of personal initiatives and communicative competence. On the other hand, there is a positive association with three types of citizen involvement: participation in elections, party identification and affinity with organized movements. This means that those who reject obedience to rules as a general element of citizenship show lower participation in elections, weaker party identification and weaker affinity with major organized movements.

Returning to the diagram in Figure 8.1: Active and involved citizens are found on the right side of the map (high scores in the dimension that measures participation). This side includes both those who are "upwardly" and "downwardly" involved; both those who believe in "solidarity" and those who are "activists" find outlets for their involvement, albeit in very different forms of participation. Citizenship is not a uniform concept, either in actual behavior or in the citizens' own ideal image.

The association between party affinity and approach toward citizenship is demonstrated in greater detail in Table 8.4. It shows the average replies to the eight questions by supporters of each political party.

Table 8.4 Party sympathy and perception of civic virtues

	Left Party Communists	Social Democrats	Center Party	Liberal Party	Moderate Party	Christian Democrats	Greens
Showing solidarity with people worse off than oneself	9.1	8.5	8.1	7.7	6.9	9.2	8.4
Voting in public elections	9.0	9.1	9.0	8.8	8.9	8.9	7.8
Never trying to evade taxes	7.9	8.6	8.6	8.0	7.2	9.5	7.1
Forming one's own opinion independently of others	9.4	9.1	8.8	9.3	9.3	9.2	9.5
Always obeying laws and regulations	7.4	8.5	8.6	7.8	7.5	9.3	7.3
Being active in organizations	5.9	5.6	5.9	5.1	4.5	6.0	5.1
Staying informed of what is happening in society	8.4	8.6	8.2	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.5
Being ready to break a law when one's conscience demands	7.4	5.5	5.5	6.2	6.0	6.9	6.9

The Confidence Gap

Modern democracy assumes the form of large, anonymous, abstract institutions. Today's interest organizations and political parties are centralized mechanisms that in practice are run by

full-time professional officials. As the Swedish public sector has expanded, public administration has swelled out into a gigantic, amorphous organization with a million and a half employees. The legal system has to enforce an enormous quantity of laws and ordinances; every year hundreds of thousands of cases are decided in the regular and administrative courts.

How does this huge machinery work? And not least, how do citizens believe that the system works? The noble concept is still that ultimately, the public sector stands in the service of the citizenry, representing their desire to organize their own society in the best way. "All public power emanates from the people," as it says at the beginning of the Constitution.

Obviously there is a wide gap between ideal and reality. Throughout the Western world, various surveys in recent decades have shown that citizens have become less confident in established institutions. Political parties, in particular, have received such attention. Swedish data, too, point to a clear increase in distrust over a period of years. The latest available election study characterizes the increase as "dramatic": "Today the Swedes are clearly more skeptical towards politicians than 15-20 years ago."⁶

The question is whether there are parallels between the citizens' distrust of parties and politicians and their attitudes toward other parts of society. Government by laws is an absolutely crucial prerequisite for the functioning of democracy. According to the Constitution, public power "shall be exercised under the laws." Citizens are protected from the public sector by a number of expressly enumerated freedoms and rights. To what extent does the public now believe that the principles of government by laws are actually practiced in Sweden?

6. Sören Holmberg & Mikael Giljam, *Väljare och val i Sverige*, Bonniers, Stockholm, 1987, p. 237.

The questions presented in Table 8.5 are intended to cover some central aspects of a society governed by laws. First, they address the demand for objectivity and equal treatment. Two possible cases of discrimination are mentioned: one based on sex, another on social position. The question of whether women are treated less favorably than men was broadly worded; here it does not refer only to public agencies. The reason is that sexual discrimination is prohibited both in the public and private sector. The question about special treatment based on social position was limited to the courts, however. The issue here is whether the respondent feels that people with a high educational level and good income receive better treatment than others.

Another aspect of government by laws is freedom of information, usually referred to in Sweden as the "principle of publicity." This principle, established more than two centuries ago, is of fundamental importance to the Swedish public administration system. The right of everyone to examine public documents is a prerequisite for both freedom of the press and, more generally, public scrutiny and monitoring of public sector operations. The interview question attempts to elicit what citizens think about the actual implementation of the principle of publicity, and whether they believe that public agencies conceal important information that the public should really find out about.

Government by laws places special demands on the people who perform the tasks of public agencies. Civil servants are supposed to be impartial and not allow themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations. One flagrant violation of this principle is the existence of corruption and bribery. One interview question simply asks to what extent citizens believe that bribes occur in the Swedish civil service.

It is debatable whether the call for efficient public administration belongs under the heading "government by laws." Strictly speaking, these are two different things; for example, the work of public agencies has actually been portrayed as a conflict between occasionally irreconcilable demands for efficiency and legal protection.⁷ But it is a fact that in contemporary administrative policy, these two concepts have been linked together. At the time as a new public administration act was being passed, the Social Democratic minister of justice felt it was possible to speak of a "broader" or "deeper" concept of legal protection, which also includes service and efficiency. Public agencies must "also provide quick, simple and clear information and offer the individual a helping hand."⁸

One additional aspect of government by laws is civil freedoms and rights. No public agency has the right to overstep established boundaries around people's private lives. Individual privacy is thus to be protected. The citizenship survey asked about two examples of possible infringements of these boundaries that have attracted great interest in public discourse over the past few years. One question deals with the forcible removal of children from their parents or guardians, and the other concerns the use of national ID numbers.

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7. Gunnar Heckscher, *Svensk statsförvaltning i arbete* (Swedish Public Administration at Work), Studieförbundet Näringsliv och Samhälle, Stockholm, 1958.
 8. For further background on the concept of legal protection and the passage of the new public administration act, see Donald Söderlind & Olof Petersson, *Svensk förvaltningspolitik*, Second Edition, Diskurs, Uppsala, 1988, p. 285.

Table 8.5 Citizens' perceptions of Sweden as a society governed by law

How often does it happen	Average (0-10)
That public agencies conceal important information that the public should really find out about?	6.6
That public agencies perform their assigned tasks inefficiently?	6.4
That people with a high educational level and good income receive better treatment from the courts than others?	6.3
That women are treated less favorably than men?	5.8
That people's national ID numbers are used to monitor them without any real reason for this?	5.6
That public officials accept bribes?	4.6
That children are forcibly taken away from their parents or guardians by public authorities on flimsy grounds?	4.0

Respondents could answer these questions by stating a number between 0 ("never occurs") and 10 ("occurs very often").

There is obviously no absolute standard for what should be considered "high" or "low." But in general, the replies tend to cluster in the middle of the scale. Few people believe that the phenomena that were described never occur, but few of them believe that they occur very often either. Because a uniform reply technique was chosen for these seven questions, it is nonetheless possible to make a comparison among them. According


to the respondents, the most common of these phenomena are that public agencies conceal information, that public agencies are inefficient and that people with higher social positions receive special treatment in the courts. Of the seven phenomena mentioned, the two that respondents believe occur least often are bribes and forcible removal of children on flimsy grounds.

Furthermore, it turns out that the answers to these seven questions have a positive mutual correlation. Those who feel that there are abuses of one type generally believe that there are also shortcomings of another type. A dimensional analysis also confirms that the pattern of replies can be represented by a single dimension. This fact makes it justifiable to summarize the replies to the various questions in a single index. Figure 8.3 shows the distribution of responses using this combined index. A high score means that a person consistently feels there are abuses. Low scores, in contrast, mean a consistent perception that the principles of government by laws are actually being observed. The average score for this summary index is slightly above the middle of the scale (5.6). There is some variation around this average, but a majority of respondents have scores somewhere in the interval between 4 and 7.

One important question is to what extent various categories of people in Sweden differ in their assessment of public institutions. Is there greater distrust in certain groups than in others? Where is the skepticism greatest? Among young people or older people, women or men, those with little or a lot of education, in rural or urban areas? One could tie a long series of hypotheses to the relationship between social position and a sense of alienation toward the established society.

The remarkable result of a large number of associational analyses, however, is that all such hypotheses must be rejected. These tests show consistently negative results. There are no essential differences among various population categories.

Perhaps even more surprising is that there is no association between distrust and the various yardsticks of citizen participation, either. Those who are suspicious of the way public institutions function score neither higher nor lower on the various dimensions of citizenship: neither initiatives nor chances to exercise influence, political participation, interest in politics nor affinity with organized movements. For example, it would be easy to assume that a respondent's assessment of how public agencies function had some relationship to his own administrative competence, but there is no statistically significant association here, either.



Figur 8.3 Uppfattningar om missförhållanden i det svenska samhället: frekvensfördelning

Number of
responses

Perception of abuses (total index)

Figure 8.3 Perceptions of abuses in Swedish society: distribution of responses

The only minor differences that can be discovered are related to party sympathy. Distrust of the authorities is somewhat above average among the supporters of two political parties: the Left Party Communists and the Greens. These respondents have particularly critical opinions when it comes to sex discrimination, concealment of information by public agencies and the abuse of national ID numbers. Otherwise there are only insignificant differences among the parties (Table 8.6).

There is thus a more or less widespread distrust of both political parties and public agencies in all population categories. To examine whether this distrust is limited to the public sector or also applies to other portions of public life, the respondents were asked what general level of confidence they had in a number of listed organizations and institutions (Table 8.7). The responses vary from 0 ("no confidence") to 10 ("very great confidence").

Table 8.6 Party sympathy and perception of Sweden as a society governed by law

	Left Party Communists	Social Democrats	Center Party	Liberal Party	Moderate Party	Christian Democrats	Greens
Distrust (average, 0-10)	6.2	5.7	5.5	5.3	5.5	5.5	6.3

Table 8.7 Citizens' confidence in various institutions

	Average (0-10)
The courts	6.3
Parliament	5.9
The major special-interest organizations	5.2
News reporting in the media	5.1
National government agencies	5.1
Local government agencies	4.9
Major private corporations	4.6
Political parties	4.6

The differences among the various types of social institutions are by no means dramatic. All the institutions listed receive average scores somewhere in the middle of the scale. The comparatively small differences nevertheless provide a basis for ranking. Highest on the list, enjoying a comparatively high level of confidence, are the courts and Parliament. Major private corporations and political parties come last, that is, they enjoy relatively low confidence.

There is thus no support for the conclusion that citizens' distrust is focused on public institutions. On the contrary, measured in this way, the court system and the national legislature enjoy the greatest legitimacy. The business sector, represented by major private corporations, enjoys no larger reserve of confidence than the political parties.

Given the conflict structure of party politics, one could expect that there would be negative associations on a number of these questions concerning confidence. One might think that a

high level of confidence in major corporations should go together with a low level of confidence, for instance, in public agencies, and vice versa. This is not the case, however. The correlations are consistently positive. Some people have confidence in institutions, others are suspicious of them. The actual object appears to be of less importance. Those who state that they have confidence in major corporations generally also have confidence in public agencies, special-interest organizations and political parties. Those who distrust one type of power center distrust another one as well.⁹

A comparison among various population categories reveals only small differences. Highly educated respondents have somewhat great confidence in the courts. Confidence in Parliament and public agencies is a little stronger among older people. But the general outcome is the same as with the respondents' opinion of Sweden as a society governed by laws. It is not possible to distinguish any particular population category where distrust is especially concentrated.

On the other hand, there are certain statistical associations between level of confidence and citizen involvement. But these

9. A principal component analysis shows, to be more precise, that the first dimension is formed particularly by national and local government agencies, Parliament and the courts. Here the media have only a weak load. This dimension can be interpreted as a general dimension of confidence, with particular emphasis on the public sector. A second dimension is characterized, above all, by the media but also by parties, special-interest organizations and major corporations.

associations are entirely in the expected direction and are of a fairly logical nature. Those who feel strong affinity for Sweden's organized movements also have relatively great confidence in major special-interest organizations (plus public agencies and Parliament). Strong party identification goes together with strong confidence in political parties. But otherwise, the associations are generally weak. Those who are distrustful of the various social institutions do not deviate in any noticeable way from other respondents in terms of activity and involvement.

Table 8.8 Party sympathy and confidence in various institutions

	Left Party Communists	Social Democrats	Center Party	Liberal Party	Moderate Party	Christian Democrats	
The courts	5.7	6.2	6.6	6.6	6.4	6.3	
5.8							
Parliament	5.6	6.4	6.0	6.2	5.2	5.5	
4.9							
Major special- interest organizations	5.4	5.6	5.2	5.2	4.8	5.0	
5.1							
News reporting in the media	5.1	5.2	4.8	5.3	5.0	4.7	
5.2							
National government agencies	4.9	5.4	5.0	5.2	4.6	5.2	
4.4							
Local government agencies	4.6	5.2	5.3	5.1	4.5	5.6	
4.2							
Major private corporations	2.8	4.2	4.9	5.3	5.7	4.7	
4.0							
Political parties	4.3	4.9	4.9	4.7	4.5	4.3	
3.6							
Average	4.8	5.4	5.3	5.4	5.1	5.2	3
.7							

But as with respondents' views of Sweden as a society governed by law, levels of confidence in institutions coincide to some extent with party sympathy. Supporters of the Greens and the Left Party Communists, in particular, are more suspicious toward established social institutions. Table 8.8 shows the extent to which differences in views are related to political sympathies.

Low scores indicate distrust. An examination of the lowest average scores in the table becomes a survey of the greatest "antipathies" in Swedish political life: the Left Party Communists' attitude toward major private corporations; the antipathy of the Greens toward political parties, major corporations and public agencies; the Social Democratic view of major private corporations; the antipathy of the Moderates toward political parties and public agencies. But in general, it is a question of minor differences.

Now, the absence of statistical associations should always be interpreted with some caution. The fact that two variables in computer material do not show any strong correlation may depend, of course, on two entirely different things -- either reality or methodology. In one case, the data provide a correct representation of actual conditions; the two phenomena are not, in fact, related to each other. But in the other case, the measuring instruments are not good enough: the structure of the questions is incapable of capturing an actually existing covariation.

It is, in fact, possible to test whether the absence of associations is due to shortcomings in the method chosen. This is because the survey includes two separate yardsticks of the theoretical concept of central importance here: the degree of confidence or distrust. In one case, the replies are based on questions about possible abuses of government by laws, in the

other they are based on the respondents' confidence in a number of social institutions. Should it turn out that these two measuring techniques are not capable of capturing the theoretical common denominator, there should be no mutual association between the two measurements. But in fact, the opposite is true. The two summary scales of the respondents' distrust toward Sweden as a society governed by laws and their confidence in institutions show a statistically significant (obviously negative) correlation ($r = 0.30$).¹⁰ The fact that different population categories express largely the same degree of confidence/distrust can therefore not be attributed to the method of study in itself.

It thus turns out to be difficult to locate in clear fashion the social and political roots of distrust. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that this distrust has two sources. The first and most important is a diffuse lack of confidence that is aimed at all types of institutions, private as well as public. The second is a reaction caused by partisan political sympathies -- a feeling of greater or lesser distance from various organized interests in society.

The picture that emerges here essentially coincides with the findings of earlier research in this field. Distrust toward parties and politicians is not concentrated in any particular

10. Additional evidence for the conclusion that the measuring instruments are satisfactory is the fact that the individual questions that form each respective scale are, in turn, mutually correlated. It is therefore justifiable to merge the separate indicators into common scales.

population category. The percentage of people expressing distrust is about the same in all groups: among young as well as old, among blue-collar workers as well as white-collar employees and business owners, among men as well as women.¹¹ There is, on the other hand, some association with political factors. Distrust is partly connected to discontent with current government policies, negative assessments of the ability of political parties to solve acute social problems and disagreement with the views of these parties.¹²

The country that has been the object of the largest number of field interview studies on attitudes towards the system and on levels of confidence in institutions is the United States. The tumultuous political events of the 1960s and 1970s, especially the civil rights struggle, rioting by blacks in major cities, the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal, were accompanied by a prolific output of measurements of the political climate. Two researchers, Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, have summarized the main findings of all these studies.¹³ Despite obvious methodological problems and difficulties of

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11. Olof Petersson, *Väljarna och valet 1976, valundersökningar, rapport 2 (Voters and the 1976 Election, Election Studies, report 2)*, SCB/Liber, Stockholm, 1977, p. 260. Holmberg and Gilljam, 1987, p. 238.
 12. Jack Citrin, "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government," *The American Political Science Review*, 68, 1974; Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government," *American Political Science Review*, 68, 1974; Petersson, 1977, p. 264; Holmberg and Gilljam, 1987, pp. 238-39.
 13. Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, *The Confidence Gap. Business, Labor and Government in the Public Mind*, The Free Press, New York, 1983.

intepretation, a relatively cohesive picture nevertheless emerges. Because Swedish studies have not been as exhaustive as the American ones, it is not possible to test whether all the theses presented in the latter are also valid under Swedish conditions. But to the extent that comparable data are available, their findings concur. The social and political nature of Swedish distrust of institutions does not appear to differ on any decisive points from what is known, for example, from the United States.

The American studies indicate that real and powerful social change has occurred. From the early 1960s and about two decades afterward, there was a clear decline in the level of confidence that the American public felt toward established social institutions. What happened before and after this period, respectively, is another matter. Available data indicate that the level of confidence bottomed out during the Depression of the 1930s, then rose in the following decades. Data from the early 1980s indicate that in some respects, the negative trend ended.

The negative trend of the 1960s and 1970s did not affect politics or parties alone. There was also rising distrust of the business community and the trade union movement. Not a single one of 25 industrial sectors and not a single one of 50 companies studied improved its reputation in the eyes of the public from the late 1960s until the late 1970s.¹⁴

The various measurements of mistrust have mutually positive correlations. Only the mass media fall partly outside this framework; attitudes toward the mass media are only relatively weakly associated with attitudes toward other institutions. But otherwise it is justified to speak of a single dimension of confidence.¹⁵

14. Ibid., p. 39.

15. Ibid., pp. 47, 98-99.

The explanations for this increased distrust are political rather than sociological. There are only insignificant differences among various population groups. The negative trend of public opinion must be attributed to external political events, not to individual factors.¹⁶

The degree of trust does not seem to be related in any systematic way with political participation. Those who are distrustful are neither more nor less politically involved than other citizens. Despite hypotheses to the contrary, it has not been possible to prove that declining voter turnout is related to the growing confidence gap.¹⁷

A lack of confidence in politicians has a tendency to be related to low confidence in other people generally. Distrust is aimed at the way institutions work and at the people who hold the leading positions in society, but not, on the other hand, toward the whole system as such. The public wants the old institutions to remain, but wants them to work better. Their opinions are not completely clear. On the one hand, citizens support the concept of a pluralistic system in which various interest groups pursue their special demands and different power groups counterbalance each other. On the other hand, there is a desire for compromise, consensus and efficiency. The positive thing about trade unions is precisely the fact that they pursue the special interests of their members. The negative thing about trade unions is precisely that they pursue the special interests of their members and thereby end up in conflict with the general interest.¹⁸

16. Ibid., pp. 101 ff, 375.

17. Ibid., pp. 340-41, 390-91.

18. Ibid., p. 220.

The Legitimacy of Interest Organizations

The American discussion on the role of interest organizations in modern democracy is of great theoretical interest. To cite political scientist Robert Dahl, it touches a fundamental problem of pluralist democracy. On the one hand, democracy requires the existence of independent organizations. On the other hand, the very independence of these organizations threatens to harm democracy.¹⁹

It is not difficult to make a list of reasons why free organizations are an indispensable element of pluralist democracy. Dahl mentions two arguments in particular.²⁰ First, organizations contribute to mutual control. The main alternative of mutual control is hierarchy. But hierarchy easily leads to oligarchy. Independent organizations counteract hierarchical dominance. Second, organizations are necessary if democracy is to work on a large scale. Freedom and organization are inseparably linked.

But there are also problems connected with the modern organizational system; Dahl calls attention to four such disadvantages.²¹ First, organizations may maintain and strengthen existing injustices. Second, organizations may deform the civic consciousness by favoring special interests and particularism. Third, organizations have great power in setting the agenda; issues not supported by organized interests have a hard time gaining attention. Fourth, finally, representative democracy is

19. Robert A. Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982, p. 31.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 32 ff.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 40 ff.

threatened. Many issues must be delegated to organizations. But this decentralization and delegation may sometimes go so far that these organizations take over completely. Elected representatives still have responsibility, but no power.

Although the relationship between interest organizations and the state is different in Sweden from that in the United States for historical reasons, "Dahl's dilemma" is equally relevant here. The citizenship survey contains six questions intended to provide a picture of what the public thinks of major organizations in Sweden today. Table 8.9 shows how these questions were phrased and what the average responses were.

The questions are designed in such a way as to reflect both sides of the organizational system. The first three questions deal with the positive side of interest organizations and their contribution to the functioning of pluralist democracy. The last three questions deal with the drawbacks of these organizations -- the possibility that they distort member opinion, that they usurp representative bodies and that non-members of organizations are at a disadvantage.

Table 8.9 Perceptions of major special-interest organizations

How often do the following events occur?	Average (0-10)
That special-interest organizations help bring about positive actions that would otherwise not have occurred?	6.3
That special-interest organizations help create security -- economic and otherwise -- for the individual?	5.8
That special-interest organizations contribute important viewpoints and facts that otherwise are in danger of being forgotten?	6.2
That special-interest organizations advocate opinions completely at variance from those of their members?	3.9
That special-interest organizations force Parliament and the Cabinet to make decisions that are not in the best public interest?	3.3
That public agencies take too little account of people who are not members of any special-interest organization?	5.3

The question was phrased as follows: "As you know, we have many large special-interest organizations in Sweden, for example those that represent various types of employees, farmers, business owners and other groups. In your view, how often do the following events occur:" The responses were classified along a scale from 0 ("never occurs") to 10 ("occurs very often").

As always in the case of attitude measurements, the distribution of responses and the averages should be interpreted with caution. The averages often end up in the middle of the scale. According to this way of measuring, organizations are viewed neither with massive skepticism nor with overwhelming enthusiasm.

Of greater interest is how the replies to the six questions relate to each other. An associational analysis indicates that the two theoretically derived dimensions do correspond to public opinion. Table 8.10 shows the results of this statistical dimensional analysis.

This is a significant finding, because it shows that the discussion of the relationship between special-interest organizations and democracy does not have a one-dimensional structure. Viewpoints cannot be represented by a single scale, from "positive" to "negative." Both theoretical and empirical reasons indicate that an assessment of these organizations must be represented by at least two dimensions. Figure 8.4 shows the various combinations of viewpoints that thereby become possible.

The vertical dimension refers to the positive effects of organizations. Those who believe that organizations make an important contribution to democracy receive high scores on this dimension. The horizontal dimension represents the negative effects of organizations. It expresses how large the disadvantages of interest organizations are.

Table 8.10 Dimensional analysis: perceptions of organizations

	Dimension	
	1	2
Dimension 1: Positive effects of organizations		
Help bring about positive actions	81	03
Create security for the individual	77	-03
Contribute important viewpoints	78	07
Dimension 2: Negative effects of organizations		
Advocate opinions at variance with those of members	-07	79
Force the adoption of decisions not in the best public interest	-06	81
Cause too little account to be taken of non-members	20	65

All loadings have been multiplied by 100.

Two of these combinations are not very surprising. In the far upper left-hand corner are those respondents who believe that special-interest organizations contribute positively to democracy while regarding their negative effects as small. Organizations are considered useful without being harmful at the same time. The opposite combination -- that organizations are only harmful -- is found in the lower right-hand corner. Here, organizations are deemed to have large negative effects, but small positive ones.

But there are another two combinations. Those respondents who feel that interest organizations have both small positive effects and small negative ones represent the view that in general, organizations are of little importance. The last combination consists of those who believe that organizations have both positive and negative effects. This is the perception that corresponds to Dahl's dilemma. Pluralist democracy requires free organizations, but free organizations are precisely what may threaten pluralist democracy.

The two aspects of the respondents' views of special-interest organizations have partially different associations with the dimensions of citizenship. The people who emphasize the positive aspect of organizations tend to be the active citizens. There are consistently positive associations between this dimension, on the one hand, and civic activities, political interest, political participation, involvement in organizations and affinity with organized movements, on the other.

The variations along the dimension of negative effects do not have the same clear associations with the two aspects of citizenship. Among those who emphasize the negative sides of organizations, there are both active and passive individuals, both those who are involved and uninvolved. There is, however, a

strong association between distrust of how government by laws operates, distrust of other social institutions and low scores on the dimension of ideal citizenship having to do with the observance of rules.




Figure 8.4 Perceptions of organizations: two dimensions

It is perhaps hardly surprising that involvement in organizations and political activity are related to the perception that organizations have large positive effects. It may, however, seem remarkable that the respondents' assessment of their negative effects is not softened at the same time. One

conceivable interpretation is that activity and involvement operate in several directions. On the one hand, the perception of the usefulness of organizations is strengthened. There is a movement upward and to the left in the diagram. On the other hand, there is also greater awareness of the importance of organizations, in positive as well as negative respects. Generally speaking, as involvement increases, organizations will be viewed as more important. This corresponds to a movement upward and to the right in the diagram. The net result of these two trends is that the respondents' assessment of the positive effects of interest organizations becomes stronger, while their view of the negative aspects remains unaffected.

The group that feels that organizations have negative effects, that are "distrustful" of organizations, is thus very mixed. It consists partly of people who are negative toward organizations in general terms. But it also includes people who share Dahl's view of the dilemma of pluralism. Powerful organizations may, of course, pose a danger, but the absence of powerful organizations is even worse.

Believing in the system and believing in oneself

To what extent does the individual citizen believe that he or she can influence policy? In the international literature in this field, discussion has focused on the concept of "political efficacy." Translating this term to Swedish is not simple; it refers to a sense of political self-confidence, a belief in the ability to exercise one's own influence. In any event, it is clear that this is a psychological concept dealing with the

individual as a citizen in a large political system.²²

One of the first attempts to measure political self-confidence in systematic fashion took place as part of the American election research program in the early 1950s. The concept was defined as "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process."²³ The feeling of being able to influence policy has later been related, among other things, to political participation and the political culture in different countries. It has also been regarded as a basis for democratic legitimacy and as one aspect of the general quality of life.

Although the concept has been very popular, its meaning has not always been equally clear. Even at an early stage, it was pointed out that political self-confidence actually has two components: a perception of oneself and a perception of the political system.²⁴ Even though these aspects may be mutually related, they involve two distinct dimensions. Further studies also indicated that the associations within these two dimensions often looked completely different. A person's sense of his own political competence was strongly related to his interest in politics, knowledge of politics and political participation. His assessment of the political system was not, however, associated

22. For a more detailed discussion of this concept and an empirical application to young people in Sweden during the 1980s, see Anders Westholm and Richard G. Niemi, "Youth Unemployment and Political Alienation," *Youth and Society*, 18, 1986, pp. 58-80.

23. Angus C. Campbell, G. Gurin and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides*, Row & Peterson, Evanston, 1954, p. 187.

24. Robert E. Lane, *Political Life*, Macmillan, New York, 1959.

with these things. Protest behavior had a positive association with political competence, but a negative association with one's assessment of the system.²⁵

The citizenship survey contained ten different questions related directly to the ability of citizens to influence policy. Five questions dealt with the responsiveness of the political system to the demands and wishes of citizens. The other five questions dealt with a person's own ability to influence policy, compared with other citizens.

Expressions such as "the political system" and "policy" are very vague. In many ways, the results of these questions hinge on exactly what is meant by these words. A person may very well have great confidence in the general norms and principles by which a country is supposed to be governed, according to its constitution, yet at the same time he may be highly skeptical of the politicians who hold leading positions at the moment.²⁶

The measurements that have been used here fall between these two levels. They are not so general that they deal with the ultimate foundations of the system of government, nor are they so narrow that they only concern the party that is ruling at the moment. These questions deal with established political parties and politicians in general, whether they are currently in power

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25. G.I. Balch, "Multiple Indicators in Survey Research: The Concept of 'Sense of Political Efficacy'," *Political Methodology*, 1, 1974, pp. 10 ff.
 26. Paul R. Abrahamson and Ada W. Finifter, "On the Meaning of Political Trust: New Evidence from Items Introduced in 1978," *The American Journal of Political Science*, 25, 1981, pp. 297-307.

or trying to get there. In other words, the attitudes presented here do not exhaust the whole area of "political efficacy." They deal with a distinct aspect of the relationship between citizens and politics, but one that is no less central because of that.

Table_8.11_Perceptions_of_the_political_system_and_political_self
Average
(0-10)_

How much importance do politicians attach to demands presented, for example, by local organizations or groups of people?	3.7
How much chance do ordinary people have of presenting their views to politicians?	4.2
How much chance of redress is there for a person who is treated improperly by a public agency?	3.4
How capable are ordinary people of understanding what happens in politics?	3.8
To what extent do ordinary people have the knowledge required to make political decisions?	3.6
Do people like you have a greater or smaller chance than others of making politicians pay heed to your demands?	4.1
Do people like you have a greater or a smaller chance than others of presenting your demands to politicians?	4.5
Do you have a greater or a smaller chance than other people of gaining redress if you should be treated improperly by a public agency?	4.6
Do you have a greater or smaller chance than other people of understanding what happens in politics?	4.8
Do you have the knowledge required to make political decisions to a greater or smaller extent than other people?	4.2

Replies to the first five questions were classified on a scale from "none at all"(0) to "very much"(10). The extreme alternatives for the subsequent five questions were "much smaller" and "much greater" respectively.

The replies generally fall around the middle or the lower part of the scale (Table 8.11). The last five questions are of particular interest. The replies were classified on a scale from 0 to 10, where the midpoint of 5 means that the respondent regards his ability to act politically as average -- neither more nor less than other people. Scores between 0 and 5 mean that the respondent regards his ability as below normal, between 5 and 10 above normal. The proportion of respondents who choose the exact figure of 5 varies between 40 and 50 percent, depending on the question. Among other respondents, it is more common to choose a reply below 5 than above. An average of the five questions provides an overall summary view (Table 8.12). For natural reasons, a smaller percentage of people end up exactly at 5; counted in this way, one out of five citizens feel he has the same opportunity to influence policy as other citizens. Slightly more than half feel they have less opportunity to influence policies than other citizens. If there were an exact correspondence between actual opportunities for influence and citizens' assessments of these, the distribution should be even; the average would then be 5. The assessments of citizens are on the pessimistic side here. Put differently: citizens have more opportunity to influence policy than they think they do.

Table 8.12 Respondents' average assessment of their own ability to influence policies, compared with other citizens

	Percentage
Less opportunity than others	52
Same opportunity as others	20
Greater opportunity than others	28
Total percentage	100

Average of the last five questions in Table 8.11. Less opportunity = mean value below 5; same opportunity = mean exactly 5; greater opportunity = mean above 5.

It now also turns out that the theoretical distinction between confidence in the way the political system works, on the one hand, and confidence in one's own ability to influence policies also has empirical support. A dimensional analysis results in two components with precisely this meaning (Table 8.13).

The two dimensions can be represented in a diagram (Figure 8.5). The horizontal axis indicates confidence in one's own ability to influence policy. The vertical axis shows variations in confidence in the political system. Those who have confidence both in the system's receptiveness to demands and in their own competence demonstrate a type of identification. The other three combinations may be regarded as different forms of alienation, based on the definitions of the alienation concept developed by the American researcher Melvin Seeman.²⁷ When confidence in the system and in oneself are both missing, there is alienation as powerlessness. The two remaining combinations have in common that only one aspect of confidence is present. Trusting the system but not one's own ability means alienation as meaninglessness. The system works but leaves no room for the person's own input. Politics appears incomprehensible; one's own actions appear meaningless. The fourth combination -- possessing political self-confidence but lacking confidence in the system -- corresponds most closely to alienation as normlessness. A person has great faith in himself, but the political system is perceived as not working according to the norms of democracy.

It should be added that the last two combinations occur somewhat less commonly, because the two dimensions of trust are mutually associated to some extent. High scores in one dimension generally tend to be combined with high scores in the other.

27. Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," *American Sociological Review*, 24, 1959, pp. 783-791.

Not unexpectedly, confidence in one's own ability to influence policies turns out to have a strong association with educational level, civic activity, political participation, political interest and organizational activity.

Confidence in the political system is also associated with an interest in politics. But it is, not least, other expressions of confidence -- a favorable appraisal of Sweden as a country governed by laws, confidence in established institutions and affinity with the organized movements in society -- which have a positive correlation with confidence in the political process.

Personality types

Obviously there is a strong connection between external and internal qualities. This study began with a number of everyday citizenship situations and an analysis of what particular groups of citizens were more able or less able to take advantage of their rights. As it turned out, it was beyond all doubt that such factors as sex, generation and class are of great importance in explaining the variations of citizenship. But it is also clear that internal factors -- psychological traits such as identity, confidence and self-perception -- play an independent role.

Traits like these can often assume subtle, implicit expressions. A cross-sectional study of this type, based on field interviews, is not always the most suitable or sensitive method for understanding such psychological phenomena. But the study includes an attempt to let the interviewees describe themselves as personalities and social creatures. Toward the end of the interview, they were presented with a number of personality types and were asked to specify to what extent they felt that each trait applied to themselves. The phrasing of the questions and the replies are found in Table 8.14.

Table 8.14 Personality traits

	Average (0-10)
Someone who always stands up for his/her own opinion	7.8
Someone who finds it easy to accept people who are different	7.6
Someone who likes to meet new people	7.3
Someone who forms his/her own opinion independently of others	7.2
Someone who finds it easy to put him/herself in other people's situation	6.5
Someone who is happy when surrounded by a lot of people	6.3
Someone who avoids conflicts	6.2
Someone that others often listen to	6.1
Someone who often gets his/her way	6.0
Someone who finds it easy to contact public agencies and companies	5.5
Someone who is willing to see things from the perspective of other people	5.1
Someone who becomes upset when things do not follow a particular pattern	5.0
Someone who easily becomes irritated at other people's behavior	4.3
Someone who enjoys organizing activities for other people	4.3
Someone who often has a hard time understanding other people's feelings	3.4
Someone who often has a bad conscience	3.4
Someone who allows him/herself to be influenced easily by others	3.2

Wording of the question: "I will now describe some different kinds of personalities. How well does this description apply to you:" The replies were classified on a scale from 0 ("not applicable to me at all") to 10 ("completely applicable to me").

The questions were deliberately constructed in such a way that they partly overlap each other. Dimensional analyses also show that the questions can be grouped together in a smaller number of main categories. Three questions measure sociability: being happy when surrounded by other people, liking to meet new people and enjoying organizing activities for other people. Tolerance and empathy are the common denominator of those questions that deal with being able to put oneself in other people's situation, being willing to see things from the perspective of other people and accepting people who are different. Being irritated about other people's behavior turns out to go together with becoming upset when things do not follow a particular pattern. This series of questions also contains an assessment of the respondent's own personal influence: someone who often gets his/her way.

Several of these personality traits have a clear statistical association with various aspects of citizenship. Table 8.15 shows some examples. The upper half of the table shows those personality types that have the strongest association with the number of initiatives to influence one's situation that the respondent has taken in any of the six citizenship roles that have been applicable to him during the past year. The lower half shows corresponding figures for assessing one's own chances of influence in these citizenship roles.

Those respondents who feel it is easy to contact public agencies and companies are the ones who take the most initiatives to influence their situation and who make the most favorable assessment of their chance to exercise influence. This personality trait may be regarded as yet another expression of subjective administrative competence. This type of administrative self-confidence is closely connected with actual attempts to exercise influence and the respondent's assessment of his own influence.

Table 8.15 Personality traits and citizenship

Personality_traits_with_strongest_associations	Associations_(r)
Took an initiative in a citizenship situation: average	
Someone who finds it easy to contact public agencies and companies	0.25
Someone who enjoys organizing activities for other people	0.20
Someone who avoids conflicts (Note negative association)	-0.16
Someone who is willing to see things from the perspective of other people	0.15
Someone that others often listen to	0.14
Assessment of ability to exercise influence: average	
Someone who finds it easy to contact public agencies and companies	0.29
Someone who often gets his/her way	0.18
Someone that others often listen to	0.17
Someone who enjoys organizing activities for other people	0.14
Someone who forms his/her own opinion independently of others	0.13

Table 8.16 Citizenship and personality traits

Dimensions of citizenship with strongest_associations	Associations_(r)
"Someone who often gets his/her way"	
Administrative competence	0.25
Chance to exercise influence as gainfully employed person	0.24
Political participation: contacts	0.20
Initiative as parent of school child(ren)	0.17
"Someone who likes to meet new people"	
Political participation: contacts	0.21
Initiative as parent of preschool child(ren)	0.20
Administrative competence	0.19
Political_participation:_manifestations	0.15

A respondent's assessment of his chance of exercising influence also has a strong association with those personality traits that deal with influence, getting one's way and being someone that others often listen to. Personal autonomy also has a covariation with the perception of one's own influence as a citizen.

An additional illustration of the association between citizenship and personality is provided in Table 8.16. The perspective is reversed here. It is based on two of the personality types. The question is then: Which dimensions of citizenship have the strongest association with these psychological traits?

A person who feels he often gets his way is, at the same time, a citizen who has great administrative competence, who believes he has a good chance to influence his working situation, who often make political contacts and who has taken an initiative in his role as the parent of a school child.

A person who likes to meet new people is an extroverted, sociable person. Citizens with this trait also make many political contacts, take initiatives as parents of preschool children, know how to appeal the decision of a public agency and often participate in political manifestations.

Behind these associations, there are obviously differences in terms of social background. Table 8.17 provides an overview of the strongest associations between social position and personality type.

The differences in the personality traits of men and women are easily discernible. Women are more likely than men to feel that they find it easy to put themselves in other people's situation.

Women score higher on sociability. But on the basis of this, one cannot draw the general conclusion that women are more extroverted. Men find it easier to contact public agencies and companies. Women find it easier to contact people.

There are also certain age-related differences. Older people are more prone to avoid conflicts. The younger generation is more socially extroverted and has a greater feeling of influence.

A high educational level goes together with administrative competence, initiative to organize, readiness to accept conflicts, ability to switch perspective and feeling of influence. These educationally related differences otherwise reflect differences among occupational categories. Blue-collar workers feel it is harder to make contact with public agencies and companies, are less inclined to organize activities for others, are less well-disposed toward switches in perspective and are less likely to feel that others listen to them.

But it is not true that the association between personality type and civic involvement is merely a simple reflection of such differences in social background. Even after accounting for occupation and educational level, the associations remain.²⁸

There is a clear association between class and personality type. The well-educated middle class has more self-confidence and thus holds an advantage when it comes to taking initiatives and trying to gain influence. Being a blue-collar worker and having small

28. A multiple regression analysis, for example with citizenship initiatives as a dependent variable, and using the question about whether the respondent is someone who finds it easy to contact public agencies and companies, plus occupation, as independent variables, indicates that both have significant effects.

economic resources are, in themselves, a disadvantage in gaining influence. In addition, there is the extra indirect effect of a lack of political self-confidence.

Table 8.17 Personality traits: correlation with sex, age and educational level

Personality_traits_with_strongest_associations	Associations_(r)
Sex	
Someone who finds it easy to put him/herself in other people's situation (women)	0.18
Someone who often has a hard time understanding other people's feelings (men)	-0.16
Someone who is happy when surrounded by a lot of people (women)	0.13
Someone who finds it easy to contact public agencies and companies (men)	-0.13
Someone who finds it easy to accept people who are different (women)	0.10
Someone who often has a bad conscience (women)	0.08
Age	
Someone who avoids conflicts (older people)	0.24
Someone who likes to meet new people (younger people)	-0.21
Someone who is happy when surrounded by a lot of people (younger people)	-0.19
Someone who often gets his/her way (younger people)	-0.16
Someone that others often listen to (younger people)	-0.15
Educational level	
Someone who finds it easy to contact public agencies and companies (the highly educated)	0.26
Someone who enjoys organizing activities for other people (the highly educated)	0.21

Someone who avoids conflicts (those with little education)	-0.19
Someone who is willing to see things from the perspective of other people (the highly educated)	0.17
Someone that others often listen to (the highly educated)	0.16
Someone who often gets his/her way (the highly educated)	0.16

9. The Family and Citizenship

One main theme of this book is the relationship between situation and action. The question is how activity and citizen involvement are affected by living conditions and access to various types of resources. Special attention is devoted to the interplay between individual and collective factors.

What, then, is the role played by an individual's most immediate social environment: his own family situation? Are people who live alone less active and involved than those citizens who live together with others? What significance does it have that there are people, not least the parents of small children, whose schedules are tightly filled, and for whom there never seems to be enough time? How do relationships within the family affect the realization of external citizenship?

Family Situation

Questions about the relationship between home life and public life are as numerous as they are central. But it is rarely as easy to answer these questions as to formulate them. Every individual is unique, and one person's life situation is not the same as another person's; every generalization involves a simplification. In a comprehensive field interview study like this one, the desire for comprehensiveness and for systematic comparisons leads to extra big problems. There is no easy way to characterize people's family situation fairly.

One initial limitation that was already imposed during the selection process has to do with the age factor. Children under

16 are not included in this study at all, nor are pensioners over age 80. But focusing on young people and adults aged 16-80 does not solve particularly many of these problems of definition and limitation, either.

One traditional way of describing a person's family situation is marital status. When asked their marital status, exactly half of the interviewees reply that they are married. But the other half -- those who are unmarried -- comprise a very mixed group. Nearly one out of three of them is in a live-in, marriage-like relationship (15 percent of all respondents). Others have previously been married: some respondents are divorced, others are widows/widowers (6 percent each).

The group of unmarried people who are neither living in a marriage-like relationship nor have previously been married thus comprise 23 percent of all respondents. But this category is far from being synonymous with the group who are "living alone," because as it turns out, more than half of these unmarried respondents live together with at least one other person. In many cases, they are young people who are still living in their parents' home. But they also include young people who have moved away from their parents and who share housing with others. In addition, they include older people who live together with siblings.

People living alone ("one-person households," as they are called in the statistics) amount to 20 percent of respondents in the citizenship survey. In other words, one out of five adults has either chosen or been forced by various circumstances to live alone. People who live alone are becoming more and more numerous. Official statistics indicate that one-person households (as a percentage of the total number of households, not the number of individuals) rose from 14 to 36 percent between 1945 and 1985. This increase is partly explained by housing construction,


which has given both young and old the opportunity to live in a home of their own.¹

One immediate hypothesis is that social isolation leads to passivity. People who live alone would therefore be expected to show lower-than-average levels of citizenship activities. This hypothesis has some support, but this is fairly weak. Voter turnout is admittedly somewhat lower among those who live alone (87 percent) than among those who live together with others (91 percent).² But in most cases there are no significant associations. The general conclusion has to be that people who live alone do not constitute a passive group of political outsiders.

But as indicated above, the category of people living alone is far from uniform. For example, it includes such disparate groups as young people who have just moved away from home to their own pad, disability pensioners, the chronically unemployed and single retirees.

The percentage of people living alone varies sharply among different age categories (Figure 9.1). It is therefore justified to divide up these people by age. It indeed turns out that living alone has completely different meanings in different age categories. Figure 9.2 shows the association between living situation and voter turnout within three different age categories (younger, middle-aged and older).

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1. Perspektiv på välfärden 1987 (Perspective on Well-Being, 1987), Levnadsförhållanden, 53, Sveriges officiella statistik, Statistiska Centralbyrån (Living Conditions, 53, Swedish Official Statistics, Statistics Sweden), Stockholm, 1987, p. 43.
 2. The fact that participation in elections is higher among married people than among unmarried people has been proven in many studies of the electorate.



Figur 9.1 Andelen ensamboende inom åldersgrupper

Percentage
living alone

Age


Figure 9.1 Percentage of people in different age categories who live alone

The hypothesis that voter turnout is lower among people who live alone is correct only among middle-aged and older people. Among young people, the opposite is true. In this age category, people who live alone are the more active ones.


Figure 9.3 shows a similar analysis using another yardstick of political participation: contacts and political communication. Here too, it turns out that there is an interplay between family situation and age. The hypothesis that people who live alone are more passive is true only of the oldest age category. It is worth mentioning that the pattern observed here also applies to other forms of citizen involvement. Among younger people, for example, those who live alone are more active in voluntary organizations than those who live together with others. Among the oldest category, the opposite is true.

So far, this discussion has only paid attention to the difference between people who live alone or together with others. Just as there are great variations within the category of people who live alone, there are obviously substantial differences among people who live in "multi-person households." One such aspect will be examined in greater detail here: the situation of families with children.

Of all respondents in the survey, 66 percent have children. But many of these children have moved away from home, either some time ago or recently. Of all respondents, 35 percent have children living at home. Table 9.1 provides a breakdown of people with children, showing their marital status.



Figur 9.2 Ensamboende och valdeltagande inom åldersgrupper



Figur 9.3 Ensamboende och politiska kontakter inom åldersgrupper

Voter turnout

Aged 61-80
Aged 31-60
Aged 16-30

Living with others

Living alone

Figure 9.2 Living alone and voter turnout in different age groups

Contacts

Aged 31-60
Aged 16-30
Aged 61-80

Living with others

Living alone

Figure 9.3 Living alone and political contacts in different age categories

Half of those who are married have children living at home. But the group called "families with children" is far from consisting only of married couples. Some of those who have live-in, marriage-like relationships and some of the respondents who are unmarried and previously married also have children living at home.

It would thus be preferable to take into account the respondents' marital status, age, household size and whether or not there are children at home, all at the same time. The number of conceivable combinations soon becomes very large. Various attempts to construct a simple "family life cycle" can be criticized precisely because they presuppose a kind of nuclear family that is becoming increasingly uncommon today.³ Even using a high degree of schematization, more than a dozen categories are required in order to represent the various categories of families (Table 9.2).

Table 9.1 __ Marital_status_and_children

	Percentage who have	
	Children	Children living at home
Married	91	50
In marriage-like relationship	52	42
Unmarried	10	5
Divorced	85	22
Widow/widower	90	12
Total	66	35


3. One study showed that only 35 to 60 percent of families could be squeezed into the traditional family life cycle pattern. Jan Trost, "Några synpunkter på familjebegreppet" (Some Views on the Concept of Family), in Bengt-Erik Andersson, ed., *Familjebilder. Myter, verklighet, visioner* (Family Images. Myths, Reality, Visions), Studförbundet Näringsliv & Samhälle (SNS), Stockholm, 1984, p. 54.

Table 9.2 Family life cycle

	Percentage
1. Unmarried, not in marriage-like relationship; living with parents	10
2. Unmarried, not in marriage-like relationship; living with other(s)	1
3. Unmarried, not in marriage-like relationship; living alone; aged 16-30	6
4. Married or in marriage-like relationship; no children; aged 16-30	7
5. Married or in marriage-like relationship; preschool child(ren)	13
6. Married or in marriage-like relationship; child(ren) over age 6 living at home	18
7. Single; children living at home	3
8. Married or in marriage-like relationship; child(ren) but not living at home; aged -64	13
9. Married or in marriage-like relationship; child(ren) but not living at home; aged 65-	9
10. Married or in marriage-like relationship; no children; aged 31-64	4
11. Married or in marriage-like relationship; no children; aged 65-	1
12. Single; no children; aged 31-64	9
13. Single; no children; aged 65-	6
Total_percentage_____	100

This more detailed breakdown shows that the great majority of people who have children are either married or in a marriage-like relationship. Those who are single and have children total 3 percent of all respondents.

It would be far-fetched to imagine that the fact of having children would affect a person's involvement in public life in a general way. Those associations which are conceivable are of an indirect nature. Nor, by any means, is it self-evident which direction this association would go. One can imagine cases where being a new parent contributes positively to a person's general sense of social commitment. A commitment centering on child care and child development issues may lead to a more general interest in social issues. But it is also possible to pose the hypothesis that parents of preschool children are less active than others. This would be attributable to purely external, practical circumstances. Babysitting, family life, paid employment, daily commuting and all the other chores of everyday life may require so much time that there are simply no hours left for voluntary organizations and other civic activities.



Figur 9.4 Frekvensfördelning över tillgång till tidsresurser

Frågans formulering: "Om du bortser från:

— arbete i hemmet, inklusive eventuell omsorg om barn och andra

— ev. förvärvsarbete/studier, inklusive resor till och från

— samt sömn

ungefär hur många timmar under en vanlig vardag har Du över till annat?"

Number of
respondents

Hours left for other pursuits

Figure 9.4 Breakdown of respondents by access to time resources

Wording of the question: "If you subtract:

- home chores, including any care provided to children and others

- any gainful employment or studies, including commuting time

- and sleep

about how many hours per ordinary weekday do you have left for other things?

The first, positive, hypothesis, has already been tested to some extent. As indicated in earlier chapters, activities and initiatives related to child care have some relationship, though by no means an extremely strong one, with both an interest in politics and participation in voluntary organizations.

Table 9.3 Family life cycle and time left for other things

	Hours:minutes
1. Unmarried, not in marriage-like relationship; living with parents	4:46
2. Unmarried, not in marriage-like relationship; living with other(s)	4:50
3. Unmarried, not in marriage-like relationship; living alone; aged 16-30	4:22
4. Married or in marriage-like relationship; no children; aged 16-30	4:11
5. Married or in marriage-like relationship; preschool child(ren)	2:33
6. Married or in marriage-like relationship; child(ren) over age 6 living at home	3:20
7. Single; children living at home	3:24
8. Married or in marriage-like relationship; child(ren) but not living at home; aged -64	4:25
9. Married or in marriage-like relationship; child(ren) but not living at home; aged 65-	7:32
10. Married or in marriage-like relationship; no children; aged 31-64	4:13
11. Married or in marriage-like relationship; no children; aged 65-	7:41
12. Single; no children; aged 31-64	4:41
13. Single; no children; aged 65-	8:15

The second, negative, hypothesis, should preferably be tested directly. It is not the fact of having children that is decisive, but lack of time. The chances of testing this hypothesis are favorable, however. The survey contains one particular question that focuses precisely on access to "time resources." Respondents were asked to estimate how many hours were left for other things during an ordinary weekday. "Other things" were defined as everything but home chores, employment and sleep. The average reply was 4 hours and 29 minutes. During an ordinary weekday, the average citizen has four and a half hours free to pursue his interests. Obviously there is great variation around this average (Figure 9.4).

Some pensioners with little need for sleep declare that they have 18-19 hours at their disposal. At the opposite extreme, 3 percent of respondents specified 0 hours. Three fourths of respondents have five hours or less left for "other things."

Not unexpectedly, there is a strong association between the family life cycle and access to time resources (Table 9.3). The quantity of time available is, of course, related to the number of children living at home. People without children living at home have a bit more than five hours left for other things. The average for respondents with one child at home is slightly above three and a half hours. Two-child families have somewhat less than three hours, and respondents with three or more children at home estimate their free time at about two hours.

Time is regarded here as a resource. The simple hypothesis is that there is a positive association between resources and citizen involvement. A person who has a lot of time at his disposal has a greater chance of participating personally in various public activities. This association should consequently be clearest in relation to the most time-consuming activities -- such as voluntary associations and political participation in the form of personal initiatives and contacts.

But this simple, seemingly self-evident hypothesis is incorrect. The observed association is not positive, but negative (Table 9.4). The paradoxical result is that the less time a person has, the more active he is.

Table 9.4 Time resources and activities

	Association (r) with time_resources
Political participation: contacts	-0.17
Membership_in_voluntary_organizations	-0.18

One immediately wonders whether the survey method has played a trick, and whether this is a matter of a false association. A first natural suspicion is that the age factor is involved. For example, retired people have a lot of spare time, but at the same time they are less active as a group than average. If it were indeed true that age variations are the only reason behind the observed association, the negative correlation between time resources and civic activities would disappear if the data were controlled for age. Table 9.5 shows the result of calculating the correlations within age categories.

Table 9.5 Time resources and activities within age groups

Age	Association (r) between time resources and	
	Contacts	Membership_in_organizations
16-30	-0.12	-0.11
31-50	-0.16	-0.17
51-80	-0.08	-0.07

The associations are somewhat weaker, but essentially remain. Age variations cannot explain the association between activity and lack of time.

Another conceivable explanation is differences in educational level. This is because it turns out there is a (negative) association between educational level and time resources: highly educated people have less time left for other things than people with little education. In that case, it might theoretically be true that because highly educated people have less time and a higher civic activity level, this would result in a false negative correlation between time resources and activities. This hypothesis is tested in Table 9.6.

Table 9.6 Time resources and activities by educational categories

Educational_level	Association_(r)_between_time_resources_and	
	Contacts	Membership_in_organizations
Low	-0.15	-0.19
Medium	-0.08	-0.09
High	-0.11	-0.08

The result of this test is essentially the same as for the age factor. The negative association between time resources and civic activities is weakened somewhat, but still remains. Variations in educational level cannot explain this paradoxical finding either.

One can continue controlling for one conceivable factor after another. To study the simultaneous effect of several different control variables, the most appropriate procedure is to use one of the more advanced statistical methods, such as multiple

regression analysis. All these analyses will not be presented here, but the general result is unchanged. The negative association between time resources and activities is weakened somewhat after controlling for other factors, but this association essentially remains. It does not change, under any circumstances, to a positive association.

Furthermore, it turns out that having children does not have the expected effect on citizen involvement, either. On the contrary, there is a positive association between the number of children at home and citizen involvement. The more children a person has, the more active he is in politics and voluntary organizations. This association remains even after controlling for sex, age, educational level and time resources.

Table 9.7 Time resources and personality traits

	Association (r) with time_resources
Someone who enjoys organizing activities for other people	-0.15
Someone who finds it easy to contact public agencies and companies	-0.13
Someone who avoids conflicts (note positive correlation)	0.12
Someone who often has a bad conscience	-0.11
Someone who is happy when surrounded by a lot_of_people	-0.10

The simple hypothesis about the role of time resources is therefore not supported by our data. It is apparently misleading to view time as a fixed quantity, which all citizens fill to the

same extent with various activities. The people who are active in public life are not those who have a lot of spare time. On the contrary, family life and public activities are cumulative. Some people seem to have time for everything. Those who work, start families and have children are also those who devote themselves to politics and organizations.

The replies to the questions about personality type provide a bit of guidance about the actual identity of these citizens with the filled-up pocket calendars. Table 9.7 shows which personality traits have the strongest associations with the quantity of available time. Negative associations mean that the personality traits listed are usually found in people with little free time.

This busiest of citizens is an extroverted person who often takes initiatives, is not afraid of conflicts, but is plagued by a bad conscience, possibly about not having time for everything.

Power Within the Family

The results of the citizenship survey we have reported so far have had in common that they were based on a representative sample of people aged 16-80 living in Sweden. This type of cross-sectional sample is the most suitable for systematically studying the differences among various population groups. But this traditional way of structuring a survey is not a method that is best suited in all respects for drawing conclusions about the importance of family structure. In an ordinary cross-sectional sample, it is the individual, not the family, that is the unit under study. All data about family conditions will thus originate from a single person -- the one who has been chosen at random to participate in the survey.

To obtain a better factual basis for drawing conclusions about the importance of the family, the main survey was supplemented with a smaller sample of married couples.⁴ The sample was taken in such a way as to be representative of married couples, at the same time as these couples could be part of the overall sample of individuals. The interview questionnaire that we employed was the same as for the other respondents.

This sample originally consisted of 347 couples. Interviews were conducted with both spouses in 264 of these cases. The percentage response was thus 76 percent. This is somewhat lower than the percentage for the field survey as a whole. The reason is that in some cases, it was only possible to interview one spouse. This single interview could, of course, be used as part of our sample of individuals, but it was regarded as having been eliminated from our sample of couples. The drop-out rate from the sample was only marginally higher than in the main sample, however. The percentage who actually responded must be regarded as fully satisfactory for this type of survey.⁵

The size of the sample of married couples strikes a balance between two contradictory wishes. On the one hand, the sample

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4. The population registry list used in selecting respondents only contains data about formal marital status. There was thus no simple method for identifying unmarried people living together under marriage-like conditions. The sample therefore consists only of married couples.
 5. One source of error which tends to overestimate the similarity between spouses is that the spouse interviewed second may have listened to, and been influenced by, the replies of the first-interviewed spouse. The interviews were therefore instructed to carefully make sure that each interview was conducted one-on-one.

should be as large as possible. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that the interviewed couples are also part of the overall survey. The more couples there are, the more observations are partly dependent on each other, and the greater is the uncertainty in statistical estimates. The total number of couples who were interviewed is sufficiently large to enable us to draw general conclusions about similarities and differences within families. But the material does not allow detailed analyses of small groups in the sub-sample.

One first question is: How homogeneous or heterogeneous are these married couples? The age differences between spouses are shown in Table 9.8. Their homogeneity is relatively great. For most couples, 62 percent, the age difference between spouses is three years or less. The husband is generally older than the wife.

Table 9.8 Married couples: age differences

	Percentage
Wife more than 3 years older than husband	6
Wife 1-3 years older than husband	14
Born the same year	10
Husband 1-3 years older than wife	38
Husband 4-6 years older than wife	21
Husband more than 6 years older than wife	11
Total percentage	100

The husbands and wives in the interviewed couples had largely the same level of education. In this respect, too, there is a relatively close match (Table 9.9). It is very unusual for a

person with a high level of education (defined here as a university-level education or a three-year academic major at an upper secondary school) is married to a person who has only received compulsory schooling (six- or seven-year primary, experimental "unitary" school or nine-year compulsory comprehensive school). People with a high level of education are generally married to each other. The main diagonal line in Table 9.9 is a measure of the percentage of married couples in which both spouses have exactly the same level of education (represented by the three-degree scale employed here). Nearly two thirds, 64 percent, are equal in terms of educational level.

Table 9.9 Married couples: differences in educational level

Husband's_education_level	Wife's_educational_level			Total, men
	Low	Medium	High	
Low	23	10	3	35
Medium	11	21	4	35
High	3	7	20	30
Total, women	36	37	27	100

In terms of occupation, there is largely the same kind of match. The figures in Table 9.10 are based on the husband's and the wife's own occupation, respectively. This analysis includes 93 percent of interviewed couples; for the remaining 7 percent, there is no occupational classification for one of the spouses (usually older women who have been housewives all their lives). If occupations are divided into three groups, roughly two thirds of all couples end up in the same category here, too. If we choose to merge white-collar employees and business owners into a single category, the result is that 71 percent of couples

are homogeneous in terms of class. Marriages across "class lines" thereby number 29 percent: in 14 percent of all cases, the husband is a blue-collar worker and the wife is either a white-collar employee or business owner, and in 15 percent of all cases the wife is a blue-collar worker and the husband is either a white-collar employee or a business owner.

Table 9.10 Married couples: occupational differences

Husband's occupation	Wife's occupation			Total, husbands
	Blue-collar	White-collar	Business owner	
Blue-collar	21	13	2	36
White-collar	12	39	2	54
Business owner	2	4	4	10
Total, wives	35	57	8	100

The line between blue-collar workers and white-collar employees is essentially equivalent to the line between occupations represented by the unions affiliated with the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and the Central Organization of Salaried Employees (TCO), respectively. But this occupational classification conceals major variations within groups. Among white-collar employees, in particular, there are great differences between high-level employees in managerial positions, on the one hand, and low-level personnel in offices or public agencies, on the other. Another classification shows these differences better. Table 9.11 includes only employees: farmers and business owners have been left out here. The first category includes blue-collar workers and lower-level white-collar employees. The second category consists of middle-level white-collar employees. The third category comprises high-level white-collar employees.

Table 9.11 Married couples: occupational differences among employees

Husband's occupation	Wife's occupation			Total, husbands
	Blue-collar, lower-level white-collar	Middle- level white-collar	High-level white- collar	
Blue-collar, lower- level white-collar	35	8	0	44
Middle-level white-collar	13	12	2	27
High-level white-collar	12	12	5	29
Total, wives	60	32	8	100

The segregation of the labor market by sexes is clearly evident here. Of all wives, 60 percent were in low-level positions, compared with 44 percent of all husbands. Of all couples included in the analysis, 53 percent end up in the main diagonal line, that is, at the same occupational level. Nearly half of all couples are thus heterogeneous in class terms, using this method of calculation. The three squares at the lower left contain 37 percent of the couples; this means that in more than one third of the cases analyzed, the husband has a higher occupational position than the wife. The opposite is substantially less common; in only one out of ten cases does the wife have a higher position than the husband. It is extremely rare for a woman in a managerial position to be married to a husband who is a blue-collar worker or low-level white-collar employee.

The homogeneity of married couples does not apply merely to age, educational level and occupation. Political affinities are

at least as close. Table 9.12 shows the association between the party sympathies of spouses. In this presentation, the political parties represented in Parliament have been merged into a socialist and a nonsocialist bloc. The remaining small parties are reported separately. It is worth pointing out that this analysis only includes those couples where both spouses stated a party sympathy. Couples in which at least one spouse was unable or unwilling to state a party sympathy comprised 32 percent of the total. Table 9.12 is thus based on two thirds of the interviewed couples.

Table 9.12 Married couples: differences in party sympathy

Husband's party	Wife's party			Total, husbands
	Social Dems, Left Party Communists	Non-socialist parties	Other parties	
Social Democrats, Left Party Communists	48	6	2	56
Non-socialist parties	7	28	4	39
Other parties	1	1	3	4
Total, wives	55	35	9	100

A majority of those respondents who state any party sympathy, both among men and among women, support one of the two socialist parties: the Social Democrats or the Left Party Communists. This distribution of replies is not specific to the sub-sample made up of married couples. In the overall sample, too, there is a

preponderance of socialist party sympathizers.⁶

In terms of their sympathies for political party blocs, the great majority of families are homogeneous. Among those married couples where both spouses state a party sympathy, only 13 percent sympathize with different blocs. If the number of couples who are heterogeneous in this respect is divided by the total number of interviewed couples, also including those in which one or both of the spouses do not have or do not wish to state a party sympathy, the figure is 9 percent. Roughly one couple out of ten were thus political mixed in the sense that they were supporters of different blocs.

6. Compared with the 1985 election results, the deviation for all the interviewees in the citizenship survey is nearly 2 percentage points upward for the socialist bloc, more than 2 percentage points upward for small parties and about 4 percent downward for the nonsocialists. In the sub-sample of married couples, the deviation for each bloc is about 1 percentage point greater, in the direction stated. One cannot expect the distribution of replies in the sample to coincide entirely with the results of the previous election. Aside from the chance sources of error that always affect random sample surveys, there are also other differences. The interviews were carried out in the fall of 1987, more than two years after the election. The interview question does not concern voting, either, but party sympathy. Experience shows that a number of presumably nonsocialist voters have a difficult time expressing an exact party sympathy; the relatively low percentages for the nonsocialist parties are probably, in part, an expression of this uncertainty among voters who have vague nonsocialist preferences. It is also natural in party sympathy polls taken during periods between elections for small parties to receive higher percentages than during actual elections. Both the electoral system and election campaigns favor the established parties.


spouses are identical quite naturally falls. Switching from bloc sympathy to party sympathy therefore results in a table with 7 X 7 or 49 squares. (The complete material is not presented here.) But the proportion of all couples appearing in the main diagonal line -- those who sympathize with the same party -- is still no less than 72 percent of all couples in the table. In a completely random distribution -- that is, if party politics did not play any part in the relationship between spouses, those sympathizing with the same party (given the distribution of parties in the sample) would have numbered only 34 percent.⁷

Homogeneity of political party sympathies in married couples is thus very high. It is the exception for spouses to have divergent party sympathies.⁸

In the same way as with age, social background and party politics, couples can also be described with the help of various aspects of citizenship identified in this book. Figure 9.5 illustrates the basic model that is used here to characterize the various dimensions of citizenship.

The horizontal axis indicates the husband's level of commitment (activity, feeling of influence or the equivalent). The vertical axis shows the corresponding level of involvement by

-
7. The deviations between observed scores and expected scores, assuming their independence, are the fundamental element of chi-squares, a common way of measuring statistical associations. The chi-square value for the 7X7 table is 349.5, a high score under any circumstances (contingency coefficient $C = 0.82$, Cramer's $V = 0.58$).
 8. A field interview survey with parents of teenagers arrived at the same finding. See Anders Westholm, upcoming dissertation.



Figur 9.6 Homogenitet och arbetsfördelning




Figure 9.6 Homogeneity and division of labor

the wife. In the simplest case, the degree of citizen involvement may assume two different scores: active or passive. The number of possible combinations in this case is four. Either both spouses are passive, both are active, or one is active but not the other.

Each of the interviewed couples can thus be placed somewhere in the diagram on the basis of interview replies. The interesting question is what combinations are actually the most common. Figure 9.6 shows two conceivable patterns of association.

The first example means that the couples are homogeneous. If one spouse is passive, the other is passive. The opposite is also true here, too: activity on the part of one is accompanied by activity on the part of the other. Putting it statistically, a positive association prevails in this example. The other example shows the opposite pattern. A negative association indicates that only one of the spouses is active. This negative association is one sign that the dominant pattern is the division of labor in the family. These two examples are extremes. In reality, there

may be intermediate positions. The absence of any association means that the various combinations are equally common. Table 9.13 provides an overview of the associations (correlations) for a number of different dimensions of citizenship.

Table 9.13 Married couples: the realization of citizenship

	Association (r) husband-wife
Has taken initiatives as:	
Resident	0.36
Consumer	0.39
Patient	0.24
Parent of preschool child(ren)	0.29
Parent of school child(ren)	0.33
Gainfully employed person	0.33
Initiatives: summary index	0.41
Assessment of chance of influence as:	
Resident	0.59
Consumer	0.25
Patient	0.39
Parent of preschool child(ren)	0.49
Parent of school child(ren)	0.49
Gainfully employed person	0.23
Chance of influence: summary index	0.50
Activities as:	
Resident	0.64
Parent of preschool child(ren)	0.47
Parent of school children	0.36
Gainfully employed person	0.16

Administrative competence	0.30
Political participation:	
Contacts	0.24
Party activities	0.57
Manifestations	0.46
Protests	0.28
Voting	0.50
Interest in politics	0.29
Party identification	0.40
Membership in voluntary organizations	0.52
Positions and activities in voluntary organizations	0.35
Perception of trade union influence	0.19
Affinity_with_organized_movements_____	0.42_____

The results are clear. The dominant pattern is homogeneity. All associations, without exception, are significant and go in a positive direction. Spouses are usually alike, not different.

A closer examination of the long series of coefficients in the table indicates, however, that the strength of the association varies. Some of these variations must be interpreted with caution. Some aspects of citizenship generate involvement by only a small number of people: the statistical association between two lopsidedly distributed variables is usually low. But not all hypotheses can be attributed to the method of measurement. One hypothesis that is close at hand is supported by the data, in fact. Those citizenship activities that are close to the family sphere show high levels of association. Activities as a resident, for example, often bring both spouses together (0.64), while activities at the workplace often generate involvement by only one spouse (0.16).

This general observation must not be pushed too far, however. It is by no means true that political participation and involvement in voluntary organizations usually divide two spouses. On the contrary, in these areas there are usually high levels of association. Families are characterized by political homogeneity not only when it comes to the direction of involvement (party sympathy) but also in terms of its strength (participation).

The associations between spouses are consistently positive, but nevertheless by no means complete. In all the respects studied here, there is at least a certain percentage of couples who are characterized by division of labor. Table 9.14 shows some examples.

In those cases where only one spouse is involved, it is more common for the husband to be active. When it comes to most forms of activity, it is relatively unusual for the wife to be active while the husband is passive. But there are exceptions, of course; these coincide with those areas that were singled out in Chapter 6 as female-dominated activities. For example, they include personal care, activities related to the situation of children, political participation in the form of manifestations and protests, and membership in such types of voluntary associations as humanitarian aid organizations and religious denominations.

Table 9.14 Married couples: division of labor in civic activities

	Both	Husband only	Wife only	Neither
Housing				
Contact with residents' association	11	13	4	72
Participated in organized resident activity	10	6	6	77
Participated in activity with neighbors	15	8	7	70

Parenthood: preschool children				
Had a talk with child care staff	43	9	31	17
Had a talk with parents on child care	26	3	37	34
Participated in activity at day care center or the like	40	11	20	29
Arranged activity at day care center or the like	6	3	3	89
Parenthood: school children				
Attended parents' meeting	87	0	11	1
Contact with teacher or school admin.	46	11	30	13
Contact with Parent-Teacher Association	11	13	25	51
Contact with other parents	42	4	27	27
Served as class mother/father	15	6	24	55
Gainful employment (employees)				
Contact with union or safety steward	30	33	16	22
Contact with foreman, employer	55	21	11	12
Elected position at workplace	6	23	9	62
Politics				
Member of political party	11	10	2	77
Attended political meeting	4	7	5	84
Elected public position	3	8	5	85
Very or rather interested in politics	35	34	8	23
Supporter of political party	50	19	11	20
Voted	91	5	1	3
Participated in public demonstration	19	12	12	57
Addressed meeting	24	34	8	33
Wrote article or letter to editor	9	18	11	62
Membership in voluntary associations				
Sports club	21	16	7	55
Outdoor activities club	6	8	5	81
Environmental organization	3	3	4	90
Cultural club	11	10	10	70
Hobby club	3	10	16	71

Automobile organization etc.	3	19	2	76
Parents' club	8	5	8	79
Investment club	1	6	3	89
Group within Church of Sweden	2	1	5	92
Other Protestant denomination	6	0	2	92
Other religious denomination	1	1	2	96
Humanitarian aid organization	5	4	11	81
Peace organization	1	2	3	94
<u>Group_for_international_issue</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>96</u>

Figures in the table are percentages. Each line totals 100 percent.

If all central aspects of citizenship are summarized, one finds that the wife is more active and involved in 29 percent of cases, while in the remaining 71 percent of cases, the husband has the higher score.⁹

9. This figure is based on an analysis in several stages. First a series of variables is formed, consisting of the difference between the scores of husband and wife. The variables in question are: took initiative to exercise influence (summary index), assessment of chance to exercise influence (summary index), the five dimensions of political participation, interest in politics, party identification, administrative competence, number of memberships in voluntary organizations, assessment of trade union influence and affinity with organized movements (summary index). A positive difference signifies that the husband has higher scores than the wife. After that, the mean valued of these thirteen differences is formed. This mean comprises an overall yardstick of which spouse is more involved. A negative mean signifies that the wife is more active, a positive mean than the husband is more active.

Despite a general similarity between spouses, there is consequently still some variation. In some families, the husband is dominant; in a somewhat smaller number, the wife dominates. What is the reason behind these variations? A number of different hypotheses and possible associations can be tested; there are also many alternative methods of conducting this test.¹⁰ Table 9.15 summarizes the main findings. The table is based on a multiple regression analysis, with the wife's participation level as the dependent variable. The b-values in the first column are a yardstick of the relative effect of a number of explanatory variables.¹¹

Only three of the explanatory factors is statistically significant: the husband's participation, the wife's own educational level and the wife's own income. The first finding is entirely expected: it merely reflects the already known fact that families in general are homogeneous, that there is a positive

10. For various reasons, it is not very suitable to conduct the test directly using the yardstick of differences described in the preceding paragraph. Given the often lopsided distribution of participation variables involved here, the differences/residuals will, of necessity, be larger the participation level is. The yardstick of differences will therefore consist of a mixture of relative and absolute levels, making the results hard to interpret.

11. The yardstick of participation is the average of the wife's and husband's respective scores on six indicators: the five dimensions of political participation and membership in voluntary organizations. A parallel analysis has been conducted, using a broader measurement for participation/involvement: an average of the thirteen indicators mentioned earlier in this section. The outcome of the regression analysis is nevertheless the same.

correlation between the activity level of spouses. The husband's participation has still been included in this analysis, for the important reason that the possible effect of the other factors on the wife's participation can be studied with reference to the fact that the family's participation level -- here in the form of the husband's activity -- has been placed under control. This provides a measure of the relative effect of various possible explanatory factors.¹²

Table 9.15 Married couples: reasons behind the wife's participation after keeping the husband's participation constant

	Standardized regression coefficient	Level of significance
Wife's participation		
Husband's participation	0.40	0.00
Wife's age	0.11	0.13
Wife's educational level	0.21	0.00
Husband's educational level	-0.05	0.50
Wife's income	0.14	0.02
Husband's income	0.00	0.98
Wife's spare time	-0.01	0.83
Husband's spare time	-0.11	0.14
Number of children at home	0.10	0.13


The result is not entirely self-evident. It turns out that certain potential determinants do not have any independent

12. A corresponding analysis where the husband's participation is a dependent variable yields largely parallel results. The only significant effects observed here are for the wife's participation and the husband's own educational level.

provable effect. Available time resources -- measured by asking how much time is left over after subtracting home chores, work and sleep -- have no significant effect; instead, as pointed out earlier in this chapter, there is a weak negative correlation. Nor does the number of children living at home appear to hinder political participation by married women. There is one circumstance that determines the outcome more than any other: the wife's own educational level. The general association between educational level and participation has an impact in this case, too, even after several other potential factors have been brought into the picture.

In other words, education can strengthen the comparative position of the wife. But the division of political labor in the family still predominantly benefits the male partner. As a closing illustration, let us show how the two spouses perceive their chance of influencing their situation (Figure 9.7). The replies are based on the questions presented earlier in Chapter 2; they deal with housing, medical care, consumption, child care, schools and gainful employment. A summary yardstick is presented here: the difference between the husband and the wife. If both spouses had exactly the same assessment of their chance of exercising influence, the difference would be zero. A negative score means that the wife states her chance of influence in lower figures than her husband does.

In most cases the difference is fairly small. The two spouses usually have similar assessments of their own influence over these areas of their lives. But in some cases there is a big difference. There are families where the husband feels he has a good chance of exercising influence, but his wife thinks her chance is poor. The opposite is very uncommon. The distribution is not symmetrical. The chance of exercising influence is more favorable to husbands than wives.



Figur 9.7 Giftna par: frekvensfördelning över skillnaden mellan makens och makans bedömning av möjligheten att påverka sin situation

The Distribution of Power Within the Family

So far this chapter, like the previous ones in this book, has discussed power over one's surroundings -- both over the external circumstances that determine a person's own living situation and over social developments and politics as a whole. But there is an additional aspect of the power of citizens: power within the family itself. The daily life of the family consists of numerous large or small decisions. As in the case of decisions involving major social issues, the many decisions made by families may involve a low or high level of consensus and varying degrees of conflict. The distribution of power between husband and wife may either be uneven, in the sense that one spouse always dominates the other, or even in the sense that both spouses have an influence on the decisions that shape the future of their family.

The citizenship survey asked four questions that directly gauge the distribution of power in the family. They all deal with the situation that arises when spouses have different opinions. How good a chance does the respondent think he has of getting his own way? The replies were plotted along the same type of scale were other questions about the chance of influencing one's own situation in other respects. The replies ranged from 0 (no chance) and 10 (very good chance). The wording of the questions and the replies can be found in Table 9.16.13

13. The table is based only on married couples. The results are essentially the same when the analysis is based on the entire sample.

Table 9.16 Married couples: power within the family

Chance_of_getting_one's_way_concerning_____	Husbands	Wives
Major purchases for the family or home	6.4	7.1
How the household work will be apportioned	5.5	6.5
How much time will be devoted to the family	6.3	6.7
How the children will be raised (couples with children living at home)	6.1	7.0
Average_index_____	6.1	6.8

Wording of the question: "As you know, family members sometimes disagree. If you and your husband/ wife/companion should happen to have different opinions, how good a chance do you think you have of getting your way when it comes to..."

As noted earlier, men feel they have greater influence on their situation. When it comes to conditions within the family, the picture is the opposite. Wives make a more favorable estimate of their chance of influence than husbands do. The differences are not dramatic, but they are clear. Women have greater influence over all four aspects of family life mentioned in the interview: purchases, the apportionment of household work, time allocation and child-raising.

The next question is how the assessments of two spouses relate to each other? If power were a constant sum, the association should be negative: the greater power one spouse feels he or she has, the less the other should consequently have. Table 9.17 shows the associations that were observed.

Table 9.17 Married couples: associations between spouses' assessments of their own power within the family

Chance_of_getting_one's_way_concerning_____	Association (r) between spouses
Major purchases	0.22
Apportionment of household work	0.08
Allocation of time	0.25
Child-raising	0.25
Average_index_____	0.30

The zero-sum hypothesis is incorrect. The association is not negative, but positive. When one spouse feels that he or she has great influence, the other spouse usually feels the same. Families do not primarily differ in the sense that some are male-dominated and others are female-dominated. The dividing line, instead, is between families where both spouses feel they have influence and those where both of them feel powerless.

Although the associations are positive, they are by no means complete. There are many exceptions from the general rule. In cases where two spouses make different assessments of their chance of getting their way, it is usually the wife who makes the more positive assessment. Table 9.18 breaks down married couples by the two spouses' assessments of their power within the family. Roughly speaking, there are twice as many families where the wife considers her chance of influence more positive than families where the husband dominates, according to the assessments of the two spouses.

Each assessment of the respondent's chance of getting his way presupposes a situation where there is disagreement. The question is: How often do such situations actually occur? As Table 9.19 indicates, the most common view is that such situations occur relatively rarely.

Table 9.18 Married couples: differences in spouses' opinion of power within the family

Influence_on_____	More positive assessment of one's power_within_family_			Total
	Husband_	Equal_	Wife_	
Major purchases	21	40	39	100
Apportionment of household work	22	31	46	100
Allocation of time	25	38	37	100
Child-raising	18	35	47	100
Average_index_____	29	18	53	100

There is relatively great agreement in the spouses' assessment of the family's conflict level (the correlation is 0.46). But in four out of ten families, the spouses have different opinions on how often their views diverge. In such cases, husbands tend to have a more harmonious image. According to wives, the level of conflict is higher.

Table 9.19 Married couples: conflicts within the family

Conflicts_occur_____	According to_husband_	According to_wife_
Very often	1	1
Rather often	8	12
Rather rarely	50	50
Very rarely	40	37
Total_percentage_____	100	100

Wording of the question: "How often do you and your wife/husband/companion have different opinions in the cases I just mentioned?"

The family may be viewed in this way as a small society within society. The next question is: To what extent are conditions within the family connected with the family's relationships with the larger society? Is someone who feels he has power within the family also someone who feels he has power over his life situation generally? Or is there, perhaps, a negative association: does a person who is restrained within the family compensate for this via voluntary organizations and politics?

Neither hypothesis has particularly strong support. A person's assessment of his own chance of influencing the family's decisions has a weakly positive association with his assessment of his chance of influencing his situation as a whole. But closer examination indicates that this tendency toward a positive association is, above all, connected with certain highly natural correlations: someone who feels he can get his way when it comes to major purchases also tends to have a favorable assessment of his chance of influence as a consumer. In the same way, there is a correlation between a person's opinion of his chance of getting his way in child care and his opinion of his own power over child care. But otherwise, the associations are weak and unsystematic. It has not been possible to find evidence that a person's assessment of his chance of influence within the family has any strong association with any of the dimensions of citizenship we have studied. Nor does the distribution of power in the family differ especially greatly between various groups, in terms of age, educational level, occupation etc.

The family has its own power structure. But this is essentially unconnected with the power of a citizen in the larger society. What decides the mutual relationships between husband

and wife in a marriage lies outside the scope of this survey.¹⁴

14. It falls outside the range of this study to discuss psychological and medical aspects of family life. As an example of research that examines the consequences of the division of power within the family, it is worth mentioning one finding: There are indications that the occurrence of depression is lowest when both spouses share decision-making in the family, compared with families where only one spouse makes all decisions. See John Mirowski, "Depression and Marital Power: An Equity Model," *American Journal of Sociology*, 91, 1985, pp. 557-592.

10. Citizens in Transition

The earlier chapters in this book may be regarded as a number of group portraits of the citizens in the welfare state of Sweden in 1987. Although our perspective has been many-faceted, perhaps the reader, like us, has sometimes wondered to what extent these snapshots would have appeared different if they had been taken during another period. How would things look if we could run the film backwards? Would the description we have presented in fact turn out to be the result of a far-reaching process of change? Or would we find that the picture repeats itself -- that the ability of citizens to assert their rights has remained essentially unchanged?

For reasons explained earlier, the citizenship survey is an independent study. Its main purpose has not been to repeat earlier surveys. It has not, however, been our intention to ignore the historical perspective entirely. For certain key indicators, it has been possible to preserve comparability with prior years. It is thereby possible to abandon our still camera and peek into the tunnel of time.

The questions that give us this opportunity were previously asked in the series of studies of living standards that began in

1968, with new surveys conducted in 1974 and 1981.¹ Aside from data on occupation, educational level, age and sex, seven measurements from these studies will be used in this chapter. Three of them are questions that measure membership, activity level and elected positions in political parties. Another three are related to various forms of individual and collective opinion-molding with no firm connection to party activity. The seventh and last concerns respondents' subjective feelings about their ability to assert their own interests against central government and other public agencies.²

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1. For a summary of the findings of these studies of living standards, see Robert Erikson and Rune Åberg, eds., *Välfärd i förändring* (Well-Being and Change), Prisma, Stockholm, 1984. Technical documentation is found in code books published by the Department of Social Research at the University of Stockholm. The samples in the three surveys are representative of residents of Sweden at the time of the interviews. The size of the samples was 6,522, 6,593 and 6,813 people, respectively, with response levels of 90.8, 85.8 and 82.3 percent, respectively. Most of the material consists of a follow-up study in which the same individuals were interviewed on these three occasions. This makes it possible to observe individual changes over time. The age limits for the sample used in the living standard studies is not exactly the same as those of the citizenship survey. To achieve comparability, the analyses in this chapter are therefore limited to people who reached an age of between 16 and 76 during the year each respective survey was conducted.
 2. Regarding the earlier analysis of these measurements in the living standard series, the reader is referred to Ryszard Szulkin, "Politiska resurser" ("Political Resources"), in Erikson and Åberg, 1984, pp. 243-266.

The task will be to establish whether, and in what ways, Sweden has changed in these areas during the twenty-year period we are able to follow. But this also raises the question of how this change, or lack of it, should be understood. Let us therefore begin with a brief look at the concept of social and political change.

Theories About Social and Political Change

The study of social change is perhaps the most important and most fascinating challenge of social research, especially sociology. Many of the foremost inspirers of modern social science have devoted their lives to discovering the laws that control processes of change and with whose help these processes can be explained and predicted. Marx's theories of the transformation of the class society, Durkheim's ideas on the association between modernization and suicide, Michel's formulation of the iron law of oligarchy and Rostow's theory of the stages of economic development all claim to have finally captured the essence of change. But to a greater or lesser degree, they have all proved wrong.

Now, this does not mean that they have to be thrown on the scrap heap of the history of social science research. In reviewing theories of social change, French sociologist Raymond Boudon has pointed to another alternative. The shortcomings of these universal theories, Boudon believes, are not attributable to any lack of good ideas. On the contrary, there is reason to believe that many of them are still fruitful. Instead, it is their claim to universality that comprises the main problem. According to Boudon, social change must be regarded as containing

a fundamental element of disorder. The nomological -- or lawmaking -- ambition of these theories is therefore in vain. In their universal form, they are condemned to failure.³

But this does not mean that social science must give up its demand for theoretical abstraction. Different models of social change, whether they originally had nomological ambitions or not, may be viewed as stylizations or ideal types, whose empirical applicability in concrete cases is an open question. This changes them from empirical theories in the nomological sense to sources of inspiration for the posing of testable hypotheses. The ideal type in itself cannot be falsified. Only its applicability in a particular case can be rejected. The researcher must be prepared for constant openness.

This argument can be extended to apply to all social science research aimed at explaining empirical phenomena. But the call for openness is doubly relevant when studying social change in particular. First, it requires being prepared for the idea that a certain type of change cannot always be explained in the same way. Second, there must also be an openness to the possibility that causal mechanisms may change during the course of the process. A change may be -- but need not be -- stable in the sense that the causes of the phenomenon under study remain the same on every date surveyed.

Let us develop this thought a bit. Suppose that an increase has been observed in, say, the level of political participation. One possibility is that this microphenomenon, M, may be regarded

3. Raymond Boudon, *Theories of Social Change: A Critical Appraisal*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1986. Originally published in French as *La place du désordre: Critique des théories du changement social*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1984.

as the result of an increased number of individual acts, m , caused by an increase in the number of individuals who find themselves in a situation, s , that leads to m . The concept of a higher level of education as the driving force of social development can serve as one among many examples of this type of explanation. As more and more people become more and more highly educated, a larger proportion of them will find themselves in a situation, s , which provides a motive for, or removes the obstacles to, attempts at political action, m . The number of such acts, M , will therefore rise. Such a process of change is stable, inasmuch as the effect of different levels of education with regard to m remains the same during the course of developments.

The fact that the process is stable does not necessarily mean that change is linear or even monotonously rising or falling. First, it is of course possible that the shift in the independent variable will change strength or even direction. Second, a given quantity of change need not have the same importance, independently of where on the scale it occurs.


Ronald Inglehart's (revised) theory of value changes in modern industrial societies can serve as an example of the latter thought. Inglehart believes that the increased importance of what he calls postmaterialistic values can be seen as the result of "the diminishing marginal utility of economic determinism." As long as the general standard of living is at a relatively low level, variations in material conditions will be very important. As general well-being rises, the differences (in absolute terms) will have less and less effect on people's political stances.⁴

4. Ronald Inglehart, "Value Change in Industrial Society," *American Political Science Review*, 81, 1987, pp. 1289-1303. In its original form, Inglehart's theory was based on Maslow's hierarchy model for human needs. See Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977.

The occurrence of a diminishing (or growing) effect may apply, in some cases, to both end points of the scale. In a famous study of the spread of medical innovation, James Coleman and his colleagues found that the acceptance of new treatment techniques among physicians at a hospital showed an S-shaped (sigmoid) curve. See Figure 10.1.A. In this case, the cause could be found in the underlying communication process. At first, the diffusion process moved slowly because only a tiny minority had tried the technique yet and could recommend it to their colleagues. After an intermediate period of acceleration, the speed of diffusion again declined, this time because the number of physicians who still sought information on the new technique was declining.⁵

An unstable process of change differs from the ones discussed above insofar as the statistical association between s and m does not remain constant. One example can be taken from a recent study of the trend of political participation in the United States. In an analysis of the relationship between race and participation during the past two decades, Norman Nie, Sidney Verba and their colleagues found that the association had changed. Blacks admittedly participated to a lesser extent than whites on both survey dates. But taking educational levels into account, it turned out that participation by blacks had exceeded that of whites in the 1967 survey, while the opposite was true of the study conducted in 1987. According to the authors, the explanation presumably lies in a change in the political situation. The civil rights movement signified a powerful mobilization of blacks, bringing them up to a level of participation far above the normally expected figure, especially among people with little education. But as the political agenda changed, this mobilization effect faded and black participation diminished. See Figure 10.1.B.6 The association between situation and action had changed.

5. J. Coleman, E. Katz and H. Menzel, *Medical Innovation. A Diffusion Study*, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1966.



Figur 10.1 Tre typer av förändring




Figure 10.1 Three types of change

In the same way, Paul Beck and Kent Jennings showed in an earlier survey how political participation among conservatives and liberals changed between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s. While the figures from the 1960s confirmed the traditional image of conservative overrepresentation, the data from the 1970s showed the opposite situation. The authors once again point to the importance of the political agenda. Between the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the political climate witnessed a transformation in the structure of opportunities and incentives for political participation.⁷

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6. Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, Kay L. Schlozman, Henry R. Brady and Jane Junn, "Participation in America: Continuity and Change," unpublished manuscript.
 7. Paul Allen Beck and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Periods and Political Participation," *American Political Science Review*, 73, 1979, pp. 737-750.

Generally speaking, in both cases the explanation may be understood as an interaction between an individual situation (race or ideological position) and a collective situation (the political agenda). Individual motives depend on the political context. Changes in participation cannot be understood by referring to either factor. Nor is it meaningful to try to specify the relative importance of the two causal factors. The explanation is found in a combination.

All the types of models discussed so far have in common that it is assumed that a change can be explained by referring to outside (exogenous) factors. Certain phenomena are singled out as causes, others as effects. This neglects the possibility that a change is actually self-generating (endogenous). Going back to the above example, under certain circumstances political participation could be both cause and effect.

This idea is perhaps not as far-fetched as it may seem at first. In fact, it is one of the most popular themes in general cultural debate. Such historical accounts begin with the fact that during the late 1960s, there was a dramatic increase in political involvement. Society was literally bubbling with collective and public activity. This trend became stronger for a time. But eventually, some time during the 1970s, a turning point was reached. People's public self was sated. Disappointment and cynicism about the lack of results became more widespread. Social commitment slowed down. People shut themselves into their cocoon. Their interest turned to private and family life. But their involvement with this smaller world also led to saturation and disappointment. So the curve turned again.

Such a historical account can be used as the basis for a general theory, and this has also been done. The best-known example is probably Albert Hirschman's book *Shifting*

Involvements. According to Hirschman, modern society undergoes a constant shift of emphasis between public and private life. The main driving force behind this interplay is frustration and disappointment with the current sphere of involvement, paired with the constant hope that a better solution can be sought in the other. The result is a cyclical endogenous model of change. See Figure 10.1.C.8

It should perhaps be pointed out that there is not necessarily any association between the cyclical element, on the one hand, and the endogenous element, on the other. Changes can be cyclical without being endogenous, for example in the case of seasonal variations in the market for foodstuffs. They can also be considered endogenous without being cyclical, as in the spiral theories devised to explain the arms race and opinion-molding.⁹ But with regard to the study objects that empirical interest focuses on in this chapter, Hirschman's combination is probably still the main variation.

The three types of processes now being discussed -- stable exogenous, unstable exogenous and cyclical endogenous processes -- are, of course, stylizations. It is conceivable that a given case might show greater or lesser elements of all three. The

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8. Albert O. Hirschman, *Shifting Involvements. Private Interests and Public Action*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1982.
 9. See, for example, Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976, pp. 62-78, and Elisabeth Noelle-Neuman, "The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion," *Journal of Communication*, 24, 1979, pp. 43-51.


question is therefore how empirically to prove the relevance of the various types. This question actually has two sides. On the one hand, we want to know whether a process is stable or unstable, exogenous or endogenous, cyclical or non-cyclical. On the other hand, it is at least equally a question of specifying its contents. Except for the Hirschman model, the types presented are undefined, insofar as they leave open what the exact causes consist of in each individual case.

The answer to both questions should ideally be sought by means of disaggregation. The variations in the dependent variable should be related to conceivable explanatory factors, both on and between the survey dates. Three main types of associations might conceivably result from such an examination (). One possibility is that the association will remain the same on all survey dates, while the average position of the independent variable shifts (Diagram A). To the extent that the shift of position multiplied by the strength of the association is as large as the aggregate change in the dependent variable, the latter has been completely explained. Another way of putting the same thing is that the observed change disappears, or at least becomes smaller, after controlling for the independent variable. Such a result can be labeled "additive change" and it signifies proof of a stable exogenous process of change.

Another possibility is that the association varies over time (Diagram B). Such variations are often of interest in themselves, because they signify that the degree of equality between different groups changes. At the same time, they always contribute to some extent to an understanding of aggregate change. This is because the size of the change will vary according to the position of the independent variable. The result can be called "interactive change" and mainly represents support

for an unstable exogenous process of change.¹⁰

Unlike the additive case, the interactive one requires no shift in the position of the independent variable in order to potentially contribute to an understanding of why a change has taken place. On the one hand, it provides special reason to recall the danger of incorrect causal conclusions. The position of various groups relative to each other can very well shift without any change in the total sum.



Figur 10.2 Tre typer av samband

Examples of:

A. Additive change

B. Interactive change

C. Independent change

Dependent variable

Independent variable

Figure 10.2 Three types of association

10. Under certain circumstances, a stable process can also be regarded as compatible with interaction. But then it is a special case, in which interaction is regarded as equivalent to non-linearity of the kind cited as an example above.

This is true especially if the process can be assumed to contain strong elements of competition. Assume that two companies change their shares of an expanding oil market. Say that the change is due to the fact that the first company has sold an oil reserve to the second company. Provided that the company that purchases the reserve is not able to produce significantly more efficiently than the company selling it, the sale does not contribute anything to an understanding of why the market as a whole is expanding. Now, instead assume that one company has discovered a new well that lowers production costs in relation to alternative forms of energy. In such a case, there is obviously a connection between changing market shares and the expansion of the market. Taken to its conclusions, the discussion implies that the credibility of an intractive explanation is ultimately a question of why relative positions change over time.¹¹

The third and final possibility is that a change turns out to be independent of the causal factor that has been tested. This is the case if the association remains constant and one or more supplementary conditions for additive change are not fulfilled. One such supplementary condition is that a change of position occurs in the independent variable. To the extent such a shift is lacking, any association does not contribute to an understanding of developments over time (Diagram C). Another supplementary condition is that the association is consistent with the shift of position. If the association is zero or goes in the wrong direction, the conclusion is once again negative.

11. In principle, of course, this question can also be tested empirically, although this often seems very difficult in practice. The explanation for this will probably ultimately assume the same form as the additive model. The latter therefore appears more fundamental in one respect.

In its purest form, the cyclically endogenous model implies that the negative conclusion should be the main result. No exogenous explanations should be available. But the endogenous approach also requires positive evidence. At a time interval amounting to about half the length of a cycle, we should find an opposite association between the earlier and current position of the dependent variable. This association should also be found at the individual level. Hirschman's model does not exclude individual variations independent of the point in time. If it did, it would immediately appear unreasonable. But it therefore instead implies the existence of individual cycles which are out of phase with the aggregate pattern of change. In order for the model in its current form to find empirical support, the existence of such cycles must be proven.

Changes of Level and Dimensionality

Before the thoughts presented above can be subjected to more detailed examination, two questions must be answered. One concerns the trend of changes in the population as a whole. To what extent have there actually been any general changes of level during the period we are able to follow? The second question concerns the mutual associations among the measurements under study. Do the individual indicators lend themselves to being grouped into a smaller number of fundamental dimensions, and in that case, have there been any changes in this dimensional structure?

The answer to the first question, briefly, is that changes of level have been very uneven. They vary greatly from one individual indicator to another. But the variations are far from

random. It turns out that they can be clearly traced back to the theoretical contents of individual questions, while demonstrating a significant element of dynamic systematics. Three main patterns are clear: slowing expansion, growing expansion and stagnation.

The first pattern is characteristic of changes in those measurements that can be labeled "administrative competence." In this case, the question refers to a person's subjective rating of his ability to assert himself against central and other government agencies, more specifically his ability to write a letter to appeal a decision by that agency. There is a marked increase here throughout the observed period (Table 10.1). In 1968 a majority -- 55 percent -- still felt they themselves could not appeal an incorrect decision by a public agency. Twenty years later the figure had dropped to 32 percent. The self-confidence of citizens in their contacts with public agencies has thus become substantially stronger. An increasingly large percentage of them feel they have a real chance to defend their own rights. The cognitive barriers against attempts to exercise influence have weakened.

But to some extent, this trend has run its course. The change was faster at the beginning of the period than toward its end. This applies especially to the lower part of the scale. Those in the worst starting position -- who cannot write an appeal letter and cannot find help either -- did not become fewer between 1981 and 1987. Instead, the position of the weakest group got worse.¹²

12. This finding is confirmed by Statistics Sweden's studies of living conditions (ULF). During the period 1978-1984, there was no decrease in the group that felt they entirely lacked a chance to appeal a decision. See Lars Häll, "Politiska resurser" ("Political Resources") in Joachim Vogel et al, *Ojämligheten i Sverige. Utveckling och nuläge, Levnadsförhållanden, Rapport 51*, Statistiska Centralbyrån, Stockholm, pp. 197-213.

Table 10.1 Administrative competence

	1968	1974	1981	1987
Can personally write a letter appealing a decision by a public agency	45.1	54.6	63.5	68.5
Cannot personally write such a letter but knows someone who can provide help	36.9	31.7	27.2	21.8
Cannot personally write such a letter and does not know anyone who can help	18.0	13.7	9.3	9.7
Total_percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The tendency toward slower growth applies only to this subjective yardstick of individual opportunities for influence. In contrast, those indicators of actual activity that are most closely equivalent to this measurement indicate growing expansion. Viewed in absolute terms, the increase must be regarded as impressive. The percentage of the population that had presented some kind of written statement of opinion in the media doubled during the period. The number of people who had addressed a meeting at some time nearly doubled (Table 10.2). There was also a sharp increase in another closely related measurement, but it was not repeated in the 1987 survey: The proportion of individuals who had contacted a person in a position of responsibility for the purpose of influencing a decision on some social issue grew from 6.8 percent in 1968 to 12.6 percent in 1981.¹³

13. See also Szulkin, 1984, p. 248.

Table 10.2 Participation in opinion-molding activities

	1968	1974	1981	1987
Has written a letter to the editor or article in a newspaper or magazine	10.0	11.4	16.0	20.4
Has spoken before a meeting of a club or organization	24.1	27.4	32.4	40.5
Has participated in a public demonstration	14.1	16.5	23.4	30.0

The same tendency can be noted for collective expressions of opinion, in the form of public demonstrations. Here too, there was a doubling -- from 14 percent in 1968 to 30 percent in 1987. Without a doubt, this trend is in dramatic contrast to the customary image of the vagaries of public involvement. Measured by participation in demonstrations, the political climate actually appears to be substantially hotter during the "calm" 1980s than during the "stormy" 1960s. In fact, this observation gives us reason to wonder to what extent the "Zeitgeist" lives its own life independently of actual developments. Is it perhaps simply that news values have changed, and that the demonstration that would have filled a full page if it had occurred in 1968 is greeted with a tired yawn at today's newspaper editorial offices?

Steeply rising curves are not found in every area, however. One important exception is citizens' involvement in political parties. The pattern here is characterized by stagnation. There is neither a clear declining trend nor a clear tendency toward an increase. The percentage of respondents who belonged to parties did, admittedly, grow slightly throughout the period. But at the same time, the curve for meeting activity turned downward after 1974, and the percentage of respondents who held elected positions fell after 1981. The parties became somewhat larger, but their members became less active (Table 10.3).

Table 10.3 Membership, activity and elected positions in political parties

	1968	1974	1981	1987
Is a member of a political party or other political organization	12.7	13.7	13.9	14.8
Has attended a political meeting or gathering during the past year	13.5	14.7	13.8	10.6
Holds an elected position in a political club or organization	2.2	2.6	3.1	2.3

Except for activity in political parties, the findings so far indicate that major changes have occurred since 1968. The question is: Do these changes also apply to the relationships among different yardsticks of activity? This problem has two aspects. On the other hand, the general strength of these relationships may have shifted. An increase means that activity is concentrated among a smaller number of people and that inequality, in terms of cumulation, has been strengthened. A decline indicates the opposite. On the other hand, the structure of relationships may also have changed. Activities may conceivably be related to each other in a different way in 1987 than they were in 1968.

Both issues can be tested by using a dimensional analysis (Table 10.4). The results indicate that no major changes have occurred either in strength or structure. Eigenvalues, which are a measurement of how strongly the replies to the different questions are connected to each other, admittedly rose somewhat between 1968 and 1981. But the increase was small and the results for 1987 signify a return to the 1968 level. The structure also remains mainly constant. On all survey dates, the data formed two

dimensions whose contents were essentially unchanged.¹⁴ The first was related to party activity, the second to individual opinion-molding. Participation in demonstrations has more in common with the second dimension but cannot be definitively classified under either one.

Table 10.4 Dimensional analysis of activity measurements

	1968		1974		1981		1987	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
Member of a political party	80	16	81	13	83	11	77	08
Has participated in a								
political meeting	77	20	76	24	76	29	77	22
Elected position in party	73	07	74	07	76	07	75	07
Has written to a newspaper	00	78	-01	80	02	79	06	80
Has spoken before a meeting	18	79	18	77	13	76	06	78
Has participated in a								
demonstration	18	43	22	45	22	49	28	44

Eigenvalue _____ 1.83 1.48 1.87 1.52 1.92 1.54 1.84 1.50

Principal component analysis, varimax-rotated solution. All loadings have been multiplied by 100.

The results provide a basis for combining some of the questions into summary indexes, thereby facilitating continued analysis.¹⁵ Party activity is based on the questions about membership, elected positions and meeting activity in political parties. Individual opinion-molding is based on the two questions concerning personal expressions of opinion in oral or written

14. The number of dimensions has been determined with the aid of Kaiser's criterion.


15. As in earlier cases, these have been constructed by adding the values of the variables that are included, without weighting.

form. Participation in demonstrations is retained as a separate measurement, since it neither theoretically nor empirically has a clear-cut connection with the two other dimensions of activity. Administrative competence is also treated separately, because this measurement refers to a prerequisite for action rather than actual activity. It is therefore not included in the dimensional analysis.

This means that three of the five dimensions of participation that provided the basis for analysis in previous chapters are represented to some extent. Aside from party activity, this applies to contacts -- which has a close affinity with what is referred to here as individual opinion-molding -- and manifestations, which are represented by participation in demonstrations. What is missing is protest activities, for which the opportunity for comparisons over time is limited, and participation in elections, which is analyzed separately as part of election studies by political scientists.¹⁶

A summary presentation of the how these measurements change levels over time is provided in Figure 10.3. Here, as later, the results are presented as mean values on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. Generally speaking, it appears that the results so far provide little support for the cyclically endogenous model of change. If the curves are regarded as being part of a cyclical process, our conclusion must be that since the late 1960s we have been in an upward phase -- something that hardly agrees with the premises of Hirschman's theory. Alternatively, our conclusion is that a cycle that peaked in the late 1960s or early 1970s is overshadowed by other processes to such a degree that its existence is in no way evident from the diagrams of change.

16. See, for example, Sören Holmberg and Mikael Gilljam, *Väljare och val i Sverige*, Bonniers, Stockholm, 1987, pp. 69-81.



Figur 10.3 Nivåförändringar

Administrative competence Individual opinion-molding
 Participation in demonstrations Party activity

Figure 10.3 Changes of level

Instead, it is the stable exogenous process that receives the strongest support so far. In all cases, the trend follows a regular pattern without elements of fluctuation. But as pointed out earlier, we cannot test how the process looks in greater detail without disaggregating the change. Such testing may well turn out to have surprises in store.

Age and Generational Membership

Differences based on age and generation occupy an altogether special place in the study of social change. They are a kind of cross-section surface, with whose help the stratifications left by the past can be distinguished in the present. Awareness of age variations is valuable in two ways. On the one hand, it may contribute to an understanding of the past. This is because the existence (or absence) of generational differences often provides a hint as to how a change affecting the population as a whole can be understood more precisely. On the other hand, the analysis can also provide an inkling of the future. To the extent that earlier changes turn out to be linked with membership in a generation, future developments will also be affected. Regardless of what else happens, representatives of the social patterns of an earlier age will die out and will be replaced by representatives of the new order of things.

One first step toward testing the viability of the generational hypothesis is to study the occurrence of age differences at each point in time. Table 10.5 shows how a linear correlation with age appears on the various survey dates. The upper line for each page heading shows the expected change in the dependent variable per year of age (non-standardized regression coefficients). The lower line indicates how large a portion of the total variation in the dependent variable can be attributed to age differences (standardized regression coefficients).

The results provide little room for generalizations. Administrative competence shows a negative association throughout the period. The higher a person's age, the lower the level of competence. The relationship between individual opinion-molding and age is virtually zero. Participation in demonstrations and

party activity, finally, both have a positive association with age at the beginning of the period, but with completely different trends of change. The relationship of age to participation in demonstrations weakens at a rapid pace, then changes direction completely toward the end of the period. Its association with party activity, on the other hand, tends to become slowly stronger.

The fact that associations with age vary so sharply between different dimensions is a first indication that they do not follow the same pattern of change. Yet their diversity is not quite as great as first appears to be the case. Three fundamental patterns of association can be distinguished: a stable negative one (administrative competence and individual opinion-molding), an unstable one (participation in demonstrations) and a stable positive one (party activity).

But, the reader objects, we just stated that individual opinion-molding has a zero association with age, instead of a negative relationship. This is indeed the case. But the fact that the coefficient appears without minus signs can be attributed in this case to the design of the question. The measurement is age-cumulative, in the sense that interviewees were asked whether at some_time they had participated in an activity of a specified kind. The period of time included in the concept "at some time" will, of course, grow with rising age. The likelihood of a positive reply will thus also increase, without necessarily meaning that older people participate more often than younger people. The fact that the association between age and individual opinion-molding is nevertheless nearly zero must be regarded as a strong indication that in reality, younger people have a higher level of activity than older people.

The opposite of an age-cumulative question structure is one based on frequency. In this case, the interview question

specifies a period of time that is equally large for all respondents, for example the past year. The great majority of the activity measurements used in the citizenship survey are of this nature. The age-cumulative structure occurs only in some of the older measurements that have been retained in order to facilitate comparisons over time.

Table 10.5 Associations with age

	1968	1974	1981	1987
Non-standardized regression coefficients				
Administrative competence	-0.25	-0.34	-0.28	-0.23
Individual opinion-molding	0.07	0.02	0.00	0.02
Participation in demonstrations	0.38	0.23	0.10	-0.12
Frequency of demonstrations	-0.01	-0.14	-0.21	--
Party activity	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.15
Standardized regression coefficients				
Administrative competence	-0.11	-0.16	-0.15	-0.12
Individual opinion-molding	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.01
Participation in demonstrations	0.19	0.10	0.04	-0.04
Frequency of demonstrations	-0.00	-0,09	-0,10	--
Party activity	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.11

One of these older questions -- participation in public demonstrations -- provides an opportunity to explicitly examine the difference between the structures of these questions. The initial question is age-cumulative. But a follow-up question then determines whether the latest incidence of a demonstration took place during a specified period of time. The follow-up question was asked only during the part of the period included in the living standard series, since the citizenship survey already

contained a frequency-based measurement elsewhere in the questionnaire.¹⁷

Participation in demonstrations in Table 10.5 refers to the age-cumulative measurement, while frequency of demonstrations refers to the frequency-based one. As the reader can see, the trend of change over time is the same in both cases. The absolute position of the association deviates sharply, however. The age-cumulative measurement shows a positive relationship with age until 1981. The frequency-based one, however, reveals that the association had changed from a zero position in 1968 to an increasingly negative association. Before 1968, older people participated in demonstrations as often as younger people. After 1968 younger people assumed a gradually increasing lead.

This general survey of the change in associations with age gives rise to two questions. One concerns the nature of the relationship. Are simple linear coefficients adequate to describe age differences? The other concerns interpretation. Can the

17. Another reason not to repeat the follow-up question was that the time interval it specified varied from one survey date to another. The 1968 study establishes how large a percentage of the people in the sample had demonstrated after 1960. The 1974 study fixed the corresponding breakpoint at 1965, the 1981 study at 1976. When the follow-up question is employed, the measurement is therefore not entirely comparable over time. These problems are, however, probably of marginal importance to the analyses in this chapter where the follow-up question is still used.


differences between various age groups be understood as a generational phenomenon, or are they instead an expression of life-cycle variations? Both questions can be explored by viewing the computer material from a somewhat different angle.

Figure 10.4 shows how the representatives of the first of the three fundamental patterns of association appear when they are viewed in a dynamic, non-linear perspective. The continuous lines show how the dependent variable varies with age at each point in time. The dotted lines indicate in what way different generations have shifted over time, with regard both to age and the position of the dependent variable.¹⁸


The linear model turns out to be insufficient to describe the age structure of both administrative competence and individual opinion-molding. In both cases, it is a matter of an arch-shaped

18. The figure is a graphic equivalent of the well-known cohort matrix. In keeping with this, the division into cohorts has been designed in such a way that the interval is as close as possible to the distances between the survey dates, at the same time as the available observations are utilized to a maximum extent. The division that most closely corresponds to these criteria, and which is consistently used in the cohort diagrams, is the following: 1892-1897, 1898-1904, 1905-1910, 1911-1917, 1918-1924, 1925-1931, 1932-1938, 1939-1945, 1946-1952, 1953-1958, 1959-1965, 1966-1971. In interpreting the results, it should be observed that the sample for the 1987 survey is smaller than for the previous ones. The statistical confidence interval for individual observations is therefore somewhat higher. This applies particularly to the oldest cohort, where mortality make the number of interviewees small.

Administrativ kompetens



Individuell opinionsbildning



Figur 10.4 Kohortdiagram för administrativ kompetens och individuell opinionsbildning

Administrative competence/Age

Individual opinion-molding/Age

Figure 10.4 Cohort diagram for administrative competence and individual opinion-molding

pattern although -- for reasons that have already been discussed -- with somewhat different average inclinations. In both cases, the curve also assumes roughly the same appearance on the various survey dates, although it gradually shifts upward. As for individual opinion-molding, some tendency toward increased pointedness is noticeable. Absolute differences increase. At the same time, however, the ratio between the top and bottom scores is about the same.

The fact that the age curves assume a similar appearance at different points in time could initially be taken as evidence that the differences between various age groups should mainly be interpreted as a life-cycle effect. But such a conclusion may be premature. A constant age curve of the kind shown in the diagrams may arise for two reasons: regular life-cycle effects and regular generational effects.

The question is therefore: How can we determine the occurrence of these different types of effects? Although the analysis in this case is based on longitudinal material, this is not as simple as it may seem at first. One familiar methodological rule is that the question of life-cycle or generational effects rarely lend themselves to determinations based on cross-sectional data. It is not equally well-known that diachronous observations also offer difficult problems of interpretation in this respect. Although the time dimension increases the number of known factors, it also adds a new unknown one. The additional factor is usually labeled the period effect and refers to a change that affects the entire sample, without regard to generational membership and age.

The variations in the computer material can thus theoretically be attributed now to three different classes of effects: generational, life cycle and period. But in real terms, there are

still only two factors to begin with. This is because the empirical equivalents of the theoretical classes of effects -- year of birth, age and date -- are not logically independent of each other. Two of them clearly define the position of the third.

To enable us to draw any conclusions, additional information must therefore be supplied. As so often in scholarly contexts, the applicable rule is that empirical demonstration requires theoretical assumptions. We must dare to state something about at least one of the classes of effects to be able to draw conclusions about the others.¹⁹

But in order for the conclusions to be meaningful, the assumptions must also be realistic. Sometimes the foundations for what is realistic may appear so loose that it seems wisest to abstain from pursuing the analysis any further. In this case, however, the circumstances are relatively favorable. This is because there are both empirical and theoretical reasons to interpret the age differences that have been demonstrated exclusively as a life-cycle effect.

The upward portion of the curve may, of course, be the result of a life-cycle change, but hardly the entire downward portion. One important bit of evidence for this view is the fact that the

19. A sophisticated description of the rules of cohort analysis, paired with an elegant if not uncontroversial application, is provided by Philip E. Converse in *The Dynamics of Party Support: Cohort-Analyzing Party Identification*, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1976. See also Karen Oppenheim Mason, William M. Mason, H.H. Winsborough and W. Kenneth Poole, "Some Methodological Issues in Cohort Analysis of Archival Data," *American Sociological Review*, 38, 1973, pp. 242-258.

measurement of individual opinion-molding is age-cumulative. This means that the age curve for individuals can never turn downward except as a result of pure errors of measurement.²⁰ The relatively sharp decline in the right-hand portion of the diagram can thus not possibly be understood as a life-cycle effect. The general weaknesses of this age-cumulative measurement appear to be an asset here.

A similar approach can be taken on the issue of administrative competence, albeit on different grounds. An actual decline in the life-cycle curve cannot, in fact, be excluded in this case. But there are strong theoretical reasons against believing that the turning point occurs as early as age 25-30, as the diagram indicates. If the age curve were merely the result of life-cycle variations, no decline should be expected before considerably later.

The conclusion is therefore that in both cases, there are strong elements of generationally related change. New generations enter the population at a starting level that, as a rule, is higher than that of previous ones. Among the very young, the superiority of the younger generation in relation to the one immediately before it is counteracted by strong life-cycle effects. The age curve therefore points upward. As each life cycle change slows (see the angle of the dotted lines in the various age groups) the generational effect has its impact and the younger generation assumes its place above its predecessor.

20. The fact that a process is irreversible at the individual level does not, of course, always have to mean that it is irreversible at the aggregate level. In this case, however, the danger of "the compositional fallacy" is probably negligible. Cf. Matilda White Riley, "Aging and Cohort Succession: Interpretations and Misinterpretations," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 37, 1973, pp. 35-49.

The occurrence of strongly positive generational effects, in turn, means that a large proportion of the change in the population as a whole is due to the fact that its generational composition is changing. Older generations with relatively small chances of individually influencing their situation are replaced by younger cohorts with stronger resources. We will eventually find additional evidence for this conclusion.

It is not, however, always true that generational and life-cycle changes follow the simple additive pattern presented above. The changes in the case of participation in demonstrations are an example of the opposite. Figure 10.5 shows how the age curves and the movements of individual generations look both for the age-cumulative measurement and the frequency-based one. In this case, the arch-shaped association with age is conspicuously absent. The main trend is linear. But the angle of the line changes markedly over time. The process does not show the same degree of stability as in the previous case.

At the starting point in 1968, the curve for the age-cumulative measurement shows the positive angle that the structure of the question gives us reason to expect. The curve for the frequency-based measurement is mainly flat, which indicates the absence of genuine age differences. But then something happens which interrupts the accustomed patterns of industrial society. People question the political culture. Obedience, loyalty and consensus are suddenly no longer self-evident truths.

This change of climate, whose origins must be traced outside Sweden, spreads first and fastest among the young. But not only there. Quite soon this trend also makes its breakthrough in older groups, if not in an equally dramatic fashion. This pattern is typical of the period effect that arises as a result of external events as opposed to demographic changes. The pure period effect model presupposes that change makes its breakthrough at the same rate in all age groups. Empirically speaking, however, this appears to be a rarity. In a diffusion process of the type that is probably applicable here, something new is usually embraced more quickly among the young than among older people, either as a

result of more intensive social communication or greater inclination to change.²¹


From the standpoint of public discourse on cultural affairs, these results appear remarkable in a number of respects. First, the process shows no tendency whatever toward ending or even slowing down. There is no doubt at all that the political agenda in Sweden during the late 1980s is different from that of 1968. To that extent, the political climate has changed. But these political shifts have apparently not subdued the general urge to show opposition, as expressed in public demonstrations. On the contrary. The trend is continuing, with young people in its vanguard.

Second, the "generation of 1968" does not appear unique in any respect in this process of change. Subsequent generations have come to embrace demonstrations as a form of political action to at least an equal degree. Older generations, too, have been significantly affected. We must go back all the way to the generations born before the breakthrough of democracy in Sweden around 1920 before we can argue that no great change has occurred.

The tendencies toward change discussed so far have all had in common that these developments are led by the young. Even though the underlying process did not turn out to be the same in all

21. Cf. Gösta Carlsson and Katarina Karlsson, "Age Cohorts and the Generation of Generations," *American Sociological Review*, 35, 1970, pp. 710-718. For a similar interpretation of the weakening of party loyalties in the U.S. during the 1960s and 1970s, see Converse, 1976, pp. 67-119.

cases, the fact remains that younger generations are becoming increasingly active. The question is: How do things look in the last of the four areas we are able to discuss, the one related to activity within political parties?



Figur 10.5 Kohortdiagram för demonstrationsdeltagande och demonstrationsfrekvens

Participation in demonstrations/Age
Frequency of demonstrations/Age

Figure 10.5 Cohort diagram for participation in demonstrations and frequency of demonstrations

In an earlier study, Jörgen Westerståhl and Folke Johansson found evidence that the trend in this area moves in the exact opposite direction from the one we have otherwise found true. An increasing percentage of active participants in Swedish political parties has come to consist of older men. The parties have found it harder to attract young people.²² The difference between the activity levels of various age groups, Westerståhl and Johansson maintain, is mainly a generational phenomenon.²³

This conclusion has been criticized. Ryszard Szulkin found little support for its viability in an analysis based on the three first observation points in the series of surveys that we are utilizing here, and which also form part of the basis for Westerståhl and Johansson's study.²⁴ The question is: Who is right, and how has the trend looked during the period since these earlier analyses were published? We will begin by looking at only one of the two parts of the thesis that older men play an increasing role in parties -- the part that refers to age rather than sex.

Figure 10.6 shows how the age curve for party activity looks on the four survey dates. Because the general differences in level during the period were so small that the curves would end

22. Jörgen Westerståhl and Folke Johansson, *Medborgarna och kommunen. Studier av medborgerlig aktivitet och representativ folkstyrelse, Rapport 5 från kommunaldemokratiska forskningsgruppen (Citizens and the Municipality. Studies of Civic Activity and Representative Government, Report 5 from the Research Group on Local Democracy)*, Ds Kn 1981:12, p. 134.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

24. Szulkin, 1984, pp. 249-252.

up on top of each other if they were plotted in the same diagram, in this case we have chosen to present them separately. In order to make the general pattern as clear as possible, age groups have also been aggregated to some extent.²⁵

As in the case of administrative competence and individual opinion-molding, the association with age turns out to be arch-shaped. The curve peaks in the late 50s and then turns downward. A number of factors help provide evidence for an interpretation mainly based on life cycles. The general level of the curve remains largely unchanged over time. Its peak occurs at an age that appears reasonable on the basis of a life-cycle model. Those who were young in 1968 have subsequently increased their activity level. Those who were then in late middle age are now less active. Nor is it true that the youngest group is less inclined to participate in political party work now than twenty years ago. The initial scores on the age curve remain essentially the same.

The result is that in the main, Westerståhl and Johansson's conclusion must be rejected. Yet to some extent, they are right. Although the general appearance of the age curve remains the same, there is evidence of change. As indicated already, the youngest group is not affected. But in somewhat higher age groups, something has happened. The activity level of those aged around 40-50 declined systematically during the period. At the same time, the activity level rose among the very oldest group. The age curve is being transformed into a line. Middle-aged people do not grow into the political parties at the same rapid pace as before. The older group stays in service.

Two interpretations are conceivable. One is that the old are


25. The following age groupings have been used: 16-27, 28-39, 40-51, 52-63, 64-76.

refusing to let go of the controls. Middle-aged people are not being given the opportunity to take over in time. The second interpretation is that the older generation is staying on out of necessity, rather than because of any lust for power. Those who should be poised to take over have found something else to do.


Whichever interpretation is the correct one, it is a matter of a very slow, though systematic change. For example, the average age of party activists forms a neatly rising scale throughout the period. But in absolute figures, the increase is hardly impressive: from age 46 in 1968 to age 47 in 1987.²⁶

26. The average age among party activists has been calculated as age weighted for the degree of party activity.


Partiaktivitet 1968




Partiaktivitet 1974



Partiaktivitet 1981



Partiaktivitet 1987



Figur 10.6 Ålder och partiaktivitet

Party activity, 1968

Party activity, 1974

Age

Age

Party activity, 1981

Party activity, 1987

Age

Age

Figure_10.6 Age and party activity

The Educational Explosion and Its Effects

The rising level of education is one of the most important social trends in postwar Sweden. No one is likely to lift an eyebrow at this general statement. Yet it would perhaps surprise many people to know how far-reaching this transformation has actually been. A picture of the changes that have occurred during the historically brief period since 1968 undoubtedly provides food for thought (Table 10.6).

Table 10.6 Educational level

	1968	1974	1981	1987
Years of education (averages)	8.25	9.18	9.84	10.78
Educational level (percentages)				
Did not complete 9-year compulsory school or earn earlier equivalent (junior secondary school certificate)	85.0	71.9	61.7	50.0
Completed compulsory school or earned junior secondary school certificate	9.3	15.9	20.7	24.7
Completed three-year upper secondary school or earned earlier equivalent (upper secondary school certificate)	5.7	12.2	17.6	25.2
Total percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

During the course of less than twenty years, the average educational level increased from just over eight years to nearly eleven years. People who have earned an upper secondary school certificate (studentexamen) or completed at least a three-year

program at the new type of upper secondary school rose from 6 percent of the population in 1968 to 25 percent in 1987. The portion of the population who had not achieved an educational level equivalent to a junior secondary school certificate or the newer 9-year compulsory school fell from 85 to 50 percent.²⁷ In terms of educational levels, Sweden is a completely different country from twenty years ago.

In this case, it is almost self-evident that the change is mainly a generational one. The age curves appearing in Figure 10.7 confirm this conclusion. Their shape is strongly reminiscent of the one presented earlier for administrative competence. The age curves are mainly negative. Because the length of formal education is irreversible for individuals, a generational interpretation of the negative age differences is unavoidable.

But further nuances can be added to this picture. The lines that express individual generations' direction of movement are not entirely flat. Even people of relatively advanced age are continuing to raise their educational level to a remarkable extent. This tendency, in turn, is generational. Those who were born during the 1940s or later, that is, those who received their

27. It is not correct in all respects to regard the 9-year compulsory school and junior secondary school as equivalent, as we have done in the table. The junior secondary school was not a compulsory form of schooling, and it lasted somewhat longer than today's 9-year compulsory school. The grouping presented in the table should be regarded as the closest we could come to comparability using the material at our disposal. Although one may question the exact placement of the lines, the table does provide a reasonably correct picture of the main trends.

education during the postwar period, show a substantially greater rate of increase into their forties than earlier generations did during the equivalent phase of their life cycle.


Although part of the explanation may conceivably be that from the beginning, more and more people choose an educational program that takes a long time to complete, other mechanisms are probably of major importance. Later generations not only study longer, but also more often. More and more people go through retraining or advanced courses. The role of adult education has expanded, but it is primarily younger rather than older people who take advantage of its opportunities.²⁸

Parallel with this development, another trend is noticeable in the younger portions of the population. Generational differences are declining in strength. Starting levels are becoming more similar. The turning point of the age curve is occurring later and later. To some extent, this development is a consequence of what has already been stated. The period of education is getting longer. Recurrent education is becoming more common. But it is probably not merely a matter of this. Viewed from a purely generational standpoint, the educational explosion is slowing down.

By way of summary, one can still say that educational levels have risen substantially during the past two decades and that to a great extent, this rise is generational. The question is: To what

28. Cf. Janne Jonsson, "Utbildningsresurser" ("Educational Resources"), in Erikson and Åberg, 1984, pp. 179-209.

extent can this contribute to an understanding of the changes that have been observed in the activity and competence levels of the population? The answer is far from self-evident. First, we have seen that there are forms of activity that do not show any change, despite the higher level of education. Second, it is not certain that the increase that has otherwise been observed can be attributed to the prevailing higher educational level.



Figur 10.7 Kohortdiagram för antal utbildningsår

Years of education/Age

Figure 10.7 Cohort diagram for years of education

The actual situation depends partly on how the associations between educational level, on the one hand, and civic activity and competence, on the other, change over time. Table 10.7 shows how things look at different points in time. The presentation follows the same principle as in Table 10.6, except that in this case the independent variable is the number of years of education instead of age.

As earlier, administrative competence and individual opinion-molding show close affinity. And as stated in earlier chapters, in both cases there is a strong positive association with education. This association remains at a stable high level throughout the period. Certain minor changes can be observed, however. Interestingly enough, the trend is not the same for both indicators.

For administrative competence, the non-standardized regression coefficients show a declining trend. The effect is smaller for each year of education counted. For individual opinion-molding, however, the trend is in the opposite direction. The effect of education increases in strength. We will soon come back to why these two otherwise closely attuned indicators show different trends here.²⁹

As earlier, the results for participation in demonstrations differ markedly from the others. The association once again turns out to be unstable over time. The relationship to educational level changes rapidly in an increasingly positive direction. Demonstration marches, once an activity almost reserved for those with little schooling, have become one of many megaphones for the highly educated. The social composition of participation in demonstrations no longer differs in educational terms from that of most other forms of political participation.

29. As the table indicates, standardized regression coefficients for administrative competence do not show the same trend of development as non-standardized ones. This is because both variance in educational level (increasing) and in administrative competence (decreasing) change in a way that counteracts the diminishing effect per year of education. Relative predictive power therefore rose until 1981, while absolute effect fell throughout the period.

In relative terms, however, the party system is still a bastion for those with little education. As shown in Chapters 6 and 7, the association between party activity and educational level is unusually weak compared with other forms of participation. It is probably also lower than the equivalent associations in most other countries. Developments over the past twenty years have not helped strengthen the connection to educational level. The association has instead become even weaker.

Table 10.7 Associations with educational level

	1968	1974	1981	1987
Non-standardized regression coefficients				
Administrative competence	4.20	3.86	3.51	3.16
Individual opinion-molding	3.08	2.97	3.46	3.93
Participation in demonstrations	-0.96	-0.13	0.48	2.01
Frequency of demonstrations	0.06	0.80	1.10	--
Party activity	0.27	0.15	0.12	-0.03
Standardized regression coefficients				
Administrative competence	0.31	0.35	0.36	0.33
Individual opinion-molding	0.28	0.31	0.34	0.37
Participation in demonstrations	-0.08	-0.01	0.04	0.15
Frequency of demonstrations	0.01	0.09	0.11	--
Party activity	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.00

The question still awaiting an answer is how the extremely varied effect of educational level can be related to the changes in activity and competence levels presented at the beginning of the chapter. In this context, let us begin with administrative competence and individual opinion-molding. Both of them show a rapid increase during the period. Both have also turned out to be strongly positively -- and relatively stably -- linked with those kinds of education whose position has continuously shifted upward. All conditions for what we began by labeling as "additive

change" are thereby fulfilled. Educational level explain at least part of the change in administrative competence and individual opinion-molding. But we still do not know how much.

The best way to study this matter is via an explicitly dynamic model. The respective dependent variables are administrative competence and individual opinion-molding. The independent variables are time (survey year), number of years of education and age, which has turned out to be related both to the dependent variables and to educational level. Generational membership is not included as a separate measurement.³⁰ Instead, the idea is that educational level, which as we know mainly follows generations, is responsible for the generational effects that were noted earlier. This makes the model into a combined test of two hypotheses. One is that education explains the changes of level over time. The other is that it also is behind the generational effects.

The results are presented in Figure 10.8. The solid lines represent the effect of each respective independent variable after keeping the other two constant. The dotted lines show the effect before keeping them constant.³¹

30. Because time and age define a generation, the model would be underidentified.


31. Because several of the associations have turned out to be non-linear, it is suitable to let the model assume the form of a variance analysis, rather than a regression analysis. The model is additive. The diagrams represent the deviations from the averages that would be observed for various dates, age groups and educational categories in the case of "balanced design." Age was classified in six categories as follows: 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65 and 66-76. Years of education were divided into seven categories as follows: 0-2, 3-5, 6-8, 9-11, 12-14, 15-17 and 18 or over.

As both top diagrams indicate, educational level explains most, if not all, of the increase that has occurred both with regard to administrative competence and individual opinion-molding. The solid lines have a coefficient of inclination less than half that of the dotted ones.³²

It also turns out that the second hypothesis is supported. After controlling for educational level, the age curve for individual opinion-molding has the positive slope that it should have, given the structuring of this measurement. A similar result is obtained for administrative competence. The negative inclination of the average disappears after controlling for educational level. The endpoints of the curve are at the same level. The fact that both indicators now behave largely in the way we had reason to expect on the basis of a pure life-cycle model is a confirmation that educational level is responsible for most of the generational effect.

The two bottom diagrams contribute to an understanding of why the linearly calculated educational effect changes in different directions for the two indicators. To some extent, they also help answer the question of why their dynamics are dissimilar: increasing expansion in one case, decreasing in the other. This is because the association with educational level turns out not to be entirely linear.

32. For individual opinion-molding, the non-standardized regression coefficient for a balanced design (no weighting of points) is 0.70 before controlling for other variables, compared with 0.24 afterward. For administrative competence, the corresponding figures are 0.85 and 0.35, respectively. A more generous way of representing explanatory power with reference to the educational level hypothesis is with the aid of variances. After controlling for educational level and age, the time factor explains 14 and 22 percent, respectively, of the variance that can be attributed before doing so.



Figur 10.8 Administrativ kompetens och individuell opinionsbildning som funktion av tid, ålder och antal utbildningsår

Individual opinion-molding	Administrative competence
Time	Time
Age	Age
Years of education	Years of education
Multivariant association	Bivariant association

Figure 10.8 Administrative competence and individual opinion-molding as functions of time, age and years of education

For individual opinion-molding, the effect is strengthened the further to the right we move on the educational scale. Because a growing proportion of forms of education have shifted toward the right-hand portion of the diagram over time, the linearly calculated association rises. The increase will thereby also occur at an accelerating pace in the population as a whole.

For administrative competence, the opposite is true. The effect is weakened the further to the right we move on the educational scale. The linearly calculated association will thereby diminish with time. Likewise, the pace of expansion also slows in the population as a whole.

Ultimately, the divergent dynamics of the two indicators can probably be explained by their being in different stages of a development process. Administrative competence, at the level expressed by the interview question, is near its peak. Saturation processes of various kinds are beginning to operate.³³ Growth is slowing. Those with relatively lower educational levels are catching up. Individual opinion-molding, on the other hand, has only just begun its journey. The educational effect has free rein. The pace of expansion is growing. The highly educated are pulling ahead.³⁴

33. For a more detailed theoretical discussion of such processes, see Johan Asplund, *Om mättnadsprocesser (On Saturation Processes)*, Argos, Uppsala, 1967.

34. Similar findings have been reported from research on knowledge gaps. Cf. Kent Asp, "Kunskapsklyftehypotesen: En kritisk granskning" (The Knowledge Gap Hypothesis: A Critical Examination), Department of Government, University of Gothenburg, 1984, and Anders Westholm, Arne Lindquist and Richard G. Niemi, "Education and the Making of the Informed Citizen: Political Literacy and the Outside World," in Orit Ichilov, ed., *Political Socialization for Democracy*, Teachers College Press, New York, forthcoming.

But the stable, additive model of the effects of education that we have just presented can apparently not be applied when it comes to participation in demonstrations. The fundamental prerequisites are missing. At the beginning of the period, there is no positive relationship whatever between educational level and demonstration activity. If we base our assessment on the situation in 1968, we should not expect increased education to contribute in any way to greater participation in demonstrations.

Table 10.8 Age, educational level and participation in demonstrations

	1968	1974	1981	1987
Participation in demonstrations				
Age	0.18	0.12	0.07	0.01
Educational level	-0.01	0.04	0.07	0.15
Frequency of demonstrations				
Age	-0.00	-0.06	-0.07	--
Educational level	0.01	0.07	0.08	--

The figures in the table consist of standardized multiple regression coefficients for a model with participation in demonstrations and frequency of demonstrations, respectively, as dependent variables, and age and educational level as independent ones.

But after that, something apparently happened. It is not only the association with age that changed. The connection with education also became stronger. In one case, the association developed in a negative direction, in the other a positive one. Because age and education, in turn, have a negative correlation, the question arises whether one of these trends is merely a


mirror image of the other. The fact that the relationship between educational level and participation in demonstrations became stronger might have been due to a growing degree of participation by younger people. But this is not the case. The trend of both associations remains after keeping the appropriate variables constant (Table 10.8). The fact that today's demonstrators are better-educated than those of yesterday is not merely a consequence of their also being younger.

It now turns out, however, that the relationship between the three variables is even more intricate. This is because the association with educational level is generational. Figure 10.9 illustrates how the linear relationship between educational level and frequency of demonstrations changed between 1968 and 1981 in the case of people born before and after 1925, respectively.³⁵ As

35. The frequency-based measurement has been used instead of the age-cumulative one for reasons of presentation. The connections are easier to understand when the cumulative aspect has been eliminated. In objective terms, the results are the same regardless of which measurement is used. Likewise, the trend represented in the diagrams also continues in the 1987 study. The choice of 1925 as a breakpoint is, to some extent, arbitrary. But it can be justified by the fact that 1925 appears to be the clearest watershed between generations that increased their participation in demonstrations to a great or a small extent, respectively, after 1968. The generations born before 1925 were also the only ones for whom there was no change worth mentioning in the association between educational level and demonstration activity through 1987. It is not unthinkable, however, that these generations, too, will eventually be pulled along by the developments that are taking place in younger cohorts.

the diagrams indicate, as early as 1968 there was a positive association between educational level and demonstration activity in generations born after 1925. This association gradually became stronger during subsequent years. In generations born before 1925, however, the relationship remained negative for as long as developments so far allow us to look.

The conclusion is that increased participation in demonstrations from 1968 onward must be understood as a complicated interplay among a number of different factors. The connection between external events and generational membership (or age) have already been discussed. In addition, the association with educational level gradually becomes stronger in younger generations. In combination with this, the relatively high level of education in these generations contributes, to some extent, to the rise in participation. If the trend of associations is taken for granted, both the general level and the differences between various generations would have been lower if the educational level of younger groups had been the same as that of older groups.



Figur 10.9 Utbildning och demonstrationsfrekvens i två generationer

Frequency of demonstrations — Born in 1925 or later
 ----- Born before 1925

Years of education

Figure 10.9 Educational level and frequency of demonstrations in two generations

The question remains: How should the changed relationship between educational level and participation in demonstrations be interpreted? Several alternatives are conceivable here, and it is difficult to take a firm position in favor of any of them. One possibility is to view the change as very much an expected result of the altered form and content of the educational system. Obedience, loyalty and respect for authority undoubtedly occupy a less prominent place in latter-day educational programs than in those of the past. Instead, at least officially, a questioning and critical approach enjoy priority. But one fact that contradicts this interpretation is that the change eventually also had an impact on generations whose schooling was relatively little affected by these educational reforms.

Another possibility is that increased participation in demonstrations by highly educated people is attributable to changes in the political agenda. What immediately comes to mind is Sweden's two great "anti" movements of the 1970s and 1980s: the struggle against nuclear power and the struggle against the employee investment funds. Also worth mentioning are an increased general interest in the environment and a greater commitment to international issues. In neither case is there reason to believe that people with little education found reason to lead the struggle.

The stagnating trend that characterizes the final measurement, party activity, during the twenty-year period is in no way unexpected, given the changes that occurred in educational level. Party activism was, and remains, weakly related to educational level. In view of this weak association, there is no reason to expect that the rising level of education would have been reflected in greater activity within the political parties.

On the other hand, it is remarkable that the association between political party activity and educational level shows no sign whatever of becoming stronger. The strong class base of the Swedish party system is in the process of loosening up. Class-based voting is becoming weaker. According to the argument presented at the beginning of Chapter 7, one natural consequence of this development ought to be a stronger association between class membership and educational level, on the one hand, and party activity, on the other.³⁶ The working class and people with little education have parties of their own to a lesser degree than they did before. They face competition from highly educated people everywhere. Yet there is no noticeable tendency for the middle class to take over party activity at the grassroots level. In this respect, nothing appears to have changed yet.

Greater Equality

The findings presented in earlier chapters imply a modification of the prevailing picture of social equality, on a number of points. The departures from prior research did not, however, end up pointing the same direction in all areas. On the one hand we noted that in some respects, gaps in social position are wider than previous research had given reason to believe. On the other hand, it turned out that differences between men and women do not always follow the pattern of male dominance that has emanated from earlier studies.


36. See the discussion of the importance of class in American politics on page XXX.

It may seem tempting to view conclusions like these as evidence of tendencies toward change. But giving in to such an inclination may prove premature. The contrasts between our description of the situation and earlier findings may, indeed, be due to genuine change. But they may also be a consequence of our having focused attention on a number of new aspects. The change may conceivably be due to our research as well as to reality.

The question is: What changes in social equality have actually occurred in those areas where there is an opportunity for direct comparison? Part of the answer has already been given in the sections that dealt with changes of dimension, age and educational level. But a number of important problems remain. First, not all of the approaches toward social equality outlined in earlier chapters have been discussed yet. Second, an analysis of change raises new aspects of the many-faceted concept of social equality.

One such aspect concerns the choice of reference point for group differences of various kinds. As long as the object to be distributed remains constant, the relationship between the size of the difference and the degree of equality seems relatively unproblematic. Large differences mean a strong element of inequality, while small differences are a sign that inequality is rather weak. The situation is not quite as simple when the object of distribution changes. At least three different approaches can be distinguished here (Figure 10.10). The line in each diagram describes one of several conceivable patterns of development without any change in equality, as this concept is defined according to each of the three approaches.³⁷

37. In the difference approach, the defining criterion of such a line is that it is parallel with the x-axis; in the other two approaches, that it runs through the origin of coordinates.



Figur 10.10 Tre perspektiv på jämlikhet

Difference approach	Ratio approach	Determinance approach
Group difference	Group difference	Group difference
Decreased equality	Decreased equality	Decreased equality
Increased equality	Increased equality	Increased equality
Total sum	Total sum	Individual variation

Figure 10.10 Three approaches to equality

The difference approach means that equality is viewed exclusively from the standpoint of the size of the absolute difference, with reference to how the object of distribution changes. For example, a situation where the average income in groups A and B amount to 100 and 200 kronor respectively is perceived as being precisely as equal as if the distribution had been 900 and 1,000 kronor. The ratio approach measures the difference in relation to the size of the object of distribution. A distribution of 100 and 200 kronor is viewed as equivalent to a distribution of 500 and 1,000 kronor. In both cases, the less favored group receives half as much as the more favored one. The determinance approach views the difference between groups in relation to the total variation among individuals. A situation where the difference between groups amounts to 100 kronor and the total variation is 200 kronor is regarded as equivalent to a

situation where the difference between groups is 500 kronor and variation among individuals is 1,000 kronor. In both cases, the difference between groups amounts to half the overall variation.³⁸

None of the three approaches allows itself to be singled out once and for all as "the right one." But the choice among them cannot be viewed as arbitrary, either. Given a firm theoretical basis, it is possible to argue for or against a particular approach to equality. It would take too much space here to discuss this relationship in detail, but a few examples are nevertheless worth mentioning in passing.

The difference approach seems the most justified in a conflict or competition situation, where the outcome is in direct or nearly direct proportion to absolute differences in resources.

38. Cf. Douglas Equalities, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 104-129. Rae distinguishes four different criteria for measuring the degree of equality. Two of these are equivalent to what we have called the difference and ratio approach here. The other two consist of John Rawls' principle of fair distribution (every distribution that means an increase for the one who is worse off is more egalitarian) and an inverted variation of this (every distribution that means a decrease for the one who is better off is more egalitarian). The relevance of these principles as criteria of equality depend partly on whether one wishes to make a distinction between equality, on the one hand, and fairness or desirability, on the other. Presuming such a distinction, the two latter criteria seem unsuitable, among other things because in some instances they treat a distribution into equal parts (absolute equality) as less equal than a distribution into parts of different sizes.

In some situations, knowledge or competence could conceivably be such a resource. The ratio approach is connected both with the economic concept of diminishing marginal utility and with the representation theory approach within political science. A real income difference of 1,000 kronor means more in a poor country than in a rich one. A difference of 10 percentage points in voter turnout means greater inequality from the standpoint of representation at a low average level of turnout than a high one. The determinance approach is especially appropriate from the standpoint of stratification or discrimination theory. Here it is a matter of the degree to which existing individual differences in a society can be attributed to a particular trait such as race, class membership or sex.

The fact that it is thus possible to identify an association between theory and concepts of equality does not mean that a particular survey always can, and should, choose one approach over another. The view of power and democracy sketched in this book does not belong entirely in any of the theoretical traditions mentioned above. Depending on how the conflict situation is defined, more than one concept of equality will be relevant to the indicators studied here.

The interesting question, instead, is: To what extent does the outcome depend on which approach is applied? Figure 10.11 shows how the degree of equality changes in terms of class membership and sex. The left-hand column of the diagram describes developments using a difference approach. The measurement is differences between averages. The zero point means perfect equality. Negative figures mean that blue-collar workers and women, respectively, have a lower average level, while positive figures imply the opposite. The right-hand column shows the

change using a ratio approach. The measurement is the ratio between each respective group's average. A figure of 1 means perfect equality. Deviations from this figure indicate the relative disadvantage or advantage of blue-collar workers and women, compared with the middle class and with men, respectively.³⁹ For reasons of space, the determinance approach has been omitted, because the results turn out to be largely the same as with the difference model.⁴⁰

Regardless of which approach is chosen, it turns out that in all cases, differences between the sexes have changed in the direction of greater equality. The differences have diminished both in absolute and relative numbers. It can be noted that this also applies to political party activity. The second stage of Westerståhl and Johansson's thesis about the changing composition of party activists can therefore also be questioned. It appears justified, to some extent, to say that the parties are aging, but hardly to say that they are becoming more of a male preserve.

39. Each approach does not correspond to a single measurement. Several variations are conceivable. These measurements differ, among other things, in terms of assumptions on scale level and form of association and how group size is taken into account. Compared with other alternatives, the measurements used here are characterized by being easy to interpret, presupposing a dichotomous division into groups and not taking group size into account. For a discussion of the problems that arise in shifting from pairwise to more general comparisons between individuals or groups, see Rae, 1981, pp. 123-128, and Amartya Sen, *On Economic Inequality*, W.W. Norton, New York, 1973, pp. 24-76.

40. The results using the determinance approach have been calculated with the aid of standardized regression coefficients.

The emergence of women as participants in demonstrations is particularly strong. In the 1968 study, women's participation in demonstrations was at a mere 41 percent of the male level. Twenty years later, women have not only caught up with men, but have surpassed them. This record-breaking change is the reason why the 1987 survey listed demonstrations as one type of participation in which women had an absolute advantage over men.⁴¹

At the same time, an additional bit of evidence for the suitability of the interactive change model can be noted. Sex is the third in the list of factors whose association with demonstration activity changes direction during the period. This means that among demonstrators who have appeared on the scene since 1968, women account for a substantially larger percentage than men.

Participation in demonstrations is not the only area where the increase among women is greater than among men. The same applies to administrative competence and individual opinion-molding. This gives us a reason to return for a moment to the dynamic model that previously turned out to be suitable for these two indicators (cf. Figure 10.8). When the model is analyzed separately for men and women, it turns out that most of the increase that previously remained after controlling for education can be attributed to the sex factor. Among men, educational level largely explains the entire change during the period. Among women, there is a substantially greater increase than would be

41. Cf. Chapter 6.

expected merely on the basis of rising educational level.⁴²

If these results clearly point to the fact that women have strengthened their position compared with men, the same simple conclusion cannot be drawn regarding the position of blue-collar workers in relation to the middle class.⁴³ In three out of four cases, the trend is indeed mainly toward greater equality. But in one of these cases, participation in demonstrations, the leveling process is not in favor of the working class. In the two first surveys, the percentage of demonstrators is higher among

42. These results were originally based on a series of variance analyses along the lines presented earlier. The average slope along the time axis can then be calculated on the basis of the point estimates obtained for each survey year. Measured using non-standardized regression coefficients without weighting of the points, we arrive at the following results before and after controlling for educational level and age. Individual opinion-molding, men: 0.60/0.10. Individual opinion-molding, women: 0.79/0.42. Administrative competence, men: 0.58/0.16. Administrative competence, women: 1.10/0.54.

43. In this case, class membership has been defined as a dichotomy based on a social class grouping. A line has been drawn between social group II (middle class) and III (working class). The classification of various occupational categories mainly follows the one presented by Robert Erikson in Erikson and Åberg, 1984, p. 35. Small farmers have been classified in social group II for all survey years, however, because the occupational data in the citizenship survey does not allow the category "farmers" to be divided on the basis of farm acreage. In the 1987 survey, non-working married women were classified on the basis of previous occupation rather than by their husband's occupation. This departure from earlier studies probably has no more than a marginal effect on the results presented here.


blue-collar workers than among white-collar employees and business owners, but in the two latter ones the situation is the reverse. Once again, it turns out that participation in demonstrations changes polarity.

In the fourth and final case, individual opinion-molding, the only clear departure from the general leveling trend occurs. In absolute terms, the differences between the working class and the middle class increased here throughout the period. Interestingly enough, in this case the ratio approach does not show the same trend. The line is mainly flat, meaning that in relative terms, the working class is about as well represented as earlier, although the absolute difference is increasing.

For the four areas discussed here, the overall conclusion is that the position of blue-collar workers has neither become stronger or weaker in any clear way. This description can also be extended to refer also to the position of people with little education, in relation to those who are highly educated. Regardless of which approach toward equality is used, the main trend in educational gaps in these four areas is the same as for differences of class.⁴⁴ The position of women, on the other hand,

44. The trend of differences in educational level for the three approaches on equality was calculated as the linear effect of years of education. In the difference approach, the measurement is the non-standardized regression coefficient, in the ratio approach the same coefficient divided by the average figure for the whole sample, and in the determinance approach the standardized coefficient. In all essential respects, the results are the same as those earlier presented for social class. Minor deviations can be noted for administrative competence, which shows no clear increase in equality in the determinance approach and for individual opinion-molding, which shows such an increase in the ratio approach.

has unmistakably changed for the better. Nor, generally speaking, is there any indication that their improvement in position is slowing down. In two cases, the slope of the line admittedly becomes somewhat less steep toward the end of the period, but in both other cases the opposite is true.



Figur 10.11 Jämlikhetens utveckling med avseende på kön och klass

Difference approach

Sex
Class

Ratio approach

Administrative competence

Individual opinion-molding

Participation in demonstrations

Party activity

Figure 10.11 Trend of equality, with respect to sex and class

The advances made by women raise an additional question of importance: To what extent have traditional differences between the sexes been eradicated at the same pace in all population groups? Of particular interest is the existence of any generational differences. Is it mainly women from younger generations who have achieved a more equal situation relative to men? Or have older women also managed to reverse past patterns?

The answer is provided in Figure 10.12.45 The right-hand column of the diagram shows the association between generational membership and equality, calculated on the basis of the difference approach. On average, all the lines incline upward. This means that the position of women compared with men is better in younger generations than in older ones. This trend is especially striking for individual opinion-molding and participation in demonstrations.⁴⁶ In both cases, men still have

45. The results represented by the solid lines in the figure are based on a series of variance analyses, with sex, survey year and generational membership as independent variables. The model includes interaction between sexes and survey years as well as between sex and generation. The lines represent the differences between the average scores for women and men that would have been observed for various points in time and generations in the case of a "balanced design." The dotted line in the left-hand column of the diagram shows the difference between the average scores of women and men without taking into account differences in the generational composition of the samples.

46. The model was also tested using the frequency-based measurement of demonstration activity. The results turned out to be essentially the same. Regardless of the measurements used, a clear difference remains between various cohorts, and in both cases it explains a substantial proportion of the leveling that takes place over time in the sample as a whole.

a clear advantage in older generations. Among younger groups, however, the difference has been eradicated entirely or has even switched direction. As for administrative competence, there is also a clear generational pattern. For party activity, on the other hand, there is only a vague hint of generational linkages.⁴⁷

The left-hand column of the diagram represents the development of equality -- with and without reference, respectively, to changes in the generational composition of the population. The solid line indicates how the equality situation would have changed if the generational composition of the sample had been the same on all survey dates. The dotted line shows the actual outcome after the older generation had disappeared and a younger one had replaced it. The difference between the two lines is a measurement of the contribution of the generational effect to changes in the population as a whole. In several cases, this contribution is substantial. The fact that women assume a stronger position in 1987 than in 1968 is largely due to the fact that the generational composition of the population has changed. Older generations characterized by less equality between the sexes have disappeared. Younger generations characterized by

47. Interpretation is also made more difficult here by the prevailing association between the general level of party activity and age. The differences between men and women may conceivably be larger among older people partly because the average level of activity there is higher. Support for the generational hypothesis is thus doubtful in this case.

greater equality have appeared.⁴⁸

The results presented above refer to equality as a differentiation. In all cases, the conclusions apply to group differences of various kinds. This still leaves the question of how equality has developed in terms of variation. The differences between individuals may have increased as well as narrowed, regardless of the changes that have been noted at group level.

In analyzing this individual variation, the distinction between a difference and a ratio approach to equality is once again highly relevant. Although these concepts were introduced in a context that referred to group differences, they have the same applicability when the question concerns the differences between individuals. In the difference approach, it concerns the extent of absolute differences. One of many conceivable measurements is

48. The analysis presented here was preceded by a breakdown aimed at clarifying the changes in individual cohorts over time. For individual opinion-molding and administrative competence, the lines turned out to be mainly flat, that is, no major change in differences between the sexes took place within cohorts. To some extent, there were exceptions for participation in demonstrations, where several generations took a step upward between 1981 and 1987. The lines for administrative competence were found to have a weak angle throughout the period. In all these three cases, there were clear differences between cohorts. As always, it is theoretically possible to imagine that these differences may have arisen in some way other than via generational effects. But alternative explanations must, in this case, be based on the occurrence of unlikely combinations of life-cycle and period effects.


the size of the standard deviation. The higher the standard deviation is, the greater is the degree of inequality. In a ratio approach, it is a matter of seeing to what degree the object of distribution is concentrated among a small portion of the population. One of the most commonly occurring measurements of equality, the gini coefficient, measures precisely this trait. The figure may vary from 0, meaning that everyone has the same share, and 1, which means that the entire object of distribution is in the hands of a single individual.⁴⁹

Table 10.9 shows how the variation among individuals for the four indicators changes during the period. The upper portion of the table states the results using the difference approach. The lower portion refers to the ratio approach. In this case, the conclusion turns out to be strongly dependent on the choice of approach. Measured with the aid of standard deviations, equality in terms of administrative competence increases, but it declines in terms of individual opinion-molding and participation in demonstrations. The variation in party activity remains largely unchanged. On the basis of the gini coefficient, equality increases for all indicators except for party activity, where the situation once again turns out to be stable.

For those readers who are well-versed in methodology, these results probably do not come as any surprise. Considering the characteristics of the measurements, in several cases there is a strong logical connection between level and variation.⁵⁰ The result is therefore largely a consequence of the changes in averages that have already been presented.

49. Strictly speaking, the figure can only be exactly 1 when the number of analytical units is regarded as a completely continuous variable.

50. In the extreme case where the variable is a dichotomy, as with participation in demonstrations, both the standard deviation and the gini coefficient are a direct mathematical function of the average.



Figur 10.12 Generationstillhörighet och jämlikhet mellan könen

After controlling for: Generational Association with
 Before controlling for: composition year of birth

Administrative competence
 Individual opinion-molding
 Participation in demonstrations
 Party activity

Figure 10.12 Generational membership and equality between the sexes

Table 10.9 Equality as variation

	1968	1974	1981	1987
Standard deviation				
Administrative competence	37.3	35.9	33.0	33.1
Individual opinion-molding	30.1	31.8	34.4	36.9
Participation in demonstrations	34.8	37.2	42.4	45.8
Party activity	22.1	23.2	23.6	21.6
Activity measurement: summary	19.4	20.6	22.0	21.7
Gini coefficient				
Administrative competence	0.31	0.26	0.20	0.19
Individual opinion-molding	0.77	0.74	0.69	0.62
Participation in demonstrations	0.86	0.84	0.77	0.70
Party activity	0.85	0.84	0.85	0.85
Activity measurement: summary	0.71	0.69	0.64	0.56

The results that are least obvious, given this approach, are the trend of the combined measurements presented at the bottom of each portion of the table. This measurement brings together all indicators of citizenship activity but does not include administrative competence. On the basis of this summary measurement, the result is a weak increase in inequality, viewed with a difference approach. This increase only continues through 1981, however, After that, no further expansion occurs. Viewed with a ratio approach, however, there is a relatively clear reduction in inequality throughout the period. Those who are less active in relative terms account for an increasing proportion of total participation. The combined activity will thereby represent an increasing proportion of the population.

This conclusion may not be drawn without reservations, however. The summary measurement that can be constructed on the

basis of available data includes only part of the total participation repertoire. The questions are also of such a nature that they measure the number of types of actions rather than the number of actions. But it still appears likely that a more complete survey would have yielded the same main trend as the one presented here.

We shall complete this review of the development of equality by discussing one aspect of the equality concept that only lends itself to examination in a dynamic perspective. The aspect in question is individual distribution over time. This distribution can be regarded as a special case of inequality as cumulation. The question concerns the degree to which activity, involvement and competence reproduce themselves from one point in time to another. To what extent is there a cumulative pattern, insofar as it is always the same people who are sustaining active citizenship?

Two extreme cases are conceivable. In one case, politically strong, active people form a distinct group. Those who participate at one point in time also do so at the next one. There is thus inequality, in the sense that the same individuals are constantly asserting themselves. In the other extreme case, political involvement demonstrates a total lack of permanence. New individuals are constantly appearing on the platform. Those who do not realize their opportunity to exercise influence at one point in time do so at the next one instead. Michael Walzer's concept of the citizen as a potential participant has its full impact here.⁵¹

51. Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p. 310.

The fact that most of the sample in the living standard series form a "panel study," i.e., there are repeated interviews with the same individuals, enables us to study the actual facts. The following analysis is based on those members of the sample who were interviewed on all three occasions between 1968 and 1981. An estimate of stability is only meaningful in the case of three of the measurements that we have previously used: administrative competence, frequency of demonstrations and party activity. Both age-cumulative measurements -- individual opinion-molding and participation in demonstrations -- cannot be used because individual change in these instances can only occur in one direction: from non-participant to participant. Their stability would thus be overestimated. The same act would be counted several times.

Table 10.10 Individual stability and change

	Stability_coefficient_(r)			Reliability
	68-74	74-81	68-81	
Without correction for errors of measurement				
Administrative competence	0.49	0.55	0.45	1.00
Frequency of demonstrations	0.40	0.41	0.23	1.00
Party activity	0.58	0.64	0.48	1.00
With correction for errors of measurement				
Administrative competence	0.82	0.93	0.76	0.59
Frequency of demonstrations	0.58	0.59	0.34	0.69
Party activity	0.75	0.83	0.63	0.77

The outcome for those measurements on which this analysis can be carried out appears in Table 10.10. Stability can be calculated in two ways. The upper portion of the table presents associations over time, disregarding the lack of reliability of the indicators. The lower part shows stability after correction for errors of measurement.

Neither of these techniques of calculation is entirely satisfactory. When the associations are calculated without taking measuring errors into account, in all likelihood continuity will be underestimated. On the other hand, the method of correction that can be applied to all three indicators probably yields an overestimate.⁵² This is because the method presupposes the assumption that no stable predictors affect the traits being measured. To the extent that such predictors exist and have a strong linear effect in the same direction on all dates, the stability coefficients obtained are too high and the reliability values are too low. For administrative competence, we are aware of at least one such predictor: educational level. In this case, the result is thus certainly an overestimate of stability. For

52. The results presented in the table are based on the method for estimating reliability proposed by David R. Heise, "Separating Reliability and Stability in Test-Retest Correlation," *American Sociological Review*, 34, 1969, pp. 93-101. The method requires access to panel data in three stages. An alternative method for this type of reliability estimation was later proposed by David E. Wiley and James A. Wiley, "The Estimation of Measurement Error in Panel Data," *American Sociological Review*, 35, 1970, 112-117. Here, as in many other cases, the two methods yield very similar results. The only major deviation is noted for demonstration activity, where the corrected correlation between 1968 and 1974 is two tenths higher if the latter method is used.

both other indicators, the earlier analysis does not provide a basis for singling out any specific predictors of this type. But here too, there is a great likelihood that the values are somewhat too high. The results of the two techniques of estimation should thus be regarded as a kind of lower and upper threshold limits for actual continuity.

Regardless of the method of measurement, the coefficients for party activity must be regarded as relatively high. The data indeed indicate that involvement in a political party is not, in any way, a life-long commitment for all activists. Without doubt, there is a significant element of mobility. But compared with the relatively high mobility that has been shown to characterize many other supposedly stable traits, the coefficients still seem quite impressive.

It hardly comes as a surprise that stability related to participation in demonstration marches is substantially lower. In more than one sense, a high degree of mobility is built into this form of action. In fact, in this case too, continuity seems amazingly strong, not least against the backdrop of the drastic change in the social composition of participation in demonstrations which took place at the same time.

Finally, given these figures, there is reason to renew our acquaintance with Hirschman's theory on the cyclical changes between private and public involvement. The theory is ultimately based on the concept of individual saturation processes. If such processes had been occurring at a level of strength and in a time frame reasonable to this theory, stability levels would have looked completely different than they actually turned out. The coefficients would have been negative instead of positive.

The empirical outcome here is, of course, hardly surprising. A negative coefficient would almost have been worth regarding as a sensation. But the fairly trivial fact that the associations go in the direction they usually do mercilessly exposes the theory's lack of realism in certain fundamental respects. The aggregated curve of changes in the Zeitgeist may certainly look both beautiful and persuasive. But its relationship to the underlying individual processes seems to be rather problematical.

Summary

One of the more ambitious attempts to test various theories of social change is the replication of the classic Middletown study conducted by Theodore Caplow and his colleagues in the late 1970s. Fifty years after Mr. and Mrs. Lynd had made their original observations of social life in a small American city, this city once again became the object of study. As far as theories of change were concerned, the conclusion was negative in all essential respects. The city had changed, but hardly in the way the theories had predicted. No general trends of the expected kind could be proven at all. On the basis of existing theories,

most of the changes observed seemed puzzling and contradictory.⁵³

Although the time, place and objects of research differ, the results obtained here have essential features in common with those stated by the American researchers. Those aspects of people's chances and attempts to exercise influence that we have been able to study do not all fit the same pattern. The associations are not similar and do not evolve in the same direction. An understanding of how developments look in one area cannot be transposed to the next.

There is one exception from this rule, but an important one: the trend of differences between the sexes. The advances made by women have had an impact in all areas. Both their self-confidence and their actual level of activity have increased compared with those of men. In one case, participation in demonstrations, this has already led to a reversal in the traditional difference between the sexes. In several other cases, women have caught up or almost caught up. This applies particularly to younger generations.

53. The main report is Theodore Caplow et al, *Middletown Families: Fifty Years of Change and Continuity*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1982. See also Theodore Caplow, "La r,p,tition des enquetes: une m,thode de recherche sociologique," *L'Ann,e Sociologique*, 32, 1982, pp. 9-22. The original Middletown studies are reported in Helen and Robert Lynd, *Middletown: A Study in American Culture*, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1930, and Robert and Helen Lynd, *Middletown in Transition*, Harcourt Brace and World, New York, 1937. A Swedish equivalent is Torgny T. Segerstedt and Agne Lundquist, *Människan i industrisamhället (Man in Industrial Society)*, SNS, Stockholm, 1952 (Part I) and 1955 (Part II). A follow-up of this study is underway within the Study of Power and Democracy in Sweden. The director of the project is Rune Åberg, Department of Sociology, University of Umeå.

The fact that the dynamic otherwise shows great differences from case to case should not be interpreted as a general absence of coherence. Dissimilarity is one thing, lack of system another. In fact, developments in all areas demonstrate a striking regularity. Practically without exception, changes turned out to move in the same direction throughout the twenty-year period. No sharp reversals or temporary shock waves could be identified. The most naive of all models of prediction -- the one that predicts that developments will continue in the same direction as they began -- is almost consistently correct in this case. In a great majority of cases, an extrapolation of the changes observed between 1968 and 1974 would have yielded a reasonably correct picture of the situation in 1987. Saying this now that the results are available is one thing, but making predictions about the future is another.

In any event, the orderly change that characterizes these decades makes it fairly easy to summarize the main trends for each of the four indicators. Two of these, administrative competence and individual opinion-molding, turned out to follow the same pattern in many respects. In both cases, a clear increase was noted during the period. This increase can, to a large extent, be understood as a result of the rise in educational level. Because educational opportunities, in turn, are strongly connected with generational membership, this trend is highly generational. Older generations with a weaker ability to assert themselves individually are being replaced by younger cohorts with stronger resources.

This fact does not mean that age-related differences in the population are increasing, however. The lower educational level of older people is partly compensated by life-cycle effects which

have the opposite effect. For individual generations, the level of competence and activity continues to rise until a rather advanced age. On the whole, developments follow a stable, additive pattern. The age curve gradually shifts upward, but in principle its appearance remains the same.

Like administrative competence and individual opinion-molding, participation in demonstrations showed a rapid increase throughout the period. But in other respects, the situation was completely different. While individual associations for the two first mentioned indicators remained similar in most cases, the social composition of participants in demonstrations underwent a remarkable transformation. The typical demonstrator that emerged from the first survey was likely to be a man and a blue-collar worker, to have little education and be on the older side. Twenty years later the picture has changed in all respects. The typical demonstrator in 1987 is a young, highly educated woman with a white-collar occupation.

Activity within political parties is mainly characterized by lack of change. There is no clear evidence that party activity has diminished during the period, but there are no signs of increase either. Compared with developments in other areas, this trend appears remarkable in a number of respects.

For most other forms of political participation in the broad sense, the general trend seems to be going in the direction of greater activity. This is true not only of the forms of participation we have been able to study here, but also others. For example, the earlier studies in the living standard series show that both the percentage of eligible people belonging to trade unions and meeting activity rose substantially during the period 1968-1981.

54. Szulkin, 1984, pp. 254-261.

The lack of increase in party activity can also be compared with the figures on change in various leisure-time activities reported in Chapter 7. In virtually all areas, the curves point upward. Activity is increasing. This generally trend does not, however, appear to apply in any way to political parties. The position of the party system thus seems relatively weakened, not only as one among many forms of political participation but also as one among many ways in which people may choose to spend their free time.

One of the most essential issues related to the development of the modern welfare state concerns the consequences of education. This issue has many sides. One of these concerns the effects of the rising level of education. Does increased education help raise the level of civic competence and activity in the population? The answer is by no means self-evident, because there are two completely different theoretical approaches to the effects of education.

One perceives differences between various educational categories as the result of education per se. A high level of education equips the individual with a set of resources in the form of motivation, knowledge and skills. The higher one's educational level, the higher the level of resources. According to this model, a higher educational level in society as a whole should lead to increased activity and competence in those areas where differences in educational background previously showed themselves.

The second approach sees education mainly as a matter of legitimacy, stratification and selection. People who have a high level of education, in relation to others, have a better chance of getting the positions, establishing the contacts and assuming

the social roles that eventually lead to knowledge and activity. On the basis of this approach, a higher level of education need not lead to any change at all. Education becomes a zero-sum game. It is merely a question of the distribution of a given set of social and political roles.⁵⁵

The results of this survey mainly support the first of these two interpretations. But raising the level of education among a majority of the people does not have the same impact in all areas. Certain individual forms of political action are the main beneficiaries. These include the ability to assert oneself in public debate and in one's contacts with public agencies and other decision-makers.

The issue of the consequences of education can, however, also be phrased as a question of social equality. Many of the concepts behind the development of the modern welfare state predict a widening gap between the highly educated and those with little schooling. One interpretation is based on the meritocratization of society. As social barriers are eliminated, there is a growing risk that weak groups of people will lose individuals who might have become their most prominent representatives. The disappearance of one type of social injustice may lead to the strengthening of other injustices.⁵⁶ Another argument is based on

55. Cf. John W. Meyer, "The Effects of Education as an Institution," *American Journal of Sociology*, 83, 1977, pp. 55-77.

56. One interesting fact is that this thought had already occurred to the members of the 1946 commission of inquiry on the schools. Those who expressed fears that the manual labor classes would be weakened as a result of expanded educational opportunities were the adult education specialist Gunnar Hirdman and the Agrarian Party member Nils Wohlin. See Jonsson, 1984, p. 182 and works cited there.

the increasing degree of professionalization. Standards of competence and efficiency are rising. In the political life of the information society, knowledge is more important than political will.⁵⁸

None of these ideas receives unambiguous support from the research findings we present here. As for individual opinion-molding, growing differences have indeed been demonstrated. But the gap is not widening so fast as to keep the role of the working class and of people with little education essentially unchanged. Another area where highly educated people are asserting themselves to a greater extent than before is participation in demonstrations. But this form of participation can hardly be included among those which are characterized by strict demands for competence and self-confidence. Instead, it appears likely that emotional involvement has made its most direct breakthrough here. The reason behind the rising participation in demonstrations should be sought in the changed contents of politics or education. For the remaining two indicators, administrative competence and party activity, our findings point toward a narrowing rather than a widening of the differences between social classes and educational categories.

To the extent any threat against the position of weak groups can be discerned, it instead lies in a weakening of the institutions of representative democracy. What characterizes party activity and election participation is that social differences are very small. When we look at other areas, the gaps seem wider.

58. See, for example, Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, Basic Books, New York, 1973.

A number of warning signals can be discerned here. Party activity is becoming weaker compared with other forms of participation. Election studies also indicate that party identification, one of the most important psychological indicators of the relationship between citizens and the party system, is fading.⁵⁹ The same thing is true of people's own estimate of their interest in politics, which can mainly be assumed to measure their attitude toward party politics in particular.⁶⁰ Finally, the declining voter turnout of recent years can be mentioned. In several cases, it appears too early to state whether these trends reflect a profound change or merely a temporary fluctuation. But they still appear to be among the most important unfavorable changes in what, in many respects, is a bright picture of the changes in democracy at citizen level.

59. Holmberg and Gilljam, 1987, pp. 241-255.

60. Ibid., pp. 51-55.

11. The Multiple Meanings of Citizenship

One theoretical starting point of this study has been the multidimensional nature of citizenship. Modern man appears in a variety of different roles and capacities. The opportunity to assert oneself, to uphold one's rights, may consequently vary greatly from one area of life to another.

One significant finding from Chapter 2 is that such variations actually do exist. There are two types of differences: between citizenship roles and between individuals. The survey was structured so that it would be possible to compare different areas of life systematically. This does not mean that it claims to be exhaustive. There are many other citizenship situations that were not included; within the fields that were selected, only a few aspects could be examined. But the questions the survey asked nevertheless covered a number of central areas of people's daily lives: housing, consumption, health care, child care, schools and worklife.

Regardless of what measurement techniques are utilized -- questions about discontent and actual attempts to exercise influence, or questions about people's self-perceived ability to exercise influence -- it is clear that there are major differences among the various citizenship roles. Worklife is characterized by relatively great discontent and many demands, but also many initiatives and attempts to exercise influence, which are often successful. Among patients and their relatives, there is often silent powerlessness, and some demands are not openly expressed. The parents of school children also feel that they have minimal opportunities to influence their children's situation in school.

Yet there are not only great variations among these areas, but also great differences among citizens playing the same role. One important source of these individual differences is their actual situation. Housing provides a characteristic example. There is a vast difference between how people who own their home assess their chances of influencing the way it should be repaired and how tenants in rental housing perceive their chances of influencing the cost of housing. Now, it is hardly surprising that the differences run along these lines; what is remarkable is the strength of this association, the fact that there are so few exceptions from the general rule. This elucidates a phenomenon of general interest. There is, at least in this country at this point in time, a strong link between the subjective and the objective. There is a uniformity of replies that indicates a strong national homogeneity in the structure of expectations. Room for "false consciousness" consequently appears to be limited. There is rarely any striking lack of correspondence between the actual situation and the assessment of this situation. In this respect, citizens' estimates of their chances of exercising influence are realistic.

One central component of the concept of citizenship is equality. As argued in the introductory chapter of this book, the ideal of equality need not be interpreted as meaning that "everyone has to be alike." Equality and universalism are not necessarily the same as conformism and uniformity. To facilitate a discussion, three different determinations of the ideal of equality were introduced. Three types of inequality could thereby be distinguished: inequality with regard to variation, differentiation and cumulation. It is now time to discuss in summary form the preliminary findings of the citizenship survey in the light of these three concepts of equality.

Inequality With Regard to Variation

None of the citizenship situations that were examined by the Survey are distinguished by full equality. There is always a certain proportion of citizens who do not take advantage of their rights, who are passive, who are discontented without doing anything about it, or who feel that they lack opportunities to exercise influence. There is no doubt whatsoever that in Sweden today, full citizenship has only been partially realized. There are major differences in people's ability to assert themselves and uphold their rights. Power is unevenly distributed in Sweden.

This is the main finding. But the survey was structured in such a way that it would be possible to distinguish the nuances in this black-and-white picture. As mentioned above, there are not only differences between individuals but also between areas of life. In some situations, the fulfillment of citizenship is not only the concern of a privileged few. There are examples, not least from worklife and roles as a parent, of a majority of people becoming involved in one way or another in efforts to protect their interests.

Any judgment as to whether a percentage is "high" or "low" obviously depends completely on the point of comparison. For example, how should a figure of 26 percent be evaluated? Is it a lot or a little? It is nevertheless a fact that Swedish citizens take advantage of one fourth of their opportunities to be active in such roles as residents, parents of preschool children, parents of school children and employees. Nearly all parents attend parents' meetings. More than one employee in six performs an elected representative function at the workplace; during a one-year period, 60 percent of all employees made at least one attempt to influence conditions at their workplace.

On only a small number of points can the findings of the citizenship survey be compared with earlier studies. These few opportunities for making comparisons over time are all the more interesting. Administrative competence -- people's ability to defend their interests against public authorities -- has increased significantly during the past two decades. One third of respondents do not, admittedly, believe themselves capable of writing an appeal of an official decision, but this proportion is falling. The one tenth who are in the weakest position of all in this respect are those who can neither write an appeal themselves nor have anyone they can turn to and ask for help. It is again worth pointing out that this proportion is not continuing to fall. This most vulnerable category remains at ten percent.

As for political participation, the picture is not uniform. It is admittedly still true that political activities, other than voting, do not attract more than a minority of all people. Although voter turnout in Sweden remains relatively high, the past two triennial elections have constituted a warning sign. The proportion of eligible citizens who do not take advantage of their right to vote now totals 14 percent. There are other signs that the vitality of representative democracy today is not the best. Activity in local party organizations is stagnating.

But it would be wrong to draw the conclusion from this that citizens are generally becoming more passive. When it comes to other forms of political involvement, the picture is different. More individual kinds of expressions of political activity and opinion-molding show a clear upward trend. Over a one-year period, more and more citizens perform acts that can be regarded as political in at least some respect. The number of demands and wishes directly or indirectly derived from popular expressions of opinion is thereby increasing.

The idea that political democracy only goes into operation on election day every three years has never been an ideal. The grassroots "popular movements" play a major role in the commonly accepted image of Swedish democracy: even between elections, citizens are involved in democratically based voluntary organizations. There is also ample evidence that Swedish popular movements rest on an impressive membership base. The average citizen belongs to three kinds of organizations. Only 6 percent have no memberships. But the study has shown that there is a good deal of "air" in these figures. The trade unions, the Konsum consumer cooperatives and the athletics movement account for nearly half the membership total. There are few real activists. In most organizations, the majority of members are paper members.

Some of the "new popular movements" enjoy particularly weak member support. The peace movement, women's organizations, local political action groups and the environmentalist movement are sustained by a few enthusiasts; the proportion of active members of each of these types of organizations amounts to roughly 1 percent of the population.

Popular support for voluntary organizations should not, however, be measured only in terms of memberships, elected positions and activities. There are also invisible ties between organizations and citizens. The feeling of solidarity and affinity with organized movements is larger than the number of members and activists would indicate.

By taking these psychological aspects into account as well, we round out the picture of citizen involvement in public life. Despite widespread skepticism toward the working methods of many central social institutions, the attitudes of citizens toward their society cannot generally be described in terms of alienation and feelings of estrangement. There is a widespread

feeling of being able to exercise influence and a willingness to translate one's sense of involvement into practical action. Latent citizenship is stronger than actual citizenship. On a number of the points where it has been possible to make comparisons over time, there is also evidence that the ability of citizens to take responsibility for their society is increasing from year to year.

There is a logical association between changes in level and changes related to equality and dispersion. But this association looks different, depending on the perspective from which equality is viewed. One simple example is illustrative.

Suppose that a country is democratized during a particular era. Privileges previously reserved for a few gradually become common property. The starting point is at a very low level, say 1 percent of the population. From the standpoint of percentages, there is great inequality. The fulfillment of citizenship is limited to a small privileged group. But from the standpoint of differences between citizens, there is little inequality. This may seem paradoxical. From the standpoint of such differences, however, we are merely saying that most citizens are equal, in this case in one depressing respect -- they are equally excluded.

Citizenship is gradually extended. When it encompasses half the population, inequality has also changed. From the standpoint of percentages, it has diminished. The concentration of privilege is no longer quite as strong. But from the standpoint of differences, it has increased. The standard deviation for a 50-50 distribution is higher than for a 1-99 distribution.

The process continues; at the theoretical end station, 100 percent of the population is included. In this final phase, inequality in both respects diminishes. From the standpoint of percentages, equality is complete when everyone has come to enjoy their rights. From the standpoint of differences, minimal inequality also prevails here.

It is not possible to determine with complete clarity where Sweden stands on this scale. Actual patterns of change do not follow the straight path of the ideal democratization process. Different dimensions of citizenship demonstrate different patterns of change. In some cases changes have reached nearly half the population, for example when it comes to individual opinion-molding. This explains the seemingly paradoxical finding that inequality in terms of differences is increasing here, while inequality in terms of percentages is continuously declining.

Inequality With Regard to Differentiation

Given the fact that there are considerable individual differences in the realization of citizenship, the question arises: What is the reason for these variations? How important are differences in access to financial and other resources, differences in social position? Attention has focused primarily on three factors: sex, generation and social position.

Our conclusion in this regard is that all three factors are of major significance. There are often strong differences between women and men, between age categories and between social classes in terms of activity levels and the ability to assert oneself in different areas of life. But these determining factors carry different weights in different contexts. The association between a person's social situation and the realities of citizenship must therefore be specified in greater detail.

Differences between the sexes do not always work in the same direction. Countless Swedish and foreign studies admittedly confirm the familiar fact that men enjoy an advantage when it

comes to activities related to worklife, party politics and contacts with public agencies. Male dominance remains strong in the labor market and the public sphere. But outside these old, traditional male domains, the situation often looks different. Women are more active than men not only in those portions of the private sphere that concern family and personal care, but also when it comes to those forms of political action that focus on opinion-molding and militant protests.

The image of women as generally more passive and inferior is thus not correct. As traditional women's areas enter the arena of public politics, the association between sex and political involvement also changes. Available time-series data also indicate that women -- especially younger, well-educated women -- are quickly catching up with men. In certain fields, traditional differences between the sexes have already been eradicated.

Civic involvement often differs greatly from one age category to another. Interpreting the significance of such age variations entails major problems. On the basis of logitudinal data, however, in some fields it has been possible to distinguish life-cycle effects, generational effects and period effects. The occurrence of different types of effects varies from one field to another. But there is one common denominator. The 20-year period we have examined has not been characterized by temporary fluctuations or shock waves. The processes of change for which there is evidence are more in the nature of ongoing, continuous structural changes.

A large proportion of the increase in civic participation that has occurred can be ascribed to the ongoing rise in the level of education. This has primarily been a matter of a generational change; new, highly educated generations replace older, less educated ones. But even in the middle-aged and older generations, some rise in the level of participation is discernible.

Age variations that can be ascribed to life-cycle processes should be added to these historical structural changes. A number of civic roles are strongly associated with a person's position on the stairway of life. Involvement in such roles as parent, resident, consumer and employee are strongest in middle age or when a person gains entry to the labor market, starts a family and has children. Certain aspects of political participation, especially contacts and political manifestations, are also highest at this age. The fact that the turning point of the age curve is reached in early middle age rather than late middle age can, in some cases, be attributed to the higher educational level of younger generations. Yet a large proportion of the arch-shaped association with age is probably due to life-cycle variations.

There are, however, examples of associations with age that have a somewhat different structure. Some types of employee involvement have a continuously rising association with age; this applies particularly to psychological identification with political parties and the organized movements in a society. It remains unclear whether these associations should be understood mainly as a generational or life-cycle effect.

Great effort has been devoted to documenting the association between citizenship and social position. Attention has focused primarily on differences related to education and occupation. The analysis has aimed particularly at developing a more sophisticated class concept than the older, cruder divisions into a few rough categories. The results of the association between class membership and citizenship are therefore probably not an expression of the attributes of the measuring instruments.

It turns out that in spite of everything, education and class still have very great significance. Blue-collar workers are constantly at a disadvantage. They are not as visible and audible

as the middle class, and they take fewer initiatives. They are not as successful in their attempts to exercise influence, and they have a more negative assessment of their chances to exercise influence. Citizenship is still lopsided today. Blue-collar workers have a harder time asserting their rights.

The class-related character of citizenship varies from field to field, however. It is quite natural that the labor market shows the largest class differences. But the roles of parent and resident are also characterized by a lack of equality linked to social position.

Involvement in party politics shows few distinctions between classes, but other aspects of political participation are correspondingly more class-related. The political opinions that are openly expressed in Sweden speak with a pronounced middle-class accent.

Differences in educational level look essentially the same as these class differences. But a high level of education is not always associated with high scores in the various dimensions of citizenship. The division into active participation, on the one hand, (the assessment of one's own) influence, on the other, is illustrative. Highly educated people, especially senior civil servants, are very active, but their participation is far from always accompanied by power and influence. On the other hand, there are social classes, especially farmers and business executives, who believe they have great influence without being concomitantly active.

The resources available to a citizen may be of both an individual and collective nature. The question is whether collective resources, such as organizational membership and access to personal networks, can compensate for any lack of individual resources. The results from examination of the

hypothesis on this point were essentially negative. Collective resources such as membership in an association do not offset the effect of individual resources. Because the availability of collective resources is, moreover, unevenly divided, these collective factors instead tend to maintain and accentuate existing inequalities.

Inequality With Regard to Cumulation

Equality in the third and final sense implies that there are no mutual associations between different spheres of citizenship. Inequality means, conversely, that a person who has a strong position in one respect is also strong in another respect. The statistical expression of inequality with regard to such cumulation is the correlation between areas of citizenship.

It is completely clear that there is some inequality in this respect, too. The various dimensions of citizenship are connected by mutual, positive correlations. Inequalities thus tend to reproduce themselves from one area to another.

But -- and this is at least as important a finding -- in most cases, these correlations are weak. The hypothesis that citizenship is one-dimensional is not supported by the data. It is not possible to rank citizens on the basis of one single criterion, from high to low, from strong to weak. The various citizenship roles are so unrelated to each other that it is justified to speak of multidimensional citizenship.

Given this background, it is of great interest that certain dimensions of citizenship stand out because of their strong mutual association. Worklife and politics are connected by the fact that those who are active and involved in one of these areas

are usually also active and involved in the other. This correlation is no false association, but persists even after the subjects are examined for differences in education, for instance. Those who are silent and powerless in the labor market are generally also passive in politics.

Another strong correlation exists between politics and participation in voluntary associations. The image of two "channels" -- a parliamentary one and a corporatist one -- cannot be understood as a description of reality. In actuality, the political arena and the system of interest organizations are linked by close personal alliances.

The Multiple Meanings of Citizenship

A summary may achieve greater or lesser accuracy as a description of the contents of a whole book. Of necessity, much of the information is lost when its contents are to be concentrated on a few pages. The degree to which information is lost is, in itself, a very valuable piece of information. This book has been particularly difficult to summarize. One important conclusion of this work is that the various dimensions, nuances and facets of modern citizenship do not allow themselves to be reduced to any single, simple dimension or classification.

We will allow this very multidimensionality, complexity and multiplicity of meanings to form the closing statement in this account of the citizens of Sweden in the late 1980s. Numerous perceptions of how our society functions are based on schematic and outdated notions. The social sciences, not least, are in need of new concepts and instruments of understanding which better reflect the multiplicity of today's society.

Citizenship is ultimately a question of opportunities for individuals to realize their liberty. The multidimensionality of citizenship is a fact likely to increase the number of different degrees of liberty and to expand the repertoire of civic action. The data presented in this book support the perception that the ability of citizens to take responsibility for their society is perhaps greater today than ever before. Whether today's established institutions are the ones best equipped to provide expression to the independence of citizens is another question.

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