THE SNS DEMOCRATIC AUDIT 1999/SNS DEMOKRATIRÅD 1999
Democracy the Swedish Way
Report from the Democratic Audit of Sweden 1999
Olof Petersson, Klaus von Beyme, Lauri Karvonen, Birgitta Nedelmann och Eivind Smith.
Summary in English
This year's report from the SNS Democratic Audit, Democracy the Swedish Way, shows that Sweden lacks a public space for the discussion of European issues and that the reform which allowed voting for individual candidates was little better than a half-measure and one that failed. In the view of the authors, Sweden can definitely develop into a better constitutional democracy.
This year's Audit looks at Swedish democracy from a European perspective. The Audit is made up of four foreign academics who are very familiar with social life in Sweden: the professors Klaus von Beyme (Heidelberg), Lauri Karvonen (Åbo), Birgitta Nedelmann (Mainz) and Eivind Smith (Oslo). The report has been edited by Professor Olof Petersson, Research Director at SNS.
EU membership and constitutional reforms
The SNS Democratic Audit discusses the need for constitutional reform. Several minor reforms to the Swedish parliamentary system might be contemplated, longer terms of office, for example, decreased proportionality in the electoral system, a higher electoral threshold against minor parties and an altered role for the Speaker in the formation of governments. However, the need for such adjustments is not pressing.
It is Sweden's membership of the EU which poses the major challenge in terms of constitutional reform. Increasingly national politics is being determined at the European level. Europeanisation has an affect on every aspect of public life in Sweden, although from the democratic standpoint it is the popular apprehension that parliament is being marginalised that debate should focus on.
The members of the Audit point out that Sweden's democratic system should be designed to ensure that the country plays a major role in the European arena. Unless the Swedish courts prove capable of asserting fundamental principles of law, there is an ever greater danger that the power of the judiciary will be transferred to the courts in Strasbourg and Luxembourg.
Constitutional democracy
Sweden can definitely develop into a better constitutional democracy in the view of the Audit. Democracy has to be something more than simply a state in which the majority rule through legislation. Constitutional government sets out additional requirements concerning due process, rights and freedoms and the separation of powers. There is therefore no contradiction between constitutional government on the one hand and popular and effective government on the other. On the contrary a properly functioning democracy requires orderly and effective forms through which to implement the will of the people.
Paradoxically the administrative courts in Sweden are both too strong and too weak. Swedish courts were prevented for many years from exercising judicial supervision over government decision-making. In European terms this has placed the courts in an unusually weak position in public life. Swedish administrative courts on the other hand have powers their European counterparts lack. As a rule appeals on administrative matters in Sweden are heard not only with reference to the legality of the decision but also to its reasonableness. Swedish courts have the power not only to quash a decision but also to change its nature.
The model of judicial review should be extended to cover all parts of the public sector. This would give the Swedish courts the kinds of powers and responsibilities deemed normal in constitutional democracies, according to the report's authors. They also take the view that Sweden should sustain and develop its own model of autonomous administrative agencies.
The allocation of responsibilities between ministries and administrative agencies can be made much clearer. The government should control the administration by issuing norms and not by intervening in individual cases. Constitutional democracy means that popularly elected politicians rule by norms. The task of interpreting and applying legal norms is, however, the responsibility of independent courts of law and the administrative agencies.
A European public space
Representative democracy presupposes a responsive interplay between voters and their representatives. Those elected to office should not simply listen, they must also argue actively for their own point of view. Leading Swedish politicians, not least members of the governing party, have failed on this count with regard to the European issue, in the view of this year's Democratic Audit. A public forum for the discussion of European issues is required in order to provide a broad basis of popular support for the debate.
It has proved very difficult to change the climate of debate in Sweden so as to include a discussion on European issues which would be reciprocal, objective and continuous. This gives the SNS Democratic Audit grounds for maintaining that Sweden, as a member state, suffers from a democratic deficit in terms of its approach to discussion of EU-affairs.
An active and open forum for European debate is of key importance not only with regard to the EU-issue in the narrow sense, but also for the workings of Swedish democracy as a whole. The alienation many Swedes feel in relation to the EU runs the risk of developing into a widespread crisis of confidence in democratic government in Sweden.
In addition Swedish members of the European parliament risk becoming a cadre of professional politicians cut off from debate in Sweden and permanently en route between Sweden, Strasbourg and Brussels. The members of the Audit take the view that the Riksdag has failed in the task of mediating the experience of the country's representatives at the European parliament so that it becomes part of the national decision-making process.
The personal voting reform
It is the view of the SNS Democratic Audit that voting for individual candidates in elections was a half-measure that failed. When Sweden finally introduced a greater element of voting for individual candidates at elections, the result was something of a compromise. The option of putting one's cross next to a particular candidate's name had a limited impact, partly because the threshold was set at a relatively high level and partly because the political parties sought to counteract the more independent individual campaigns.
Sweden has abandoned the advantages of the old electoral system. What she has gained instead are the disadvantages of voting for individual candidates with none of the advantages. One alternative would be to revert to the old system, another would be to complete the process and introduce obligatory voting for individual candidates.
Sweden has lessons to learn from the rest of Europe
Finally, the SNS Democratic Audit recommends that Sweden should not adapt itself on every point to a model based on a European norm, which can scarcely be said to exist in any case. On certain points, such as the principle of public access to official documents and the Swedish model of autonomous administrative agencies, it is Europe that has lessons to learn from Sweden. There are, however, many aspects of the Swedish polity which could usefully be changed so as to strengthen democracy.
A greater degree of awareness about Sweden's past and about her nearest neighbours would provide a better basis on which to conduct a critical and independent discussion with the aim of finding ways to improve the country's democratic institutions.
Demokrati på svenskt vis Demokratirådets rapport 1999.
Olof Petersson, Klaus von Beyme, Lauri Karvonen, Birgitta Nedelmann och Eivind Smith.
SNS Förlag, Stockholm 1999.
The Democratic Audit of Sweden is organized by SNS, the Swedish Center for Business and Policy Studies, a Stockholm-based research organization. The task set itself by successive Democratic Audit Groups has been to contribute to a constructive, objective debate on the workings of Swedish democracy by highlighting different aspects of the Swedish political system. The group is variously composed each year, but it is always made up of four to five independent social scientists.
